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ABSTRACT 
 
FROM SIDUMO TO DUNSMUIR – THE TEST FOR REVIEW OF CCMA 
ARBITRATION AWARDS 
 
This thesis seeks to identify the test for judicial review of arbitration awards issued by the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (‘CCMA’). Currently, that test is set 
out in section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’), read with the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & 
others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). In terms of Sidumo, section 145 of the LRA has been 
suffused by the standard of reasonableness, consistently with the right to just administrative 
action found in section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the 
Constitution’). In search of a clear formulation of the test, an extensive examination of South 
African case law on the subject is undertaken. Thereafter, relevant principles of judicial 
review in South Africa in the administrative sphere generally are considered. Finally, an 
assessment of Canadian case law and commentary in this field is conducted. The conclusion 
to this thesis proposes a revised test for review of CCMA awards. 
 
The principal research findings begin by recognising the significance of efficiency, 
accessibility, flexibility and informality to ensuring fair and efficacious labour dispute 
resolution. The implication of this is that the test for review of CCMA awards should not be 
too exacting. Still, section 33 of the Constitution cannot be ignored and a broader ambit of 
review may therefore be necessary in certain instances. In fact, to maintain legal certainty, 
intrusive review may sometimes be crucial. These factors must be balanced when formulating 
a reliable and practical approach to review of CCMA awards. A key finding of this thesis is 
that – ostensibly due to the complexity of doing so – the Labour Courts have struggled to 
apply the current test for review consistently, fairly or predictably.  
 
While South African principles of administrative law offer some guidance in identifying the 
test more clearly, it is argued that greater clarity remains necessary. Thus, Canadian law is 
consulted. Canada’s legal system is found to elucidate the standard in seven specific ways. 
From there, it is recommended that section 145 of the LRA be reformulated consistently with 
the standard of reasonableness, in a manner informed by the Canadian model. It is then 
proposed that the revised test encompass discrete standards of review applicable to different 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
4 
 
categories of defect. The standards advanced range from flexible forms of reasonableness to 
correctness. By recasting the test in this manner, greater structure is simultaneously lent to it. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that, were the test proposed to replace the Courts’ current 
attitude to review, a suitable balance between the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action may be struck. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Picture the drafters of the Labour Relations Act (‘LRA’ or ‘the Act’).1 They are embroiled 
in a discussion over how arbitration awards issued by commissioners of the new dispute 
resolution body – the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (‘CCMA’) – 
should be assessed by the courts. Their vision for the institution was a ‘one stop shop’, 
which would provide quick, accessible, informal and cheap labour dispute resolution 
services to the public.
2
 These features they deemed crucial to the unique exigencies of 
employment relationships.
3
 Thus, when an appropriate measure of judicial scrutiny was 
ultimately agreed upon, the possibility of appeal from CCMA awards was excluded from the 
LRA.
4
 In its place, limited grounds of review akin to those in the Arbitration Act were 
prescribed.
5
 By doing so, the drafters of the Act sought to promote the efficiency and 
authority of the CCMA.
6
 Simultaneously, by minimising judicial intervention with CCMA 
proceedings, the informality necessary for effective labour dispute resolution was to be 
maintained.  
 
In another room,
7
 the drafters of the final Constitution were similarly engaged in debate. For 
them the issue was revising the interim Constitution’s formulation of the right to just 
administrative action.
8
 Still incensed by the injustices committed by South Africa’s 
erstwhile government, they sought to define judicial powers of review to ensure that all 
                                                          
1
 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’ or ‘the Act’). 
2
 Paul Benjamin ‘Friend or foe? The impact of judicial decisions on the operation of the CCMA’ (2007) 28 ILJ 1 
at 3-6; The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act 1995 16 ILJ 278 (‘The Explanatory 
Memorandum’) at 279 & 318-319; Consult too Paul Benjamin & Carole Cooper ‘Innovation and continuity: 
Responding to the Labour Relations Bill’ (1995) 16 ILJ 258 (A). 
3
 For the unique nature of employment relationships and dispute resolution in this arena generally, see John 
Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 2 ed (2008) at 15-18. 
4
 Section 143(1) of the LRA. This was consistent with the idea that arbitration awards should be final and 
binding. 
5
 The Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
6
 Benjamin (2007) at 3-6; The Explanatory Memorandum; Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others [1998] 
11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 25; Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 
1097 (CC) para 245. 
7
 And around the same time. 
8
 Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (‘the Interim Constitution’); 
Carephone para 15. Section 33 read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’) provided the drafters with an interim measure to the problem. For the final 
version, see section 33 of the Constitution.  
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future governments would properly be held accountable for their actions.
9
 To achieve this, 
the drafters surmised, public institutions would need to act with accountability, transparency 
and openness.
10
 Furthermore, any actions taken by the administration would be required to 
meet constitutional standards of reasonableness, lawfulness and procedural fairness.
11
 In 
their view, it was only in this way that administrative justice could be assured.
12
 
 
Regrettably, the two teams did not meet to align their conclusions. The result has been 
contention over how to construe the provisions of section 145 of the LRA – the grounds for 
review of CCMA arbitration awards – alongside the requisites of section 33 of the 
Constitution – the right to just administrative action.13 This dissertation attempts to resolve 
the controversy by devising a test for review of CCMA awards complementary to both. 
Before outlining the route it follows, a brief synopsis of the topic is provided below.  
 
2. SUMMARY OF THE TOPIC  
 
In October of 2007, the Constitutional Court gave judgment in Sidumo & another v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others.
14
 Amongst the key findings of the Court was that 
the grounds for review of CCMA arbitration awards provided for in section 145 of the 
LRA,
15
 were suffused by the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
16
 In accordance with 
                                                          
9
 Hugh Corder ‘Comparing administrative justice across the Commonwealth: A first scan’ 2006 Acta Juridica 1 
at 2; Lourens du Plessis & Hugh Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) at 165-
170; Iain Currie and Johan De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed  (2005) at 642-643; Etienne Mureinik ‘A 
bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31. The government nevertheless did 
express fears that socio-economic reform might be hampered by affording the courts powers of review which 
were too expansive; Hugh Corder ‘Administrative justice’ in D van Wyk et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism 
(1994) 387 at 398. 
10
 See sections 1(d), 195(1) and 33 of the Constitution in particular. For the importance of administrative justice 
to South Africa’s democracy generally, consult Hugh Corder ‘Reviewing review: much achieved, much more to 
do’ in Hugh Corder & Linda van der Vijver (eds) Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 1; Cora Hoexter ‘The 
current state of South African administrative law’ in Hugh Corder & Linda van der Vijver (eds) Realising 
Administrative Justice (2002) 20; Etienne Mureinik ‘Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability’ 
1993 Acta Juridica 35 and Jeffrey Jowell in ‘The democratic necessity of administrative justice’ 2006 Acta 
Juridica 13. 
11
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
12
 Corder (2006) at 2; Du Plessis & Corder (1994) at 165-170; Currie & De Waal at 643; Mureinik (1994). 
13
 For a full discussion of the contention (since Carephone at least) see chapters 3 to 5 of this thesis; for 
examples, see Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others 2001 (3) SA 68 (LC); Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC); Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 
& others [2009] 11 BLLR 1128 (LC) para 13 and Edcon Ltd  v Pillemer NO & others [2010] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA) 
para 12. 
14
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 [12] BCLR 1097 (CC). 
15
 Note that, throughout this thesis, references to ‘section 145’ are references to section 145 of the LRA, unless 
otherwise stated. 
16
 Stipulated in section 33 of the Constitution. 
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this standard, reviewing courts are obliged to assess the reasonableness of a CCMA 
commissioner’s award by asking whether ‘…the decision reached by the commissioner [is] 
one that a reasonable decision maker could not reach?’17 
 
Unfortunately, very little guidance was offered by the Court in Sidumo as to how this 
standard should be applied in practice. Confusion has consequently arisen, resulting in a 
variety of judicial attitudes to review.
18
 These range from complete disregard for the 
reasonableness test to intricate and involved assessments thereof.
19
 Specifically, some courts 
depict the reasonableness standard as a resolutive one, sufficient to excuse other 
irregularities in arbitration awards.
20
 Others pay only nominal attention to it in favour of the 
applicant’s allegations of section 145 defects,21 while still others dismiss these grounds 
entirely preferring to apply reasonableness alone.
22
 In addition, whether the introduction of 
the reasonableness standard has narrowed the grounds for review or expanded upon them 
remains uncertain.
23
 Equally debatable are the questions whether reasonableness comprises 
both procedural and substantive elements and if so, what these are.
24
 Finally, the differences 
between the Carephone
25
 and Sidumo tests are unclear – again this is evident from reviewing 
                                                          
17
 Sidumo para 110. 
18
 Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 13; C Garbers ‘Reviewing CCMA awards in the aftermath of Sidumo’ 
(2008) 17(9) Contemporary Labour Law 84 at 84; PAK Le Roux & K Young ‘The role of reasonableness in 
dismissal’ (2007) 17(3) Contemporary Labour Law 21 at 30. For different approaches to review, compare The 
Foschini Group v Maidi & others [2010] 7 BLLR 689 (LAC) with State Information Technology Agency (SITA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (2008) 29 ILJ  2234 (LAC). 
19
 Compare Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC), Ellerine Holdings 
Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] JOL 22087 (LAC), Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others 
[2011] 4 BLLR 404 (LC) and Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 
594 (LC), for example, with Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 26444 (LC) 
and Clarence v The National Commissioner of the SA Police Service (2011) 32 ILJ 2927 (LAC). 
20
 See Edcon, where the SCA ostensibly held that despite procedural irregularities in the commissioner’s award, 
as the outcome was reasonable, the award should not be set aside. 
21
 Maepe v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & another (2008) 29 ILJ 2189 (LAC); 
Consult chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis for details; Darcy Du Toit Reviewing CCMA arbitration awards: Has 
section 145 become academic? Paper presented at the 13
th
 Annual SASLAW Conference, Vineyard Hotel, Cape 
Town (22 October 2010) at 2; Manana v Department of Labour & others [2010] 6 BLLR 664 (LC). 
22
 In Ray-Howett’s opinion, this occurred in Fidelity; Grant Ray-Howett ‘Is it reasonable for CCMA 
commissioners to act irrationally?’ (2008) 29 ILJ 1619 at 1621; More blatantly, see Kievits Kroon (LC) para 28. 
23
 Certain critics have argued that following Sidumo, the courts’ powers of review have been reduced; Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) (Shoprite Checkers 1’) para 19; Palaborwa 
Mining Co Ltd v Cheetham & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 306 (LAC) para 6; John Grogan ‘In the shadow of Sidumo: 
Applying the ‘reasonable commissioner’ test’ (2008) 24(6) Employment Law 3; Garbers (2008) at 85; John 
Grogan ‘Two-edged sword: The CC’s ruling in Rustplats’ (2007) 23(6) Employment Law 3 at 22.  
24
 In Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 14, the Labour Court held that reasonableness comprised both procedural 
and substantive elements. See also Sasol Mining; Anton Myburgh ‘Sidumo v Rustplats: How have the courts 
dealt with it?’ (2009) 30 ILJ 1 at 19; Landman, in AA Landman ‘A study in deference: Labour Court deference 
to CCMA arbitration awards’ (2008) 29 ILJ 1613 at 1618, disagrees with this approach. 
25
 In Carephone, the LAC held that the section 145 grounds of review were suffused by the interim 
Constitution’s requirement of rational justifiability for all administrative action; Carephone para 37. 
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courts’ divergent attitudes to each.26 Compounding the confusion, and despite the import of 
the distinction between appeal and review,
27
 frequent references to the ‘correct’, ‘wrong’ or 
‘incorrect’ findings of commissioners appear in Labour and Labour Appeal Court 
judgments.
28
 Altogether, the result has been inconsistency and unpredictability in review 
proceedings
29
 – an intolerable outcome, given the LRA’s principal objective of promoting 
effective dispute resolution.
30
 
 
This objective, stipulated in section 1(d)(iv) of the Act, was considered vital to the unique 
context of labour disputes.
31
 Thus, it was with efficiency in mind that the CCMA was 
established.
32
 As alluded to above, the need to ensure fairness to both parties, together with 
the exigencies of employment relationships,
33
 further necessitated that the institution be 
accessible, informal, cost-effective and flexible in its operations.
34
 Primarily for these 
reasons, the original grounds for review provided for in section 145 were cast in narrow 
                                                          
26
 Compare, for example, Ellerine Holdings at 10-11 & 16 with Cheetham, Fidelity and Bestel v Astral 
Operations Ltd & others [2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC) paras 16-17. 
27
 While the courts have repeatedly confirmed the importance of the distinction, the candidate questioned the 
legitimacy of this in Emma Fergus ‘The distinction between appeals and reviews – Defining the limits of the 
Labour Court’s powers of review’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1556. Consult this work for the differences between appeal and 
review generally and the rationale behind the distinction. 
28
 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Turnbull [2008] 9 BLLR 817 (LAC) para 21; Khanyile v Billiton 
Aluminium SA Ltd t/a Hillside Aluminium (LAC) unreported case no DA24/06 of 24 February 2009 para 34; 
Motsamai v Everite Building Products (Pty) Ltd [2011] 2 BLLR 144 (LAC). For confirmation that this is not the 
proper enquiry on review, see National Union of Mineworkers & Another v Samancor Ltd (Tubatse 
Ferrochrome) & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1618 (SCA)  paras 5, 7 & 15 and Bestel. 
29
 Compare Shoprite Checkers 1 with Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] JOL 23356 (SCA) 
(‘Shoprite Checkers 3’) and Shoprite Checkers v CCMA & others [2008] 9 BLLR 838 (LAC) (‘Shoprite 
Checkers 2’). See also Myburgh (2009) and DJ Meyer ‘Comparing apples with pears: Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Ltd v CCMA and Others and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA’ (2010) 43(2) De Jure 344. 
30
 Section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA. 
31
 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town and Others 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) para 31; The Explanatory 
Memorandum at 279 & at 318-319; Benjamin and Cooper (1995). 
32
 Section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA; The Explanatory Memorandum at 279 & 318-319; Food & Allied Workers Union 
on behalf of Mbatha & others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko Milling & Baking & others (2011) 32 ILJ 
2916 (SCA) (‘FAWU’) paras 21-22. Consider, however, Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 1789 (LAC) 
paras 52-56.  
33
 For the unique nature of labour dispute resolution generally, see Brand et al (2008). Consider too the 
Namibian judgment of Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of The Republic of Namibia and 
Others 2009 (2) NR 596 (SC) para 70, in which the Namibian Supreme Court discussed the importance of 
employment to a person’s sense of self-worth; Dyokhwe v De Kock NO & others (2012) 33 ILJ 2401 (LC) para 
28. In Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta) [1987] 1 SCR 313 at 368, the importance of 
having a job was described as follows: ‘Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person’s life, 
providing the individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in society. A 
person’s employment is an essential component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-
being. Accordingly, the conditions in which a person works are highly significant in shaping the whole 
compendium of psychological, emotional and physical elements of a person’s dignity and self-respect …’, as 
cited in HOSPERSA obo Venter v SA Nursing Council [2006] 6 BLLR 558 (LC) para 27 and again in Standard 
Bank of South Africa v CCMA & others [2008] 4 BLLR 356 (LC) para 65. 
34
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319. 
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terms and the Act contains no right to appeal against CCMA awards.
35
 Review was directed 
at promoting the credibility of CCMA proceedings,
36
 in turn encouraging buy in from all 
stakeholders.
37
 The idea was that awards would be final and binding, and subject to scrutiny 
in limited circumstances only.
38
 Review was therefore not to be confused with appeal. Since 
Sidumo,
39
 retaining the distinction between the two has proved difficult.
40
 Yet, its importance 
is frequently confirmed by reviewing courts in light of legislative intent.
41
 
 
Still, the CCMA remains an administrative institution tasked with administrative functions.
42
 
Thus, it is subject to the constraints imposed on administrative bodies by the Constitution, 
including the requirements of accountability, transparency and openness.
43
 In addition, it 
must exercise its powers and perform its functions consistently with the right to 
administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair under section 33 of 
the Constitution.
44
 
 
Regrettably, the inconsistency and unpredictability with which reviews are being conducted 
is undermining both the LRA’s and the Constitution’s objectives.45 The doctrine of legal 
                                                          
35
 John Brand ‘CCMA: Achievements and challenges – Lessons from the first three years’ (2000) 21 ILJ 77 at 
77; Benjamin (2007) at 32. 
36
 Benjamin (2007) at 3-6; The Explanatory Memorandum. 
37
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 279 & 318-319; Benjamin & Cooper (1995). 
38
 Section 143(1) of the LRA. 
39
 Read with Carephone para 37. 
40
 Primarily on account of the fact that reasonableness constitutes a substantive measure of review; Carephone 
para 37; Sidumo paras 106-110; Herholdt para 52; Fidelity; Discovery Health Limited v CCMA and others 
[2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC) and Cheetham. 
41
 FAWU paras 21-23; The Explanatory Memorandum at 279 & 318-319; Sidumo para 108-109; The South 
African Municipal Workers Union v The South African Local Government Bargaining Council & others  (LAC) 
unreported case no DA06/09 of 29 November 2011 (‘SAMWU’) paras 9 & 18; Bestel paras 16-17; Transnet 
Freight Rail paras 74-75; For the distinction between appeals and reviews generally, consult Fergus (2010); 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 (1) SA 111 (A) and Chevron 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule & Others (2001) 22 ILJ 627 (LAC). 
42
 Sidumo para 88. 
43
 Section 33 of the Constitution; see too section 195(1) of the Constitution prescribing the standards for the 
public administration generally. Part of the rationale for allowing judicial review is to ensure that administrative 
decision-makers are held accountable for their conduct; Garbers (2008) at 86; Ray-Howett at 1628; Sidumo 
paras, 88, 138 & 140; Carephone paras 9, 19 & 34-35. 
44
 Sidumo paras 88, 138 & 140; Carephone paras 34-37; Garbers (2008) at 86; Ray-Howett at 1628. For the role 
of review in ensuring accountability while still maintaining the separation of powers between executive, 
legislature and judiciary, consult Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) at 131 and Lawrence 
Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 305. For the positive impact of review on improving administrative 
performance, see Jowell and JR De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa revised 1 ed 
(2005) at 30. 
45
 The lack of predictability in the outcome of review proceedings further threatens the legitimacy of the labour 
dispute resolution process.  
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certainty and the rule of law are simultaneously threatened.
46
 The need for clarification is 
accordingly considerable. The path taken in this thesis, in attempting to achieve such clarity, 
is depicted in the overview of each chapter below.  
 
3. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
 
3.1 Chapter 1 
 
In order to set the appropriate backdrop for review, the first chapter describes the nature and 
characteristics of the CCMA. It begins with an analysis of the purposes behind its 
establishment and a discussion of the CCMA’s features. A synopsis of the statistics arising 
from its operations follows. By illustrating both the institution’s intended nature and the 
reality of its everyday functions, the chapter reveals the extreme pressures under which the 
CCMA and its commissioners function.
47
 Together with pertinent principles of 
administrative law (which are relevant in light of the CCMA’s status as an administrative 
body),
48
 this is the framework in which CCMA awards ought to be evaluated. Having 
addressed the context for review of CCMA decisions,
49
 the dissertation turns to the Labour 
Appeal Court’s judgment in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others50 and the 
implications thereof for the statutory grounds of review. 
 
3.2 Chapter 2 
 
In chapter 2, Froneman DJP’s decision in Carephone that the grounds for review in section 
145 of the LRA were infused by the Constitutional requirement that awards ‘be justifiable in 
                                                          
46
 For a useful discussion of the need for consistency, see Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 para 
133. 
47
 Recognised in the CCMA’s Annual Report for the period 2009-2010 (specifically at 3); CCMA Annual Report 
2009-2010 Department of Labour RP: 84/2010, available at www.ccma.org.za, accessed on 12 August 2012. 
48
 Sidumo para 88. These factors include accountability, transparency and openness as well as reasonableness, 
procedural fairness and lawfulness; sections 1, 33 and 195 of the Constitution; Carephone paras 9, 19 & 34-37; 
Sidumo paras 138 & 140. 
49
 The importance of context is clear as the nature and scope of the reasonableness standard is contextually 
dependent; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 
490 (CC) para 45; Hoexter (2007) at 315. De Ville (2005) at 212-214; Clive Plasket The Fundamental Right to 
Just Administrative Action: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the Democratic South Africa (PhD 
Thesis) 2002 at 339-363. 
50
 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
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relation to the reasons given for them’,51 is examined.52 At the time, the interim Constitution 
was in effect. The right to just administrative action provided for therein prescribed rational 
justifiability, along with lawfulness and procedural fairness, as the requisites for just 
administrative action.
53
 Naturally the phrase ‘rational justifiability’ is distinct from that of 
‘reasonableness’ applicable under the final Constitution.54 The rationale for aligning the 
statutory grounds with the right to just administrative action was nevertheless alike in both 
cases – commissioners perform administrative functions; they are consequently bound to 
comply with the standards set by the Constitution.
55
 As such, in so far as Froneman DJP 
explained the reasons for, and appropriate application of, the rational justifiability standard 
in Carephone, to understand Sidumo it is crucial to understand Carephone. The chapter thus 
evaluates this decision with reference to pertinent case law arising from it. 
 
3.3 Chapter 3 
 
Following the review of Carephone, the focus necessarily turns to the Constitutional Court’s 
decision in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others.
56
 There, the Court 
held that:  
 
‘…section 145 is now suffused by the constitutional standard of reasonableness. That 
standard is the one explained in Bato Star: Is the decision reached by the 
Commissioner one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach?’57  
 
As mentioned above, however, the infusion of section 145 with reasonableness was not the 
straightforward affair it was intended to be. On the contrary, it led to an abundance of 
contradictory decisions by the Labour and Labour Appeal Courts and Supreme Court of 
Appeal. It is these judgments which this chapter studies. Given the sheer number of 
                                                          
51
 This standard essentially came to be known as the ‘rationality’ or ‘rational justifiability’ test; Shoprite 
Checkers (2001) (LAC) para 26; Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & Others (2002) 23 
ILJ 863 (LAC) para 19; Du Toit (2010) at 1-2. 
 
52
 This test asked: ‘…is there a rational, objective basis justifying the connection made by the administrative 
decision-maker between the material properly available to him and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived 
at?’; Carephone para 37. 
53
 Section 33 read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution; Carephone para 15. 
54
 And held to infuse section 145 of the LRA in Sidumo. 
55
 Read with the remaining constraints imposed on the public administration by the Constitution; sections 1(d), 
33 & 195(1) of the Constitution. 
56
 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
57
 Sidumo para 110. See also Le Roux & Young at 30, where the authors argue that this test constitutes an over-
arching standard of review and does not exist as an independent ground for review; Du Toit (2010) at 2; Manana 
expresses a similar view. 
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decisions which have been handed down since Sidumo, it is impossible to evaluate every 
one. As a result, while the majority of Labour Appeal Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgments are covered in this chapter, only significant decisions of the Labour Courts are 
addressed. For the most part too, the discussion of these cases ends with those decided on or 
before 31 December 2011. 
 
By appraising these cases, chapter 3 charts the progress of the courts on controversial 
questions. Included amongst these are the relationship between reasonableness and section 
145; the meaning of reasonableness; whether reasonableness truly encompasses both 
procedural and substantive components; the continued relevance (if any) of the Carephone 
standard; the capacity of reasonableness to override procedural defects in awards and 
whether Sidumo has limited or expanded the courts’ powers of review.58 The assessment of 
the judiciary’s varying attitudes to review is directed at extracting the controversial questions 
from those which are no longer in doubt.
59
 As without knowledge of these controversies they 
cannot be resolved, the evaluation is critical to revising the current test for review. It further 
forms the backdrop for the next chapter which endeavours to establish the appropriate 
context for reformulating section 145 and the Sidumo standard.   
 
3.4 Chapter 4 
 
Here, the groundwork for formulating a test for review that is both fitting and reliable in 
practice is laid. First, those aspects of the reasonableness standard which are clearly 
ascertainable are confirmed and the outstanding questions reiterated. Recognising the 
contextual variability of reasonableness,
60
 it is then argued that to clarify the uncertainties, a 
thorough examination of contextual considerations relevant to reasonableness review in 
section 145 proceedings is necessary. After evaluating these factors the chapter resolves that 
while important, there are simply too many of them to constitute an accessible tool from 
                                                          
58
 This question was initially contentious. Shoprite Checkers 1 para 19; Cheetham para 6; Grogan (2008) at 3; 
Garbers (2008) at 85; Grogan (2007) at 22. Compare these views, however, with Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & 
Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2552 (LC) paras 40-43 and Ellerine Holdings at 10-11; Sidumo para 140; Consider too 
Sidumo para 106, where the majority held that the test was more extensive than the rationality test on account of 
its substantive nature. Finally, consult Carephone para 31. 
59
 See Southern Sun Hotel Interests where the Court noted expressly that the reasonableness standard’s definition 
remained uncertain in various respects; Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 13; Garbers (2008) at 84; Le Roux & 
Young at 30. Compare too Foschini (2010) (LAC) with State Information Technology Agency.  
60
 The contextual nature of reasonableness has repeatedly been affirmed; Bato Star para 45; Hoexter (2007) at 
315; De Ville (2005) at 212-214; Plasket at 339-363. 
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which to delineate the scope of review. Something more concrete is needed. Greater clarity 
is therefore sought in the meanings ascribed to reasonableness in South African 
administrative law.
61
 It is found, however, that while useful to a degree, purporting to define 
reasonableness in a finite sense is of limited utility. Reasonableness by its very nature is 
context dependent.
62
 Defining its boundaries with meticulous precision should accordingly 
be approached with caution. Nevertheless, the rule of law and the doctrine of legal certainty 
do require a measure of rigidity.
63
 As such, when formulating a suitable test for 
reasonableness in section 145 proceedings, a balance between the two must be struck. While 
South African law, it is submitted, must inform both the context and foundations of review, 
it fails to provide sufficient guidance as to the manner in which this balance may be 
achieved.  Structure is consequently sought in related principles of Canadian labour and 
administrative law. These are examined in chapter 6. Before doing so, the comparative 
compatibility of various jurisdictions’ tests for review is explored. 
 
3.5 Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 considers the relative suitability of the British, Australian, New Zealand and 
Canadian legal systems as comparative tools for South African labour law. Outlines of these 
countries’ approaches to review of labour related, administrative (and, where relevant, 
judicial) determinations are provided. The compatibility of each with the test for review of 
CCMA awards is then assessed in turn.  It is concluded that the Canadian system of judicial 
review constitutes the most apposite and instructive comparator for the purposes of this 
thesis.  
 
3.6 Chapter 6 
 
Chapter 6 is the predecessor to the conclusion of this dissertation.  Similarly to chapter 4, its 
emphasis is on narrowing the gap between what is certain and what is uncertain. It attempts 
to achieve this by appraising the Canadian approach to judicial review of labour arbitrators’ 
and boards’ decisions.64 The chapter opens with a brief description of the former test for 
                                                          
61
 Including those associated with rationality, justifiability and proportionality specifically. 
62
 De Ville (2005) at 212; Hoexter (2007) at 315; Plasket at 339-363; Bato Star para 45. 
63
 Shoprite Checkers 3 para 31. 
64
 For Canadian administrative and labour law generally, consult Gus van Harten, Gerald Heckman & David 
Mullan Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials 6 ed (2010) and Donald D Carter et al Labour Law in 
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review in Canada. Thereafter, it addresses key decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
which the standard of reasonableness (and judicial review generally) were themselves 
reviewed.
65
 Of these, the most pivotal is Dunsmuir v New Brunswick.
66
 Following the 
discussion of relevant case law, the critique
67
 to which Dunsmuir (and, to a lesser extent, 
subsequent cases) gave rise is considered. In doing so, specific questions surrounding 
Sidumo are resolved. These include the questions concerning the relationship between the 
Carephone and Sidumo standards, as well as that between reasonableness and the section 
145 grounds, the confines of the procedural and substantive components of reasonableness 
and the circumstances in which the standard may be resolutively applied. Finally, a vision 
for delineating reasonableness with a measure of precision, while retaining its flexible 
nature,
68
 is established. Structure is given to this vision in the conclusion to the thesis. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
Here, a succinct and practical test for reasonableness review and review instituted on one or 
more of the statutory grounds is formulated. The test is expressly devised to suit the unique 
context of South African labour dispute resolution (albeit with reference to Canadian law). It 
is accordingly proposed that due consideration be given to replacing the current legislative 
grounds of review with this test. In turn, legal certainty will be better assured and efficiency 
promoted. Simultaneously, parties’ Constitutional rights to both fair labour practices and just 
administrative action will be better protected.
69
   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Canada 5 ed (2002). The candidate’s reasons for choosing Canada as the principal comparative jurisdiction are 
explained in chapter 5. 
65
 Again, the discussion of relevant case law ends with case law handed down on or before 31 December 2011. 
66
 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190. Two other critical cases addressed are Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa 2009 SCC 12 and Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
67
 Amongst other texts, Michel Bastarache ‘Modernising judicial review’ (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 227; 
Piper Henderson ‘Supreme Court of Canada’s new ‘reasonableness’ standard of review applied in recent 
education cases’ [2008] 18 Educ & LJ 179; David Mullan ‘Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, Standard of review and 
procedural fairness for public servants: Let’s try again!’ [2008] 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 117, are considered. 
68
 With reference to a finite but still apt set of contextual considerations drawn primarily from the Canadian 
approach. 
69
 Sections 23 & 33 of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
THE NATURE OF THE CCMA AND ITS ARBITRAL FUNCTIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others,
70
 the Constitutional Court 
held that arbitrations of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(‘CCMA’)71 constitute administrative action for the purposes of section 33 of the 
Constitution.
72
 The implication of this finding is that CCMA arbitration awards are amenable 
to review, not only on the basis of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘the 
LRA’),73 but also in accordance with the Constitutional right to just administrative action.74 
As the grounds for review provided for in section 145 of the LRA were intentionally cast in 
narrow terms in light of the exigencies of labour dispute resolution,
75
 extending reviewing 
courts’ powers consistently with this right should not be frivolously undertaken.76 A principal 
assertion of this thesis is that while CCMA arbitrations comprise administrative action, 
factors unique to the labour relations arena require that a contextually appropriate measure of 
                                                          
70
 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 88. 
71
 The Commission for Conciliation, Meditation and Arbitration (‘the CCMA’) was established in terms of 
section 112 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘the LRA’ or ‘the Act’). 
72
 Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’), provides for the right 
to just administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
73
 Or ‘the Act’. 
74
 Section 33 of the Constitution. Ordinarily, in terms of this right, administrative action is reviewable on any of 
the grounds provided for in section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘the PAJA’). 
See, for example, Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 
(4) SA 490 (CC) para 25, where the Court held: ‘The cause of action for the judicial review of administrative 
action now ordinarily arises from the PAJA, not from the common law as in the past...’ and Kriel v The Legal 
Aid Board [2009] 9 BLLR 854 (SCA). In Kriel, the Supreme Court of Appeal similarly noted that: ‘It is trite that 
the appellant can only be entitled to relief in terms of the PAJA if his dismissal amounted to administrative 
action.’ Consult too Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council & Others 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 26 and Cora Hoexter ‘Administrative action in the courts’ 2006 
Acta Juridica 303 at 307. For reasons discussed in more detail in later chapters of this paper, the Constitutional 
Court in Sidumo found that CCMA arbitration awards were not subject to review on the grounds provided for in 
the PAJA. Applicants in review proceedings involving such awards were instead required to base their 
applications on the grounds set out in section 145 of the LRA, subject to the suffusion of these grounds with the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness; Sidumo para 109; consider, however, Grant Ray-Howett ‘Is it 
reasonable for CCMA commissioners to act irrationally?’ (2008) 29 ILJ 1619 at 1626. 
75
 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act (1995) 16 ILJ 278 (‘the Explanatory 
Memorandum’) at 318-319; Paul Benjamin ‘Friend or foe? The impact of judicial decisions on the operation of 
the CCMA’ (2007) 28 ILJ 1 at 41; see also Sidumo paras 143, 158 & 245; Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & 
others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 para 25. 
76
 See chapter 2 of this paper, read with section 36 of the Constitution. Indeed, it is not unusual for administrative 
law principles to differ from one contextual arena to the next. In Germany, for example, there are different codes 
for discrete areas of administrative law; Rainer Pfaff & Holger Schneider ‘The Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act from a German perspective’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 59. 
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review be applied to CCMA arbitration awards.
77
 When devising that measure, the features 
and objects of the CCMA, read with those of the LRA, are important consideration. Equally 
significant is the impact of these features and objects on the institution’s operations, 
commissioners and parties to disputes. 
 
The CCMA was primarily established to resolve labour disputes expeditiously, thereby 
reducing the incidence of industrial action.
78
 In turn, social justice was to be achieved.
79
 To 
realise this goal, the LRA assigned specific characteristics both to the CCMA and to 
proceedings conducted under its auspices. To understand the influence of these traits on 
judicial review, it is necessary to evaluate them comprehensively. That evaluation is 
undertaken below.
80
 Adding to this, the impact of the CCMA’s features on the institution’s 
commissioners and daily operations is assessed, with reference to reported statistics. By 
doing so, the context in which reviews of CCMA awards should be conducted is revealed. 
                                                          
77
 Arguably, any limitation of the right to just administrative action is justifiable in this context; consider 
Tembeka Ngcukaitobi & Jason Brickhill in ‘A difficult boundary: Public sector employment and administrative 
law’ (2007) 28 ILJ 769 at 775, where the authors mention this ossibility in the context of excluding the 
application of PAJA from all labour disputes; consult too Paul Benjamin ‘Conciliation, arbitration and 
enforcement: The CCMA’s achievements and challenges’ (2009) 30 ILJ 26 at 26 & 42-43. 
78
 It was further devised to address the problems associated with the Industrial Courts; The Explanatory 
Memorandum. 
79
 Ibid; Paul Benjamin ‘Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA)’ Publication pending (2013) at 1. Consult generally, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration Annual Report 2009-2010 Department of Labour RP: 84/2010, available at www.ccma.org.za, 
accessed on 12 October 2012; for more recent but less specific figures, see the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration Annual Report 2010-2011 Department of Labour RP: 58/2011, available at 
www.ccma.org.za, accessed on 12 October 2012. Consider too Tanya Venter & Andrew Levy ‘Disputes at the 
CCMA, bargaining councils and Tokiso’ in Andrew Levy & Tanya Venter (eds) The Dispute Resolution Digest 
2012 (2012) 23. 
80
 Note that while contested by some, the evaluation is premised on the Constitutional Court’s (‘CC’) finding in 
Sidumo that CCMA arbitrations constitute administrative action. For the protracted debate on whether CCMA 
arbitrations constitute administrative action, consider Carephone; Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn 
Ceramics v Mudau & others [2003] 10 BLLR 1034 (LC); Kynoch Feeds (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (1998) 19 
ILJ 836 (LC) para 46; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO and Others [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC); 
Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd v Brand NO (2001) 22 ILJ 993 (LC); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & 
Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1232 (LC). For the test for administrative action generally, see  Nakin v MEC, Department 
of Education, Eastern Cape Province and Another 2008 (6) BCLR 643 (Ck); Fedsure; section 1 of PAJA; 
President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby and Football Union & Others 2000 (1) SA 1 
(CC) (‘SARFU’); Calibre Clinical Consultants (Pty) Ltd & another v NBCRFI & another [2010] JOL 25831 
(SCA); Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica at 307 and Iain Currie ‘What difference does the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act make to administrative law?’ 2006 Acta Juridica 325; Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) 
Ltd and others v Minister of Public Works and others 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA); Chirwa v Transnet Ltd (2008) 4 
SA 367 (CC) and Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security & others [2009] 12 BLLR 1145 (CC); Iain Currie & 
Johan De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) at 650-662; JR De Ville Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in South Africa revised 1 ed (2005) at 1-69; Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica; Cora Hoexter 
‘The future of judicial review in South African administrative law’ (2000) 117(3) SALJ 484; Catherine O’Regan 
‘Breaking ground: Some thoughts on the seismic shifts in our administrative law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 424; Cora 
Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa (2007); Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law (1984); Iain Currie & 
Jonathan Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act benchbook (2001); Cora Hoexter with Rosemary 
Lyster The New Constitutional and Administrative Law vol 2 (2002). 
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2. SIDUMO & ANOTHER V RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MINES LTD & 
OTHERS
81
  
 
In Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others,
82
 writing for the majority 
of the Court, Navsa AJ addressed the question of whether CCMA arbitrations constituted 
administrative action. He began by observing that while CCMA arbitrations and court 
proceedings shared a number of similarities, they remained distinct in important respects.
83
 
The responsibilities of administrative tribunals ranged from implementing legislation to 
determining disputes in a manner akin to that of the courts.
84
 Yet, the CCMA’s lack of 
judicial authority withdrew its operations from the judicial sphere. As such, and despite the 
fact that the CCMA exercised public power, it was not a branch of the judiciary. Instead, it 
was an administrative body tasked with quintessentially administrative functions; it was 
accordingly subject to section 33 of the Constitution.
85
  
 
Supporting Navsa AJ’s conclusion but wishing to amplify his reasoning, O’Regan J 
recognised that the question of whether CCMA arbitrations constituted administrative action 
was difficult. The issue required due consideration of the role of the CCMA in South Africa’s 
Constitutional order and the purposes of the right to just administrative action.
86
 While it is 
unnecessary to explain the manner in which O’Regan J resolved the debate here, her 
description of the CCMA and its purposeful establishment as an accessible, cost-effective and 
efficient institution for the resolution of labour disputes is key.
87
 Distinctively to Navsa AJ, 
the Judge held that CCMA arbitrations were primarily adjudicative in nature.
88
 However, the 
CCMA was still an administrative body, lacking judicial power.
89
 Arbitrations performed by 
                                                          
81
 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
82
 Ibid. While the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) heard the matter before it progressed to the CC (and so was 
equally tasked with the question of whether CCMA arbitrations constituted administrative action), the SCA was 
somewhat dismissive of the issue. Cameron JA (writing for the majority of the SCA in Sidumo; Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & Others [2006] 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA)), surmised simply 
that: ‘There can be no doubt that a CCMA commissioner’s arbitral decision constitutes administrative action.’ 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 25. As such, and whereas it is arguable that Cameron JA’s efficient 
resolution of the question is laudable (see, in this regard, Hoexter (2000) SALJ at 517), Cameron JA’s rather 
perfunctory statement of the position offers minimal analytical assistance. 
83
 Sidumo paras 81-85. 
84
 Ibid para 82. 
85
 Ibid para 88. 
86
 Ibid para 123. 
87
 Ibid para 125. 
88
 At least to the extent to which it involved the application of legal principles to the facts of a dispute. 
89
 Sidumo paras 124-132. 
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it therefore fell within the scope of section 34 of the Constitution. This did not inevitably 
imply that they were excluded from the reach of section 33.
90
 Whether they fell within its 
ambit had to be determined with reference to the objects of section 33 and the context in 
which arbitrations take place.
91
 Following careful analysis of this issue, O’Regan J concluded 
that it was Constitutionally appropriate to hold the CCMA (as an administrative tribunal) to 
the standards of scrutiny provided for in section 33.
92
  
 
Despite the courts’ finding that CCMA arbitrations comprised administrative action, both 
Judges agreed that the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(‘PAJA’), listing the grounds of review93 applicable to administrative action generally, were 
not suited to CCMA awards.
94
 Thus, to secure parties’ rights to just administrative action 
during section 145 proceedings, it was necessary to construe section 145 as suffused by the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness.
95
 The meaning and scope of this standard, together 
with its impact on the section, are thoroughly canvassed in later chapters. What follows here 
is a description of the CCMA’s characteristics in so far as they influence the permissible 
reach of review.  
 
                                                          
90
 Ibid para 126. 
91
 Ibid para 132. 
92
 Ibid para 139 -140; note that Ngcobo J (writing for the minority) disagreed, holding that commissioners’ 
awards were not reviewable under section 33 of the Constitution. Ngcobo J nevertheless recognised that CCMA 
arbitrations were subject to certain legislative and Constitutional constraints. These constraints were 
ascertainable with reference to the primary objects of the LRA, as well as the foundational principles of the 
Constitution. The most pertinent requisites therefore were that arbitration proceedings be fair and that the 
doctrine of legality be complied with; Sidumo paras 163, 164 & 200-240. For detailed discussions of the doctrine 
of legality, consult Fedsure para 56 and AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and 
Another 2006 (11) BCLR 1255 para 39. Consider too Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation and Others 2010 (5) BCLR 391 (CC) para 49; Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister 
of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and 
Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) para 20 
and SARFU para 38. 
93
 Section 6 of PAJA. 
94
 Sidumo para 104. 
95
 Ibid para 110. 
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3. THE NATURE OF THE COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION 
AND ARBITRATION 
 
The CCMA was established in terms of section 112 of the LRA. The Act does not expressly 
state the purposes of the body.
96
 It nevertheless appears from the structure of the CCMA’s 
statutory functions read with the objects of the LRA, that it was created to promote effective 
dispute resolution within the labour sphere.
97
 This was to be achieved in a forum accessible to 
the public at large.
98
 The purposes of the CCMA are depicted in its Annual Report of 2009 to 
2010 in the following terms: 
 
‘The purpose of the CCMA is to promote social justice99 and fairness in the 
workplace. This will be done through the delivery of ethical, quality, innovative and 
cost-effective dispute management and dispute resolution services that are in 
accordance with the law.’100 
 
In order to advance these objectives, particularly in the realm of unfair dismissal disputes,
101
 
the Task Team responsible for drafting the Act substituted court proceedings with CCMA 
arbitrations. Their rationale for this is recorded in the LRA’s Explanatory Memorandum,102 
which highlights the benefits of ‘final and binding’ arbitration over adjudication. Those 
benefits include informality, cost-effectiveness, accessibility and efficiency. In addition, the 
                                                          
96
 See, however, O’Regan J’s analysis of the CCMA in Sidumo, where she held that the purpose of the CCMA 
was to create a body for the ‘affordable, accessible and quick resolution of workplace disputes’; Sidumo para 
125. 
97
 Theron & Godfrey suggest that th  protection of workers’ rights should be the keystone of effective dispute 
resolution; Jan Theron & Shane Godfrey ‘The CCMA and small business – The results of a pilot study’ (2000) 
21 ILJ 53 at 54. 
98
 This is equally apparent from the rationale behind the establishment of the CCMA; the Explanatory 
Memorandum at 318-9. In contrast to the expense associated with court proceedings, the CCMA’s services are 
free, which clearly promotes accessibility; Darcy Du Toit et al Labour relations law: A comprehensive guide 4 
ed (2003) at 5; Benjamin (2007) at 3-4; Paul Benjamin & Carola Gruen The regulatory efficiency of the CCMA: 
A statistical analysis of the CCMA’s CMS database Development & Policy Research Unit Working Paper 
06/110 (June 2006) at 1; John Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 2 ed (2008) at 1. 
99
 Another important purpose behind enabling expeditious dispute resolution and the subsequent establishment of 
the CCMA was the reduction in the incidence of strike action and the consequent promotion of labour peace; Jan 
Theron & Shane Godfrey ‘The labour dispute resolution system and the quest for social justice: A case study on 
the CCMA, unfair dismissals and small business’ (2002) SAJLR 21 at 31; Benjamin & Gruen at 1; Benjamin 
(2007) at 26; the Explanatory Memorandum at 284-285 & 318.  O’Regan in Catherine O’Regan ‘The 
development of private labour arbitration in South Africa: A review of the arbitration awards’ (1989) 10 ILJ 557 
at 570, records the preventative role which arbitration may play in the context of collective bargaining. 
100
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 2. See also Benjamin (2013) at 53; For contrary views on the CCMA’s 
achievement of social justice, compare Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 63 with the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (‘OECD’) Territorial Reviews: The Gauteng City - Region, South Africa © OECD 
(2011). 
101
 As well as unfair labour practice disputes, which are similarly subject to arbitration in terms of section 186 
read with section 191 of the LRA. 
102
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 317-318. 
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drafters hoped that by precluding judicial involvement, arbitrations would remain non-
legalistic and so better suited to the unique character of employment relationships than 
judicial processes.
103
 Finally, crafting the CCMA in this way was intended to ensure a 
‘credible, legitimate alternative process’, which would reduce industrial action arising from 
dismissals.
104
 In turn, the problems associated with the former conciliation boards and the 
Industrial Court were to be avoided.
105
  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the CCMA’s most significant function is the resolution of 
employment disputes by means of arbitration. In order to provide a complete picture, it is 
nonetheless useful to mention the additional legislative duties of the institution. Sections 
115(1) and (4) of the LRA stipulate these;
106
 they encompass resolving disputes (both by 
conciliation and arbitration), providing assistance with establishing workplace forums, 
compiling and publicising information about the body’s operations and performing any 
further duties which the CCMA is obliged to perform under the LRA or related legislation.
107
 
                                                          
103
 Ibid. 
104
 Ibid. The benefits of arbitration are recognized in many commonwealth countries. As Lewis and Clark have 
observed in the United Kingdom, for example: ‘Arbitration is cheaper, speedier, more informal and more 
accessible, it avoids the legalism and publicity associated with the tribunals, and offers the possibility of a more 
flexible range of remedies, including greater likelihood of reinstatement or re-engagement.’; R Lewis & J Clark 
Employment Rights, Industrial Tribunals and Arbitration: The Case for Alternative Dispute Resolution (1993) at 
33. See also J Clark ‘Arbitration in dismissal disputes in South Africa and the UK’ (1997) 18 ILJ 609. For the 
detrimental impact of broad judicial review on the essence of arbitration, see Calvin William Sharpe ‘Reviewing 
CCMA arbitration awards: Towards clarity in the Labour Courts’ (2000) 21 ILJ 2160 at 2164 ftnt 13 and 
Steelworkers v Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co 363 US 564 (1960); for a more general appraisal, see Calvin 
William Sharpe 'Judicial review of labor arbitration awards: A view from the bench' (1999) 52 Natl Acad Arbs 
Ann Proc 126. 
105
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 325-332; O’Regan notes that amongst these problems were: ‘Extended 
delays in obtaining relief, excessive formalism in the preparation of cases, overreliance on the use of lawyers and 
consequent expense...’ O’Regan (1989) at 559. Parties to disputes further complained about the competence of 
the members of the Industrial Courts. 
106
 Or at least its compulsory functions. 
107
 Sections 115(1) & (4) of the LRA. For the purposes of this paper, the most pertinent disputes required to be 
referred to conciliation and then to arbitration are those stipulated in section 191 of the LRA. For a list of the 
CCMA’s discretionary functions, see the residual provisions of section 115 of the LRA. Consult too Du Toit et 
al (2003) at 32-33 and the CCMA’s Annual Report 2009-2010 where it describes its functions as follows: 
‘The CCMA’s compulsory statutory functions are to – 
• conciliate workplace disputes; 
• arbitrate certain categories of disputes that remain unresolved after conciliation; 
• establish picketing rules; 
• facilitate the establishment of workplace forums and statutory councils; 
• compile and publish information and statistics about our activities; 
• accredit and consider applications for subsidy by bargaining councils and private agencies; and 
• provide support for the Essential Services Committee. 
The CCMA’s discretionary statutory functions are to – 
• supervise ballots for unions and employer organisations; 
• provide training and information relating to the primary objective of the LRA; 
• advise a party to a dispute about the procedures to follow; 
• offer to resolve a dispute that has not been referred to the CCMA; and 
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As alluded to above, the effective functioning of the CCMA when fulfilling these obligations 
is supported by its distinctive features. Together with its independent status, these contribute 
to realising the LRA’s goals generally. Before considering the appropriate scope of review, it 
is necessary to address the CCMA’s characteristics in detail. They are accordingly analysed 
below. First, however, the CCMA’s status as an independent tribunal is briefly discussed. 
 
3.1 The CCMA as an independent body 
 
To secure the objects of legitimacy and credibility, the CCMA was established as an 
independent institution.
108
 It is managed by its governing body
109
 which consists of a 
chairperson, the director of the CCMA
110
 and nine other members. The members are 
nominated by the National Economic Development and Labour Council (‘NEDLAC’)111 and 
hold office for periods of three years.
112
 When nominating the members of the CCMA’s 
governing body, NEDLAC is obliged to ensure equal representation from organized labour, 
organized business and government.
113
 
 
As such, all major stakeholders are involved, consistently with the tenor of the LRA.
114
 This 
‘tripartite’ approach to developing and implementing labour policy and legislation is widely 
recognised as necessary for the credibility and legitimacy of relevant policies and laws. The 
CCMA as a statutory (albeit independent) institution is no exception and thus its credentials 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
• publish guidelines on any aspect of the LRA and to make rules.’ 
108
 Section 113 of the LRA.  
109
 The governing body, in terms of section 3 read with Schedule 3 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 
1999, is also the official accounting authority of the CCMA. 
110
 While part of the governing body, the Director is not empowered to vote on decisions it takes; section 116(2) 
of the LRA. 
111
 NEDLAC was established in terms of section 2 of the National Economic, Development and Labour Council 
Act 35 of 1994 (‘the NEDLAC Act’). NEDLAC’s Executive Council is comprised of representatives from 
organized business, organized labour, organizations of community and development interests and the state; 
section 3 of the NEDLAC Act. For the objects, powers and functions of NEDLAC, see section 5 of the 
NEDLAC Act. 
112
 Sections 116(1) & (2) of the LRA. 
113
 Together with one independent person for the position of chairperson; section 116(3) of the LRA. 
114
 See the purposes of NEDLAC as well as the composition of its Executive Council as referred to above; see 
also sections 3 & 5 of the NEDLAC Act. As Cheadle notes, specifically in relation to drafting the Codes of Good 
Practice (provided for in section 203 of the LRA), allowing all ‘social partners’ to participate in the process 
promotes legitimacy; Halton Cheadle ‘Regulated flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’ (2006) 27 ILJ 
663 at 685 para 77. For an historical account of the political circumstances which gave rise to the involvement of 
trade unions in governmental policy and legislative drafting, consult Du Toit et al (2003) at 16-17; Department 
of Labour The Innes Labour Brief: A strategic approach for the Minister of Labour (1994) 6(1) at 58-62, as cited 
in Du Toit et al (2003) at 17 and Catherine O’Regan ‘1979-1997: Reflecting on 18 years of labour law in South 
Africa’ (1997) 18 ILJ 889 at 898-899. 
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are boosted by the tripartite nature of its governing body.
115
 Cooperation from all parties to 
CCMA disputes is concurrently encouraged.
116
 In addition to managing the CCMA and its 
affairs, the governing body oversees the appointment of commissioners. It is required in this 
regard to prepare a Code of Conduct for commissioners and to ensure their compliance 
therewith.
117
  
 
Notwithstanding its independence in name and management, the CCMA is primarily financed 
by the Department of Labour. To this extent therefore, it is dependent on government. 
Fortunately, there is no evidence to suggest that this has affected its ability to operate 
impartially and objectively.
118
 Still, given its administrative standing,
119
 the CCMA remains 
accountable to the Executive. Each year, it is obliged to submit an annual report of its 
activities and financial position to the Minister of Labour.
120
 A statement of the CCMA’s 
estimated income, expenditure and future financing needs must similarly be provided.
121
 The 
institution’s accountability, coupled with its duty to compile and publish information and 
statistics on its activities,
122
 preserve the CCMA’s integrity. All told, it enjoys measurable 
respect from the public and its stakeholders as a result.
123
 The features of CCMA proceedings 
complement this and a discussion of those features follows. 
 
                                                          
115
 The appropriateness of a tripartite approach to the composition of the CCMA’s governing body reflects that 
of the International Labour Organisation (‘the ILO’). The ILO’s governing body consists of 56 titular members 
(including 28 representatives from governments, 14 employee representatives and 14 employer representatives) 
and 66 deputy members (including 28 representatives from governments, 19 employee representatives and 19 
employer representatives), available at http://www.ilo.org/gb/AboutGB/lang--en/index.htm, accessed on 19 
October 2010.  
116
 Du Toit et al (2003) at 5; Benjamin (2009) at 26. See also John Brand ‘CCMA: Achievements and challenges 
– Lessons from the first three years’ (2000) 21 ILJ 77 at 80 for a discussion of the legitimacy which this 
approach has lent to the CCMA. Brand emphasizes the significance of involving all stakeholders in achieving 
that legitimacy. Consider too the CCMA’s Annual Report of 2009-2010 at 5. 
117
 Section 117 of the LRA; Department of Justice The Code of Conduct – Commissioners Consolidated Labour 
Court Directive 2010, available at 
http://www.worklaw.co.za/SearchDirectory/Codes_Of_Good_Practice/COMMISSIONERS.asp, accessed on 18 
July 2012.  
118
 Details of its financing obligations and allowances are set out in section 122 of the LRA.  
119
 See the discussion above and SARFU para 138. 
120
 Section 122(3) of the LRA. This report must be tabled in parliament by the Minister within 14 days of its 
submission. 
121
 Section 122(3) of the LRA. 
122
 Section 115(d) of the LRA. 
123
 Benjamin (2013) at 53. 
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3.2 The features of CCMA proceedings 
 
 
In giving effect to both the purposes of the LRA and the institution’s establishment, CCMA 
proceedings are characterised by certain key traits, including accessibility, flexibility and 
informality and expeditiousness.
124
 It is instructive to address these in turn.  
 
3.2.1 Accessibility 
 
First, CCMA proceedings are designed to be accessible to the general public.
125
 There are at 
least three ways in which this objective is achieved. To begin with, the CCMA’s services are 
essentially free.
126
 There are no costs for referring unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice 
disputes to the institution at all. All employees, no matter how poor, may therefore do so. 
Supplementing this is Rule 25 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings before the CCMA 
(‘the CCMA Rules’).127 In terms of this Rule, legal representation is prohibited in all unfair 
dismissal proceedings arising from the alleged misconduct or incapacity of the dismissed 
employee.
128
 Should either or both of the parties to the dispute be desirous of lawyers, they 
are required to make express application there ore to the presiding commissioner.
129
 While 
                                                          
124
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 317-318. 
125
 Theron and Godfrey emphasize that, part cularly in the South African context where poverty is rife, social 
justice is necessarily bound to socio-economic factors. Achieving social justice in the workplace therefore 
requires access to socio-economic resources and the elimination of discrepancies between different racial and 
other groups; Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 25-26. In the absence of accessibility, the LRA’s objective of 
achieving social justice might never be achieved. 
126
 Only under exceptional circumstances are parties required to pay fees to the CCMA; consult, in this regard, 
sections 123, 140, 147, 188A & 189A of the LRA and www.ccma.org.za, where an outline of those 
circumstances is provided. 
127
 Rules for the conduct of proceedings before the CCMA GNR 1448 GG 25515 of 10 October 2003 (‘the 
CCMA Rules’). 
128
 Legal representation is currently prohibited during all conciliation proceedings, regardless of the nature of the 
dispute. Still, parties may be represented by a director or employee of the party in question, or by any member, 
office bearer or official of the party’s registered trade union or registered employers’ organization; rule 25 of the 
CCMA Rules. Note, however, that in Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Minister of Labour and Others 
(NGHC) unreported case no 61197/11 of 15 October 2012, the High Court ruled that the prohibition of legal 
representation during CCMA arbitration proceedings was unconstitutional. It thus ordered the CCMA to revise 
rule 25 within 3 years of its judgment. For the duration of that 3 year period, the Court’s decision will be 
suspended and so legal representation will remain precluded from CCMA proceedings until October 2015 (or the 
CCMA amends the CCMA Rules). For the CC’s earlier (and effectively contrary) pronouncement on the matter, 
see Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Mudau NO & others [2009] 6 BLLR 517 (CC). 
129
 In the absence of both the commissioner’s and the other party’s consent, the applicant is required to satisfy 
the commissioner (in terms of Rule 25(1)(c)) that it would be unreasonable to expect the applicant to deal with 
the dispute without legal representation, taking account of the following factors:  
‘(a) the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute; 
(b) the complexity of the dispute; 
(c) the public interest; and 
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there are various reasons for the exclusion,
130
 its principal impact on accessibility is that it 
minimizes the costs of arbitration proceedings.
131
 Concomitantly, the preclusion promotes 
access to the institution. As discussed in later paragraphs, it supports timeous dispute 
resolution too. Yet, its implications for CCMA commissioners can be severe.
132
 These are 
considered under ‘expeditiousness’ below. Unfortunately, the frequency of review 
proceedings curtails the value of Rule 25 and the CCMA’s free services;133 this effect must 
consequently be accounted for when revising the test for review.  
 
Finally, the CCMA’s accessibility is endorsed by its extensive geographical presence. The 
institution boasts 19 offices across the country, making its services readily available to the 
majority of South African residents.
134
  
 
3.2.2 Flexibility and informality 
 
The second critical feature of CCMA proceedings is that of flexibility. Combined with 
informality, flexibility is important to ensuring that disputes are resolved in a manner 
apposite both to employment relationships generally and to individual cases.
135
 Section 138 
of the LRA is the principal statutory mechanism for enabling flexibility.
136
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(d) the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their representatives to deal with the dispute.’  
Until 1 January 2012, the statistics on the number of parties represented during arbitration proceedings were 
unreliable. Fortunately, as of that date, the CCMA’s CMS database has been revised to include mandatory 
recording of statistics on legal representation. More recent statistics on the matter are accordingly now both 
available and arguably more legitimate; Benjamin & Gruen at 59 and Benjamin (2013) at 11-12. 
130
 Which make up the majority of disputes referred to the institution; for the percentage of disputes concerning 
misconduct and incapacity dismissals, consult the CCMA’s Annual Report 2009-2010. 
131
 Rule 25 of the CCMA Rules currently ensures this. Note, however, Law Society of the Northern Provinces. 
The prohibition contrasts starkly with court proceedings, the costs of which are often prohibitive; Currie & De 
Waal at 138-139 & 718.  
132
 For one, commissioners are denied the benefits enjoyed by the courts of assistance from the parties’ legal 
representatives; Benjamin (2007) at 9. 
133
 Consult, however, Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 1789 (LAC) paras 53-56, where the Judge contested 
this view. 
134
 In the financial year of 2009 to 2010, the CCMA opened 3 new offices, thereby further improving access to 
its services in response to the global economic crisis; the CCMA’s Annual Report 2009-2010 at 3, 88 & 89. 
135
 A comprehensive discussion of the unique nature of employment relationships falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. Suffice to say here that the employment relationship is characterised by an imbalance of power; Sidumo 
para 74. For detailed discussions thereof, consult Brand et al (2008) at 15-18. 
136
 This section simultaneously promotes informality; Brand et al (2008) at 17. The statute promotes flexibility 
not only by granting this broad administrative discretion to CCMA commissioners but also by providing for 
Codes of Good Practice under section 203 of the Act. These codes are detailed in later paragraphs and constitute 
a form of ‘soft law’; Cheadle at 668. 
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a) The nature of commissioners’ discretionary powers 
 
Section 138 addresses the manner in which arbitration proceedings are to be conducted.
137
 Its 
relevant provisions read as follows: 
 
‘138.    (1)  The commissioner may conduct the arbitration in a manner that the 
commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly 
and quickly, but must deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with 
the minimum of legal formalities. 
(2)  Subject to the discretion of the commissioner as to the appropriate form 
of the proceedings, a party to the dispute may give evidence, call witnesses, 
question the witnesses of any other party, and address concluding 
arguments to the commissioner…138 
…(6)  The commissioner must take into account any code of good practice 
that has been issued by NEDLAC or guidelines published by the 
Commission in accordance with the provisions of this Act that is relevant to 
a matter being considered in the arbitration proceedings. 
(7)  Within 14 days of the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings— 
(a) the commissioner must issue an arbitration award with brief 
reasons, signed by that commissioner;… 
(b) … 
(c) …. 
…(9)  The commissioner may make any appropriate arbitration award in terms 
of this Act, including, but not limited to…. 
(10)  The commissioner may make an order for the payment of costs 
according to the requirements of law and fairness in accordance with rules 
made by the Commission in terms of section 115 (2A)( j) and having regard 
to— 
(a) any relevant Code of Good Practice issued by NEDLAC in 
terms of section 203; 
(b) any relevant guideline issued by the Commission.’139 
 
It is significant that commissioners are afforded substantial discretion by this section to 
determine the form which arbitration proceedings take.
140
 In addition to reducing the 
                                                          
137
 Section 136 of the LRA provides for commissioners to be appointed to arbitrate disputes. 
138
 Clark’s opinion on this subsection and its relationship with subsection 138(1) is detailed below; Clark (1997) 
at 616-617. 
139
 Section 138(10) provides a good example of a discretion required to be exercised with reference to certain 
considerations. Thus, the discretion is not completely unfettered and is subject to stipulated constraints; Consult 
generally, in this regard, Cheadle at 668 para 20. 
140
 Benjamin (2007) at 8; Brand (2000) at 87. Note that Le Roux has argued that the CCMA Rules began the 
process of formalizing CCMA proceedings. In turn, he submits, the breath of commissioners’ discretionary 
powers under section 138 was reduced; PAK Le Roux ‘New regulations governing conciliation and arbitration 
proceedings at the CCMA’ (2000) 9(11) Contemporary Labour Law 105 at 110. Yet, as the CCMA Rules 
regulate only the time periods and formal procedures to be followed, prior to and during conciliation and 
arbitration proceedings, they do not regulate the manner in which proceedings are actually conducted. As such, it 
is doubtful whether the CCMA Rules have had a substantial impact on the discretion which commissioners enjoy 
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technicalities and delays prevalent in court processes,
141
 the legislature’s intention when 
granting this discretion was to promote flexibility and informality in CCMA arbitrations.
142
 
In the context of employment relationships, there are sound reasons for this. For one, where 
parties are likely to continue with their relationship following the dispute resolution process, 
traditional litigation resulting in a ‘winner’ and a ‘loser’ is undesirable.143 If anything, it may 
serve to aggravate existing hostility between the parties. Thus, while commissioners’ 
exercises of discretion under section 138 may be reviewed in terms of section 145 of the 
LRA,
144
 when doing so, courts should recount both the extent of commissioners’ 
discretionary powers and the rationale underlying them.
145
  
 
The statutory discretion of commissioners consists of several components. Two of these are 
clearly stipulated in section 138 itself. First, commissioners are obliged to exercise their 
discretions in such a way that disputes are fairly and quickly resolved. Secondly, when 
resolving disputes, they must address the principal merits of each, without undue legal or 
technical formality.
146
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
under section 138 of the LRA. Arguably nonetheless, the CCMA guidelines on misconduct arbitrations do limit 
the breadth of commissioners’ discretionary powers; CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct arbitrations in GenN 602 
GG 34573 of 2 September 2011 (‘the Guidelines’). For commissioners’ similarly wide discretionary powers to 
determine appropriate awards, consider sections 193 & 194 of the LRA, read with subsequent chapters of this 
thesis. 
141
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 315-322; Benjamin (2009) at 26. 
142
 Consult section 138 itself. 
143
 Brand et al (2008) at 15. Mischke & Brand comment further that it is for this reason that less formal 
procedures are better suited to labour dispute resolution. They observe that ‘[i]t is possible for disputes to be 
processed in a manner that satisfies the needs, and considers the interests, of both parties to such an extent that 
they emerge from the process mutually satisfied and recommitted to their extended relationship…’; Carl 
Mischke (adapted by John Brand) ‘Overview of the dispute system’ in Brand et al (2008) at 15.  
144
 Section 145 was intentionally cast in narrow terms. It mimics section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, 
which provides for narrow grounds of review in respect of private arbitration awards. As Benjamin records, this 
suggests that the legislature’s intention when drafting the section was that Labour Courts would be obliged to 
conduct review proceedings comparably to the manner in which the civil courts do when reviewing private 
arbitration proceedings; Benjamin (2007) at 33. See also the Explanatory Memorandum at 315 -322 and Shoprite 
Checkers (2000) (LC). The scope of section 145 has since been extended by the suffusion of section 145 with the 
reasonableness standard however; Sidumo para 109, read with Bato Star. 
145
 For the appropriate approach to reviewing CCMA arbitration awards generally, consult chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis and the conclusion hereto; see also, Foschini Group v Maidi & others [2010] 7 BLLR 689 (LAC) 
paras 32-35; Pep Stores Pty Ltd v Laka NO & others (1998) 19 ILJ 1534 (LC); Naraindath v CCMA & others 
(2000) 21 ILJ 1151 (LC) and Le Monde Luggage t/a Pakwells Petje v Commissioner Dunn & others [2007] 10 
BLLR 909 (LAC). In Le Monde Luggage, the LAC confirmed the approach endorsed by the Court in Naraindath 
that proceedings akin to those of the small claims court were generally apposite to CCMA arbitrations.  
146
 Section 138 of the LRA; Benjamin (2007) at 8-9. Consider too Sondolo IT (Pty) Ltd v Howes & others [2009] 
5 BLLR 499 (LC) paras 8-11 and Minister of Safety and Security v Madisha & others [2009] 1 BLLR 80 (LC) 
paras 12-13. 
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In Naraindath v CCMA & others,
147
 Wallis AJ examined the nature of commissioners’ 
discretionary powers in detail.
148
 He began by observing that these powers were measurably 
broad and that they afforded commissioners significant leeway as to the form of arbitration 
proceedings. Explaining the emphasis in section 138 on conducting arbitrations ‘with the 
minimum of legal formalities’, the Judge noted that commissioners were not required to 
mimic the formal procedures of the courts.
149
 This would counter the Act’s intentions when 
establishing the CCMA. Nonetheless, held Wallis JA, commissioners’ discretionary powers 
were subject to the qualification that arbitrations were not to deprive either of the parties of 
their right to a fair hearing.
150
 Arbitration awards evincing such deprivation would be 
susceptible to review.
151
 According to him, specific guidelines for arbitration proceedings 
could accordingly not be formulated.
152
 While at times the ‘traditional adversarial approach’ 
to proceedings might be warranted, the Judge expected those occasions to be scarce.
153
 In 
conclusion, Wallis JA offered an outline of the process CCMA commissioners were to follow 
during arbitration proceedings; he stated:  
 
‘In general a commissioner will start with the brief statements required by the rules 
setting out the stances of the respective parties. The task of commissioner[s] may be 
eased by having available a record of what the relevant witnesses said at a disciplinary 
enquiry. There may well be documents which are relevant and the consideration of 
which will dispose of peripheral matters. Ordinarily there will be no legal 
representation. In those circumstances it is wholly appropriate for the commissioner to 
conduct the proceedings in the same manner in which commissioners of the Small 
Claims Court have for many years conducted proceedings with conspicuous success. 
The proceedings before that tribunal are informal in nature and conducted in a manner 
                                                          
147
 Naraindath v CCMA & others [2000] 6 BLLR 716 (LC). 
148
 For comprehensive explanations of the confines of commissioners’ powers and obligations, consult Benjamin 
(2007) at 8-19 and chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. 
149
 Naraindath para 26. See also Foschini (2010) (LAC). In Benjamin’s view, reviewing courts should 
accordingly consider, for example, the extent to which a procedural or substantive rule applicable to judicial 
proceedings should apply to CCMA arbitrations; Benjamin (2007) at 17. 
150
 Benjamin (2007) at 9. In the event of a conflict between expediting the process and upholding the parties’ 
rights to a fair hearing, parties’ rights are to be preferred; Northern Training Trust v Maake & others [2006] 5 
BLLR 496 (LC) para 29; Foschini Group (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & 
others (2002) 23 ILJ 1048 (LC) and Halcyon Hotel (Pty) Ltd t/a Baraza v CCMA & others [2001] 8 BLLR 911 
(LC). 
151
 Naraindath para 27. 
152
 See, however, Char Technology (Pty) Ltd v Mnisi & others [2000] 7 BLLR 778 (LC) para 1 and Eastern 
Cape Agricultural Cooperative v Du Plessis & others (2000) 21 ILJ 1335 (LC) para 31. In both cases, the Courts 
described the key duties of commissioners at the commencement of arbitration proceedings, with express 
reference to assisting lay applicants and lay employers.  Since Naraindath, specific guidelines have nonetheless 
been published in relation to misconduct arbitrations; The Guidelines. 
153
 Naraindath para 32; consider too Foschini (2010) (LAC) paras 32-35 and Pep Stores. 
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determined by the commissioner subject to the overriding need to comply with the 
principles of natural justice.’154 
 
Subsequently, in CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others,
155
 the CC explained the 
discretion as requiring commissioners to: ‘cut through all the claims and counter-claims and 
reach for the real dispute between the parties.’156 Notably, it added that ‘to perform th[at] task 
effectively, commissioners must be allowed a significant measure of latitude in the 
performance of their functions.’157 However, held the majority, three constraints attached to 
commissioners’ exercises of discretion too. These included that, when resolving disputes, 
commissioners were to determine the ‘real dispute between the parties’, ensure fairness to 
both parties and finalise the matter efficiently.
158
 
 
On this basis, the test for review might be reduced to asking whether commissioners had 
identified the relevant parties’ dispute accurately and resolved it fairly and quickly. The 
proposal is helpfully concise. Yet, O’Regan J’s dissenting judgment in Tao Ying,159 suggests 
that greater depth of analysis may be needed. While accepting the tenor of the majority’s 
sentiments, she recorded: 
 
‘I proffer two points of caution. First, it is, at the end of the day, essential for the 
decision-maker in a fair adjudicative process to understand what the issues for 
decision are. Moreover, when that process is adversarial, it is necessary that the 
parties understand the issues as well, so that those issues may be properly engaged. 
We must be careful that, in attempting to acknowledge the informality of the 
processes before the CCMA, we do not lose sight of the essentialia of an adjudicative 
process.’160 
 
Thus, commissioners remain bound to apply the basic tenets of adjudication when doing so is 
necessary to secure fairness.
161
 Since Tao Ying, the LC in Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet 
                                                          
154
 Naraindath para 32; consult also sections 26-33 of the Small Claims Court Act 61 of 1984. Wallis AJ’s views 
have been endorsed by subsequent courts; Foschini (2010) (LAC) paras 32-35; Le Monde Luggage para 17. In 
the latter, the Court held in this regard that: ‘The arbitration process before a member of the second respondent 
[the CCMA] should not be reduced to the evidentiary formalism which applies in a formal court of law.’  
155
 CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) 
156
 Ibid para 65. 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Ibid. 
159
 CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC). 
160
 Ibid para 152. 
161
 Ibid; Carephone para 20; Sidumo para 208. When doing so, commissioners should have regard to the 
competing interests of the parties to the dispute, with reference to relevant principles of labour law and 
considerations of equity; Sidumo paras 76-77 & 168-184. 
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Bargaining Council & others
162
 has lent instructive substance to the CC’s comments. There, 
the Court defined commissioners’ decision-making duties as incorporating: applying the laws 
of evidence;
163
 applying the substantive law of dismissal; applying their minds to materially 
relevant facts; disregarding materially irrelevant factors; and weighing up materially relevant 
facts and issues.
164
 Clearly then, despite their mandate to finalise disputes quickly and 
informally, commissioners are obliged to meet a minimum standard of due process.
165
  
 
Even so, the central implication of commissioners’ prerogative to conduct proceedings as 
they see fit, is that arbitrations need not be adversarial in nature. Unless it is crucial to 
preserving the parties’ rights, arbitrations should not imitate formal court processes.166 A 
more inquisitorial approach is often better suited to resolving employment disputes.
167
 This 
does not mean that commissioners must favour one approach to the complete exclusion of 
another, however. As Benjamin points out, rather than selecting a cleanly adversarial or 
strictly inquisitorial stance, arbitrators should focus on addressing the substantial merits of 
the dispute before them and may run arbitrations in any manner required to achieve this.
168
  
 
                                                          
162
 Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC). 
163
 Note, however, the SCA’s directive in Edcon that the applicant’s contention that the commissioner had 
admitted uncorroborated hearsay evidence did not require investigation on account of the award’s substantive 
reasonableness; Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO & others (2009) 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA). 
164
 Transnet Freight Rail para 16. See also in this regard Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & 
others [2011] 4 BLLR 404 (LC) para 10, citing Sidumo para 268. 
165
 Commissioners’ obligations during misconduct dismissal arbitration proceedings have been expressly 
regulated by the Guidelines. These Guidelines comprise numerous pages of instructions to commissioners as to 
how misconduct dismissal arbitrations should be conducted. While the instructions are undoubtedly helpful for 
commissioners, if faultless compliance therewith is required to meet the reasonableness test on review, the 
guidelines may have severe consequences for the efficiency of both arbitration and review proceedings. For one, 
the incidence of review proceedings may increase. In addition, the likelihood of finding awards reasonable may 
become negligible. Given the bulk and intricacy of the Guidelines, commissioners cannot, in any event, fairly be 
expected to display perfect compliance with each and every guideline in their awards. As such, while the 
Guidelines are informative in so far as they add content to the nature of commissioners’ obligations, they should 
not become the basis for assessing the reasonableness of CCMA arbitration awards. For further directions on the 
manner in which CCMA proceedings are to be conducted, consult the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration CCMA Practice and Procedure Manual 5 ed (November 2010), available at 
http://www.ccma.org.za/UploadedMedia/2010%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20Manual.pdf, accessed on 
11 June 2012 (‘the Manual’). 
166
 As Benjamin points out, the courts have not always endorsed this idea, with some judges ‘issu[ing] severe 
warnings to arbitrators as to the consequences of departing from the conventional adversarial hearing…’; 
Benjamin (2007) at 17-19. This encourages commissioners to adopt adversarial methods of conducting 
arbitrations rather than more inquisitorial methods. In turn, flexibility in CCMA proceedings is hampered. 
167
 Unfortunately, despite this, there is an alarming trend towards holding commissioners to the standards 
required of the judiciary during review proceedings; Benjamin (2007) at 10. 
168
 Provided that the parties’ rights to a fair hearing are not violated by assuming a more inquisitorial approach 
and that the process is expeditiously and fairly conducted; Benjamin (2007) at 17-19. According to Benjamin, 
reviewing courts have often failed to acknowledge this. Again, the flexibility advocated by the LRA is hindered. 
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To understand the options available to commissioners, it is useful to consider the traditional 
formulations of these two discrete types of dispute resolution process. Looking to the 
adversarial approach first,
169
 Brand describes it as envisaging the parties as embroiled in a 
contest against one another, with the presiding officer performing the role of ‘umpire’.170 At 
the extreme end of this model, the decision-maker is completely detached from the parties’ 
dispute and entirely neutral. To attain an impartial image, he or she refrains from asking 
questions of the parties or interfering in the dispute as far as possible.
171
 The system ensures 
that witnesses are subjected to cross-examination,
172
 but it essentially submits control of the 
proceedings to the parties.
173
 In contrast, during less adversarial proceedings, the decision-
maker would assume greater control of the hearing, inquiring about facts and evidence from 
the parties and calling and questioning witnesses when necessary.
174
  
 
Brand observes that the principal difficulty with the latter model - the so-called ‘inquisitorial 
approach’ - is that it strains the decision-maker’s ability to appear neutral and impartial, 
which is vital to achieving natural justice.
175
 Moreover, it obliges decision-makers to 
‘dominate’ the proceedings, demanding greater skill and competency on their part than is 
needed for adversarial processes.
176
 Adding to these difficulties are those associated with 
                                                          
169
 Which is traditionally used by the courts. 
170
 John Brand ‘How to participate in the arbitration process’ in Paul Pretorius (ed) Dispute Resolution (1993) at 
105-106; see also David Butler ‘Expediting commercial arbitration proceedings: Recent trends’ (1994) 6 SA 
Merc LJ 251 at 260-261 and DW Butler (original text by C Smith) ‘Arbitration’ The Law of South Africa vol 1 2 
ed (2003) para 588, where the author describes the interventionist role which arbitrators may adopt. 
171
 Whether by requiring further evid nce (by requesting specific witness testimonies for example) to determine 
the dispute or otherwise; Brand (1993) at 105-106. 
172
 Which Clark records is considered crucial to ensuring that the principles of natural justice are upheld; Clark 
(1997) at 615. 
173
 Clark (1997) at 615; Albertyn observes that the question of control is central to the nature of dispute 
resolution processes in general; Christopher Albertyn ‘Specialised arbitration and mediation’ in Paul Pretorius 
(ed) Dispute Resolution (1993) at 113; see also Clark (1997) at 611; Guideline 33 of the Guidelines. 
174
 Consult too Dimbaza Foundaries Ltd v CCMA & others [1999] 8 BLLR 779 (LC); Benjamin (2013) at 24. 
175
 According to Brand et al (2008), arbitrators should be ‘fair, unbiased and independent’. For the nature of 
labour dispute resolution generally, see Brand et al (2008) at 19. A possible means of avoiding the problem of 
parties perceiving impartiality as a result of commissioners’ adopting an inquisitorial approach was usefully 
proposed in Eastern Cape Agricultural Cooperative paras 31-32. Consider too Benjamin (2013) at 25-26. 
176
 Brand (1993) at 105-106. Clark submits further that the two primary features of adversarial proceedings 
include the parties’ essential ‘control over the pre-hearing process…[and]…control over the hearing process’. 
This contrasts with inquisitorial or investigative proceedings where the arbitrator maintains substantial control 
over the manner in which proceedings are conducted and the issues in dispute determined; Clark (1997) at 611. 
Lord Justice Staughton in ‘Common law and civil law procedures: Which is the more inquisitorial?’ in Current 
Problems in Arbitration and Litigation Lecture series published by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (1988) 
117 at 118 describes the nature of adversarial proceedings as follows: ‘[T]he essence of adversarial procedure is 
that the judge listens to the evidence and arguments of the parties, and decides between them; he does not make 
his own enquiries as to the facts, or adopt conclusions of fact not proposed by either party; nor does he propose 
or adopt arguments or conclusions of law differing from those which the parties put forward. By contrast, where 
the procedure is inquisitorial the judge can and does exercise all of those functions.’ See also Butler (1994). 
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excessive degrees of informality, which are exacerbated where the motive for informality is 
expeditiousness.
177
 As Brand submits, ‘justice and fairness’ may require time to achieve and 
efficiency should not be prized at their expense.
178
 Thus, some structure and order is 
necessary, in the absence of which, parties’ rights to fairness may be undermined.179  Chaotic 
attitudes to arbitrations accordingly cannot be tolerated.
180
  
 
Despite the potential pitfalls of the inquisitorial approach, in the context of CCMA 
arbitrations, where the parties are frequently unrepresented and lack the requisite skills to 
ensure that fundamental issues are addressed (or crucial witnesses called),
181
 handing control 
of the proceedings to the parties may endanger their rights. Were commissioners precluded 
from calling witness or questioning parties of their own accord, identifying the true issues in 
dispute may become fortuitous. As the inquisitorial approach allows commissioners to deal 
with all of the issues which, in their opinions, are relevant to determining a dispute fairly, the 
model offers a solution to these problems in CCMA proceedings.
182
 In turn, the parties are 
assured of a more material form of justice. Supplementing the suitability of this model in the 
employment context is that inquisitorial proceedings facilitate the narrowing of issues in 
dispute. As Brand records, it is due to this attribute that inquisitorial tactics have generally 
proved more effective for resolving labour disputes than formal legal pleadings and 
processes.
183
 As such, it is unsurprising that the Act endorses the inquisitorial method, rather 
than adversarial processes.
184
 All told therefore, not only does the informality of the 
inquisitorial approach accord with legislative intent but it promotes the features of flexibility 
and accessibility inherent in the CCMA.
185
 Unfortunately nonetheless, commissioners 
                                                          
177
 Brand (2000) at 86-87; Brand et al (2008) at 16. 
178
 Ibid. 
179
 Ibid. Consult too Maake para 29 and Benjamin (2013) at 24, together with the references cited therein. 
180
 Brand et al (2008) at 17. 
181
 Clark (1997) at 615; Brand et al (2008) at 146. 
182
 Clark (1997) at 611; Guideline 33 of the Guidelines. 
183
 Brand (2000) at 79. Narrowing the issues in dispute requires commissioners to identify the true nature of the 
dispute between the parties. According to Brand, the process often leads to a ‘more accurate discovery of the real 
dispute between the parties than the adversarial exchange of pleadings.’; Brand (2000) at 79. 
184
 Clark (1997) at 615, citing Brand (1993) at 106. 
185
 Consider, in this regard, Clark’s reference to Wood’s remark that: 
‘…The [investigative] arbitration process is more flexible than that of a tribunal ... the freedom from 
rigid precedent has been shown to be particularly valuable, enabling legal rules to be applied with 
greater attention given to the context and needs of the particular parties concerned. Perhaps above all, 
an arbitrator is freer to resist the pervasive pressure of legal processes which tend to divert attention 
from the central issues.’  
Clark (1997) at 622-623, citing J Wood 'Dispute resolution - conciliation, mediation and arbitration’ in W 
McCarthy (ed) Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses (1992) at 268, 261, 257-8 & 260. 
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regularly do not conduct arbitrations in a typically inquisitorial fashion, preferring the ‘safer’ 
route promised by adversarial or court-like processes.
186
 
 
Having said that, in the context of compulsory, statutory arbitrations where Constitutional 
rights are at stake (including those conducted by the CCMA), care is required to secure 
parties’ rights.187 Thus, following inquisitorial models specifically designed for private and 
voluntary arbitration should be approached with caution during these proceedings. The 
submission is best illustrated by way of an example. 
 
The model developed by the Independent Mediation Services of South Africa (‘IMSSA’) is 
instructive.
188
 That model was devised to ensure a ‘quick, fair, user friendly and non-judicial’ 
approach to private dispute resolution. To realise these goals, IMSSA dispensed with many of 
the court like documents and processes which it had previously used.
189
 In their place, a 
traditionally inquisitorial approach was implemented. As a result of the new system, the 
challenges of narrowing the issues in dispute were alleviated. In turn, IMSSA was able to 
limit the average time taken to conclude dismissal disputes to a single day.
190
 
 
                                                          
186
 Benjamin suggests various reasons for this, including:  
‘...the absence of training and direction from the CCMA as to how to conduct an arbitration in this 
manner; the complexity of many unfair dismissal cases; the informality of pre-arbitration procedures; as 
well as the perception of parties and their representatives for whom adversarial proceedings are the 
norm. This perception is also reflected in the jurisprudence of the [Labour Courts] which tends to view 
informal adversarial proceedings as the preferred norm.’ 
Benjamin (2007) at 19. It was conceivably in response to these concerns that the Guidelines were published.  
187
 There are important differences between private and compulsory arbitration. First, during private arbitrations, 
the parties determine the terms of reference themselves and so retain a measure of control over the proceedings 
and the criteria used for resolving the dispute; Barney Jordaan, Peter Kantor & Craig Bosch Labour Arbitration 
with a commentary on the CCMA Rules 2 ed (2011) at 5-6; Brand et al (2008) at 41. Secondly, with private 
arbitrations, the parties choose their arbitrator – in contrast to the CCMA’s mandate to allocate arbitrators to 
disputes conducted under its auspices; Brand et al (2008) at 144 & 149. In addition, during compulsory 
arbitrations, control over the manner which proceedings take essentially vests in the relevant commissioner 
rather than the parties; Brand et al (2008) at 144. For further information on the distinctions between these 
proceedings, consult Sidumo paras 86-88; Martin Brassey Employment and Labour Law: Commentary on the 
Labour Relations Act vol 3 (2006) at A7–1–A7–2; Currie & De Waal at 651 ftnt 34; Telcordia Technologies Inc 
v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (5) BCLR 503 (SCA) para 45; Total Support Management (Pty) Ltd & another v 
Diversified Health Systems (SA) Pty Ltd  2002 (4) SA 661 (SCA) para 24 and Steyn v Middelburg Ferrochrome 
(a division of Samancor Ltd) & others (2009) 30 ILJ 1637 (LC). 
188
 IMSSA was established in 1984, resulting in a significant increase in the number of labour disputes resolved 
through private arbitration; O’Regan (1989) at 557. 
189
 Including ‘pleadings, pre-trial meetings, discovery and legal representation’ and official records; Brand 
(2000) at 86-87. 
190
 Brand (2000) at 86-87. 
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At first glance, the IMSSA method seems entirely compatible with CCMA arbitration 
proceedings.
191
 However, in the context of the CCMA, the Constitutional rights of the parties 
to fair labour practices and a fair hearing are paramount,
192
 and the form of the proceedings 
must ultimately give effect to those rights. In contrast, during private arbitration proceedings, 
the parties’ foremost rights arise from the law of contract rather than the Constitution. Thus, 
to the extent to which the efficiency and informality of IMSSA-like processes jeopardise 
parties’ Constitutional rights,193 conducting CCMA arbitrations along identical lines would 
be inappropriate.
194
 Bearing both the advantages and disadvantages of inquisitorial processes 
in mind, the legitimacy of the proposal that commissioners should simply focus on resolving 
the substantial merits of the case quickly and fairly, is apparent.
195
 As such, neither a strictly 
inquisitorial model nor a stereotypically adversarial process should be favoured to the 
complete exclusion of the other.
196
 
 
An additional consideration when determining the appropriateness of the degree to which the 
inquisitorial approach
197
 is fitting, is the presence or absence of legal representation during 
the proceedings. According to Clark, one of the key determinants of whether proceedings 
should be conducted inquisitorially or adversarially is the nature of the parties’ 
representation, if any, during the arbitration concerned.
198
 Where the parties are not 
represented, inquisitorial processes are generally preferable. That principle, submits Clark, 
should nonetheless be subject to the proviso that where a complex legal issue is in dispute, or 
interests broader than those of the immediate parties to the dispute are at stake, adversarial 
                                                          
191
 As Clark observes, the South African system does not envisage the adoption of a purely investigative or 
inquisitorial approach to arbitration proceedings however; instead it recognises the utility of both hybrid models 
and adversarial ones; Clark (1997) at 612. 
192
 Sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution. 
193
 In Brand’s view, the efficient nature of CCMA proceedings adversely affects parties’ perceptions of fairness 
in the conciliation and arbitration processes. In support of this contention, he refers to the International Labour 
Organisation’s (ILO’s) finding that: ‘the pressure of attempting to complete all ‘simple’ dismissal cases within 
the time can also induce a sense in the parties of being subjected to undue pressure in the conduct of their case 
and of being denied a fair hearing.’; Greg Smith, Rob LaGrange & Andre van Niekerk Report by team of experts 
(1998) International Labour Organisation, as cited by Brand (2000) at 87. Unfortunately, given the pressures 
under which commissioners operate, parties’ perceptions in this regard are arguably legitimate. Sasol Mining 
para 7. he concern has partly been addressed by the CCMA through enhanced training and mentoring 
programmes; Benjamin (2013); For parties’ rights to a fair hearing, see Goldfields Investment Ltd & another v 
City Council of Johannesburg & another 1938 TPD 551 at 556; Sidumo para 263; Tao Ying Metal Industry (Pty) 
Ltd v Pooe NO & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1949 (SCA) para 126; Branford v Metrorail Services (Durban) & others 
(2003) 24 ILJ 2269 (LAC) and Telcordia Technologies paras 71-73 & 78. 
194
 Brand (2000) at 86-87; Naraindath para 27; PPWAWU & another v Commissioner CCMA (Port Elizabeth) & 
another [1998] 5 BLLR 499 (LC) paras 7-9. 
195
 Benjamin (2007) at 17-19. 
196
 Benjamin (2013) at 24. 
197
 Or ‘investigative’ approach as Clark labels it; Clark (1997) at 609-610. 
198
 Clark (1997) at 612. 
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proceedings may be better.
199
 Rule 25 of the CCMA Rules, while largely supportive of 
inquisitorial methods of conducting CCMA arbitrations,
200
 concurrently recognises the need 
for legal representation where complex legal questions arise.
201
 
 
Clearly then, there are numerous factors commissioners must account for when exercising 
their discretionary powers under section 138. Coupled with the technical and legalistic 
attitude to CCMA awards often evinced by the courts,
202
 determining the appropriate manner 
of proceedings can be onerous.
203
 As Godfrey and Theron observe, not infrequently, the 
Labour Courts demand ‘judicial standards’ from commissioners. For the reasons discussed 
above, requiring strict compliance with court-like standards is contrary to legislative intent 
and may threaten (rather than support) parties’ rights.204 
 
A further challenge faced by commissioners when conducting arbitrations, is again 
highlighted by Clark. It arises from sections 138(1) and 138(2) of the LRA which, in his 
view, are contradictory.
205
 While section 138(1) promotes an essentially inquisitorial 
approach, section 138(2) provides for the right of the parties to call and cross-examine 
witnesses – established features of the adversarial model.206 According to Clark, section 
138(2) leaves the grant of that right in the hands of the relevant commissioner. Yet, the 
                                                          
199
 Ibid; Clark submits that granting commissioners the discretion to allow legal representation in suitable cases, 
as section 140 of the LRA did prior to the 2002 amendments, and rule 25 of the CCMA Rules currently does, 
facilitates an appropriate relationship between representation and the adoption of either an adversarial or an 
inquisitorial approach to the proceedings. For a contrary view, see Law Society of the Northern Provinces. 
200
 The CCMA Rules. In terms of this rule, legal representation is precluded from unfair dismissal proceedings, 
where the reason for the dismissal relates to the conduct or capacity of the relevant employee, unless both parties 
consent, or the commissioner allows it. 
201
 Rule 25(1)(c) of the CCMA Rules.  
202
 Benjamin (2007) at 17-19. In Benjamin’s opinion: ‘It is suggested that the tendency to articulate rules of 
general application is not an appropriate exercise of the LC's supervisory jurisdiction. The role of the court 
should be to direct arbitrators as to how they should exercise the various statutory discretions conferred on them. 
Neither parliament nor the CCMA has sought to lay down a body of rules to deal with the conduct of arbitrations 
and it is not appropriate for the labour courts to step in and lay down rules of general application. The LC's role 
should be to develop guidelines that assist arbitrators to exercise their wide-ranging statutory discretion in a 
manner consistent with the purposes of the Act and that does not violate the parties' rights.’; Benjamin (2007) at 
17-19. Consult too Benjamin (2013) at 24. 
203
 Benjamin (2007) at 8; for the approach which commissioners are obliged to adopt when conducting 
arbitration proceedings involving lay persons, see Char Technology para 1 and Eastern Cape Agricultural 
Cooperative paras 31-32. 
204
 Coupled with the requirement that they provide only brief reasons for their awards; Section 138(7)(a) of the 
LRA; Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 59-60. Consider too, in this regard, Chemical Workers Industrial Union & 
Others Sopelog CC (1994) 15 ILJ 90 (LAC) at 94-98. There, the LAC explained the significance of limiting the 
permissible scope of appeal during appeals against determinations of the Industrial Court. 
205
 Clark (1997) at 616-617. 
206
 Ibid. 
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CCMA’s publicity leaflets, policy documents and general practice do not portray these rights 
in this manner. Instead, they depict the parties’ rights as absolute.207  
 
The contradiction (for the purposes of misconduct dismissal disputes at least) has ostensibly 
been clarified by the publication of the CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations (‘the 
Guidelines’).208 These Guidelines may be positive in so far as they resolve the tension 
between sections 138(1) and 138(2). Still, they curb the reach of commissioners’ statutory 
discretions extensively.
209
 In light of Clark’s observations above, whether the limits placed on 
commissioners’ powers are congruent with legislative intent is doubtful. 
 
Under Guideline 14 for example, commissioners are advised of parties’ rights to call, 
examine and cross-examine witnesses (and present closing arguments) subject to their 
discretion in terms of section 138.
210
 This seems consistent with the Act. The Guidelines later 
state, however, that the parties are entitled to exercise these rights regardless of the manner of 
the proceedings. Read together with the remaining provisions of the Guidelines – which are 
protracted, rigid and mandatory in nature – these directives significantly restrict 
commissioners’ abilities to regulate the form of proceedings. The flexibility and informality 
needed for effective labour dispute resolution may consequently be endangered thereby. 
Whereas the purpose of the Guidelines is to promote consistency in the outcome of 
arbitration awards,
211
 whether this justifies the threats they pose to legislative intent and the 
efficacy of proceedings is questionable.
212
 A final concern is that the Guidelines may 
encourage review proceedings based on technical irregularities by commissioners who fail to 
comply strictly with each and every item. The Guidelines should accordingly be cautiously 
approached by reviewing courts, bearing in mind the constraints they impose on 
commissioners’ discretionary powers. 
 
                                                          
207
 Ibid. 
208
 CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations GenN 602 GG 34573 of 2 September 2011 (‘the Guidelines’). 
209
 Ibid. 
210
 Guideline 14 of the Guidelines. 
211
 Guideline 3 of the Guidelines. 
212
 Section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA. 
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b) The Codes of Good Practice 
 
Returning to the Act’s espousal of flexibility, the Codes of Good Practice (enacted under 
section 203 of the LRA) (‘the Codes’) are noteworthy.213 Section 138(10) of the LRA obliges 
commissioners to have regard to these Codes when undertaking arbitration proceedings. 
Various Codes have been promulgated. By far the most pertinent of these for this dissertation 
is the Code of Good Practice for Misconduct and Incapacity Dismissals (‘Code for 
Dismissals’),214 which plays a critical role in most arbitrations.215 Item 1 of that code 
specifically affirms the need for flexibility. It reads: ‘[The Code] is intentionally general. 
Each case is unique, and departures from the norms established by this Code may be justified 
in proper circumstances’.  
 
The coupling of Codes with firm legislative provisions was intended to facilitate certainty, 
while retaining the flexible nature of the process and law.
216
 In addition, it was hoped that the 
Codes would educate employers and employees about the proper procedures for resolving 
disciplinary issues in the workplace. Consequently, the incidence of dispute referrals to the 
CCMA was to be reduced.
217
 Unfortunately, this has not been the case.
218
 The formulation 
and purpose of the Codes are neatly described by Cheadle as follows: 
 
‘The codes were to provide a legitimate, coherent, accessible and flexible 
jurisprudence to guide employer policy and practice, collective agreements and 
dispute resolution.’219 
 
Legitimacy and coherence were arguably achieved through the Codes’ implementation. 
Regrettably, the same cannot be said of their envisaged flexibility. According to Cheadle, 
while the codification of labour law by the Codes lent cogency to the law,
220
 the codification 
                                                          
213
 Flexibility in determining fairness in labour disputes has long been recognised as crucial to the dispute 
resolution process. As O’Regan recorded: ‘No hard and fast rules concerning substantive fairness can be set...’; 
O’ Regan (1989) at 573.  Debatably, the same is true of procedural fairness. 
214
 The Code of Good Practice Dismissals, Schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘Code for 
Dismissals’). 
215
 Note that the majority of arbitrations concern allegations of unfair dismissal based on misconduct or 
incapacity; Benjamin (2013) at 1; CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 & CCMA Annual Report 2010-2011. See 
also Venter & Levy. 
216
 Benjamin (2009) at 27.  
217
 Benjamin & Gruen at 1. Regrettably, this has not been the case; Benjamin (2009) and Benjamin (2013). 
218
 Ibid. 
219
 Cheadle at 685 para 76; Benjamin & Gruen at 1. 
220
 Paul Benjamin & Carole Cooper ‘Innovation and continuity: Responding to the Labour Relations Bill (1995) 
16 ILJ 258 (A) at 273. 
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process was intended to be on-going. The Codes were to be regularly updated, with reference 
to Labour Court judgments and CCMA awards.
221
 Yet, they have not been regularly revised 
and are now outdated,
222
 requiring extensive supplementation from legal precedent.
223
 Given 
their purported function as an educational tool for employers, employees and commissioners, 
the stagnancy of the Codes is concerning. The implications for flexibility are equally 
worrying. Exacerbating this, neither commissioners nor courts have succeeded in applying 
the Codes in the variable manner intended. On the contrary, they have largely enforced their 
provisions in a formal and technical fashion. Amongst other undesirable results, pre-dismissal 
hearings have frequently become ‘over-proceduralised’.224  
 
As Theron and Godfrey observe, the vital role flexibility plays in labour dispute resolution is 
demonstrated by the position of small businesses.
225
 When deciding disputes, the distinctive 
needs of these entities must therefore be accounted for by commissioners.
226
 The 
commentators cite the differences between the depth of employment relationships in small 
enterprises and larger ones as a prime illustration of their exigencies. In small businesses, the 
parties inevitably work closely together and often have meaningful personal relationships. In 
contrast, employees employed by large enterprises may rarely, if ever, interact with their true 
employers; managers and supervisors are their closest contacts and distant connections 
                                                          
221
 Cheadle at 685 para 78. 
222
 See also Benjamin & Gruen at 61, where the authors assert that the Labour Court’s judgments on review 
constitute binding precedent. Thus, they argue, it is vital that the Codes of Good Practice are regularly updated to 
reflect the changing jurisprudence of the courts. Whereas the Codes of Good Practice indeed require revision 
from time to time, the submission that decisions on review are binding should be treated with caution. Decisions 
of this nature ought to bind later courts only to the extent to which similar facts are in dispute. In the absence of 
specificity in the facts, judgments handed down on review should not, however, necessarily give rise to 
precedent; consider, in this regard, K Van Dijkhorst ‘Courts: Stare decisis’ The Law of South Africa vol 5(2) 2 ed 
(2003) para 164 and Bourke’s Estate v Commissioner for Inland Revenue [1991] 4 All SA 94 (AD) at 101. In 
addition, as enquiries into reasonableness inevitably involve value judgments (in respect of which reasonable 
people may differ), where awards are overturned for unreasonableness, whether the relevant court’s reasoning 
would be binding is questionable; Fidelity Cash Management Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
& Arbitration & others (2008) 29 ILJ 964 (LAC) paras 98- 102; Sidumo para 109; consult too chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. 
223
 Cheadle at 685 para 79. 
224
 Cheadle at 670 para 23; Benjamin (2009) at 47. Note, however, Benjamin’s earlier (seemingly contrary 
views); Benjamin (2007) at 22. See also PAK Le Roux ‘Dismissals for misconduct: Some reflections’ (2004) 25 
ILJ 868 at 875 and Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA & others [2006] 9 BLLR 833 
(LC) paras 838-841, where the LC cautioned commissioners against assuming overly technical attitudes to 
procedural fairness when resolving arbitrations. As detailed in subsequent chapters, the tendency towards rigid 
applications of the Codes of Good Practice should be borne in mind by reviewing courts. 
225
 Theron & Godfrey (2000). Consult too, Theron & Godfrey (2002). For the United Kingdom’s equivalent to 
the Code for Dismissals, see the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service’s (‘ACAS’) Advisory Handbook 
– Discipline at Work, available at http://www.acas.org.uk, accessed on 12 May 2012. Significantly, ACAS’s 
handbook suggests different approaches to disciplinary proceedings for small and large enterprises.  
226
 Theron & Godfrey (2000) at 55; Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 32. 
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characterise the parties’ working relationships.227 Resultantly, argue Theron and Godfrey, 
reinstatement is likely to be less suited to disputes involving small businesses than to cases 
involving larger ones.
228
 In addition, as small enterprises invariably have fewer resources 
available to them than their bigger counterparts, holding them to the same standards of 
procedural fairness may not be appropriate.
229
 
 
Theron and Godfrey’s sentiments are reflected in the Code for Dismissals, which directs 
commissioners to consider the differences between large and small entities when determining 
fairness in dismissal disputes.
230
 Again, in this way, the Code for Dismissals confirms the 
need for flexibility and variation in relation to both the manner of proceedings and the 
meaning of fairness. 
 
Despite this directive,
231
 Theron and Godfrey’s study on CCMA proceedings involving small 
businesses reveals that commissioners only rarely consider the needs of small entities during 
the decision-making process.
232
 The authors propose that the primary reason for this is the 
perception held by commissioners that they are bound to resolve matters with reference to 
strict legal principles rather than equity and fairness.
233
 The perception is aggravated by the 
Labour Courts’ formal attitudes to CCMA awards.234 The impact of formal, technical 
approaches on small businesses is thus another contextual factor pertinent to review. 
Ultimately, in the absence of legislative amendment, fairness in disputes (particularly those 
concerning small enterprises) may only be achieved through the flexible application of the 
Codes. Regrettably, the courts’ and CCMA’s current approaches thereto, coupled with the 
                                                          
227
 Theron & Godfrey (2000) at 71. 
228
 Ibid. 
229
 For further difficulties imposed by the LRA on small entities, see Theron & Godfrey (2000) at 71 and Theron 
& Godfrey (2002) at 61-62. 
230
 Item 1(1) of the Code for Dismissals. According to O’Regan, before the LRA’s promulgation in 1995, 
arbitrators generally accounted for the different exigencies of large and small employers; O’Regan (1989) at 
572-3. 
231
 Or the express reference thereto in the Code for Dismissals itself. 
232
 Theron & Godfrey (2000) at 69. See also Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 37 & 53-4 and Cheadle at 685-686. 
233
 As the court in Super Group Autoparts t/a Autozone v Hlongwane NO & others [2010] 4 BLLR 458 (LC) 
held, the LC is ultimately a court of equity; Super Group para 11. The role of equity should therefore be recalled 
during review proceedings. Consider further, in this regard, Brand (2000) at 89. 
234
 For commissioners’ obligation to apply the law as directed by the courts, consult Le Roux v Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1366 (LC). In Le Roux, the Court referred with 
disdain to Hammond & Others v L Suzman Distributors (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 3010 (CCMA), where the 
presiding Commissioner had refused to follow a binding judgment of the LC as it did not lead to an equitable 
outcome. While the Court’s approach in Le Roux has been followed, given the need for flexibility, accessibility 
and social justice, the legitimacy of rigid adherence thereto is questionable; Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 37. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
46 
 
stale status of the Codes and the technicality and length of the Guidelines, are inhibiting the 
realisation of these goals.  
 
3.2.3 Expeditiousness and efficiency 
 
The LRA intends to promote the ‘effective’ resolution of disputes.235 It is therefore 
unsurprising that one of the features of the CCMA is efficiency in dispute resolution.
236
 In the 
labour relations realm, efficiency was deemed crucial to maintaining industrial peace and 
enduring employment relationships. The interests of both parties to the dispute are usually 
aligned in this regard.
237
 The LRA promotes expeditiousness in CCMA proceedings in 
several ways,
238
 not least of all by requiring employees to refer unfair dismissal disputes for 
conciliation within 30 days of the dismissal in question.
239
 Where the dispute concerns an 
allegedly unfair labour practice, the employee must refer it for conciliation within 90 days of 
the unfair practice itself.
240
 Once a referral has been received, the CCMA is obliged to 
conciliate the matter within 30 days.
241
 Where conciliation fails, parties have 90 days in 
which to refer the unresolved dispute to arbitration.
242
 Compared to the time periods involved 
in court proceedings (where prescription is often the only constraint placed on permissible 
                                                          
235
 Section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA. 
236
 Sidumo paras 124-125; Food & Allied Workers Union on behalf of Mbatha & others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Sasko Milling & Baking & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2916 (SCA) (‘FAWU’) paras 21-22; section 1(d)(iv) of 
the LRA; Benjamin (2007) at 3-6; the Explanatory Memorandum at 279 & 318-319; Benjamin (2009); Benjamin 
& Cooper. 
237
 Employees’ interests lie primarily with finding alternative employment should they not be reinstated and in 
securing financial relief in the period between their dismissals and reinstatement or new employment. 
Employers, on the other hand, require speedy resolution of disputes to ensure both financial certainty and 
workforce continuity. Consider, for example, the implications of section 193 of the LRA (providing for 
‘retrospective reinstatement to the date of the dismissal’) for small employers; Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 54. 
238
 Benjamin summarises several key aspects of the Act which promote informal and expeditious dispute 
resolution, including: ‘short time periods for referring disputes, simplified dispute referral forms, compulsory 
conciliation of all disputes, an approach to arbitration that seeks to focus on the merits of cases rather than 
technicalities, restrictions on legal representation in dismissal arbitration, no right of appeal against arbitrators’ 
decisions and restrictions on the grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards…’; Benjamin (2009) at 26. See 
also Benjamin (2007) at 3.  
239
 Or of the date on which the employer took the final decision to uphold the dismissal; section 191(1)(b)(i) of 
the LRA. For the meaning of conciliation, consult Albertyn (1993) at 114. 
240
 Or of the date on which the employee became aware of the unfair labour practice in question; section 
191(1)(b)(ii) of the LRA.  
241
 Section 135(2) of the LRA. 
242
 Section 136(1)(b) of the LRA. The CCMA has jurisdiction to arbitrate only certain kinds of disputes. 
Generally speaking, where the CCMA does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter, the dispute may be referred 
to the Labour Court for adjudication. For categories of dispute falling within the CCMA’s arbitral jurisdiction, 
see section 191(5), read with section 191(12), of the LRA. Note that, between 2009 and 2010, the average time 
period for finalizing arbitration proceedings was 39 days from the date of referral; CCMA Annual Report 2009-
2010 at 14. 
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time lapses between disputes arising and proceedings being instituted)
243
 the CCMA’s time 
periods are remarkable and plainly encourage speedy dispute resolution. 
 
Adding to this is the LRA’s provision for the compressed dispute resolution procedure known 
as ‘con-arb’.244 In con-arb proceedings, the matter is set down for conciliation and arbitration 
on the same day, and both processes are performed by the same commissioner.
245
 If 
conciliation is unsuccessful, the commissioner proceeds directly to arbitration, without the 
need for subsequent referral to arbitration.
246
 As Benjamin notes, con-arb has had a 
measurable impact on the time spent finalising disputes. Again, this process advances 
efficiency.
247
 
 
Of further import is the statutory duty of commissioners to issue awards within 14 days of the 
conclusion of arbitration proceedings.
248
 CCMA awards are final and binding,
249
 and no 
appeal lies against them.
250
 In terms of the LRA, parties aggrieved by commissioners’ 
decisions are limited to instituting review proceedings, based on one or more of the grounds 
set out in section 145. These grounds were intentionally cast in narrow terms and mimic those 
applicable to private arbitration awards under section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.
251
 
The aim of confining their reach was to discourage review of CCMA awards, thereby 
                                                          
243
 The Prescription Act 68 of 1969. In terms of this act, debts (for one) prescribe following periods of between 
three and thirty years. For the common law principles of prescription, consult JS Saner (original text by HJ 
Fabricius) ‘Prescription’ The Law of South Africa vol 21 2 ed (2010) para 106. 
244
 Section 191(5A) of the LRA. Con-arb must be used where the dismissal or unfair labour practice relates to 
probation, or where neither of the parties has objected to the resolution of the dispute through con-arb. The con-
arb process was implemented in 2002 by section 46(g) of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 12 of 2002 and 
accordingly did not form part of the original Act. For a comprehensive discussion of both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the con-arb process in the context of CCMA proceedings, consult Alan Rycroft ‘Rethinking the 
con-arb procedure’ (2003) 24 ILJ 699; see also Albertyn (1993) at 120-121.  
245
 For the implications of this process both on the parties to disputes and the proceedings themselves, see 
Rycroft (2003) at 703-709. 
246
 Section 191(5A) of the LRA. Benjamin records that the con-arb process has increasingly been used by the 
CCMA; Benjamin (2009) at 32; Benjamin (2013).  
247
 Benjamin (2009) at 32; see also Benjamin & Gruen at 29. Con-arb is the default position. Parties may, 
however, object to the con-arb process when referring disputes to the CCMA. For the precise figures, consult the 
CCMA Annual Report 2010-2011. For the successes and failures of con-arb, see Venter & Levy at 31-33. 
248
 Section 138(7) of the LRA. 
249
 Unless it is an advisory award; section 143 of the LRA. Arbitration awards may be enforced as though they 
were orders of court, provided only that the Director of the CCMA certifies that the award in question does not 
constitute an advisory award. 
250
 Sections 143 & 145 of the LRA. 
251
 Benjamin (2007) at 33; Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC). For an informative discussion of these grounds and 
their narrow nature, see Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union of SA v Veldspun (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 
ILJ 1431 (A). 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
48 
 
avoiding the delays associated with court processes.
252
 The need for efficiency in labour 
dispute resolution and the stark consequences of delay, submits Benjamin, justified doing 
so.
253
 Since their enactment nevertheless, the grounds provided for in section 145 have been 
extended by the CC to incorporate the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
254
 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA explains the rationale for prohibiting appeals 
against CCMA awards.
255
 It records the bar as pivotal to ensuring the credibility and 
legitimacy of the new framework. Effectiveness, accessibility, efficiency and informality, and 
arbitration rather than adjudication were, in the Task Team’s view, key to realising these 
objectives.
256
 By dispensing with the option of appeals, unnecessary ‘legalism’ was to be 
avoided and speedy dispute resolution attained. According to the drafter’s of the Act:  
 
‘…appeals lead to records, lengthy proceedings, lawyers, legalism, inordinate delays 
and high costs. Appeals have a negative impact on reinstatement as a remedy, they 
undermine the basic purpose of the legislation and they make the system too 
expensive for individuals and small business.’257  
 
The courts have repeatedly affirmed the import of the LRA’s dispute resolution structure, as 
well as its preclusion of appeals.
258
 Ironically, this is undercut by the cumbersome structure 
                                                          
252
 Limiting the parties’ rights of review (by providing for only narrow grounds in section 145) was intended to 
promote the expeditious resolution of labour disputes. It was further hoped that by confining review and 
prohibiting appeals, the difficulties associated with appeals against the Industrial Court’s decisions (which 
operated under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956) could be avoided; the Explanatory Memorandum at 318-
319; O’Regan (1989) at 559; Brand (2000) at 77; Benjamin (2007) at 31-32. Brand recalls nonetheless that while 
limiting review and precluding appeals may promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness, parties have only one 
opportunity to have the merits of their disputes tested. In turn, their rights to fairness are endangered; Brand 
(1993) at 95.  
253
 Benjamin (2007) at 31-32. 
254
 In accordance with the Constitutional right to just administrative action; section 33 of the Constitution; 
Sidumo para 109.  
255
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 318-9. 
256
 Ibid. 
257
 Ibid. According to the Explanatory Memorandum at 319:  
‘Prior to the establishment of the present LAC, it was argued that an appeal structure would provide the 
consistency required to develop coherent guidelines on what constitutes acceptable industrial relations 
practice. This has not been the case. The LAC's judgments lack consistency and have had little impact 
in ensuring consistency in judgments of the Industrial Court. The draft Bill now regulates unfair 
dismissal in express and detailed terms and provides a Code of Good Practice to be taken into account 
by adjudicators. This will go a long way towards generating a consistent jurisprudence concerning 
unfair dismissal despite the absence of appeals.’  
Consider too Brand (2000) at 77 and Benjamin (2007) at 32. 
258
 See, for example, Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC) para 61; FAWU paras 21-22. For the distinction between 
appeal and review generally, consult Emma Fergus ‘The distinction between appeals and reviews – Defining the 
limits of the Labour Court’s powers of review’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1556; Coetzee v Lebea NO & another (1999) 20 
ILJ 129 (LC); County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others 
(1999) 20 ILJ 1701 (LAC); Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) and Mthembu & Mahomed Attorneys v Commission 
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of appellate courts in South Africa, which exposes the decisions of the Labour Court on 
review to three tiers of appeal.
259
 Parties having the resources to institute appeal proceedings 
may appeal against the Labour Court’s order to the Labour Appeal Court, against the Labour 
Appeal Court’s order to the Supreme Court of Appeal and finally, against the Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s order to the Constitutional Court.260 Contributing to this is the unfortunate reality 
that well-resourced employers may institute review proceedings purely for the purposes of 
delay, with no genuine intention of pursuing the matter.
261
 The absence of legislative 
provision requiring review proceedings to be set down for hearing within a specific period of 
the serving and filing of the respondent’s replying affidavit, enables this tactic.262 
Applications for review may accordingly be instituted
263
 but never heard.
264
  
 
Another threat to efficiency was posed by the LAC’s decision in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v 
Marcus NO & Others.
265
 There, the Court extended the grounds of review listed in section 
145 of the LRA to include rational justifiability.
266
  The extension saw an influx in review 
proceedings.
267
 The Constitutional Court’s (‘CC’) subsequent decision in Sidumo, updating 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (1998) 19 ILJ 143 (LAC). More recently, however, see 
Herholdt paras 53-56. 
259
 Consider, in this regard, Anton Steenkamp and Craig Bosch ‘Labour dispute resolution under the 1995 LRA: 
Problems, pitfalls and potential’ 2012 Acta Juridica 120. 
260
 Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule & others [2003] 7 BLLR 631 (SCA); NUMSA & others v Fry’s 
Metals (Pty) Ltd [2005] 5 BLLR 430 (SCA); Benjamin (2007) at 6-7. For the legislature’s response to remedying 
the delays and difficulties associated with the cumbersome structure of the courts, consider the draft Superior 
Courts Bill GG 33216 of 21 May 2010; at the time of writing the Bill was open for public comment. Should this 
Bill be passed, the Labour Courts will be dispensed with and all labour matters will proceed directly to the High 
Courts, thereby eliminating one tier of appeal. Consult too the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill GG 
32311 of 17 June 2009. 
261
 Benjamin (2009) at 41; Benjamin (2007) at 34; Benjamin & Gruen at 35-36. 
262
 Benjamin (2009) at 42; John Grogan ‘Stalled reviews: Lessons by the DOL’ (2005) 21(5) Employment Law 
16. 
263
 Coupled with a convenient application for a stay of the CCMA arbitration award until such time as the review 
proceedings are heard. Note, however, the current Labour Relations Amendment Bill, which aims to remedy this 
problem, available at: 
 https://www.labour.gov.za/downloads/legislation/bills/proposed-amendment-bills/lraamendmentbill.pdf, 
accessed on 27 November 2012. 
264
 Benjamin (2009) at 41-42; Steenkamp & Bosch at 131. See, however, K Young ‘Labour Court review 
applications: Diligence and the onus to pursue without undue delay’ (2007) 16(8) Contemporary Labour law 87; 
Autopax Passenger Services (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2007] 1 BLLR 39 (LC) and 
Bezuidenhout v Johnston NO & others [2006] 12 BLLR 1131 (LC).  
265
 In Carephone, the LAC found that when holding CCMA commissioners to the standards required by section 
33 of the Constitution, reviewing courts were to enquire whether there was: ‘…a rational objective basis 
justifying the connection made by the […commissioner…] between the material properly available to him and 
the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?’; Carephone para 37. This standard was generally referred to as 
the rational justifiability standard but has since been replaced by the standard of reasonableness; Sidumo para 
109.  
266
 Ibid. 
267
 Benjamin (2009) at 43. According to Benjamin, as a result of the LAC’s decision in Carephone, the estimated 
incidence of review proceedings increased from approximately 10% to 20%; Benjamin (2007) at 34 & 39. 
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the test for review, was expected to reduce the frequency of reviews.
268
 Whether it did so, 
however, remains unclear.
269
 Arguably instead, Sidumo has augmented the difficulties with 
review. As indicated above, in Sidumo, the Court held that section 145 had been suffused by 
the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
270
 Reasonableness is generally acknowledged 
to permit more intrusive review than rational justifiability.
271
 Thus, it seems improbable that 
by replacing the Carephone standard
272
 with reasonableness, the incidence of review 
proceedings will be suppressed. Still, whatever the impact of Sidumo is, the benefits for 
efficiency of discouraging review proceedings persist; they are therefore relevant on 
review.
273
  
 
Whereas the prohibition against appeals supports efficiency and accessibility, it is by no 
means beyond criticism.
274
 As Brand remarks, the difficulty with the ban is its effect on 
consistency in the outcomes of proceedings. As CCMA awards do not constitute legal 
precedent, commissioners are not bound by each other’s findings. There is further little scope 
for reviewing courts to confirm the true state of the law.
275
 In Brand’s view, while limiting 
challenges to private arbitrators’ decisions is apt, the same cannot be said of statutorily 
compelled arbitral awards.
276
 As such, extending the ambit of review (in Carephone and 
subsequently in Sidumo) was debatably a necessary evil.
277
 
 
Returning to the Act’s promotion of expeditiousness, the exclusion of legal representatives 
from specified disputes discourages the protraction of proceedings oft occasioned by 
lawyers.
278
 Again, while advantageous to a degree, the prohibition presents problems. In 
particular, it places a considerable burden on commissioners, who are denied the benefits of 
                                                          
268
 Benjamin (2009) at 43. 
269
 Consider Alan Rycroft ‘An evaluation of the Labour Court’ at 64-68 in Andrew Levy & Tanya Venter (eds) 
The Dispute Resolution Digest 2012 (2012) 61, read with the CCMA Annual Report 2010-2011. 
270
 Sidumo para 109. 
271
 For the relationship between rationality and reasonableness, consult chapters 3, 4 and 6 of this thesis. 
272
 Carephone para 37. 
273
 Benjamin (2009) at 47-48. Note, however, Tuchten J’s contrary sentiments in Herholdt paras 53-56. See also 
O’Regan J’s argument in Sidumo that extending section 145 to incorporate reasonableness would not hamper 
efficiency. 
274
 Consider Herholdt paras 53-56; Benjamin & Cooper at 275, citing Clive Thompson 'The 1995 Labour 
Relations Bill' IMSSA Bulletin (1995) at 23. 
275
 In addition, argues Brand, the lack of appeals detracts from the capacity of the courts to remedy the 
potentially severe implications of unfair or incorrect findings. This is particularly concerning in South Africa, 
where unemployment and poverty are rife; Brand (2000) at 90. 
276
 Brand (2000) at 90; see also Sharpe (2000) at 2173. 
277
 Brand (2000) at 90. 
278
 Rule 25 of the CCMA Rules; Benjamin (2009) at 35. As discussed above, the prohibition similarly promotes 
accessibility and flexibility. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
51 
 
legal argument and written pleadings enjoyed by the courts.
279
 Instead, commissioners 
receive but brief statements of the parties’ cases which rarely include legal references or 
argument.
280
 Once more, this is a feature of the CCMA process to which reviewing courts 
should be alive when assessing awards.
281
  
 
Accessibility, flexibility and informality and efficiency are concepts entrenched in the 
reasons for the CCMA’s development and the provisions of the LRA itself. The concepts are 
paramount to effective labour dispute resolution.
282
 Nonetheless, various challenges face 
these features of CCMA proceedings and the institution has only partially attained them as a 
result. In themselves, they require commissioners to function under tremendous pressure both 
time and resource-wise.
283
 The extent of the strain imposed on commissioners is revealed by 
the figures depicted in the CCMA’s Annual Reports.284 In particular, the figures cited in its 
report of 2009/2010 are exemplary;
285
 that report is discussed below.
286
 
 
4. THE CCMA’S ANNUAL REPORT 
 
When introducing the CCMA’s Annual Report of 2009/2010, the Chairperson of its 
Governing Body described the year as one which had confronted the CCMA with 
considerable challenges. Specifically, the ‘global economic crisis’, together with the 
enhanced accessibility of the institution and its budgetary constraints, placed it under severe 
pressure.
287
 As a result of these challenges, the South African government was obliged to 
                                                          
279
 In judicial proceedings, the presiding officers almost always have the benefit of legal argument from qualified 
attorneys or advocates. In addition, parties to court proceedings are required to submit detailed written pleadings 
of their cases, a benefit not enjoyed by arbitrating commissioners who are instead limited to brief accounts of 
parties’ contentions (if these are provided at all). These accounts are generally handwritten and incorporated into 
the LRA referral forms 7.11 and 7.13. Reviewing courts should be alive to these issues when assessing 
commissioners’ awards; Benjamin (2007) at 10-13; note, however, Brand (2000) at 79, as discussed above.  
280
 See the LRA Referral Forms 7.11 and 7.13, available at http://www.ccma.org.za, accessed on 20 November 
2012. 
281
 Benjamin (2007) at 13. 
282
 And arguably that of social justice too; Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 63. 
283
 Benjamin (2007) at 3. 
284
 Brand observes that these pressures have been shown to be deleterious to commissioners’ independence and 
health, as well as to the quality of their awards; Brand (2000) at 84; consider too Benjamin (2009) at 38 & 40 
and Benjamin (2013). For comparative figures associated with the Industrial Courts, see O’Regan (1989) at 559. 
285
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010; for more recent, but less specific figures, see the CCMA Annual Report 
2010-2011 at 18-21. For a general analysis and additional details, consider Venter & Levy. 
286
 As noted above, the CCMA’s governing body is obliged by section 122(3) of the LRA to submit an annual 
report of its finances and operations to the Minister of Labour. For the institution’s statistics, consult the 
CCMA’s Annual Reports, available at http://www.ccma.org.za; Benjamin (2009) at 27-40 and Benjamin (2007) 
at 3. 
287
 Due principally to the increased caseload; the CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 3. 
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advance additional funding to the CCMA to secure its continued operation.
288
 The pressures 
it faced are significant for several reasons. First, they constitute a stark reminder of the need 
for flexibility in CCMA proceedings. In order to adapt and respond to changing economic, 
societal and financial circumstances, commissioners must be permitted to conduct 
proceedings in flexible ways. Second, they divulge the role of context in delineating the 
scope of review – CCMA awards cannot, under such pressurised circumstances, be expected 
to be perfect and reviewing courts must recall this when evaluating commissioners’ findings. 
Finally, the challenges posed to the CCMA portray the institution’s reliance on government, 
notwithstanding its statutorily established independence.
289
 In turn, the pertinence of 
administrative law must be acknowledged. Together with the ambit of review, the 
implications of this are detailed in subsequent chapters. 
 
The figures cited in the Annual Report further attest to the obstacles the body faced. During 
the 2009/2010 financial year, 153 657 disputes were referred to the CCMA, equating to 617 
new referrals every working day.
290
 This marked an increase of 9% in the institution’s 
caseload. Of these disputes, the vast majority concerned unfair dismissals.
291
 In the same 
year, 116 022 conciliations were conducted, amounting to 466 conciliations each working 
day. Conciliations comprised 61% of the total matters heard by the CCMA, reflecting an 
increase of 14% over the previous year.
292
 Impressively, 99.8% of these were heard within 
the statutory time frame of 30 days. On average, finalising a dispute by conciliation was 
completed within 27 days of the receipt of the referral.
293
 
 
                                                          
288
 The CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 23, records that the CCMA made representations to the Department 
of Labour during the financial year of 2009 to 2010 for an increase of R65 million in its Government Grant 
allocation. Inadequate resources has been an ongoing problem for the CCMA; Brand (2000) at 81-83. 
289
 Section 113 of the LRA. 
290
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 18. For the effect of the economic downturn on the number of disputes 
arising from operational requirements dismissals, which were referred to the CCMA during this period, see the 
CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 22. 
291
 As Benjamin and Gruen observe, for various reasons, these statistics are not, however, altogether reliable; 
Benjamin & Gruen at 28. According to Benjamin, the incidence of unfair dismissal disputes has been notably 
consistent over the years; Benjamin (2009) at 29. For more recent figures, see Venter & Levy and the CCMA 
Annual Reports, available at http://www.ccma.org.za.  
292
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 18. According to Godfrey and Theron, compared to their predecessors 
(the conciliation boards which operated under the 1956 Labour Relations Act), the CCMA has achieved 
significant success in resolving disputes by conciliation; Theron & Godfrey (2002) at 29.   
293
 Recall, however, that these figures are deceptive; Benjamin & Gruen at 13 & 24. For further comments on the 
CMS database, see Benjamin (2009) at 38 and Benjamin (2013). In the latter, Benjamin notes that some of these 
difficulties have since been rectified. Consider too Haroon Bhorat, Kalie Pauw & Liberty Mncube 
Understanding the efficiency of the dispute resolution system in South Africa: an analysis of CCMA data 
Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 09/137 (May 2009). 
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In addition to conciliations, 48 138 arbitrations were held, corresponding to 25% of the 
disputes dealt with by the CCMA during the period under review. This constituted an 
increase of 20% over the preceding year.
294
 99% of the arbitration awards issued were 
rendered within the 30 day statutory time period therefore
295
 and the average time from 
referral to finalisation was 39 days.
296
 Finally, 24 778 additional ‘processes’297 were heard 
during 2009/2010, reflecting a 10% increase from 2008/2009, and 10 506 applications for 
certification of arbitration awards were received.
298
  
 
Both the immensity of these figures and the speed with which conciliations and arbitrations 
are handled
299
 depict the stressors placed on commissioners’ operations. Positively however, 
they confirm the CCMA’s achievement of efficient dispute resolution - a commendable 
attribute given its legislative mandate. Adding to the body’s accolades, the Annual Report 
recorded a substantial reduction in the number of awards referred to the Labour Court for 
review, compared to that of 2007/2008.
300
 The implication is that the quality and legitimacy 
of awards improved during 2009/2010. According to the report, the primary reason for this 
was the implementation of an award perusal system, which had been formalized over 
preceding years.
301
 When considering the impact of Sidumo (if any) on the frequency of 
reviews, the introduction of this system (which coincided with the CC’s judgment), must be 
noted.
302
 
 
Given the relationship between the characteristics of CCMA proceedings and the daily 
challenges with which it is confronted, when determining the extent of reviewing courts’ 
                                                          
294
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 19. 
295
 Initially, there were lengthy delays between arbitration proceedings and the issuing of awards; Theron & 
Godfrey (2000) at 59. 
296
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 19. Consider too Benjamin & Gruen at 28.  
297
 These include rescissions and in limine proceedings, for example. 
298
 This reflects an increase of 7% from the financial year of 2008 to 2009. Whether this suggests that the impact 
of the economic crisis was so severe that employers simply could not afford to abide by arbitration awards, or 
whether there is an alternative explanation for the increase, is unclear. 
299
 Consider too the Director’s Report, where the CCMA’s internal targets are discussed; CCMA Annual Report 
2009-2010 at 10-12. These targets constitute overt indicators of the pressures placed on commissioners to 
resolve disputes quickly, despite the absence of resources. 
300
 According to the report, the number of review proceedings declined between 2007 and 2008. In the financial 
year of 2009 to 2010, there was a further 5.4% reduction in the incidence of review proceedings against CCMA 
arbitration awards; CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 13. 
301
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 13. Thus, the reduction in review proceedings should not be assumed to 
have arisen as a result of the CC’s decision in Sidumo. For additional mechanisms implemented to improve the 
quality of awards (including extensive training for commissioners and mentoring programmes), see Benjamin 
(2013) at 14. 
302
 As noted earlier, rather than remedying the confusion, the decision has only led to further confusion and 
inconsistency. See, in this regard, Herholdt paras 53-56 and the ensuing chapters of this thesis. 
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powers, it is necessary to recall not only its features, but also their impact on the institution 
itself.
303
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The Constitutional Court has confirmed the status of CCMA arbitration proceedings as 
administrative action.
304
 Still, the characteristics of the institution distinguish it from 
archetypal administrative bodies. These features are crucial to achieving the CCMA’s 
objects
305
 and concurrently those of the LRA.
306
 As such, they must be attended to during 
section 145 proceedings. In turn, when reformulating the test for review, deviating from 
generic approaches may be justified.
307
  
 
Included amongst the relevant traits of the CCMA are its independence, accessibility, 
efficiency, and flexibility.
308
 The institution’s independence from government is assured by 
the LRA. Even so, as a creature of statute exercising public power and dependent on 
government for funding, the CCMA remains accountable for its actions.
309
 Looking to the 
second of its features, the institution’s geographical reach and provision of largely free 
services, ensures its accessibility. Efficiency is maintained through certain legislative 
mechanisms provided for in the LRA. Of these, the short time periods for referrals and for 
hearing disputes, as well as the obligation of commissioners to render awards within 14 days 
of concluding arbitration proceedings, are most striking.
310
 Finally, flexibility and informality 
are supported by the LRA’s directive that disputes be resolved by conciliation and arbitration 
rather than traditional court adjudication. In this way, coupled both with the Codes 
                                                          
303
 In addition to resolving individual disputes, the CCMA performs certain services, including the mediation of 
large scale disputes, general dispute management and prevention, education, training and development, 
institution building and the determination of matters relating to essential services; CCMA Annual Report 2009-
2010 at 21 – 39. 
304
 Sidumo para 88. 
305
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 2. 
306
 Most pertinently that of ensuring the effective resolution of labour disputes; section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA; 
consider too section 23 of the Constitution. 
307
 Consider the CC’s rejection of PAJA’s application to section 145 proceedings; Sidumo para 104. The 
influence of policy considerations on the nature of disputes arising in the labour relations arena is of additional 
relevance. As Cheadle observes: ‘...the policy issues that should inform the granting of a remedy in employment 
law become lost in a general right to test administrative action…’; Cheadle at 678 para 51. See also Chirwa 
paras 143-149 and Gcaba para 69. Arguably, this overlaps with O’Regan J’s approach in Sidumo, of determining 
the administrative status of the CCMA with reference to the Constitutional appropriateness of doing so; Sidumo 
paras 132-137.  
308
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319. 
309
 Consistently with sections 1(d), 33 and 195(1) of the Constitution; see too Sidumo para 88. 
310
 Sections 138(7) and 191 of the LRA. 
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promulgated under the Act
311
 and commissioners’ broad discretions to conduct arbitrations in 
any appropriate manner but ‘with the minimum of legal formalities’,312 informality and 
flexibility in CCMA proceedings are legislatively secured. The intention behind these 
features was to design a dispute resolution system responsive to the sensitive nature of 
employment disputes. Regrettably, judicial interference and the failure to update the Codes 
regularly have scuppered this objective somewhat. While the Code’s stagnation requires 
regulatory amendment to rectify, tempering the impact of undue judicial intervention, by 
revising the test for review, is the task of this thesis. 
 
Each of the CCMA’s characteristics plays an important role in promoting its goals and 
effective functioning. As these features affect both commissioners and parties to disputes in 
various ways, they are equally germane to review. Commissioners are required to hear and 
resolve a substantial number of cases annually, with minimal financial or legal assistance.
313
 
In addition, their statutory mandate to finalise disputes quickly places them under 
considerable pressure.
314
 Frequently, changing economic, social, and political forces 
aggravate these stressors.
315
 In spite of this, the CCMA’s recorded performance and 
efficiency are impressive.
316
 Its contribution to alleviating tensions arising in the employment 
arena is well recognised
317
 and it enjoys wide esteem within the communities it serves.
318
  
 
To ensure the CCMA’s continued functionality, efficacy and credibility, when reviewing 
arbitration awards, respect for its role in protecting employees’ rights to fair labour practices 
is due.
319
 To ensure this, the essence and key features of the institution, as well as their 
impact on commissioners and parties, must be recalled. The requisites of the right to 
                                                          
311
 Section 213 of the LRA. 
312
 Section 138(1) of the LRA. 
313
 Rule 25 of the CCMA Rules, read with the discussion thereon above. 
314
 Section 138(7) of the LRA. 
315
 CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 2-3. 
316
 Compare its success, for example, with that of the former Industrial Courts. Prior to the creation of the 
CCMA, conciliation boards and the Industrial Court were responsible for conciliating labour disputes; Du Toit et 
al (2003) at 22. The success rate of the Industrial Courts in conciliating disputes was less than 30% and that of 
conciliation boards, 20%. By comparison, in the financial year of 2009 to 2010, the CCMA successfully resolved 
59% of all disputes referred to it by conciliation. This figure has been reasonably consistent over the past three 
years; CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 13. 
317
 Consult, for example, Benjamin (2013) at 52-53.  
318
 Du Toit et al (2003) at 42-45; Benjamin (2009) at 26. Theron & Godfrey (2000) at 56 and Brand (2000) at 78. 
Furthermore, the institution was awarded the Public Sector Gold Award for the best reputation in the legal sector 
in the financial year of 2009 to 2010; CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 at 10. Note, however, Theron & Godfrey 
(2002) at 45-46 and Brand (2000) at 81. 
319
 Section 23 of the Constitution. 
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administrative justice and the traditional manner in which it has been effected during review 
proceedings threaten these features. When delineating the powers of reviewing courts, a 
suitable balance between them and the right to just administrative action must accordingly be 
struck. As discussed in the chapters which follow, achieving that balance may be difficult. 
The discussion opens with the predecessor to reasonableness – rational justifiability – and the 
judgment of the LAC in Carephone. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE TEST FOR REVIEW PRIOR TO SIDUMO V RUSTENBURG PLATINUM 
MINES – CAREPHONE (PTY) LTD V MARCUS NO & OTHERS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the Constitutional Court’s (‘CC’) decision in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd & others,
320
 the scope of the test for review of CCMA arbitration awards 
had been comprehensively considered in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others.
321
  The 
principle distinction between the two judgments lies in the Constitution in terms of which 
each was decided. While Carephone was effectively determined under the interim 
Constitution,
322
 Sidumo followed the final Constitution.
323
 The two are therefore intimately 
connected and a thorough appraisal of Carephone is crucial to understanding Sidumo. The 
debate and confusion to which Carephone gave rise further illustrate many of the difficulties 
associated with formulating the standard of review. What follows is a brief synopsis of 
Carephone, together with a discussion of the reasons for the Court’s decision and the 
uncertainty resulting from it.
324
  
 
2. CAREPHONE (PTY) LTD V MARCUS NO & OTHERS 
 
In Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others,
325
 the Labour Appeal Court (‘LAC’) was 
called to establish the nature and extent of the courts’ powers of review over CCMA 
arbitration awards.
326
 Before doing so, it was necessary to determine whether review 
proceedings against arbitration awards could be instituted under both sections 145 and 
158(1)(g) of the LRA,
327
 or whether applicants were confined to bringing proceedings under 
                                                          
320
 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
321
 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
322
 Compare section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (‘the Interim 
Constitution’) with section 33, read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6, of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’). While they read identically, Carephone was formally determined under the 
latter; Carephone para 15. 
323
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
324
 Ibid; Sidumo paras 106 & 110. 
325
 Carephone. 
326
 Carephone para 2. 
327
 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’ or ‘the Act’); section 158(1)(g) (as it then was) read as follows: 
‘The Labour Court may –  
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section 145.
328
 The principal basis of the argument for the former was that section 145, in so 
far as it offered only limited grounds of review,
329
 failed to give adequate effect to the 
parties’ rights to just administrative action.330 To circumvent this difficulty, section 
158(1)(g)
331
 had sometimes been construed as  a permissible avenue for reviewing arbitration 
awards.
332
  In Carephone, Froneman DJP rejected this approach.
333
  
 
Before doing so, however, the question of whether CCMA arbitrations constituted 
administrative action required attention.
334
 The Judge began with an overview of the 
Constitutional context in which the CCMA operates. Importantly, while the CCMA was not 
judicial in nature, it remained bound by the Constitutional provisions governing organs of 
state and the public administration; it was similarly bound by the Bill of Rights.
335
 Thus, in 
Froneman DJP’s view, the CCMA was clearly an administrative body for the purposes of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
…despite section 145, review the performance or purported performance  of any function provided for 
in this Act or any act or omission of any person or body in terms of this Act on any grounds that are 
permissible in law…’ 
In the lead up to Carephone, the Labour Courts had passed conflicting judgments on the question; Carephone 
para 4; Daniel Malan Pretorius ‘Making you whistle: the Labour Appeal Court’s approach to reviews of CCMA 
arbitration awards’ (2000) 21 ILJ 1506; B Grant ‘The review of arbitration awards in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act’  (1999) 2 Stell LR 251 at 252-253; Standard Bank of South Africa v CCMA & others [1998] 6 
BLLR 622 (LC); Linda Deutsch v Pinto & another (1997) 18 ILJ 1008 (LC); Ntshangane v Speciality Metals CC 
[1998] 3 BLLR 305 (LC); Pep Stores Ltd v Advocate AP Laka NO & others [1998] 9 BLLR 952 (LC); Edgars 
Stores (Pty) Ltd v Director, CCMA & others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC); Kynoch Feeds (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & 
others [1998] 4 BLLR 384 (LC); Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others 
[1997] 11 BLLR 1475 (LC); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [1998] 5 BLLR 510 (LC). Note that 
in terms of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 12 of 2002, the section was amended and the word ‘despite’ 
was replaced with the phrase ‘subject to’. According to Benjamin, the original section was an ‘obvious drafting 
error’; Paul Benjamin ‘Friend or foe? The impact of judicial decisions on the operation of the CCMA’ (2007) 28 
ILJ 1 at 32. 
328
 Of the LRA. 
329
 Carephone para 7. As Grant notes, section 145 offers litigants only narrow, procedurally based grounds of 
review consistently with the purpose of the LRA to promote efficient dispute resolution; Grant at 252; section 
1(d) of the LRA; The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act 1995 16 ILJ 278 (‘the Explanatory 
Memorandum’) at 318-319. 
330
 In terms of section 33 read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution. See also Nicci Whitear-Nel 
‘Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC)’ (1999) 20 ILJ 1483 at 1484. 
331
 Note that section 158(1)(g) constitutes a broader and more general basis for review than section 145; Calvin 
William Sharpe ‘Reviewing CCMA arbitration awards: Towards clarity in the Labour Courts’ (2000) 21 ILJ 
2160 at 2161-2163. 
332
 Whitear-Nel at 1484; Sharpe (2000) at 2161-2163; see too the decisions cited in Carephone para 4. 
333
 Note that Froneman DJP wrote the decision on behalf of an unanimous Court; Carephone paras 25-27. In 
doing so, the Judge interpreted the words ‘despite section 145’ as ‘subject to section 145’; Carephone paras 26-
28; See also Standard Bank (1998) (LC) at 625A-B. For criticism of the interpretive approach adopted by 
Froneman DJP, see Pretorius at 1512-1513. Note that while the Judge discussed both subsections 158(1)(g) and 
158(1)(h) as bases from which to review CCMA arbitration awards, it is unnecessary to distinguish between the 
subsections for the purposes of this thesis. They will instead be referred to generally as section ‘158(1)’, unless 
otherwise specified. 
334
 Carephone para 15. 
335
 See, in particular, sections 195(1) & 2, 8, 33, 165-166 and 239 of the Constitution; Carephone paras 11-16.  
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Constitution.
336
 Amongst other obligations,
337
 the institution’s administrative status obliged 
commissioners not only to respect parties’ fundamental rights, but also to ensure fairness, 
impartiality, equitability and an unbiased approach during all arbitration proceedings.
338
 
Apposite adherence to the rule of law was of further import.
339
  
 
This outcome was endorsed by the substantive component of the right to just administrative 
action.
340
 Accountability, responsiveness and openness in all public institutions, noted 
Froneman DJP, were the core values upon which the right was based.
341
 The suggestion that 
the CCMA, while a public body, was exempt from upholding those values
342
 was contrary to 
the essence of the right.
343
 There could be no doubt therefore, held the Judge, that when 
conducting arbitrations, the CCMA engaged in administrative action.
344
 This, in turn, 
imposed Constitutional constraints upon the exercise of commissioners’ arbitral powers; 
these constraints were described in Carephone as follows: 
 
‘The constitutional imperatives for compulsory arbitration under the LRA are thus 
that the process must be fair and equitable, that the arbitrator must be impartial and 
unbiased, that the proceedings must be lawful and procedurally fair, that the reasons 
for the award must be given publicly and in writing, that the award must be justifiable 
in terms of those reasons and that it must be consistent with the fundamental right to 
labour practices.’345 
 
Having identified these limits, Froneman DJP examined the relevant provisions of the 
LRA
346
 and resolved that the Act complied with them.
347
 To the extent to which 
commissioners failed to adhere to these constraints, review proceedings were available. 
Section 145(2)(a)(iii)
348
 was more than sufficient for protecting parties’ rights in this regard 
                                                          
336
 Carephone paras 17-18. 
337
 Most importantly perhaps, the obligations to remain accountable, open and transparent as stipulated in 
sections 1(d) and 195(1)(f)-(g) of the Constitution. 
338
 Section 195(1)(d) of the Constitution; Carephone paras 11-16. 
339
 Carephone para 9; section 1(c) of the Constitution. This section provides that South Africa is a democracy 
which is founded, among other things, on the rule of law. In Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others 
2010 (2) SA 92 (CC), the Court explained the relationship between the aforementioned values and the rule of 
law as follows: ‘[T]he rule of law requires that [judges] should not act arbitrarily and that [judges] should be 
accountable’; Strategic Liquor Services para 17. 
340
 Section 33 of the Constitution; Carephone para 19. 
341
 Ibid; Carephone para 35.. 
342
 On the basis that arbitration proceedings did not constitute administrative action. 
343
 Carephone para 19. 
344
 Ibid paras 11-19. 
345
 Ibid para 20. 
346
 Specifically, he examined sections 136-138 of the LRA. 
347
 Carephone paras 21-22; sections 136-138 of the LRA. 
348
 The subsection permits review on the basis that a commissioner exceeded his or her powers. 
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and there was accordingly no need to permit review under section 158(1)(g).
349
 In fact, 
warned the Judge, permitting such review would only impede the expeditiousness and 
informality with which CCMA proceedings were intended to be resolved.
350
  
 
Froneman DJP then addressed the nature of review appropriate to administrative action. He 
noted first that the entrenchment of the right to administrative justice had extended the scope 
of review.
351
 This was apparent from the Constitutional stipulation that administrative action 
be justifiable in relation to the reasons for it.
352
 This requirement introduced a need for 
rationality in the merits or outcome of administrative decisions.
353
 In other words, 
irrationality as a ground of review was no longer confined to review for procedural 
irregularities or constitutive merely as evidence thereof.
354
  
 
Nonetheless, cautioned Froneman DJP, the distinction between appeals and reviews remained 
important. Reviewing courts were not excused by the rationality test from maintaining this 
distinction during section 145 proceedings. The term ‘justifiable’ meant: ‘able to be shown to 
be just, reasonable, or correct, or defensible.’355 Yet, it did not require that administrative 
action in fact be ‘just, justified or correct.’356 According to Froneman DJP, this fine 
discrepancy was crucial to sustaining the discrete characteristics of appeal and review.
357
 
Informing the distinction was respect for the proper separation of powers between the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary.
358
 This obliged reviewing courts to refrain from 
                                                          
349
 Carephone paras 24-29. 
350
 Ibid para 28, read with the implications of the Judge’s earlier remarks; Carephone para 21. Those included 
that section 138(1) of the LRA required commissioners to conduct arbitration proceedings quickly and with the 
minimum of legal formalities. 
351
 Following Carephone there was little doubt that the introduction of the rational justifiability test had extended 
the available grounds of review; Whitear-Nel at 1486; Sharpe (2000) at 2174; Grant  at 255-256; Gill Loveday 
‘Justifiability is the key: Review judgments reviewed’ (1998) 14(5) Employment Law 4. Whether the same can 
be said in the wake of Sidumo is controversial. The reasons for the uncertainty are detailed in later chapters of 
this dissertation.  
352
 Section 33 read with item 23 of Schedule 6 to the Constitution; Carephone para 31. See also the SCA’s 
decision in Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others [2006] 11 BLLR 1021 
(SCA) which confirms this. 
353
 Carephone paras 30-31. Prior to Carephone, unreasonableness had been held to constitute a reviewable 
irregularity only where the unreasonableness arose from the relevant commissioner’s failure to apply his or her 
mind to the matter before him or her; Venture Motor Holdings Ltd t/a Williams Hunt Delta v Biyana & Others 
(1998) 19 ILJ 1266 (LC) paras 5 & 26; Hira and Another v Booysen and Another 1992 (4) SA 69 (A); 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Wits Nigel Ltd 1988 (3) SA 132 (A). 
354
 Carephone paras 30-31. 
355
 Ibid para 32. 
356
 Ibid. 
357
 Ibid. 
358
 The need to respect the separation of powers (‘SOP’) ostensibly led to decisions such as Davis JA’s in BMD 
Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU [2001] 7 BLLR 705 (LAC). There, the Judge held that the rational 
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simply replacing commissioners’ findings with their own preferences as to outcome. Courts 
were not permitted to assume the administrative function themselves, despite the need for 
value judgments to be made during the course of rationality review.
359
 
 
Expanding on the meaning of rational justifiability, Froneman DJP recounted the substantive 
nature of the test, recording that it had often been referred to as reasonableness, 
proportionality or rationality.
360
 In his view, however, it was unhelpful to redefine it. Instead, 
the appropriate test for review could be formulated plainly as follows: 
 
‘…is there a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the 
administrative decision maker between the material properly available to him and the 
conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?’361  
  
Applying the new standard to the matter before the Court,
362
 Froneman DJP found the 
Commissioner’s award rationally justifiable.363 According to the Judge, the Commissioner’s 
reasoning was rationally connected to the material before him and he had therefore not 
exceeded his ‘constitutionally constrained’ powers under section 145(2)(a)(iii).364 Notably, 
the test devised in Carephone made no reference to the capacity of alternative reasons to 
justify otherwise deficient awards. On a direct reading thereof then, reasons other than those 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
justifiability standard required courts to: ‘…afford administrative bodies a significant margin of appreciation and 
[did] not [permit them to] evaluate their actions in terms of value judgments which the courts impose upon the 
activities of such bodies.’; BMD Knitting Mills para 18. 
359
 Carephone paras 33-35. In reaching this conclusion, Froneman DJP referred to Hira at 91E-I; in Hira, the 
Appellate Division had remarked that ‘it was quite proper to give an independent and impartial administrative 
tribunal the exclusive competence to decide not only matters of fact, but also of law, with no right of appeal to a 
court.’ Thus, in Froneman DJP’s iew, the LRA’s conference of decision-making power on the CCMA did not 
offend section 34 of the Constitution; Carephone para 33. For affirmation of this approach, consult Cora Hoexter 
‘Standards of review of administrative action – review for reasonableness’ in Jonathan Klaaren (ed) A delicate 
balance: The place of the judiciary in Constitutional democracy – Proceedings of a symposium to mark the 
retirement of Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa (2006) at 68–9. 
360
 For alternative meanings associated with the concept (and the relationship between ‘reasonableness’ and 
‘appropriateness’), see Whitear-Nel at 1487-1489; Standard Bank (1998) (LC) paras 21-27. Note that in 
Standard Bank, Tip AJ contended that reasonableness review was available to aggrieved litigants as a result of 
commissioners’ statutory obligation to render ‘appropriate awards’ under section 138(9) of the LRA. In effect, 
he held, reasonableness and appropriateness were equivalent. Consider too Pep Stores and C Garbers ‘The 
demise of the “reasonable employer” test’ (2000) 9(9) Contemporary Labour Law 81 at 87.  
361
 Carephone para 37; the test has been labeled the ‘rational justifiability test’, the ‘rational justifiability 
standard,’ the ‘Carephone standard’ and the ‘Carephone test’ and these terms will be used interchangeably to 
refer to the standard throughout the text of this thesis.  See, in this regard, Loveday (1998) at 4 and Mark Wesley 
‘Review of CCMA arbitration awards: Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw & others’ (2001) 22 ILJ 1515 at 
1515. Wesley refers to the standard simply as the ‘justifiability’ test. 
362
 Before doing so, Froneman DJP confirmed that there was no basis on which to set the award aside under 
sections 145(2)(a)(i), 145(2)(a)(ii) or 145(2)(b) of the LRA. These sections include the grounds of improperly 
obtaining an award, gross irregularity and misconduct. 
363
 Carephone para 53. 
364
 Ibid. For a discussion of the standard’s application to private arbitration awards, see Roelof McLahlan ‘Lack 
of justifiability or rationality as a ground for review of private arbitration awards’ (2002) 5 De Rebus 49. 
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given by commissioners ought to have been irrelevant to the enquiry. Still, following 
Carephone, reviewing courts regularly resorted to assessing alternative reasons for awards 
when applying the standard of rational justifiability.
365
 
 
3. CRITICISING CAREPHONE 
 
Froneman DJP’s decision is generally concise and well constructed. His location of the 
rational justifiability enquiry within section 145(2)(a)(iii), while understandable in the 
circumstances, was nevertheless unfortunate.
366
 The substantive nature of rationality 
inevitably requires scrutiny of the merits of disputes. However, the authority of decision-
makers to issue final determinations cannot, by definition, depend upon the validity of those 
determinations.
367
   
 
In an earlier decision of the Labour Court – Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Reutech 
Defence Industries v Naicker & others
368
 – Landman J addressed the meaning of ‘excess of 
powers’ thoroughly. Amongst other pertinent observations, the Judge remarked that: 
 
‘...(3) The powers of … [CCMA commissioners] are,…, the powers conferred by the 
LRA and include the exercise of such discretionary powers as the law allows. 
 
(4) A commissioner will exceed the commissioner’s powers when the 
commissioner strays from the ambit of the commissioner’s jurisdiction or where the 
commissioner makes a ruling or awards a remedy which is beyond the powers of the 
commissioner. 
 
                                                          
365
 See, for example, Conradie JA’s judgment in De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others [2000] 9 
BLLR 995 (LAC). Consider too the Court’s decision in Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA & others 
[2004] JOL 12787 (LAC). As Benjamin records, following Carephone reviewing courts regularly conducted 
review in a manner more consistent with appeal; Benjamin (2007) at 34. 
366
 Garbers (2000) at 86-87 would arguably disagree. 
367
 Consider Makhanya v University of Zululand [2009] 4 All SA 146 (SCA) paras 50-54 and Reunert Industries 
(Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others [1997] 12 BLLR 1632 (LC). In Reunert 
Industries, the Court described the ground of excess of powers in detail, noting that: ‘Where the commissioner is 
given a choice of remedies the commissioner will not exceed the commissioner’s jurisdiction or powers merely 
by choosing one above another.’; Reunert Industries at 1637. Consult too Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw 
NO & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1232 (LC) para 53 and Bombardier Transportation (Pty) Ltd v Mtiya NO & others 
[2010] 8 BLLR 840 (LC). For the meaning of jurisdiction, see I Ellis ‘Civil Procedure: Magistrates Courts’ The 
Law of South Africa vol 3(2) 2 ed (2006) para 26 and Emma Fergus ‘Circumventing review – When is a question 
jurisdictional?’ (2012) 129 SALJ 504. 
368
 Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others [1997] 12 BLLR 1632 
(LC). 
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(5) Where the commissioner is given a choice of remedies the commissioner will 
not exceed the commissioner’s jurisdiction or powers merely by choosing one above 
another...’369  
 
On the strength of Landman J’s words, ‘excess of powers’ occurs when commissioners act in 
a manner inconsistent with the powers conferred upon them by the LRA.
370
 Placing the 
rational justifiability test within this irregularity suggests that, due to the Constitutional 
requisite that administrative action be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, when 
commissioners fail to reach rationally justifiable findings they exceed their powers.
371
 
However, this view misconstrues the intended function of section 33 of the Constitution and 
the reach of reviewing courts’ powers under section 145. There are several reasons for this. 
 
First, the principal purpose of section 33 is to establish the right to just administrative 
action.
372
 Yet, the creation of that right does not necessarily give rise to a corresponding 
power.
373
 If it did, the result would be an exceptionally generous construction of ‘excess of 
powers’ which would enable undue judicial interference with commissioners’ awards.374 A 
better understanding is that rather than imposing a power on commissioners to act reasonably, 
section 33 establishes a check on the exercise of commissioners’ powers. In turn, parties’ 
rights to just administrative action are protected.
375
 As Cheadle has explained: 
 
‘…bills of rights limit the exercise of power of the legislature and the executive by 
defining their limits and the nature of their engagement with the legal system. In a 
sense, a bill of rights is no more than a set of rules governing the limits (and 
sometimes the content) of other rules.’376 
 
Analogously, in Reunert Industries, Landman J described the impact of the Constitution on 
commissioners’ obligations; he stated:  
 
                                                          
369
 Ibid at 1636-1637. 
370
 Sidumo para 165; see also Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd [2007] 2 All SA 243 (SCA) para 52 
and the SCA’s reference thereto in Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impreglio SpA and Others 
[2006] 1 AC 221 [HL] para 24. Consider too Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) at 228-
229 and Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 386-389. 
371
 Carephone paras 22-24. 
372
 Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) at 642-644. 
373
 Hugh Corder ‘Reviewing review: much achieved, much more to do’ in Hugh Corder & Linda van der Vijver 
(eds) Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 1; Corder suggests that section 24 of the interim Constitution did 
not impose a positive duty on administrative bodies (or at least not all administrative bodies) to act fairly and 
reasonably. 
374
 Reunert Industries at 1636-1637. 
375
 Sidumo para 172. Note too, however, Ngcobo J’s judgment in Sidumo; Sidumo paras 273-277. 
376
 MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2010; 
updated loose-leaf) at 1-1. 
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‘Arbitrators…[are under a] duty to seek, but not necessarily to achieve, a lawful, just, 
fair and proper decision…’377 
 
In other words, commissioners must attempt to reach reasonable conclusions. Yet, to the 
extent to which they do not reach them, they cannot be said to have exceeded their powers.
378
  
 
Secondly, interpreting section 33 of the Constitution in this way threatens the separation of 
powers between the legislature and the judiciary. The legislature has conferred the power to 
resolve specified labour disputes on CCMA commissioners. Should their jurisdiction to 
exercise that power be subject to the requirement that they resolve disputes reasonably in 
every instance, failures by commissioners to reach reasonable conclusions would deprive 
them of the right to have exercised that power in the first place.
379
  The implication is that the 
power to determine whether commissioners may decide disputes at all, lies with the judiciary 
rather than the legislature. This blatantly disregards the proper delegation of governmental 
power and must for that reason be rejected. 
 
Thus, Froneman DJP’s location of rational justifiability within section 145(2)(a)(iii) of the 
LRA was regrettable. Whereas subsequent courts often ignored that location,
380
 labelling the 
rational justifiability test as an incident of ‘excess of powers’ evidently contributed to the 
confusion arising from Carephone. Specifically, the relationship between the section 145 
grounds of review and rational justifiability, as well as the degree (if any) to which they were 
interdependent, was unclear.
381
 Given the dual components of review,
382
 reading section 145 
                                                          
377
 Reunert Industries at 1634. 
378
 Ibid. 
379
 See Langa CJ’s decision in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and others [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 155, where the 
erstwhile Chief Justice observed that: ‘It seems to me axiomatic that the substantive merits of a claim cannot 
determine whether a court has jurisdiction to hear it.’ See also David Mullan Administrative Law (2001) at 54, 
citing P Craig in Administrative Law at 299-302 et seq; Telcordia Technologies para 52. 
380
 County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC) para 8. In Shoprite Checkers 
(2000)(LC), Wallis J held:  
‘It is certainly novel to suggest, as the judgment in Carephone suggests at paragraph 53 thereof, that 
justifiability of the award on the merits of the material placed before the arbitrator can properly fall 
within the ambit of an excess of the arbitrator’s powers. To adopt that approach is effectively to say that 
the only jurisdiction which the arbitrator has is to decide the case correctly and that is not only contrary 
to authority but would have the effect of transforming a review into an appeal.’; Shoprite Checkers 
(2000) (LC) para 53. 
In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) however, the Court 
described rational justifiability as falling within the ground of excess of powers; Shoprite Checkers (2001) 
(LAC) para 21.  
381
 Compare, for example, the varying approaches to this question adopted by the Judges in both County Fair 
Foods and De Beers as discussed in later paragraphs. 
382
 Being comprised of both substantive and procedural elements. 
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generally
383
 – as impliedly incorporating substantive rationality independently of the grounds 
provided for therein – would accordingly have been preferable.384  
 
Still, the Carephone decision was commendable in numerous respects. First, by detailing the 
Constitutional context in which section 145 review proceedings were to be conducted, and 
distinguishing between appeals and reviews as Froneman DJP did, critical aspects of the 
purposes and nature of review were canvassed.
385
 The Judge’s emphasis on rational 
justifiability as requiring only the ability to appear justified (rather than to be justified) is of 
further utility in defining the limits of review.
386
 Finally, it was apparent from Froneman 
DJP’s decision that the original section 145 grounds of review remained applicable.387 
Notwithstanding the clarity of his decision, however, later courts failed to apply the test 
consistently.
388
 In the process, the essence of the standard was unravelled, leaving a poor 
foundation for the CC’s decision in Sidumo.   
 
Four areas of concern were primarily responsible for the muddle.
389
 The first questioned 
whether CCMA arbitrations constituted administrative action.
390
 The second countered 
                                                          
383
 And without reference to the individual grounds stipulated therein. 
384
 It might well have appeased Nicholson JA’s concerns about locating the Carephone test under the ground of 
gross irregularity too; consult, in this regard, Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 340 
(LAC) para 39. 
385
 Carephone paras 15-37. For a positive appraisal of Carephone, see PAK Le Roux ‘The test for review of 
CCMA commissioners: Some certainty at last?’ (2001) 10(12) Contemporary Labour Law 117. 
386
 Carephone para 32. 
387
 This is evident from his description of the two components of review: procedural review as it was previously 
known and substantive review in the form of rational justifiability; Carephone paras 19-37. Consult too Crown 
Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others [2002] 6 BLLR 493 (LAC) para 58. 
388
 For a more detailed discussion of the manner in which the courts applied the test, see Edcon v Pillemer NO & 
others [2010] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA) para 12. There, Mlambo JA set out the two distinct (but opposing) interpretations 
of the Carephone standard which reviewing courts applied before Sidumo; the Judge suggested that only one of 
these interpretations was correct. See also Sharpe (2000) at 2164-2170; Benjamin (2007) at 34. 
389
 In Toyota SA Motors, Nicholson JA raised additional concerns (albeit only in obiter dicta). First, he 
questioned the capacity of the rational justifiability standard to be distinguished from the test on appeal. In 
support of his contention he cited the principles articulated in R v Dhlumayo 1948 (2) SA 677 (A); Toyota SA 
Motors paras 33-39. Furthermore, the Judge contested the LAC’s Constitutional basis for suffusing the section 
145 grounds of review with rationality, arguing that it had been unnecessary to do so in the absence of a 
Constitutional challenge (under section 36 of the Constitution) to the section. As such, he had ‘grave doubts’ as 
to whether the Carephone standard constituted an independent basis for review; Toyota SA Motors para 40. See 
too, in this regard, Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC) paras 64-77 and De Beers paras 7-9. Finally, Nicholson JA 
recorded his disagreement with casting rational justifiability as a form of gross irregularity; Toyota SA Motors 
para 39. For a comprehensive critique of the case, see Pretorius at 1513 & 1523; Garbers (2000) at 84-87. 
390
 Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC) paras 88-90; Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd v Brand NO & others (2001) 22 ILJ 
993 (LC) paras 53-55; Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Mudau & others [2003] 10 BLLR 
1034 (LC) at 1043 & 1047; Wesley; Pretorius at 1514-1523. Contrarily, Garbers suggested that, following 
Carephone, there was no dispute about the status of CCMA arbitration proceedings as administrative action; 
Garbers (2000) at 85. Consider, however, the Sidumo decisions, which evince the enduring uncertainty around 
the issue.  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
66 
 
Carephone’s prescriptions as to the reach of section 158(1)(g) and the prohibition against 
reviewing awards in terms thereof.
391
 Thirdly, the LAC was criticised for inappropriately 
investigating section 145’s compatibility with section 33,392 in the absence of a direct 
Constitutional challenge to the section.
393
 Finally, controversy arose around the confines and 
meaning of the rational justifiability standard.
394
 In particular, its aptitude for fudging the 
distinction between appeal and review was contested.
395
 The first and third of these critiques 
are beyond the scope of this paper and they will not be detailed here. Instead, it will merely 
be assumed that CCMA arbitrations constitute administrative action.
396
 The LAC’s 
entitlement to question section 145’s Constitutional compliance397 will similarly be 
accepted.
398
 As to the second challenge, it may readily be dispensed with. In fact, the 
legislature has since intervened.
399
 As a result, there is no longer any doubt that review 
proceedings against CCMA arbitration awards may only be brought in terms of section 145 
                                                          
391
 See, for example, Pretorius at 1524; Sharpe (2000) at 2171-2172; Loveday (1998); Shoprite Checkers (2000) 
(LC); Garbers (2000) at 82. 
392
 Of the Constitution. 
393
 Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC); Toyota SA Motors. 
394
 Loveday (1998); Whitear-Nel at 1487-1489, citing Tip AJ’s formulation of reasonableness  in Standard Bank 
as akin to ‘appropriateness’; Standard Bank (1998) (LC) paras 21-27. An alternative approach to rational 
justifiability suggests that the proper enquiry entails asking whether the outcome of the award was related to the 
purposes for which the power to resolve disputes was afforded to commissioners; Crown Chickens para 58; 
County Fair Foods para 10. Note that while Kroon JA in County Fair Foods criticized the Carephone judgment 
on the basis that Froneman DJP had failed to interpret the meaning of the term ‘justifiability’ correctly, the Judge 
nonetheless relied upon, and agreed with, Froneman DJP’s depiction of the rational justifiability standard; 
County Fair Foods paras 10-20. 
395
 Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC); Toyota SA Motors. Note that the candidate has elsewhere expressed the view 
that the distinction is unhelpfully superficial; Emma Fergus ‘The distinction between appeals and reviews – 
Defining the limits of the Labour Court’s powers of review’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1556; see also JR De Ville Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action in South Africa revised 1 ed (2005) at 30. In Garbers’s view, the Carephone 
standard imported a ‘90% right of appeal’ against CCMA awards; Garbers (2000) at 82. Consider, however, 
Pretorius’s distinctive view, which emphasizes that the rational justifiability test is concerned with the manner in 
which proceedings are conducted, rather than the correctness of awards; it therefore does not conflate appeal 
with review; Pretorius at 1522. 
396
 Arguably, the LAC’s findings in Carephone were in any event correct; Whitear-Nel at 1485. For further 
reading on the subject, consult Currie & De Waal at 650; De Ville (2005) at 35-87; Hoexter (2007) at 164-222; 
Cora Hoexter ‘Administrative action in the courts’ 2006 Acta Juridica 303 and President of the Republic of 
South Africa v South African Rugby and Football Union & Others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) (‘SARFU’). 
397
 In the absence of a Constitutional challenge thereto. 
398
 Doing so was arguably apt nonetheless. As the LAC in Carephone was obliged to determine whether section 
158(1) of the LRA was available to parties as an avenue for review of arbitration awards, it was necessary for the 
Court to assess the Constitutional validity of section 145 to a degree; Carephone paras 2-28; Whitear-Nel at 
1484. The contention is endorsed by section 39(2) of the Constitution which engenders courts when interpreting 
legislation to: ‘…promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights...’. Thus, the Constitution itself 
obliged the LAC to interpret the LRA with reference to and in compliance with the Bill of Rights; Pretorius at 
1523; Garbers (2000) at 86. All that was required was that the LAC’s interpretation of section 158 was one 
which the section was reasonably capable of bearing; Dadoo Ltd & others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 
1920 AD 530 para 554-555. Whether its interpretation was reasonable is debatable; Whitear-Nel at 1486; 
Kynoch Feeds (1998) (LC) at 395-396 and Solomon v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
& others (1999) 20 ILJ  2960 (LC) paras 19 & 21.  
399
 Section 158(1)(g) now reads ‘subject to section 145…’ rather than ‘despite section 145...’; section 36(b) of 
the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 12 of 2002. 
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of the LRA.
400
 The final difficulties listed above are, nonetheless, of significant import to this 
thesis. Together with judicial decisions following Carephone in which the scope of the 
rational justifiability standard was thoroughly examined, these critiques are analysed 
below.
401
 Unfortunately, much of the confusion evident in the courts’ decisions persists 
today. 
 
4. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CAREPHONE 
 
4.1 County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others 
 
In County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others,
402
 the LAC had the opportunity to 
interpret and apply its decision in Carephone for the first time.
403
 Kroon JA, Ngcobo AJP and 
Conradie JA each wrote a separate judgment, illustrating discrete ways in which the rational 
justifiability test could be construed. The discrepancies between the judgments reveal the 
indefinite relationship between section 145’s grounds of review and the Carephone test well. 
Key aspects of each decision are addressed in turn below. 
 
Kroon JA began by noting that, notwithstanding Carephone, there was no reason to limit 
rational justifiability to proceedings instituted under section 145(2)(iii)  of the LRA. In his 
view, the standard might just as easily have been situated in the context of gross irregularities 
or misconduct.
404
 Given that Froneman DJP’s placement of rational justifiability within 
excess of powers was somewhat problematic, Kroon JA’s approach, while not ideal, was at 
least progressive. Still, section 145 was cast in purposively narrow, procedural terms.
405
 
Comparatively, rational justifiability allowed for substantive review.
406
 Thus, describing the 
latter as a cleanly independent basis for review would seemingly have been more logical.
407
 
                                                          
400
 Read with reference to the Carephone test; Andre van Niekerk et al Law@work 2 ed (2012) at 448. 
401
 For the manner in which reviewing courts applied the test, see Sharpe (2000).   
402
 County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC). 
403
 For a discussion of this case, see John Grogan ‘Blowing the whistle: The test for evaluating CCMA awards’ 
(1999) 15(6) Employment Law 14. 
404
 County Fair Foods para 8. While his approach was preferable to Froneman DJP’s, it was (and is) still not 
ideal; the relationship between rationality (or reasonableness) and section 145 is appraised in detail in later 
chapters. 
405
 National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and others 2003 (2) BCLR 
154 (CC) (‘NEHAWU’) para 31; Benjamin (2007) at 33-36; the Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319; Section 
1(d) of the LRA. 
406
 Carephone paras 36-37. 
407
 In addition, as Sharpe observes, given the importance of the statutory rights protected by the LRA, enabling 
both substantive and procedural review was fitting; Sharpe (2000) at 2174. See also Grant at 255-256. 
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In the absence of doing so explicitly, the uncertain relationship between the legislative and 
Constitutional grounds of review endured. 
 
While aligning himself with certain of the Court’s findings in Carephone,408 Kroon JA 
criticised the distinction drawn by the LAC between ‘justifiable’ and ‘just, justified or 
correct’.409 Of particular concern to him was Froneman DJP’s use of the word ‘correct’. In 
this regard, he observed: 
 
‘The meanings of the word “justifiable” adverted to by the learned judge were “able 
to be legally or morally justified, able to be shown to be just, reasonable or correct; 
defensible.” If the word “correct” were excised from those meanings and the 
remainder were contrasted simply with the word “correct” there could be no quarrel 
with the distinction drawn. I am not convinced, however, of the correctness, in the 
present context, of including within the meanings of “justifiable’ that of “able to be 
shown to be correct” and of contrasting “justifiable” with “just” or “justified.”’410  
 
Given the emphasis on review proceedings precluding judicial analyses of the correctness of 
a tribunal’s findings,411 Kroon JA’s concern is unsurprising. Yet, it reveals a 
misunderstanding of the meanings attributed to ‘justifiability’ by Froneman DJP. Rather than 
suggesting that decisions need be correct, just or justified, ‘justifiable’ implied that decisions 
be capable of objective substantiation on the strength of the reasons given for them.
412
 In 
other words, whether a decision was correct was immaterial – justifiable awards required 
only that corroborative explanations accompany them.
413
  
 
A preferable definition of the term ‘justifiable’ is absent from Kroon JA’s judgment and 
cannot clearly be garnered from it. In holding the Commissioner’s decision defective, the 
Judge recorded three specific irregularities in the award.
414
 First, the Commissioner’s factual 
findings indicated that he had not applied his mind to relevant evidence.
415
 Secondly, there 
was no rational connection between the Commissioner’s findings and the evidence before 
                                                          
408
 County Fair Foods para 9; specifically, he agreed with Froneman DJP’s emphasis on the significance of the 
distinction between appeals and reviews and his definition of the extended test for review. 
409
 County Fair Foods para 10; the Judge referred to the former as applicable to review proceedings and the latter 
as applicable to appeals. 
410
 County Fair Foods para 10. For a more thorough discussion of the various meanings attributed to these terms, 
consult chapter 4. 
411
 Coetzee v Lebea NO & Another (1999) 20 ILJ 129 (LC) para 10; Carephone para 32. See too Fergus (2010) 
and the references cited therein; De Ville (2005) at 30. 
412
 This was Froneman DJP’s view; Carephone para 32. 
413
 Carephone para 32. 
414
 Regarding both the manner in which the Commissioner had reached his decision and the decision itself. 
415
 County Fair Foods paras 14, 17 & 19. 
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him.
416
 Finally, the Commissioner’s failure to afford proper recognition to pertinent features 
of the third respondent’s conduct, had led him to lose sight of other important considerations, 
in turn rendering the award irrational.
417
 Ultimately, in Kroon JA’s opinion, in the absence of 
a rational connection between evidence and award, the Commissioner’s determination 
evinced a gross irregularity warranting review.
418
  
 
Want of rationality (or reasonableness) in administrative determinations has long been 
recognized
419
 as a potentially adequate basis from which to infer failures to apply the mind.
420
 
In this form, it constitutes a procedural irregularity capable of review.
421
 Unfortunately, it is 
unclear from Kroon JA’s decision whether he deemed the award defective on this basis, or 
whether the Commissioner’s failure to apply his mind had simply resulted in an irrational 
outcome. To the extent to which the former led to the review, Kroon JA did not apply the 
Carephone standard at all. Were it the latter approach which informed his conclusion 
however, substantive irrationality ostensibly did come into play. In any event, and regardless 
of the precise rationale behind it, the varying interpretations of Kroon JA’s decision 
exemplify the indefinite nature of the relationship between the rational justifiability standard 
and section 145 of the LRA. 
 
Ngcobo AJP’s judgment clarified the essence of Kroon JA’s somewhat, but simultaneously 
blurred the distinction between appeal and review. According to Ngcobo AJP, the 
Commissioner’s failure to refrain from interfering with the employer’s sanction422 constituted 
an impermissible error of judgment. This error justified the conclusion that the Commissioner 
had failed to apply his mind and had consequently committed a gross irregularity.
423
 At a 
glance, Ngcobo AJP’s findings seem consonant with the distinction between appeal and 
                                                          
416
 Ibid para 17. 
417
 Including the interests of the parties involved; ibid para 18. 
418
 County Fair Foods para 20. 
419
 Both prior to and since Carephone. See, for example, Venture Motor Holdings paras 5 & 26; Hira, 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Kynoch Feeds (1998) (LC) paras 33-36. 
420
 See Darcy Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 4 ed (2003) at 153-155. The precise 
phrase ‘failure to apply the mind’ was not necessarily adopted by the courts in all instances but its essence is 
evident in a number of the reviewable defects listed by Du Toit et al as examples of gross irregularities and 
excesses of power.   
421
 Coetzee para 10; Hoexter (2007) at 294-295; De Ville (2005) at 209; Union Government (Minister of Mines 
and Industries) v Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Ltd 1928 AD 220 at 237; Du Toit et al (2003) at 153-
155. 
422
 Ngcobo AJP found that the employer’s sanction was ‘reasonable’. 
423
 County Fair Foods paras 36-37. 
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review.
424
 Yet, the path which led him to this conclusion suggests otherwise. In holding the 
award defective, the Judge ambiguously remarked: 
 
‘The reviewing court is concerned with the manner in which the commissioner comes 
to a conclusion. It does not concern itself with the result. … The reviewing court must 
ask itself whether the award can be sustained by the facts and the applicable law. If 
the award can be sustained by the facts and the law, interference with the award is not 
warranted. If it cannot, interference is warranted.’425 
 
And further that: 
 
‘…the question is not whether another reasonable commissioner would have made the 
same ‘error of judgment’. The question is whether the commissioner interfered with 
the sanction fairly imposed by the employer in circumstances where the commissioner 
should not have interfered.’426 
 
Just how an enquiry into the sustainability of an award, with reference to the facts and the 
applicable law, was distinct from an appeal went undefined.
427
 Asking directly whether a 
commissioner had interfered where he should not have done so depicts confusion equivalent 
to that apparent in Kroon JA’s decision.428  Regrettably, however, Ngcobo AJP shed no light 
on these issues, leaving the disconcerting impression that provided judicial dissatisfaction 
persisted awards would be amenable to review. As such, despite his reference to a gross 
irregularity, the Judge seemingly engaged in substantive review. 
 
Conradie JA took an opposing view, finding that it was only where a commissioner’s award 
was so clearly and dramatically incorrect that it made one ‘whistle’, that interference would 
be warranted.
429
 Applying this approach after analysing both the evidence and the award, the 
                                                          
424
 The Judge looked only to alleged procedural irregularities in the award, rather than to the substance of the 
Commissioner’s findings. 
425
 County Fair Foods paras 26-27. For a similar depiction of review, consult Coetzee para 10. Note, however, 
that in Rustenburg Platinum Mines, the SCA disapproved of this approach as impermissibly blurring the 
distinction between appeal and review; Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 30. 
426
 County Fair Foods para 35. 
427
 Consider Froneman DJP’s attempt at tackling this issue; Carephone para 37. For critique of rational 
justifiability and its conflation of appeal with review, consult Toyota SA Motors paras 33-39; Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-31; Fergus (2010). 
428
 Ibid; Kroon JA arguably misunderstood Froneman DJP’s divergent descriptions of ‘justifiability’ and 
‘justified’. 
429
 County Fair Foods para 43; his approach is reflected in the sentiments of van Dijkhorst JA in Adcock Ingram 
Critical Care v CCMA & Others [2001] 9 BLLR 979 (LAC). There, the Judge held: ‘The test to be applied is 
that set out by this Court in Carephone… The mere fact that the reviewing Court differs in its conclusion of law 
or fact from that of the tribunal of first instance may not be reason for interference as that would blur the 
distinction between appeal and review. But when the difference is so great that it impinges upon the basic norm 
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Judge resolved that while the Commissioner had made an ‘error of judgment’, the error was 
not so egregious as to be unreasonable.
430
 Consequently, the award ought to have stood.
431
  
 
Conradie JA’s judgment reflects a standard of review akin to ‘gross unreasonableness’ or the 
Wednesbury test.
432
 This test essentially renders the question of whether interference is 
justified, a matter of degree. The Wednesbury standard may be suitably deferential to 
commissioners’ findings433 but it also poses difficulties. First, the standard fails to provide an 
objective basis from which judges may assess rational justifiability.
434
 In addition, it neglects 
the significance of commissioners’ reasons in rationality review, favouring a focus on the 
extent of the ‘chasm’ between commissioners’ findings and those of reviewing courts.435 This 
necessarily requires that a comparison be made between the court’s preferences as to 
outcome and those of the presiding commissioner. However, in review proceedings, courts 
are not generally possessed of all evidentiary material available to commissioners during 
arbitrations.
436
 They are accordingly in an inferior position relative to the CCMA in so far as 
factual and evidentiary determinations are concerned. The appropriateness of a test 
comprising little more than comparison is therefore questionable.
437
   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
viz the necessity of a fair trial, interference is warranted. Whether that point has been reached has to be decided 
on the facts of each individual case. In this case the divide is in my view so great that it warrants interference…’; 
Adcock Ingram para 22. 
430
 County Fair Foods para 48. 
431
 Ibid para 47. 
432
 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223; so-called 
‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ gen rally requires absurdity or gross unreasonableness; Sir William Wade & 
Christopher Forsyth Administrative Law 9 ed (2004) at 364 & 371-372; Cora Hoexter with Rosemary Lyster The 
New Constitutional and Administrative Law vol 2 (2002) at 186; PP Craig Administrative Law 4 ed (1999) at 
537; De Ville (2005) at 209. Wednesbury unreasonableness and gross unreasonableness have not always, 
however, been construed as equivalent; LA Rose Innes Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals in South 
Africa (1963) at 215; the Introduction to this dissertation. Note Pretorius’s opposition to casting the test for 
review as one which sets the threshold for review at ‘egregious’ findings or conduct on the part of 
commissioners; Pretorius at 1523-1525. 
433
 Consistently with the doctrine of the SOP and the implications of the right to just administrative action. 
434
 See Shoprite Checkers, where Wallis AJ commented on the role of review in establishing objective 
justifications for awards; Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC) paras 29-30. Consult too Hoexter (2007) at 311 and 
Hoexter with Lyster (2002) at 518. In these texts the difficulties with the ground of unreasonableness provided 
for in section 6(1)(h) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’) are recorded. 
435
 Hoexter with Lyster (2002) at 518; Hoexter (2007) at 311-318 and De Ville (2005) at 209-211. 
436
 Cases in which the complete record was not available include Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & others [2011] 
2 BLLR 129 (LAC); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) (‘Shoprite 
Checkers 1’); SA Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd & others; SA Rugby (Pty) 
Ltd v SARPU & another [2008] 9 BLLR 845 (LAC) para 31. 
437
 Furthermore, reviewing courts do not benefit from the oral testimonies of the parties or the witnesses called 
during the relevant arbitration proceedings. Courts therefore cannot make credibility findings as effectively as 
commissioners can; Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer & Matthew Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3 
ed (2004) at 180; Housen v Nikolaisen 2002 SCC 33 para 22; Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v Alberta, 
2010 ABCA 216 para 47. 
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Usefully, the CC has since rejected the Wednesbury standard.
438
 Thus, it is unnecessary for 
the purposes of this thesis to appraise Conradie JA’s judgment in greater detail.439 His 
application of the gross unreasonableness standard, when compared to the attitudes of his 
brethren, nevertheless helpfully illustrates another construction of rational justifiability 
adopted post Carephone.
440
 When read together, the LAC’s diverse findings lucidly illustrate 
the persistent confusion around the relationship between section 145 and the Carephone test. 
 
4.2  De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others441  
 
In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others,
442
 the LAC was again divided as to 
the rational justifiability of the award in question. Whereas Conradie JA and Willis JA 
concurred in upholding the appeal, their reasons for doing so were disparate.
443
 Zondo AJP 
was alone in finding that the Commissioner’s decision should be exempt from review and his 
approach to review contrasts starkly with those of the other two Judges. Once more, 
comparably to County Fair Foods, the discrete attitudes of the three Judges evince varying 
interpretations of the rational justifiability enquiry and its indefinite association with section 
145.  
 
In holding as he did, Zondo AJP examined (near exclusively) the Commissioner’s three 
principle reasons for ordering reinstatement.
444
 The first of these reasons, he deemed 
irrational. Similarly, the second was illogical.
445
 Yet, the third of the Commissioner’s reasons 
was neither irrational nor unjustifiable; it further did not depict a gross irregularity.
446
 As 
such, the Judge concluded that the award should have been upheld.
447
 Before doing so, he 
                                                          
438
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) paras 42-44; consider too Roman v Williams NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C) at 284-285; Garbers (2000) at 
86-87 submits that Carephone did not impose the requirement that, to succeed on review, allegations of 
commissioners’ excesses of power had to be gross. 
439
 At least for the purposes of defining the ambit of reasonableness or rational justifiability.  
440
 Consider too County Fair Foods para 43. 
441
 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others [2000] 9 BLLR 995 (LAC). 
442
 Ibid. 
443
 Ibid. 
444
 The employees had been dismissed for fraud. 
445
 De Beers para 8. 
446
 Ibid paras 8-9. 
447
 Ibid para 13; just why Zondo AJP considered it necessary to conclude that the reason given did not constitute 
a gross irregularity is unclear. 
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emphasized the nature of review proceedings as distinct from appeal, precluding judicial 
interference in case of disagreement alone.
448
  
 
Zondo AJP’s stance was both apposite and questionable. In so far as he considered the 
rationality of the award in light of the Commissioner’s reasons, his decision is valuable.  His 
approach in this respect plainly accorded with Carephone’s stipulation that assessing 
commissioners’ reasons formed the basis for rationality review.449 In addition, he did not 
succumb to the temptation of substituting his own opinion of the matter for that of the 
Commissioner.
450
 However, the legitimacy of upholding the award on the strength of the 
Commissioner’s third reason alone, after describing her remaining reasons as irrational and 
illogical, is doubtful. Allowing awards premised upon irrational and unjustifiable reasons to 
stand simply due to one reasonable contention, fails to preserve the Constitutional 
imperatives of accountability, transparency and openness.
451
 It also appears illogical. While it 
is conceivable that an award may be justifiable with reference to only certain of the reasons 
given for it, where the majority of a commissioner’s reasons are wholly unjustifiable it is 
counterintuitive to endorse the award.
452
  
 
Conradie JA approached the enquiry somewhat differently.
453
 Rather than confining his 
analysis to the Commissioner’s reasons, he analysed the evidence in detail, with reference to 
both her findings and ultimate award.
454
 Having decried the validity of certain of these 
findings,
455
 Conradie JA evaluated the Commissioner’s reasons. He described these reasons 
in turn as incorrect,
456
 ‘bizarre’457 and based on a misunderstanding of applicable legal 
principles.
458
 According to him, supplementary to the factors considered by the 
                                                          
448
 De Beers para 13. 
449
 Carephone paras 20 & 31-38. 
450
 This aptly accords with the principles devised in Carephone; Carephone para 36. 
451
 Section 1(d) of the Constitution; Carephone para 19. 
452
 Recall the functions of judicial review generally in ensuring accountability and enhancing improved decision-
making in future decisions; Jeffrey Jowell ‘The democratic necessity of administrative justice’ 2006 Acta 
Juridica 13 at 17; Solomon paras 19 & 21; Cape Bar Council v Judicial Service Commission & another (Centre 
for Constitutional Rights & another as amici curiae) 
[2011] JOL 27947 (WCC) paras 28-29; Standard Bank (1998) (LC) para 19. De Ville argues that judicial review 
has an additional role to play in promoting cooperation and conversation between the judiciary and the public 
administration; De Ville (2005) at 30. 
453
 Not only is his approach distinct from Zondo JP’s but it is vastly different to that which he adopted in County 
Fair Foods. 
454
 De Beers paras 17-19. 
455
 Ibid para 17.  
456
 Ibid para 20. 
457
 Ibid para 21. 
458
 Ibid para 22. 
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Commissioner was an additional concern – the dismissed employees had shown no remorse. 
Whereas their lack of remorse ought to have been taken into account, the Commissioner had 
not done so.
459
  
 
Conradie JA’s approach demonstrates an interpretation of rational justifiability commonly 
adopted by the courts following Carephone. The interpretation permitted reviewing courts to 
reflect on alternative reasons for awards when assessing the rationality thereof. There are two 
related difficulties with this construction. First, Froneman DJP made no provision in his 
definition of rational justifiability for alternative reasons to be considered during review 
proceedings.
460
 As such, Conradie JA’s stance does not strictly comply with the Carephone 
standard. Secondly, and consequent thereon, is the impact of the Judge’s interpretation. By 
allowing alternative reasons to inform review, the potential for judges to replace 
commissioners’ findings with those of their own preference may arguably be increased. 
Given that this practice was explicitly denounced by the LAC in Carephone, the validity of 
permitting it on review was (at the time of De Beers) debatable.
461
  
 
Conradie JA then resolved that, as the Commissioner had ‘ignored or misapplied legal 
principles to an extent that [was] inappropriate or unreasonable’, she had ‘failed to make a 
rational connection between the material available to her and the conclusion which she 
reached.’462 As a result, her award was irrational and liable to be set aside.463 Ostensibly 
therefore, in the Judge’s view, irrationality incorporated errors of law.464 While review for 
material error of law had repeatedly been declared legitimate,
465
 whether minor errors 
                                                          
459
 Ibid para 25. 
460
 Carephone para 37. 
461
 Note that this issue was ostensibly resolved by the CC in Sidumo. 
462
 De Beers para 27. 
463
 The error rendering the award reviewable concerned the commissioner’s misunderstanding of the significance 
of the employees’ ‘long service’ as a mitigating factor; De Beers paras 26-27. Yet, the materiality of this 
misunderstanding is debatable and the relevance of mitigating circumstances is far from clear; compare Consani 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (2004) 25 ILJ 1707 
with MEC for Health (Gauteng) v Mathamini & others (2008) 29 ILJ 366 (LC). For a summary of the current 
approach to mitigating circumstances, see National Union of Mineworkers & another v CCMA & others (LC) 
unreported case no C507/06 of 22 October 2010. See also Nicola Smit ‘How do you determine a fair sanction? 
Dismissal as an appropriate sanction in cases of dismissal for (mis)conduct’ (2011) 1 De Jure 49 at 69-70 and 
item 3(5) of the Code of Good Practice Dismissals, Schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
464
 Consider too Metcash Trading (Pty) Ltd t/a Trador Cash & Carry Wholesalers v Sithole & others (1998) JOL 
3591 (LC) where the Court emphasized that in order to be rationally justifiable, the law applied by 
commissioners must be the correct law. Sharpe disagrees; Sharpe (2000) at 2168. 
465
 Maneche & others v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (2007) 28 ILJ 2594 
(LC) paras 13 -14; Hira at 93; Mlaba v Masonite (Africa) Ltd & others [1998] 3 BLLR 291 (LC) at 301C-302E; 
OK Bazaars (A Division of Shoprite Checkers) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & 
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warranted interference remained uncertain.
466
 Equally unclear was whether mistakes of law 
were required to result in irrational outcomes for reviewable defects to arise. Conradie JA’s 
failure to address both the materiality of the Commissioner’s error and the relationship 
between the relevant grounds of review was accordingly regrettable. Nevertheless, once 
more, the discrepancies between his and Zondo AJP’s approaches divulge the contested 
nature of review subsequent to Carephone. 
 
Willis JA agreed with Conradie JA that the Commissioner’s award ought to be overturned. 
Yet, his reasons for doing so differed significantly from Conradie JA’s. This time, the Judge 
began with an assessment of the Commissioner’s reasons, findings and award,467 observing 
that: 
‘The overall impression, upon reading the award, is of a humane, compassionate, 
intelligent person, honestly trying to apply her mind to the issues. Ordinarily one 
cannot reasonably expect much more from an arbitrator.’468 
 
As such, when regard was had to all the material properly before the Commissioner, together 
with the connections she had made between that material and her award, the Commissioner’s 
decision was justifiable.
469
 Willis JA’s emphasis on the relationship between the 
Commissioner’s evidence, reasons and award470 was perhaps more appropriate than either 
Zondo AJP’s minimalist attitude or Conradie JA’s appellate like stance. The Judge did not, 
however, stop there. There was another ground on which he deemed the award reviewable - 
the Commissioner had misconstrued the nature of her powers. In essence, Willis JA held, 
rather than applying the reasonable employer test, the Commissioner had decided the matter 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
others (2000) 21 ILJ 1188 (LC) para 10 and Foschini Group (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others (2002) 23 ILJ 1048 
(LC) para 25. In Mlaba the enquiry into materiality was formulated as:  
'If, in the exercise of this discretion, a commissioner makes an error of law, this does not render the decision 
of the commissioner reviewable unless it is a material error in the sense that it results in the commissioner 
asking the wrong question or basing his or her decision on a matter not prescribed by the statute.' Mlaba at 
301. 
Consider too Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v Commission for Conciliation, Arbitration 
and Mediation & others (2006) 27 ILJ 1644 (LC); Coin Security (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation & Arbitration & others (2005) 26 ILJ 849 (LC) paras 40-53; Baxter at 521. 
466
 Ibid; National Commissioner of the SA Police Service v Potterill NO & others (2003) 24 ILJ 1984 (LC) paras 
23-25; Hira at 93. In Hira, the Appellate Division held that only material errors of law were reviewable; Hira at 
91. See also Willis JA’s views on review for error of law; De Beers paras 55-56. 
467
 De Beers paras 28-39. 
468
 Ibid para 40. This approach compares to that of Sharpe who proposes that an appropriate test for review 
should ask ‘whether the commissioner made a good faith effort to reach a reasoned conclusion based on a 
consideration of relevant legal and evidentiary materials’; Sharpe (2000) at 2173. 
469
 De Beers para 42. 
470
 This is discussed in more detail below. 
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simply on her own assessment of fairness.
471
 In doing so, she had exceeded her powers,
472
 
and the award consequently fell to be set aside.
473
  
 
Two aspects of Willis JA’s judgment are noteworthy. First, while arguably aptly deferential, 
Willis JA’s appraisal of the award’s rationality appears premised on little more than an 
imprecise intuition.
474
 In turn, it offers minimal insight into the meaning of the Carephone 
standard. His concurrence with Zondo AJP on the question of rationality despite the ultimate 
reviewability of the award,
475
 nonetheless demonstrates the difficulties with defining the 
standard appropriately.
476
 Positively, from the Judge’s finding that the award was reviewable 
on the basis of excess of powers, the continued independence of the section 145 grounds of 
review may be inferred.
477
 Notwithstanding the substantive rationality of the Commissioner’s 
award, Willis AJ deemed the legality of her approach to resolving the dispute, faulty.
478
 For 
the purposes of understanding Sidumo, this indication of section 145’s independence is 
paramount. Following the CC’s decision, there was a degree of uncertainty around the 
continued validity of the section 145 grounds.
479
 Remembering that Carephone was a prelude 
to Sidumo, Willis JA’s decision usefully endorses their enduring relevance.480  
                                                          
471
 Willis JA evidently deemed the reasonable employer test to be the appropriate test for determining fairness. 
This test has since been rejected by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo. For discussions of the test, see BMD 
Knitting Mills; Engen Petroleum Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & Others (2007) 
28 ILJ 1507 (LAC); Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 40-41; Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza 
(1999) 20 ILJ 578 (LAC) para 33; Van Niekerk et al (2012) at 51-52; Nicola Smit ‘When is dismissal an 
appropriate sanction and when should a court set aside an arbitration award? Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC)’ (2008) 29 ILJ 1635 at 1637-1639; Wayne Hutchinson 
‘Is the Labour Appeal Court succeeding in its endeavours to create certainty in our jurisprudence?’ (2001) 22 ILJ 
2223; Wayne J Hutchinson ‘The Supreme Court of Appeal restores administrative justice’ (2007) 28 ILJ 92; 
John Grogan ‘Death of the reasonable employer: The seismology of review’ (2000) 16(2) Employment Law 4; 
John Myburgh SC & André van Niekerk ‘Dismissal as a penalty for misconduct: The reasonable employer and 
other approaches’ (2000) 21 ILJ 2145; Garbers (2000). 
472
 In support of this determination, he cited Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v Veldspun (Pty) 
Ltd 1994 (1) SA 162 (A); there, the Court held that an arbitrator would exceed his or powers to the extent to 
which he or she had made ‘…a determination outside of the terms of the submission (or referral in the case of 
arbitrations being conducted in terms of the LRA).’; Veldspun at 169C. 
473
 De Beers paras 50-62; In Zondo AJP’s opinion, it was inappropriate for Willis AJ to have addressed this 
ground of review at all, as it had not been proposed by the applicants in their review application; De Beers at 
paras 14-15. Compare this view to the varying approaches of the Judges in CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & 
others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) paras 68 & 130-134. 
474
 De Beers para 40. 
475
 Particularly when compared to the conclusive remarks of Conradie JA to the contrary. 
476
 And simultaneously retaining the distinction between appeal and review; consider Shoprite Checkers (2000) 
(LC) para 73; Toyota SA Motors paras 33-39; Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-31. 
477
 For additional confirmation of the continued validity of the section 145 grounds of review, see Shoprite 
Checkers (2000) (LC) paras 58-91. 
478
 De Beers paras 50-62. 
479
 Consider, for example, Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 26444 (LC) and 
Edcon. 
480
 See too Crown Chickens para 58. 
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4.3  Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others481 
 
While Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others (‘Shoprite Checkers (LC)’) will 
not be discussed in detail here, to understand the appeal against it, it is necessary to mention 
it briefly. In Shoprite Checkers (LC), Wallis AJ re-examined Carephone, stridently holding 
that it had been erroneously decided. As such, and despite the binding nature of LAC 
determinations, he was not obliged to follow it.
482
 His primary concerns with Froneman 
DJP’s findings included that:  
 
a) the rational justifiability standard fused the distinction between appeal and review 
contrary to the intentionally narrow grounds provided for in the LRA;
483
 
b) the LAC had construed section 145 inappropriately, and in the absence of a 
Constitutional challenge to the section there had been no basis for doing so;
484
 and 
c) CCMA arbitrations did not constitute administrative action.485 
 
Predictably, controversy ensued.
486
 
 
4.4     Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others487 
 
Following the confusion created by Shoprite Checkers (LC), appeal proceedings were 
instituted. The legitimacy of Carephone thus confronted the LAC in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others (‘Shoprite Checkers (LAC)’).488 While the rational justifiability 
test faced scrutiny, the primary question before the Court in Shoprite Checkers (LAC) was 
                                                          
481
 Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC). 
482
 Ibid para 91. For similar sentiments, see Volkswagen SA para 62. 
483
 Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC) paras 58-60 & para 73. Recall that Constitutional considerations prevail over 
legislative provisions, however; section 2(1) of the Constitution; Kynoch Feeds (1998) (LC) para 47; Carephone 
paras 8-9; note, nonetheless, the SCA’s comments in Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 23-24.  
484
 Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC) paras 75-77. In addition, the LAC’s reasoning process had been fatally 
flawed. Since then, the CC has held that, where there is a legal issue apparent on the papers before the court 
which has not been raised by the parties, it is incumbent upon the court to address it mero motu; Tao Ying para 
68. Note, however, O’Regan J’s dissenting remarks; Tao Ying paras 130-134. 
485
 Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC) paras 88-90; for a comparable approach, consult Volkswagen SA paras 53-55. 
In Volkswagen SA, Landman J refused to follow Carephone on the basis that it had been decided on a 
subsequently outdated Constitutional provision; Volkswagen SA paras 57-62. 
486
 Ibid. 
487
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC); for a general discussion of 
this case, see Wesley. 
488
 Ibid. 
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whether CCMA arbitrations constituted administrative action.
489
 Notwithstanding the 
consequence of this question, however, Zondo JP neglected to answer it. Instead, he held 
simply that the Constitutional requirement that all exercises of public power must be rational 
was undisputed.
490
 As commissioners were clearly exercising public power during arbitration 
proceedings, to the extent to which the meanings of ‘rationality’ and ‘justifiability’491 were 
adequately aligned, the administrative nature of CCMA arbitrations would be immaterial.
492
 
The Judge then concluded that the terms were suitably similar in meaning to counteract the 
contention. In his view: 
 
 ‘[A]lthough the terms “justifiable” and “rational” may not, strictly speaking, be 
synonymous, they bear a sufficiently similar meaning to justify the conclusion that 
rationality can be said to be accommodated within the concept of justifiability as used 
in Carephone. In this regard, I am satisfied that a decision that is justifiable cannot be 
said to be irrational and a decision that is irrational cannot be said to be justifiable.’493 
 
In effect, for the purposes of review at least, rationality and justifiability were 
interchangeable.
494
 According to Zondo JP, the appropriate test for review based on 
rationality therefore obliged reviewing courts to: 
 
a) consider the material properly available to the commissioner, the final decision taken, 
and the reasons for it; 
b) recall that a finding of irrationality would be infrequent;495  
c) carefully maintain the distinction between appeal and review; and 
d) ensure that the need for efficiency in labour dispute resolution was not forgotten.496 
 
Applying these factors to the matter before him, Zondo JP held that the Commissioner’s 
award, while open to criticism, was neither irrational nor unjustifiable;
497
 it was accordingly 
                                                          
489
 Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) para 3. 
490
 This was apparent from the CC’s decisions in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and 
Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) paras 85-90 
and Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and 
Others 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC)  paras 56-59; Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) para 19. 
491
 Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) paras 21 & 26. 
492
 Ibid para 19. 
493
 Ibid para 25. 
494
 For the courts frequent equations of these terms, consult chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation.  
495
 On the authority of Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers. For his earlier analogous assertion, see Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines (2004) (LAC) para 15, where he remarked that, in case of doubt, courts should not interfere.  
496
 Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) para 82. 
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immune from review. In doing so, he aptly refrained from substituting his own preferences as 
to outcome, for those of the Commissioner.
498
 To this extent, his judgment was creditworthy. 
Both his clarification of the nature of review and his emphasis on the expeditiousness vital to 
labour dispute resolution were further fittingly congruent with the objects of the LRA.
499
  
Yet, the Judge’s failures to affirm the Constitutional status of CCMA arbitrations and to 
acknowledge the distinction
500
 between justifiability and rationality were regrettable.
501
 In 
neglecting the former, the Constitutional foundations of review went unconfirmed. 
Simultaneously, the essential role of the right to administrative justice in review proceedings 
was undermined. The Judge’s oblique references to trivial discrepancies between 
‘justifiability’ and ‘rationality’ did not assist in refining the meaning of the Carephone 
standard either. Compounding these problems was the absence from Zondo JP’s decision of 
emphasis on the import of the connections made by commissioners between evidence, award 
and reasons when conducting rationality review. To the extent to which outcome rather than 
reasoning process forms the basis for such review, the distinction between appeal and review 
is obscured.
502
 
 
4.5   Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others503 
 
Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others
504
 illustrates these 
difficulties well. There, the LAC again both clarified the nature of review and muddied the 
waters. In evaluating the relevant Commissioner’s award, Nicholson JA505 described ‘rational 
justifiability’ as implying that awards should: 
 
‘…not be arbitrary and must have been arrived at by a reasoning process as opposed 
to conjecture, fantasy, guesswork or hallucination. Put differently, the arbitrator must 
have applied his mind seriously to the issues at hand and reasoned his way to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
497
 Ibid paras  84 & 101; in concluding as he did, the Judge again recounted the role of efficiency in resolving 
labour disputes; consider too, in this regard, NEHAWU para 31 and Food & Allied Workers Union on behalf of 
Mbatha & others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko Milling & Baking & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2916 (SCA) 
(‘FAWU’) para 19. 
498
 Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) paras 83-84. 
499
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319; section 1(d) of the LRA; Benjamin (2007) at 32-33. 
500
 That a distinction does exist was clearly implied by his findings. For the differences between rationality, 
justifiability and reasonableness, refer to chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
501
 His use of the word ‘correct’ to describe aspects of the commissioner’s findings was similarly not ideal; 
Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) para 83. 
502
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-30; Pretorius. 
503
 Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others [2002] 6 BLLR 493 (LAC). 
504
 Ibid. 
505
 Writing for an (effectively) unanimous Court. 
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conclusion. Such conclusion must be justifiable as to the reasons given in the sense 
that it is defensible, not necessarily in every respect, but as regards the important 
logical steps on the road to his order.’506 
 
The passage is lucid and ostensibly apposite. However, the Court’s findings were 
disappointingly inconsistent with it.
507
 Rather than limiting his appraisal to the 
Commissioner’s stated reasons, Nicholson JA declared the award incapable of justification 
whether based on the reasons given for it or on any alternative reasons discernible from the 
evidence.
508
 Thus, despite his emphasis on rationality review as entailing assessments of the 
reasoning process and logicality of commissioners’ decisions (with reference to the reasons 
given for decisions), Nicholson JA ultimately concerned himself with alternative reasons 
capable of sustaining the award.
509
 Doing so enabled intrusive review. Once more, the 
distinction between appeal and review was blurred and the Carephone standard misconstrued.  
 
4.6  Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others510  
 
In Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others,
511
 the SCA 
remedied at least some of the debate. In the process, it addressed the relationship between 
section 6 of the PAJA
512
 and section 145 of the LRA.
513
 In particular, whether the PAJA’s 
grounds could legitimately form the basis for reviewing CCMA arbitration awards was 
determined. With extensive reference to the Constitutional foundations of the PAJA, the 
Court held in this regard that the grounds listed therein had indeed superseded those of the 
LRA.
514
 It was nonetheless immaterial to the matter at hand whether the Carephone standard 
or section 6(2)(f) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (‘PAJA’)515 was applied - 
both tests produced the same result.
516
 Unfortunately, the LAC in Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
Ltd v CCMA & others had failed to properly apply either of these tests. The Carephone 
standard required reviewing courts to enquire whether there had been ‘a rational objective 
                                                          
506
 Crown Chickens para 58. 
507
 Ibid para 64. 
508
 Ibid paras 64 & 65-67. 
509
 Ibid. 
510
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others [2006] 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA). 
511
 Ibid. 
512
 Section 6 of the PAJA lists the grounds of review on which review proceedings may be instituted against 
administrative action generally.  
513
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 18-27. 
514
 Ibid paras 24-27. 
515
 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’). 
516
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26. 
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basis justifying the connection the commissioner made between the material before him and 
the conclusion he reached.’517 Critically, it did not allow for alternative reasons justifying an 
award to be appraised on review. Yet, the LAC had done so, failing to confine its evaluation 
to the rationality of the Commissioner’s reasoning process and instead conducting an 
appeal.
518
 While the SCA conceded that review for irrationality inevitably entailed a measure 
of substantive scrutiny, the fundamental distinction between review and appeal persisted. The 
LAC’s findings were therefore inappropriate and the appeal was upheld.519 
 
The significance of the SCA’s interpretation of the Carephone standard lies in its reversion to 
the original delineation of the standard.
520
 The Court suitably refrained from examining the 
simple rationality of the Commissioner’s final award, as many courts had formerly done.521 
As Cameron JA observed, the effect of this approach had been to collapse the standard into 
little more than a deferential appeal.
522
 Comparatively, the SCA’s emphasis on the rationality 
of the Commissioner’s reasoning process523 enabled it to maintain the distinction between 
review and appeal recognised in Carephone.
524
 Rather than examining the outcome of an 
award (and whether it was supported by the facts and the law), rational justifiability, in the 
Court’s view, focused on the connections made by commissioners between their stated 
reasons for awards, the evidence properly before them and their final determinations.
525
 The 
SCA’s decision is usefully coherent with that of the LAC’s in Carephone. Given that 
reviewing courts struggled to apply the rational justifiability standard as it stood, however, 
the absence of supplementary guidelines in the Court’s judgment left them little better 
equipped than before. 
 
                                                          
517
 Ibid para 29. 
518
 Ibid paras 29-30. 
519
 Ibid paras 30-35 & para 53. 
520
 Compare the SCA’s decision in Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 29 to Carephone para 37. 
521
 See the Labour Courts’ decisions in County Fair Foods and De Beers paras 17-27, for example; Benjamin 
(2007) at 34; Sharpe (2000) at 2164-2170. Fortunately, some courts seemingly construed the test for review quite 
appositely; Metro Cash & Carry Ltd v Le Roux NO & others [1999] 4 BLLR 351 (LC) paras 12-19. 
522
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-30. 
523
 Ibid para 29. 
524
 Carephone para 32. The Judge noted further that the rational justifiability test focuses on the justifiability of 
awards, rather than on the question of whether awards are truly justified or correct. 
525
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 29. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Carephone extended the grounds of review available to parties aggrieved by CCMA 
awards.
526
 Key to this extension was the infusion of rational justifiability into section 145 of 
the LRA. While the scope of rationality review was, for the most part, clearly expressed by 
Froneman DJP, the judgment led to both controversy and confusion. As a result, varying 
interpretations of rational justifiability pervaded subsequent judicial determinations.
527
 
Furthermore, distinctive approaches to the relationship between section 145 and the 
Carephone test developed. The SCA’s pronouncement in Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
admirably attempted to elucidate the test, and to some extent it succeeded.
528
 Further 
guidance would nevertheless have been useful. 
 
Despite the inconsistencies to which Carephone gave rise, both Carephone and Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines hold apparent value. Pertinently, read together, the decisions explicate the 
essential principles of review and the Constitutional bases therefore. By revisiting these 
matters, some of the contention discussed above may be remedied. Given that the 
Constitutional premises of substantive review remain largely intact since Carephone,
529
 
before examining Sidumo it is instructive to recount the principles and values addressed in 
these two fundamental judgments.
530
 
 
The first evident principle was that review was comprised of both procedural and substantive 
elements.
531
 Whereas the former were regulated by the grounds provided for in section 145 of 
the LRA, the latter was found in the right to just administrative action.
532
 At the time of 
                                                          
526
 Sharpe (2000) at 2174; Grant at 255-256; Loveday (1998). 
527
 Compare, for example, the decisions of the 3 Judges in County Fair Foods and De Beers as discussed above; 
consider too Adcock Ingram para 22 and Coetzee para 10. 
528
 Whether it stated the principles applicable to review any more clearly than the LAC had in Carephone, 
however, is questionable. 
529
 Notwithstanding a change in the Constitution applicable – the interim Constitution has since been replaced by 
the Constitution. Note also Edcon, where the SCA held that the only difference between the Carephone and 
Sidumo standards was ‘in the semantics’; Edcon para 16. 
530
 Being Carephone and Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA). 
531
 Carephone paras 15-37; Sharpe (2000) at 2174. Prior to Carephone, irrationality had succeeded as a ground 
of review only in so far as the alleged irrationality exposed the relevant commissioner’s procedural irregularity; 
Venture Motor Holdings paras 5 & 26; Hira, Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Kynoch Feeds (1998) (LC) 
paras 33-36. Following Carephone, in County Fair Foods, Ngcobo J ostensibly adopted this approach too; 
County Fair Foods paras 26-27. 
532
 At the time of Carephone, this right appeared in section 33 read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6 to the 
Constitution. Currently, the right resides in section 33 of the (final) Constitution. 
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Carephone, this right permitted substantive review based on rational justifiability.
533
 
Notwithstanding the introduction of rationality review, the section 145 grounds of review still 
maintained their currency.
534
 The scope of review had simply been extended.
535
 While the 
substantive constituent of review permitted a measure of scrutiny into the merits of 
arbitration proceedings, it did not allow for covert appeals.
536
 The correctness of 
commissioners’ findings was accordingly irrelevant to the enquiry; so too was the plain 
sustainability of awards on the facts and the law.
537
 Rather than emphasizing rationality in 
outcome, substantive review focused on the rationality of the connections made by presiding 
commissioners between evidence, awards and reasons. It was only by retaining this emphasis 
that the proper distinction between appeals and reviews could objectively be maintained.
538
 
Appraising alternative reasons for awards intruded upon this distinction, facilitating appellate 
like attitudes to review.
539
 Thus, alternative reasons justifying or invalidating awards 
(according to Rustenburg Platinum Mines at least) were of minimal relevance to section 145 
reviews.  
 
As detailed in later chapters of this thesis, it is here that a significant discrepancy between the 
Carephone standard and the Sidumo test arises – specifically, in review proceedings based on 
the latter, no proscription on assessing alternative reasons for awards exists.
540
  At this point 
therefore, the Carephone test loses its comparative value. The principle that reviews should 
not be transmuted into appeals nonetheless remains important. As such, the Courts’ directives 
as to how appellate style review may be avoided, maintain a degree of legitimacy following 
Sidumo. 
  
Supporting these principles were the Constitutional values associated with review. Paramount 
in this regard was the right to just administrative action which grounded judicial review and 
particularly substantive review.
541
 Underpinning this right were the values of accountability, 
                                                          
533
 Carephone paras 15 & 31; section 33 read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution. 
534
 De Beers paras 56-62; Solomon paras 19 & 21. In Solomon, the Court emphasized the function of judicial 
review in ensuring due process. 
535
 Carephone paras 30-31; Whitear-Nel at 1486; Sharpe (2000) at 2174; Grant at 255-256 and Loveday (1998). 
536
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-30; Sharpe (2000) at 2168. 
537
 Ibid; Sharpe (2000) at 2168. For alternative (and debatably contrary) interpretations of the test, see Coetzee 
para 10 and County Fair Foods para 27.  
538
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-30; Sharpe (2000) at 2168; Shoprite Checkers (2000) (LC) paras 
29-30. 
539
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-30. 
540
 Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC) para 102. 
541
 County Fair Foods para 5. 
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transparency and openness, with which all administrative bodies were Constitutionally 
obliged to comply.
542
 CCMA arbitrations comprised administrative action. Hence, the 
intrusion of rational justifiability into section 145 (and its concomitant extension) was 
justifiable despite the section’s intentionally narrow grounds.543 While the right to fair labour 
practices supported the rational justifiability standard, given the inherent presence of fairness 
throughout the LRA it was of relatively incidental import in determining the limits of 
review.
544
 The expeditiousness with which labour disputes were to be resolved, however, 
remained a significant consideration in review proceedings.
545
 Similarly, the separation of 
powers between the executive (encompassing the public administration), the legislature and 
the judiciary was germane to review.
546
 Consequently, exercising a degree of deference 
towards commissioners’ determinations was fitting.547  
 
Following Carephone, it was these principles and values which informed
548
 the ambit of 
review available under section 145. By analogy, and to the extent to which these principles 
and values do not impinge upon the final Constitution’s right to just administrative action,549 
they bear corresponding relevance to the scope of review following Sidumo. Barring the 
principles associated with alternative reasons for awards, they may thus be resorted to when 
interpreting the confines of reasonableness review. Through analyses of the CC’s decision in 
Sidumo and key judgments flowing from it, this measure of review is discussed in depth in 
the chapters which follow. 
  
                                                          
542
 Sections 1(d) & 195 of the Constitution; Carephone paras 9-13. 
543
 Carephone paras 8-9 & 30-31; Whitear-Nel at 1486; Kynoch Feeds (1998) (LC) para 47; Garbers (2000) at 
85; Wesley at 1520. Compare these commentators’ views with those of Grogan (2000) at 8. Consider too the 
CC’s policy arguments in Chirwa and Gcaba v Minister for Safety & Security & others 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC). 
544
 Section 23 of the Constitution; consider, in this regard, Carephone para 20, read with the LRA generally. For 
the provisions of the Act of greatest relevance to ensuring fairness in CCMA proceedings, see chapter 1.     
545
 Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) para 82; Rustenburg Platinum Mines (2004) (LAC) para 15; the Explanatory 
Memorandum at 318-319; section 1(d) of the LRA. 
546
 Carephone para 34. For the doctrine of SOP, see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 109, 111 & 
113 and Hoexter (2007) at 139-142. 
547
 This may be inferred from Zondo JP’s comments in Rustenburg Platinum Mines (2004) (LAC) para 15; Smit 
(2008) at 1636; BMD Knitting Mills para 18. 
548
 Or at the very least ought to have informed. 
549
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 3 
  
THE INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS 
STANDARD  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nine years after Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others,
550
 in the seminal decision of 
Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others,
551
 the Constitutional Court 
(‘CC’) held that: 
 
‘…section 145 is now suffused by the constitutional standard of reasonableness. That 
standard is the one explained in Bato Star: Is the decision reached by the 
Commissioner one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach?’552 
 
Both the meaning of this standard and its proper application remain unclear and courts have 
frequently offered inconsistent interpretations thereof. The principal areas of controversy are 
first the relationship between reasonableness and the section 145 grounds of review.
553
 
Secondly, both the test’s precise definition and its capacity to negate the import of procedural 
irregularities are confusing. Further uncertain is whether the principles of review associated 
with Carephone continue to apply and if so, the extent to which they do. Related to this 
question is whether the standard has expanded upon or limited judicial powers of review.  As 
reasonableness requires reviewing courts to assume a deferential stance to commissioners’ 
awards, the contention around these issues threatens the distinction between appeal and 
review; in turn, the doctrine of separation of powers (‘SOP’) is endangered.554 Parties’ rights 
                                                          
550
 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
551
 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
552
 Sidumo para 110. See also PAK Le Roux & K Young ‘The role of reasonableness in dismissal: the 
Constitutional Court looks at who has the final say’ (2007) 17(3) Contemporary Labour Law 21, who submit 
that reasonableness is an over-arching standard of review, rather than an independent ground for review; Le 
Roux & Young at 30. 
553
 Section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘the LRA’ or ‘the Act’). For grounds of review accepted 
by the courts since Sidumo, refer to Anton Myburgh ‘Sidumo v Rustplats: How have the courts dealt with it?’ 
(2009) 30 ILJ 1; Anton Myburgh ‘Determining and reviewing sanction after Sidumo’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1; Anton 
Myburgh ‘Reviewing the review test: Recent judgments and developments’ (2011) 32 ILJ 1497 and the 
judgments cited in each.  
554
 Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 305; Cora Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa (2007) 
at 49-54; Cora Hoexter with Rosemary Lyster The new Constitutional and administrative law vol 2 (2002) at 186 
& 131-134. Consider too De Ville’s approach in JR De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South 
Africa revised 1 ed (2005) at 30; Emma Fergus ‘The distinction between appeals and reviews – Defining the 
limits of the Labour Court’s powers of review’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1556 at 1569-1570. In Engen Petroleum Ltd v 
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to fair labour practices and the necessarily efficient nature of labour dispute resolution are 
similarly hampered. Thus, it is crucial that the ambiguities surrounding the Sidumo test be 
addressed and clarity obtained. Before illustrating the courts’ frustrations with 
reasonableness, it is necessary to consider Sidumo in some detail. What follows is a 
discussion of this decision and then an analysis of pertinent Labour Court (‘LC’), Labour 
Appeal Court (‘LAC’) and Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) cases in which the courts have 
responded to it. 
 
2. SIDUMO & ANOTHER V RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MINES LTD & 
OTHERS
555
 
 
Following Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others,
556
 
Sidumo appealed to the Constitutional Court, giving the CC an opportunity to examine the 
scope of review under section 145. Before doing so, various questions arose. First was 
whether the reasonable employer test remained part of South African law. Secondly, it was 
necessary to resolve the debate about the status of CCMA arbitrations as administrative 
action. Finally, to the extent to which CCMA arbitrations did constitute administrative action, 
whether PAJA’s557 grounds of review applied to section 145 proceedings required attention.  
 
The first of these questions saw the Court reject the SCA’s findings in Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines Ltd; in its view, the reasonable employer test did not comply with contemporary 
constitutional principles of South African labour law.
558
 The CC nonetheless confirmed the 
legitimacy of the SCA’s decision in respect of the second enquiry, holding that CCMA 
arbitration proceedings qualified as administrative action.
559
 Its third finding was again 
contrary to the SCA’s conclusions, however. According to the majority,560 CCMA awards 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
CCMA & others [2007] 8 BLLR 707 (LAC), the LAC held that in terms of the doctrine of separation of powers 
(‘SOP’), the legislature’s entitlement to make policy choices must be respected by the courts provided they are 
not contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’); Engen Petroleum 
para 72. See also Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 
687 (CC) para 46; Carephone paras 34-35. In Sidumo, however, O’Regan J suggested that the doctrine of SOP is 
irrelevant to section 145 proceedings; Sidumo paras 136-137. Consult too Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetham 
& Others (2008) 29 ILJ 306 (LAC) para 6. O’Regan J’s sentiments are discussed in more detail below. 
555
 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
556
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others [2006] 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA). 
557
 Section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’). 
558
 Sidumo paras 62-79. The question is addressed in more detail later. 
559
 Sidumo para 88. The legitimacy of this finding is beyond the scope of this paper and will therefore not be 
examined here. For further commentary, consult the references cited in chapter 1. 
560
 Led by Navsa AJ. 
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were not reviewable under PAJA. In reaching these conclusions, the Court affirmed the 
Constitutional foundations of review, recounting key principles in the process.
561
 The most 
important of its findings are discussed below. 
 
First, the Court assessed the administrative status of CCMA proceedings. In doing so, it 
acknowledged the evident similarities between the CCMA and courts of law, while recording 
relevant distinctions between them.
562
 Foremost of these was the obligation imposed on 
commissioners by the LRA to determine disputes speedily, fairly and without undue legal 
formality. This obligation rendered arbitrations discrete from adjudicative processes.
563
 
Adding to this, lawyers were expressly excluded from attending most arbitrations and 
resultant awards bore no precedential value.
564
 The resolution of disputes by the CCMA was 
compelled by statute which differentiated its proceedings from private and voluntary 
arbitrations.
565
 What this revealed, nonetheless, was that when conducting arbitrations, 
commissioners exercised public power. Finally, case law concerning the nature of 
administrative action under the Constitution, endorsed the status of CCMA arbitrations as 
administrative. Altogether, these factors confirmed that CCMA arbitrations comprised 
administrative action.
566
 The implication of this finding (to which the Court returned later) 
was that section 145 of the LRA had to be read consistently with section 33(1) of the 
Constitution – the right to just administrative action.567  
 
Turning then to PAJA’s application, the majority emphasized the features of dispute 
resolution under the LRA. Of specific import in this regard were the specialized fora 
provided for in the Act, which were purposefully designed to protect parties’ rights to fair 
                                                          
561
 Sidumo paras 80-105. Consider too O’Regan J’s judgment emphasizing the relevance of commissioners’ 
Constitutional obligations to determining the status of the CCMA; Sidumo paras 123, 132, 138 & 140. 
562
 Sidumo paras 81-87. 
563
 Ibid para 85; see also section 138 of the LRA. 
564
 Ibid; consult too Brassey’s and Currie and De Waal’s comments on the status of the CCMA, cited in Sidumo 
paras 86-87; Martin Brassey Employment and Labour Law: Commentary on the Labour Relations Act vol 3 
(2006) at A7-1 – A7-2; Iain Currie & Johan De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) at 651 ftnt 34. 
Note, however, Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Minister of Labour and Others (NGHC) unreported 
case no 61197/11 of 15 October 2012. In Law Society of the Northern Provinces, the Court declared the 
prohibition on legal representation in certain CCMA proceedings unconstitutional. 
565
 Sections 133-139 of the LRA. For the differences between private and compulsory arbitration, consult Barney 
Jordaan, Peter Kantor & Craig Bosch Labour Arbitration with a commentary on the CCMA Rules 2 ed (2011) at 
5-6; John Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 2 ed (2008) at 41, 144 & 149; Sidumo paras 86-88; Brassey at 
A7–1–A7–2; Currie & De Waal at 651 ftnt 34; Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (5) BCLR 503 
(SCA) para 45 and Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others [1997] 12 
BLLR 1632 (LC) paras 3-4 & 6. 
566
 Sidumo para 98-100. See also chapter 1, Sidumo paras 81-84 and the case law referred to therein. 
567
 Ibid para 89. 
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labour practices. To achieve this, the LRA sought to: ‘…provide simple procedures for the 
resolution of disputes through statutory conciliation, mediation and arbitration and the 
licensing of independent alternative dispute resolution services…’568 The Act further strived 
to ensure that ‘disputes of right’ were resolved: ‘…in a way that would be accessible, speedy 
and inexpensive, with only one tier of appeal.’569  
 
It was therefore plain that labour disputes required expeditious determination. These features 
of dispute resolution were reflected not only in particular provisions of the Act but also in its 
spirit and objects.
570
 Pertinent to the case at hand, held the Court, was that efficiency 
permeated section 145 which offered only limited grounds of review to parties aggrieved by 
commissioners’ awards.571  
 
The SCA had deemed the only conflict between the LRA and PAJA to reside in the time 
periods for review mandated by each. The CC, however, disagreed. It argued that there was a 
general ‘lack of cohesion’ between the statutes’ principal provisions.572 Primarily, this 
stemmed from the expertise and efficiency with which labour disputes were to be finalised.
573
 
The scope of the courts’ powers under PAJA and the LRA were resultantly disparate.574 
Further suggesting the uniqueness of dispute resolution in the labour sphere was section 210 
                                                          
568
 Ibid para 94. 
569
 Ibid; the Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act (1995) 16 ILJ 278 (‘the Explanatory 
Memorandum’) at 279. 
570
 Sidumo para 98. 
571
 Ibid para 94; section 1(d) of the LRA; for the LRA’s general endorsement of efficiency, see Carli Botma & 
Adriaan van der Walt ‘The role of reasonableness in the review of labour arbitration awards (Part 1)’ 2009 
Obiter 328 at 329. 
572
 Sidumo para 95. 
573
 Ibid paras 96-97. 
574
 Compare section 8(1)(c)(ii) of PAJA, which provides as follows: 
‘8(1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1), may grant any order that 
its just and equitable, including orders-… 
…(c) setting the administrative action aside and-… 
…(ii) in exceptional cases- 
(aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or correcting a defect resulting 
from the administrative action; or 
(bb) directing the administrator or any other party to the proceedings to pay 
compensation…’,  
with section 145(4) of the LRA, which states: 
‘Section 145… 
…(4) If the award is set aside, the Labour Court may- 
a) determine the dispute in the manner it considers appropriate; or’ 
b) make any order it considers appropriate about the procedures to be followed to determine the dispute.’ 
Consider too section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA and the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA at 279 & 318-319. 
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of the LRA, which attested to section 145’s incompatibility with PAJA.575  Finally, several 
canons of statutory interpretation implied that the LRA took precedence over PAJA.
576
 On 
these bases, the CC declared that PAJA did not apply to reviews of CCMA arbitration 
awards.
577
  
 
Having resolved these issues, the majority turned to section 145’s Constitutional 
compliance.
578
 The starting point for the enquiry was the Constitution. Both section 3 of the 
LRA
579
 and the Constitution itself espoused this approach. Section 145 was accordingly to be 
interpreted consistently with the right to just administrative action in section 33.
580
 
Carephone had been decided under the interim Constitution’s formulation of the right.581 Yet, 
that formulation had been modified by the final Constitution.
582
 Rather than rational 
justifiability, the Constitutional requisites for administrative action (including CCMA 
arbitrations) were now lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness.
583
 Arbitration 
proceedings and associated awards which fell short of these standards were consequently 
reviewable.
584
 To ensure these standards were met, held the CC, it was necessary that: ‘The 
reasonableness standard […suffused…] section 145 of the LRA.’585 According to the Court, 
applying this test would: 
 
‘…give effect not only to the constitutional right to fair labour practices but also to 
the right to administrative action which [was] lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair.’586 
 
                                                          
575
 Sidumo paras 98-100; section 210 of the LRA reads as follows: ‘Application of Act when in conflict with 
other laws: –If any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises between this Act and the 
provisions of any other law save the Constitution or any Act expressly amending this Act, the provisions of this 
Act will prevail.’ 
576
 Including that general legislation should not prevail over specific legislation; Sidumo para 101. 
577
 Sidumo paras 101-104. 
578
 Ibid para 104. 
579
 Section 3 stipulates that when interpreting the LRA, courts are obliged to do so consistently with the 
Constitution. 
580
 Sidumo para 105. 
581
 Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (‘the interim Constitution’); 
Carephone was formally decided in accordance with section 33, read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6, of the 
Constitution; Carephone para 15. 
582
 For the meaning of the interim Constitution’s right to just administrative action, see Hoexter (2007) at 303-
307 and Etienne Mureinik ‘Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability’ 1993 Acta Juridica 35. 
583
 See section 33 of the Constitution. 
584
 Sidumo para 89. 
585
 Ibid para 106. As Grogan observes, apart from reflecting on the fact that commissioners are obliged to act 
rationally and remain impartial, the Judge provided later courts with no further explanation of the meaning of 
‘reasonableness’; John Grogan ‘Two-edged sword: The CC’s ruling in Rustplats’ (2007) 23(6) Employment Law 
3 at 7.  
586
 Sidumo para 110. 
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The majority’s intentions behind this statement are debatable. One interpretation is that the 
Court sought merely to confirm the interdependence of Constitutional rights and their 
inherently supportive nature.
587
 Thus, requiring commissioners’ decisions to be reasonable 
would enhance the likelihood of decisions being fair.
588
 Through proper protection of the 
right to just administrative action, the right to fair labour practices would be secured. More 
controversial constructions have, nonetheless, also surfaced.  
 
One of these is that the efficient nature of labour dispute resolution necessitates a higher 
threshold for review than that previously applicable. In other words, following Sidumo, the 
courts’ powers of review were constricted.589 Various challenges may be levelled against this 
view and they are fully discussed in later paragraphs.
590
 Suffice to say here that, in her 
concurring judgment in Sidumo, O’Regan J591 held the reasonableness standard to have 
extended the scope of review.
592
 Her statement alone points to the illegitimacy of the 
construction.
593
 Adding to this, the proposition is contrary to the purpose of judicial review – 
of promoting parties’ rights to just administrative action. As such, it is illogical to aver that by 
reading section 145 consistently with section 33, the CC constrained the Labour Courts’ 
powers of review.
594
 
                                                          
587
 Constitutional rights are inherently interlinked and should therefore be interpreted harmoniously with another 
if at all possible; S v Rens 1996 (1) SA 1218 (CC) at 1222-1223; De Ville (2005) at 80; S v Mhlungu and Others 
1995 (3) SA 867 (CC). By subsequently holding that there was no reason why sections 23, 33 and 34 of the 
Constitution should not overlap, Navsa AJ ostensibly endored this principle too; Sidumo para 112. For the proper 
approach to Constitutional interpretation generally, consult LM Du Plessis Reinterpretation of Statutes (2002) at 
133-144. 
588
 Consider Ngcobo J’s decision in Sidumo for a discussion of fairness; see also John Grogan ‘Death of the 
reasonable employer: the seismology of review’ (2000) 16(2) Employment Law 4 at 10. 
589
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) (‘Shoprite Checkers 1’) para 19; 
Cheetham para 6; John Grogan ‘In the shadow of Sidumo: Applying the ‘reasonable commissioner’ test’ (2008) 
24(6) Employment Law 3 at 3; C Garbers ‘Reviewing CCMA awards in the aftermath of Sidumo’ (2008) 17(9) 
Contemporary Labour Law 84 at 85; Grogan (2007) at 22. Compare this approach, however, to that of the 
Labour Court in Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2552 (LC) paras 40-43 and Ellerine 
Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] JOL 22087 (LAC) at 10-11. 
590
 See the discussion of Cheetham below. 
591
 In her concurring decision in Sidumo. 
592
 Sidumo para 140. Consider too Sidumo para 106; there, Navsa AJ observed that the Carephone standard was 
substantive in nature and permitted more intrusive scrutiny than the rationality test formulated in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); Carephone para 31. The extension of the courts’ powers of review has been 
confirmed in decisions such as Value Logistics para 40 and Ellerine Holdings at 10-11. 
593
 For further affirmation of O’Regan J’s statement, consult Hoexter (2007) at 306, where she refers to Minister 
of Health and Another v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign and Innovative 
Medicines SA as Amici Curiae) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 108. Arguably, this has been clear for some time; 
Roman v Williams NO 1998 (1) SA 270 (C) at 284-285. 
594
 Recall the applicant’s argument in Carephone that section 145 of the LRA did not offer adequate protection 
for parties’ rights and thus it was necessary to permit review of CCMA awards under section 158(1)(g) of the 
Act; Carephone paras 5-8 & paras 30-31. 
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An alternative approach argues that reasonableness has diminished the role of section 145.
595
 
Proponents of this view submit that the standard offers sufficient protection to the right to fair 
labour practices in itself and thus section 145 is superfluous. Whereas some courts have 
adopted this attitude,
596
 Constitutional considerations cast doubt on its viability.  For one, 
were section 145 to have been obliterated by the Sidumo test, the Constitutional values of 
accountability, transparency and openness in administrative decision-making would be 
defeated.
597
 Secondly, given the critical functions of section 145 of ensuring that awards are 
lawful and procedurally fair, were the section declared redundant, achieving these 
imperatives would be left to chance.
598
 
 
The breadth of the PAJA’s grounds for review599 equally illustrates the irony of dispensing 
with section 145 in favour of reasonableness exclusively.
600
 From these it is plain that, in the 
context of general administrative action, the legislature deemed grounds other than 
reasonableness to be necessary for protecting parties’ rights.601 As PAJA was enacted to give 
effect to the right to just administrative action, it follows that Parliament saw all the grounds 
provided for therein as important. The legislature’s recognition of both procedural and 
substantive bases for review accordingly affirms the continued pertinence of grounds other 
than reasonableness. By analogy, section 145 must remain applicable. Finally, the doctrine of 
SOP deserves a mention.
602
  In Sidumo, O’Regan J contested the alleged significance of the 
SOP to section 145 proceedings, observing that: 
 
                                                          
595
 Consider the SCA’s dismissal of the remaining grounds for review alleged by the applicant on the basis that 
the relevant award was substantively reasonable; Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO & others (2009) 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA). 
See also Grogan (2008) at 3. 
596
 Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 26444 (LC) para 28. Note, however, 
the LAC’s rejection of this view in Kievits Kroon Country Estate v MMoledi & others  (LAC) unreported case 
no JA78/10 of 24 July 2012 para 21 and Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 
197 (LAC). 
597
 Garbers (2008) at 86; Grant Ray-Howett ‘Is it reasonable for CCMA commissioners to act irrationally?’ 
(2008) 29 ILJ 1619 at 1628-1634. 
598
 A reasonable award which was reached by means of an unreasonable reasoning process would be allowed to 
stand; Garbers (2008) at 87; Ray-Howett at 1628-1634. 
599
 Which include but are not limited to unreasonableness; section 6 of PAJA. Consider too A Pillay ‘Reviewing 
reasonableness: an appropriate standard for evaluating state action and inaction?’ (2005) 122 SALJ 419 at 424. 
600
 Under section 33 of the Constitution. 
601
 Consistently with the right to just administrative action. 
602
 Hoexter (2007) at 67-76: Engen Petroleum para 72. Bato Star paras 45-46. Note, however, O’Regan J’s 
submission that the doctrine does not apply to section 145 review proceedings as discussed below; Sidumo paras 
136-137. 
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‘The doctrine of the separation of powers…has no application in the present case. 
There is no reason why, from a separation of powers perspective, the conduct of the 
CCMA should be immune from scrutiny under section 33.’603   
 
While at first glance her comments decry the doctrine’s relevance to the issue, a closer look 
reveals a different picture.
604
 Notably, the Judge expressed these sentiments following her 
discussion of the cases in which public institutions had been exempt from reasonableness 
review altogether.
605
 Given the principle that reviewing courts may not supplant the choices 
of the legislature with their own and should approach administrative decisions with respect, 
O’Regan J arguably sought merely to assert that subjecting CCMA awards to scrutiny on the 
basis of reasonableness was apt. Awards were not to be excused from review therefore. The 
role of the SOP in section 145 proceedings – of promoting balance between judicial appraisal 
and due restraint
606
 – consequently remains significant.607 
 
Approaching the question from another perspective confirms this. Abandoning legislative 
intent in favour of an ‘all encompassing’ standard of reasonableness disregards the role of the 
legislature in delineating the scope of the law.
608
 This undermines the doctrine, again 
rendering the aforementioned construction problematic. Finally, the approach negates the 
proper role of the judiciary in review proceedings. That role precludes the courts from 
performing administrative functions themselves.
609
 It is resultantly fortunate that this 
interpretation has now been refuted by the LAC.
610
  
 
Returning to the majority judgment in Sidumo, Navsa AJ next considered Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others,
611
 in which the 
                                                          
603
 Sidumo para 137. 
604
 Read with both Bato Star and Engen Petroleum.  In Bato Star, O’Regan J propounded the import of the 
doctrine of SOP, with reference to deference and the need for courts to refrain from usurping the functions of 
administrative agencies. Comparably, in Engen Petroleum, the LAC emphasized the legislature’s entitlement to 
make policy choices; Bato Star paras 45-46; Engen Petroleum para 72; Consider too Carephone paras 34-35.  
605
 These cases included Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council and Others 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa v South 
African Rugby and Football Union & Others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) (‘SARFU’) and De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) 
SA 785 (CC); Sidumo para 136. 
606
 Bato Star paras 45-46; Engen Petroleum para 72; Carephone paras 34-35.  
607
 Consult too Fidelity paras 98-99. 
608
 Relative to that of the judiciary at least. 
609
 Carephone para 35; Bato Star para 45. 
610
 Fidelity para 101. 
611
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 
(CC). 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
93 
 
Constitutional formulation of reasonableness had first been devised.
612
 Significantly, in Bato 
Star, the CC had rejected the notion of gross unreasonableness as the requisite standard under 
the Constitution.
613
 In other words, egregious unreasonableness was not required to justify 
review. Instead, held the majority, the question was simply whether the decision made by the 
relevant commissioner was ‘one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.’614  
 
Addressing the nature of reasonableness more fully, the CC in Sidumo confirmed its 
substantive character, acknowledging that when applying the test, courts would invariably 
need to assess the merits of disputes.
615
 Value judgments would accordingly be necessary. In 
making such judgments, conceded the Court, it was unavoidable that the distinction between 
appeal and review would be threatened. To minimize the threat, reviewing courts were to 
recount Hoexter’s advice that: ‘…the danger [lay], not in careful scrutiny, but in “judicial 
overzealousness in setting aside the administrative decisions that [did] not coincide with the 
judge’s own opinions.”’616 
 
In other words, while intensive scrutiny was acceptable, where awards fell within the range of 
permissible outcomes prescribed by reasonableness, interference would not be warranted.
617
 
The proposition arises from the concept of de erence – a well established tenet of judicial 
review.
618
 In essence, deference ensures that administrative decisions are not lightly 
interfered with and that the separation of power between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary is maintained.
619
 As Landman states, the notion of deference implies that: ‘…the 
                                                          
612
 Ibid para 44.  
613
 Ibid paras 44-45. For an earlier comparable decision, see Roman at 284-285. For gross unreasonableness 
generally, see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 2 All ER 680. 
614
 Sidumo para 107.    
615
 Ibid para 108. 
616
 Ibid para 109. For discussions of deference, see Hoexter (2007) at 138-147 and De Ville (2005) at 67-68; 
Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 148-156. Note that Hoexter’s description of 
deference concerns non-specific administrative action. As such, it must be tailored to the unique nature of labour 
dispute resolution when applying it to section 145 reviews. Of particular significance in this regard is the need 
for efficiency in this context; Sidumo para 137. Consider further, Geo Quinot ‘Towards effective judicial review 
of state commercial activity’ (2009) 3 TSAR  436. 
617
 Ibid. 
618
 For deference generally, consult DM Davis 'To defer and when? Administrative law and Constitutional 
democracy' 2006 Acta Juridica 23; H Corder 'From despair to deference: same difference?' in G Huscroft & M 
Taggart (eds) Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law (2006) at 375 and Hoexter (2007) at 138-47. For 
‘deference as respect’, see David Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law (2004).  
619
 Consistently with the Constitution’s directives therefore; sections 33 & 195(1) of the Constitution; Hoexter 
(2007) at 130-139 & 316; Bato Star paras 46-48; Carephone para 34; De Ville (2005) at 30 
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court not only exercises restraint when a decision is under review but also [it]...allows for a 
broad margin and prevents a court from straying within the domain of the decision-maker.’620 
 
By adopting a deferential attitude, held the majority in Sidumo, it would be possible to apply 
reasonableness without engaging in an appeal.
621
 Unfortunately, the CC offered no practical 
guidance as to how this was to be done,
622
 leaving reviewing courts with principles more 
readily declared than applied.
623
 Similarly absent from the Court’s findings was a definition 
of reasonableness capable of clear and consistent application. 
 
Despite these omissions, the CC applied the cited principles to the facts, noting first that the 
Commissioner had both paid due consideration to the Code of Good Practice Dismissals
624
 
and applied his mind to the question before him.
625
 Pertinently here, Navsa AJ remarked: 
 
‘Given the pressures under which commissioners operate and the relatively informal 
manner in which proceedings are conducted, and the further fact that employees are 
usually not legally represented, it is to be expected that awards will not be 
impeccable.’626 
 
When evaluating the reasonableness of awards therefore, they should not be critiqued against 
judicial standards of precision. In light of the legislative framework for arbitration and the 
stressors under which commissioners function, doing so would be inappropriate. The 
connotation is that the context in which the CCMA operates affects the ambit of review. This 
                                                          
620
 AA Landman ‘A study in deference: Labour Court deference to CCMA arbitration awards’ (2008) 29 ILJ 
1613 at 1615-1616. 
621
 Sidumo para 108-109. Ray-Howett suggests that a better way to secure the distinction between appeals and 
reviews is to adopt the so-called ‘austere’ approach to review. In terms of this approach, when evaluating the 
reasonableness of commissioners’ decisions, only the reasoning processes adopted by commissioners should be 
appraised; Ray-Howett at 1631. Regardless of the potential clarity which his proposal might bring, it is doubtful 
that the CC in Sidumo intended reasonableness to be construed in this limited fashion. 
622
 Sidumo para 109. 
623
 In turn, courts have regularly engaged with the merits of disputes in a manner more like appeal than review. 
See, for example, Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others (LAC) unreported case no JA17/2009 of 24 
February 2009 para 64; Clarence v The National Commissioner of the SA Police Service (2011) 32 ILJ 2927 
(LAC); Zono v Gruss NO & others [2011] 9 BLLR 873 (LAC) paras 14, 15 & 36; Mutual Construction 
Company Tvl (Pty) Ltd v Ntombela NO & others [2010] 5 BLLR 513 (LAC) and Dunwell Property Services CC 
v Sibande & others [2012] 2 BLLR 131 (LAC); Miyambo v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration & others (2010) 31 ILJ 2031 (LAC) paras 12 & 21; Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Turnbull 
[2008] 9 BLLR 817 (LAC) and Khanyile v Billiton Aluminium SA Ltd t/a Hillside Aluminium (LAC) unreported 
case no DA24/06 of 24 February 2009.  
624
 The Code of Good Practice Dismissals, Schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘Code for 
Dismissals’).  
625
 Sidumo para 117. 
626
 Ibid para 118. Note, however, Maepe v CCMA & another [2008] 8 BLLR 723 (LAC) para 8; O’Regan J’s 
judgment in CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) para 140 and Ellerine Holdings 
at 11.  
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notion is hardly novel; in fact, in Bato Star it was specifically highlighted.
627
 There, in 
clarifying the nature of reasonableness under the Constitution, the CC had resolved that the 
reasonableness of decisions was to be determined with reference to: 
 
‘[T]he nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the 
range of factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature 
of the competing interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and 
well being of those affected.’628  
 
In turn, as De Ville remarks: 
 
‘…the circumstances of the case at hand, the specific statutory provisions, the legal 
and administrative scheme provided for in the statute concerned, as well as the 
broader context…will all play a role in determining what reasonableness requires in 
the specific case at hand.’629 
 
Consequently, when delineating the scope of review, the nature and context of CCMA 
arbitrations, together with the specifics of the dispute in question, require attention.
630
 Having 
recognized this in Sidumo, the CC confirmed the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s 
award. In its view, both his reasoning and the material before him established this.
631
 The 
Court’s concluding comments are instructive: 
 
‘This is one of those cases where the decision-makers acting reasonably may reach 
different conclusions. The LRA has given that decision-making power to a 
commissioner.’632 
 
Given its earlier sentiments, the outcome of Sidumo was clearly informed by legislative 
intent, read with contextual factors specific to CCMA proceedings. Significantly too, the CC 
asserted the rule that reasonable decisions may differ from one decision-maker to the next.
633
 
To this extent, the Court illustrated the crucial interplay between the right to fair labour 
                                                          
627
 Bato Star paras 41 & 54; De Ville (2005) at 212. Compare these sentiments to JR De Ville 'Deference as 
respect and deference as sacrifice: A reading of Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs' (2004) 20 
SAJHR 577, where he criticizes the contextual approach to applying reasonableness. 
628
 Bato Star para 45. 
629
 De Ville (2005) at 212. 
630
 For a more in-depth discussion of relevant contextual considerations, consult chapter 4. Consider too Ellerine 
Holdings at 13 and Sidumo para 118. 
631
 Sidumo para 119. 
632
 Ibid. 
633
 The principle that a reasonable decision is one which falls within the range of acceptable outcomes indicates 
that what is reasonable in the eyes of one court or tribunal may well be different to what is reasonable in the eyes 
of others; Bato Star para 45. 
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practices, the doctrine of SOP and the reasonableness standard well. Regrettably, its findings 
remained ambiguous in other respects.  
 
In addition to its failure to define deference or reasonableness in practical terms, the Court 
neglected to clarify the relationship between section 145 and the reasonableness test. In 
particular, Navsa AJ confirmed the award’s reasonableness without reference to the 
remaining grounds of review advanced by the applicant. These included that the 
Commissioner’s reasons and findings were irrational; that there was no link between the 
evidence and his factual findings; that the Commissioner had been so grossly careless that his 
conduct amounted to misconduct; that the Commissioner had failed to apply his mind to the 
facts and had accordingly denied the employer a fair hearing;
634
 and finally that the 
Commissioner had acted in excess of his powers.
635
 Disappointingly, the majority offered no 
explanation for disregarding these grounds. While it might be inferred that section 145 had 
lost its relevance following Sidumo, the inference is an unlikely one.
636
 More probable is that 
the remaining grounds simply did not justify review. Alternatively,
637
 from the Court’s failure 
to discuss grounds aside from reasonableness it may be deduced that the CC deemed the 
applicant’s grounds to depict a single but composite defect –  the alleged ‘irrationality’ (or 
unreasonableness) of the Commissioner’s award.638 
 
Concurring with Navsa AJ’s principal findings,639 O’Regan J elaborated on his reasoning. In 
doing so, she provided additional insight into the scope of reasonableness review. First, she 
emphasized the import of section 33 of the Constitution in upholding the Constitutional 
values of accountability, responsiveness and openness.
640
 Requiring administrative action to 
be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair ensured that exercises of public power were 
                                                          
634
 And had committed a gross irregularity by doing so. 
635
 Sidumo para 23 & 185. 
636
 For this view, consider Kievits Kroon (LC). 
637
 Particularly given that neither Navsa AJ nor the other Judges expressly stated that the section 145 grounds 
had been displaced by the standard of reasonableness. See too Fidelity; The South African Municipal Workers 
Union v The South African Local Government Bargaining Council & others (LAC) unreported case no DA06/09 
of 29 November 2011 (‘SAMWU’) paras 9, 10, 18 & 27. Note, however, Edcon para 23 and Kievits Kroon (LC) 
para 28. 
638
 For similar attitudes to reasonableness, consult Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation & Arbitration & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 1381 (LAC) para 21; Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & others 
[2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC) paras 16-17 and SA Municipal Workers Union on behalf of Petersen v City of Cape 
Town & others (2009) 30 ILJ 1347 (LC) paras 53-54 (‘Petersen’), read with paras 26-27.  
639
 Botma & van der Walt (Part 1) argue that Navsa AJ’s findings were hardly ground breaking, having mostly 
been determined in either Carephone or the LAC’s decisions since then.  
640
 See section 1 of the Constitution. 
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conducted with due accountability, openness and transparency.
641
 It followed that 
reasonableness was not to be interpreted as reducing commissioners’ Constitutional 
obligations. On the contrary, O’Regan J observed, section 145’s suffusion with the standard 
had expanded the reach of review; the grounds stipulated therein had not been limited by it.
642
 
Nonetheless aware of the dangers associated with extending review,
643
 the Judge commented: 
 
‘It is clear that the CCMA has been established to expedite the resolution of labour 
disputes in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Special procedures have been 
created to avoid the delays and costs associated with dispute resolution in the ordinary 
courts…  
 
 
… [However, as] the Labour Relations Act already provides for the scrutiny on 
review of decisions of the CCMA by the Labour Court, no further delay will be 
caused by that scrutiny being on the basis of the constitutional standards established 
in section 33. So the need for speedy and cheap resolution of disputes does not mean 
that the CCMA should not be held accountable for its decisions, nor that it should not 
be monitored by the Labour Court to ensure that it acts lawfully, reasonably and 
procedurally fairly. Indeed, as Sachs J has reasoned,
644
 it is entirely consistent with 
our Constitutional order that the procedures and decisions of the CCMA should be 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and that this should be ensured by 
appropriate scrutiny by the Labour Courts.’645 
 
In other words, according to O’Regan J, expanding the permissible grounds for review would 
not endanger the efficiency with which labour disputes were to be resolved. In any event, the 
constitutional principles of accountability, transparency and openness in administrative 
decision-making rendered commissioners’ compliance with these values crucial.646  
 
Two aspects of O’Regan J’s decision are particularly germane. First is her commendable 
acknowledgment of the role of accountability, transparency and openness in judicial review. 
Inevitably associated with these values are the purposes of review. As discussed in her 
judgment, judicial review ensures that both the parties’ rights to just administrative action and 
                                                          
641
 Sidumo para 138. See too Solomon v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others 
(1999) 20 ILJ  2960 (LC) paras 19 & 21. 
642
 Sidumo para 140. 
643
 Primarily that of excessive judicial review, leading to the protraction of labour disputes contrary to the objects 
of the LRA; section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA. 
644
 Sachs J wrote a concurring judgment too but for different reasons. Pertinently therein, he addressed the 
contextual factors relevant to review; Sidumo para 158. For further discussion of these factors, see De Ville 
(2005) at 211-216.  
645
 Sidumo para 140. 
646
 Ibid. 
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key Constitutional values are upheld.
647
 In practical terms,
648
 this translates into adequate 
scrutiny and supervision of administrative determinations, thereby facilitating improved 
future decision-making.
649
 By means of review, commissioners may be directed towards 
more legitimate approaches to resolving labour disputes. This important function of review is 
an underlying theme in numerous cases, and it is addressed more fully under Fidelity below. 
 
Secondly, O’Regan J’s statement that extending the ambit of review would not hamper 
efficiency is significant. Usefully, it avows that reasonableness has indeed expanded the 
reach of review.
650
 Still, the Judge’s sentiments in this regard should be treated cautiously. It 
may be that if suitably applied, reasonableness need not jeopardize the speed with which 
disputes are finalised. Yet, broadening reviewing courts’ powers may conceivably encourage 
the institution of review proceedings generally.
651
 In addition, should the test be inadequately, 
inconsistently or ambiguously applied,
652
 the probability of frivolous review proceedings may 
be increased.
653
 
 
In a dissenting minority decision, Ngcobo DJP held that CCMA arbitrations did not constitute 
administrative action.
654
 Whereas the Judge’s findings were obiter dicta, his description of the 
standards to which commissioners may be held and his definition of gross irregularities,
655
 
have been repeatedly cited by reviewing courts.
656
 As such, Ngcobo J’s judgment is 
informative when identifying the confines of review.
657
 
 
                                                          
647
 Ibid para 138; sections 1(d), 33 & 195 of the Constitution. 
648
 And while not expressly stated in Sidumo. 
649
 For the constituents of administrative justice generally, consult Jeffrey Jowell ‘The democratic necessity of 
administrative justice’ 2006 Acta Juridica 13 at 16-17; Cora Hoexter ‘The current state of South African 
administrative law’ in H Corder & L van der Vijver (eds) Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 20 at 27; Hugh 
Corder ‘Reviewing review: much achieved, much more to do’ in H Corder & L van der Vijver (eds) Realising 
Administrative Justice (2002) 1 at 1-2 and Mureinik (1993). 
650
 This ought, nonetheless, to be construed with reference to the  majority’s finding that the reasonable employer 
test no longer forms part of South African law; Sidumo para 79. This is discussed in more detail below. 
651
 As the likelihood of success is inevitably greater where a wider variety of grounds are available. 
652
 As has arguably been the case; consider the Shoprite Checkers trilogy discussed below and Emma Fergus & 
Alan Rycroft ‘Refining review’ 2012 Acta Juridica 170 at 187-192. 
653
 Desperate applicants may simply rely upon serendipity rather than legitimate bases for review. See Paul 
Benjamin ‘Friend or foe? The impact of judicial decisions on the operation of the CCMA’ (2007) 28 ILJ 1 at 32-
36. 
654
 Sidumo para 163. 
655
 Ibid para 268. Ellerine Holdings para 12; Afrox Healthcare para 21. 
656
 See for example SAMWU paras 9, 10, 18 & 27; Afrox Healthcare para 21; Ellerine Holdings para 12; 
Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC) para 11. 
657
 In case of section 145 proceedings; Sidumo paras 267-268. 
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The Judge began with the reasons for the LAC’s decision in Carephone, reiterating section 
145’s purposefully narrow construction.658 To ensure the section’s compliance with section 
33, the Court in Carephone had introduced the rational justifiability test, thereby extending 
permissible review beyond mere procedural impropriety. In so doing, substantive defects 
(such as irrationality) were proclaimed reviewable.
659
 Logically, corresponding principles 
must apply to the reasonableness enquiry, again revealing its expansive nature. Consistently 
with the majority, Ngcobo J highlighted the need for efficiency, finality and cost-effective 
labour dispute resolution under the LRA. In his view, while Constitutional values informed 
the interpretation of section 145, these features of dispute resolution and the Act’s primary 
objects
660
 were of equivalent worth.
661
 
 
The relevance of his observations is apparent. However, it has not been these dicta which 
have drawn the courts’ attention. Instead, their focus has fallen on Ngcobo DJP’s descriptions 
of commissioners’ obligations during arbitration proceedings. Most frequently cited in this 
regard is the following passage: 
 
‘Thus construed, the commissioners are required to act fairly in the determination of 
unfair dismissal disputes. If a commissioner fails to do so he or she commits a gross 
irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings and the ensuing arbitral award 
falls to be reviewed and set aside. Similarly, if a commissioner makes an award which 
is inconsistent with his or her obligations under the LRA, he or she acts in excess of the 
powers conferred by the LRA and the award falls to be reviewed and set aside.’662 
 
In other words, on account of their duty to determine matters procedurally fairly, 
commissioners’ failures to do so are ‘grossly irregular’.663 In addition, where commissioners 
depart from their statutory powers and duties, their resultant findings may be set aside. 
                                                          
658
 The limited nature of the section 145 grounds for review is well established; Edgars Stores (Pty) Ltd v 
Director, Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (1998) 19 ILJ 350 (LC) at 356 & 
359; the Explanatory Memorandum at 327-330; Paul Benjamin & Carole Cooper ‘Innovation and continuity: 
Responding to the Labour Relations Bill’ (1995) 16 ILJ 258 at 274-275; Benjamin (2007) at 3-6; Carephone 
para 25; Sidumo para 245. See also chapter 1 of this thesis.  
659
 And therefore ‘substantive impropriety’ too. Recall that the reasonableness test is a substantive enquiry which 
invariably requires reviewing courts to make value judgments; Carephone paras 25 & 36; Sidumo para 179. 
660
 In particular, section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA was relevant. 
661
 Sidumo para 253. 
662
 Ibid para 165. 
663
 In accordance with section 145(2)(ii) of the LRA. Thus, when determining whether such an irregularity has 
occurred, the essential question is whether the commissioner’s conduct deprived the parties of their rights to a 
fair hearing. For judicial endorsement of this approach, see Fipaza v Eskom Holdings Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2903 
(LC) para 58; Relyant Retail Ltd t/a Bears Furnishers v CCMA & others [2009] JOL 24327 (LC); Woolworths 
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] 5 BLLR 577 (LC) paras 19-23 and Transnet Freight Rail paras 10, 11, 14 & 
17. 
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Debatably, while Ngcobo J’s remarks offered a neat summary of awards’ vulnerability under 
section 145, they did little to expound the principles of review beyond those applicable under 
Carephone.
664
 Still, in so far as they acknowledge commissioners’ duties as key to defining 
the ambit of reasonableness, they set the context for review; in that way they are valuable. 
 
3. COURT DECISIONS FOLLOWING SIDUMO 
 
Since Sidumo, definite patterns of confusion and controversy have surfaced in the case law. 
Some courts make but passing or no reference to the Sidumo test,
665
 applying a process more 
like appeal than review. Others apply the test in association with one or more statutory 
ground(s) of review, while others treat it as an entirely independent basis for review.
666
 In 
some instances, the section 145 grounds are completely disregarded
667
 when in others they 
are not. Furthermore, inconsistent opinions as to the relationship (if any) between the 
Carephone and Sidumo standards frequently appear between judgments.
668
 Finally, 
contention around the question of whether reasonableness extends or restricts the legitimate 
sphere of review abounds.
669
 What follows is an analysis of court decisions in which the 
aforementioned controversies are most apparent.
670
 Throughout the analysis, the legitimacy 
                                                          
664
 See the discussion of case law in chapter 2; for the section 145 grounds of review generally, consult Reunert 
Industries at 1634-1637. 
665
 See, for example, Miyambo paras 12 & 21. 
666
 Sidumo paras 110 onwards; Cheetham paras 5-6; Edcon para 23; Kievits Kroon (LC); Dunwell para 17. 
Compare these cases, however, to the courts’ remarks in Fidelity and Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner 
Nggeleni & others [2011] 4 BLLR 404 (LC). For varying opinions on the independence of the section 145 
grounds, consult Sidumo paras 247-255; Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 340 
(LAC) paras 33 & 40; Samancor Tubatse Ferrochrome v Metal & Engineering Industries Bargaining Council & 
others (2010) 31 ILJ 1838 (LAC); Foschini Group v Maidi & others 
[2010] 7 BLLR 689 (LAC); Le Roux & Young at 30; Darcy Du Toit Reviewing CCMA arbitration awards: Has 
section 145 become academic? Paper presented at the 13
th
 Annual SASLAW Conference, Vineyard Hotel, Cape 
Town (22 October 2010) at 7-9 and Garbers (2008). 
667
 Kievits Kroon (LC) para 28. 
668
 Compare, for example, Ellerine Holdings at 10-11 with Edcon para 16; Cheetham; Fidelity and Bestel paras 
16-17. 
669
 Consider, amongst others, the views of Garbers (2008); Du Toit (2010) and Carli Botma & Adriaan van der 
Walt ‘The role of reasonableness in the review of labour arbitration awards (Part 2)’ 2009 Obiter 530 at 543; 
Cheetham para 6; Ellerine Holdings paras 10-11; Carephone para 37 and Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 28. 
For the notion that reasonableness permits greater scrutiny than the traditional model of review does (albeit in 
the general administrative law context), see Hoexter (2007) at 301-318; De Ville (2005) at 209-210; Roman at 
281; Steyn v Middleburg Ferrochrome (A division of Samancor) and others (2009) 30 ILJ 1637 (LC) paras 37-
38. 
670
 Due to the wealth of Labour Court (‘LC’) decisions following Sidumo, it is not possible to evaluate each and 
every one. Thus, the analysis of case law in this thesis focuses on the Labour Appeal Court’s (‘LAC’) and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s (‘SCA’) decisions. Labout Court (‘LC’) judgments are addressed in limited cases 
only. With the exception of a few exceptional decisions, the analysis is further confined to judgments handed 
down before 1 January 2012. Given the Court’s comments in Dell v Seton South Africa (Pty) Ltd & others 
[2011] 9 BLLR 846 (LAC) para 33, relying predominantly on the LAC’s decisions is arguably appropriate. Note, 
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of these varying interpretations of Sidumo will be appraised and those best suited to the South 
African legal framework identified.   
 
3.1 The impact of reasonableness on the ambit of review: Palaborwa Mining Co 
Ltd v Cheetham & Others
671
  
 
The first of the LAC’s decisions following Sidumo was Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v 
Cheetham & Others.
672
 The principal theme in Cheetham is well captured by Willis JA’s 
depiction of the reasonableness test. In his opinion, Sidumo had: 
 
‘…reduced the potential for the Labour Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal to 
exercise scrutiny over the decisions of commissioners who are appointed to arbitrate in 
terms of the LRA.’673 
 
Thus, according to the Judge, the LRA’s conferral of power on commissioners (rather than 
courts)
674
 implied that interference would be warranted in only very limited circumstances. 
This, coupled with the CC’s findings in Bato Star and the administrative status of CCMA 
arbitrations, necessitated that Labour Courts: ‘defer (but not in an absolute sense) to the 
decision of the commissioner.’675 Notwithstanding his recognition of deference, Willis JA 
emphasized the quasi-judicial nature of CCMA arbitration proceedings.
676
 To this end, he 
decried the reverence associated with the Sidumo test, noting that: 
 
‘Commissioners of the CCMA have the advantages both of administrative decision-
makers (their decisions are not disturbed merely because a court considers them to 
have been wrong) and judicial officers (independence) but are not subject to most of 
the checks and balances that are applicable to an administrative decision-maker or a 
judicial officer or even a decision-maker in the private sector. The implications are 
considerable.’677 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
however, Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] JOL 23356 (SCA) (‘Shoprite Checkers 3’) para 
9. For the LAC’s powers generally, see section 174 of the LRA. 
671
 Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetham & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 306 (LAC). 
672
 Ibid. 
673
 Ibid para 6. For challenges to this approach, consider Garbers (2008) and Ray-Howett. 
674
 At least in so far as determining fairness was concerned. 
675
 Cheetham para 5; Garbers submits that deference implies that reviewing courts may not substitute their own 
reasons for those of commissioners in order to justify their findings; Garbers (2008) at 85. 
676
 Cheetham para 6. 
677
 Ibid. Both Ray-Howett and Garbers seemingly agree that too much deference is undesirable; Ray-Howett at 
1628; Garbers (2008) at 86. 
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In other words, the deferential nature of reasonableness presented problems. There is much to 
be said for the Judge’s concerns in this regard. Despite the need for courts to balance the 
rights to fair labour practices and administrative justice, deference should be approached with 
caution.
678
 If inappropriately or overzealously applied, it has the potential to reduce the 
perceived legitimacy of CCMA awards; it may further affect the levels of accountability to 
which commissioners are held, in turn detracting from the rights it seeks to protect.
679
 
Supplementing these difficulties, critics have argued that a less deferential approach would 
better promote efficiency and expeditiousness in labour dispute resolution.
680
 Should awards 
be thoroughly scrutinized for both substantive and procedural adequacy, the credibility 
afforded to CCMA decisions would be enhanced. In turn, the incidence of review 
proceedings may be reduced.
681
  
 
Of course, there is just as strong an argument to be made to the contrary.
682
 Subjecting 
administrative decisions too readily to judicial review may obstruct administrative efficiency 
and effectiveness. Not only does inadequate deference impair cost effectiveness
683
 but it 
aggravates the omnipresent problem of administrative ineptitude.
684
 To the extent to which 
courts are too dictatorial in their attitudes to review, administrators may misunderstand what 
is expected of them.
685
 They may consequently adopt unnecessarily protracted procedures 
when fulfilling their functions, in desperate attempts at covering every possible 
contingency.
686
  
                                                          
678
 Ray-Howett at 1628; Garbers (2008) at 86. 
679
 Ibid. See too Ngcobo J’s decision in Sidumo, emphasizing the import of the right to fair labour practices and 
the statutory context in which review takes place, to review proceedings generally; Sidumo para 253. 
680
 De Ville (2005) at 30; Jowell (2006) at 17. Compare, however, Davis (2006) and Government of the Republic 
of South Africa & others v Grootboom & others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
681
 Ray-Howett at 1628. For further discussions of ‘deference’ and the rationale behind it, consult Landman at 
1615-1616. For deference generally, see Davis (2006); Corder in G Huscroft & M Taggart (2006) at 375 and 
Hoexter (2007) at 138-47. For the incidence and success of review, see Tanya Venter & Andrew Levy ‘Disputes 
at the CCMA, bargaining councils and Tokiso’ in Andrew Levy & Tanya Venter (eds) The Dispute Resolution 
Digest 2012 (2012) 23 and Alan Rycroft ‘An evaluation of the Labour Court’ in Andrew Levy and Tanya Venter 
(eds) Dispute Resolution Digest 2012 (2012) 61. Consult too the CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 Department 
of Labour RP: 84/2010, available at www.ccma.org.za, accessed on 12 October 2012 and the CCMA Annual 
Report 2010-2011 Department of Labour RP: 58/2011, available at www.ccma.org.za, accessed on 12 October 
2012. 
682
 Albeit in the context of commercial administrative activity. 
683
 Quinot at 440. 
684
 Ibid. 
685
 On account of the discrepancy between their apparent legislative obligations and the dictates of reviewing 
courts. 
686
 Quinot at 442. To the extent to which courts are too dictatorial in their attitudes to review, decision-makers 
may be unable to identify what is required of them. In turn, they may adopt inappropriate or protracted 
procedures in order to cover every possible contingency. Consider Benjamin (2007) at 17-19; Halton Cheadle 
‘Regulated flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’ (2006) 27 ILJ 663 at 670; Paul Benjamin 
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Nevertheless, failing to hold commissioners accountable for their awards could have 
disastrous effects not only for the professed credibility of awards, but also for awards 
themselves. Ultimately, too much deference may harm parties’ rights to fair labour 
practices
687
 rather than support them. As such, where interference with awards is warranted, 
they should be quashed. Determining the appropriate balance between too much and too little 
deference is the challenge which reviewing courts invariably face.  
 
Despite Willis JA’s concerns with the reasonableness standard’s reverent nature, he duly 
applied it to the facts before him. As the Commissioner’s decision in Cheetham was in his 
view reasonable, he subsequently upheld the appeal.
688
 When doing so, the Judge did not 
refer to the applicant’s alleged grounds of review, thus failing to explain the relationship 
between section 145 and reasonableness. Equally absent from his decision was an objective 
or substantive explanation for the conclusion that the award was reasonable, thereby 
providing no guidance as to the standard’s practical application. Debatably, despite the 
absence of overt direction in these areas, it may be inferred from Willis JA’s decision689 that 
he considered reasonableness to be an independent test for review.
690
  
 
Pateli JA and Molahleli JA concurred in Willis JA’s judgment,691 agreeing that 
reasonableness afforded commissioners greater latitude than previously granted.
692
  Pateli JA 
similarly confirmed that mere judicial disagreement with commissioners’ conclusions did not 
render them unreasonable. Furthermore, as the task of determining fairness was primarily 
entrusted to commissioners, their findings were not open to ready interference.
693
 
Consistently with Willis JA’s remarks, the Judge added: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Conciliation, arbitration and enforcement: The CCMA’s achievements and challenges’ (2009) 30 ILJ 26 at 47; 
chapter 1. For a case in which the Court was arguably too intrusive, see Clarence. 
687
 The right to which the LRA seeks to give effect; section 23 of the Constitution. Note too Shoprite Checkers 3, 
where the SCA reiterated that the starting point must always be the Constitution; Shoprite Checkers 3 paras 26-
28. 
688
 Cheetham para 6.  
689
 In which he found the award reasonable without reference to the remaining grounds of review. 
690
 For a similar approach, see Dunwell para 17. 
691
 Albeit with certain reservations regarding Willis JA’s comments in paragraph 6 of the judgment. The Judges 
did not, however, stipulate precisely which comments they disagreed with. 
692
 Cheetham para 12. 
693
 And reviewing courts were to remind themselves of these constraining features of reasonableness during 
review proceedings; Cheetham para 12. 
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‘…This was the legislative intent and as much as decisions of different commissioners 
may lead to different results, it is unfortunately a situation which has to be endured 
with fortitude despite the uncertainty it may create.’694 
 
Plainly therefore, Pateli JA shared Willis JA’s anguish about the potentially detrimental 
impact of deference on the quality of commissioners’ awards. The Judges’ disquiet illustrates 
two points. First, it portrays a particular construction of the Sidumo test, as demanding the 
need for considerable respect to be shown to administrative actions. Secondly, and more 
positively, the LAC’s distress attests to the function of judicial review of bettering future 
decisions-making.
695
  
 
As for the first of these, the Judges in Cheetham seemingly understood Sidumo to have 
curtailed the scope of review. This was necessary to preserve legislative intent, which 
precluded officious interference with commissioners’ awards.696 While Willis and Pateli 
JJA’s respect for the doctrine of SOP is laudable, their construction of the standard as a 
restrictive one contradicts its Constitutional foundations.
697
 Ostensibly, their argument was 
based on the need for efficiency in labour dispute resolution, congruently with section 
1(d)(iv) of the LRA.
698
 However, as O’Regan J reflected in Sidumo,699 extending review to 
encompass reasonableness need not defeat the speed with which labour disputes are 
resolved.
700
 As section 33 protects individuals from unjust administrative action, it endorses, 
rather than diminishes, the permissible ambit of review – in the absence of adequate scrutiny 
the section’s protective role would be hampered. Were the contrary true, commissioners may 
be less inclined to comply with the values of accountability, transparency and openness than 
before.
701
 For these reasons, infusing section 145 with the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness necessarily augmented the Labour Courts’ powers of judicial review.702 
                                                          
694
 Cheetham para 13. 
695
 For the meaning of administrative justice, see Jowell (2006) at 16-17; Hoexter in Corder & van der Vijver 
(eds) (2002) at 27; Corder in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 1-2 and Mureinik (1993). 
695
 For examples of successful grounds for review, consult the cases referred to in Myburgh (2009); Myburgh 
(2010) and Myburgh (2011). 
696
 Cheetham para 13. 
697
 See, in this regard, sections 23, 33 & 1(d)(iv) & 195(1) of the Constitution. 
698
 For efficiency generally, consult Benjamin (2007) at 3-6; the Explanatory Memorandum at 279 & 318-319; 
Benjamin & Cooper; Benjamin (2009); Sidumo paras 124-125; Food & Allied Workers Union on behalf of 
Mbatha & others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko Milling & Baking & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2916 (SCA) 
(‘FAWU’) paras 21-22 and chapter 1. 
699
 Sidumo para 140; for similar sentiments, see Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 28. 
700
 Ibid. 
701
 Section 195 of the Constitution; Garbers (2008) at 86; Ray-Howett at 1628. 
702
 Sidumo para 140; Carephone para 31. Consider too Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 28; there, the Court 
held that the test was more stringent than that applicable under Carephone. The history of the final Constitution 
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Supporting this argument is the distinction between rationality and reasonableness.
703
 As the 
CC held in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,
704
 rationality comprises only one facet 
of reasonableness. All exercises of public power (whether executive, legislative or 
administrative in nature) are required by the rule of law to at least be rational.
705
  Yet, 
distinctively to executive and legislative conduct, administrative action may be challenged on 
the basis of reasonableness; litigants are confined to questioning the former on the ground of 
irrationality alone.
706
 As administrative action may therefore be exposed to more vigorous 
examination by the courts than executive or legislative conduct, it follows that reasonableness 
constitutes a more intrusive test than rationality.
707
 On that basis, it is nonsensical to suggest 
that reasonableness sets a lower threshold for review than that applicable under rational 
justifiability.
708
  
 
These observations point strongly to the expansive effect of Sidumo. However, its effect must 
be understood with reference to the Court’s finding that the reasonable employer test was 
defunct.
709
  That test had obliged commissioners to determine the fairness of dismissals from 
the employer’s perspective. In essence, commissioners were to defer to employers’ decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
further suggests that reasonableness was intended to allow greater scrutiny of administrative decisions than that 
permissible under the interim Constitution. For the history of these sections generally, see Hugh Corder 
‘Comparing administrative justice across the Commonwealth: A first scan’ 2006 Acta Juridica 1 at 2; Lourens 
du Plessis & Hugh Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) at 165-170; Currie & 
De Waal at 642-643; Etienne Mureinik ‘A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 
SAJHR 31 and Hugh Corder ‘Administrative justice’ in D van Wyk et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism 
(1994) 387 at 398. 
703
 For a recent discussion of the distinction, consult Value Logistics paras 38-44. 
704
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 85. Consider too in this regard, Hoexter (2007) at 306-309; Pillay, at 
425-429 and chapter 4 of this thesis. 
705
 In other words, to the extent to which it is adopted, the proposal would undermine the rule of law; 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 85; Cape Bar Council v Judicial Service Commission & another (Centre for 
Constitutional Rights & another as amici curiae) [2011] JOL 27947 (WCC) paras 25-30. Note too Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26, refered to in para 43 of Sidumo. There, the SCA observed that section 33 of the 
final Constitution could not have been intended to prescribe a lower standard of review than that which was 
applicable under section 24 of the interim Constitution.  
706
 Pillay at 425-429. 
707
 Ibid; Value Logistics paras 38-44 and Sidumo para 140. Consider too, in this regard, New Clicks para 108; 
Myburgh (2009) at 24 and Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Province, Western 
Cape and Another 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC). 
708
 De Ville agrees that reasonableness is a more extensive test than rational justifiability; De Ville (2005) at 212-
213; Myburgh (2009) at 24. For varying arguments on the subject, refer to Garbers (2008) at 85; Ellerine 
Holdings at 11 and Zondo JP’s judgment in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others [2001] 9 BLLR 
1011 (LAC), as discussed in chapter 2. 
709
 Sidumo paras 72-79; see too Nicola Smit ‘How do you determine a fair sanction? Dismissal as appropriate 
sanction in cases of dismissal for (mis)conduct’ (2011) 1 De Jure 49 at 54. 
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According to the CC, the Constitutional endorsement of fairness in labour disputes rendered 
the reasonable employer test archaic. Commissioners’ findings on sanction were to be 
informed with reference to both parties’ needs rather than simply the employers’.710 
Resultantly, following Sidumo, commissioners were not required to accede to employers’ 
sanctions.
711
  In turn, they were granted a broader discretion to determine fairness than that 
which they had previously enjoyed. 
 
Seemingly, it was this finding which led to constructions of reasonableness as demanding 
greater degrees of judicial deference.
712
 Naturally, to the degree to which commissioners’ 
powers were widened by Sidumo, the scope for judicial intervention was reduced.
713
 Yet, 
their powers were extended in relation to decisions on sanction alone. In so far as Sidumo 
may be said to have constrained review therefore, the constraint did not arise from the 
reasonableness standard itself. Instead, it was a consequence of expanding the authority of 
commissioners to assess employers’ decisions.714 It further has no application to 
commissioners’ findings which do not address sanction.715 Proposing simply that 
reasonableness limits courts’ powers of review is accordingly misleading and incomplete.716 
It is also a proposition which cannot be understood in isolation, or without reference to the 
Court’s abandonment of the ‘reasonable employer test’. To summarise: the notion that 
reasonableness restricts judicial scrutiny may only logically apply to commissioners’ 
discretionary findings on the fairness of dismissals; it is by no means a general rule.
717
 
Generally speaking in fact, given the courts’ mandate to scrutinize the merits of proceedings 
when testing awards for reasonableness, the standard has broadened the ambit of review.
718
 
 
An alternative reason for this particular construction of reasonableness may have been Navsa 
AJ’s reference to Hoexter’s depiction of reasonableness as a deferential enquiry. The 
                                                          
710
 For a comprehensive discussion of the reasonable employer test and case law relevant to it, see Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 40-47. 
711
 Sidumo paras 72-79. 
712
 Refer to the discussion above. 
713
 Grogan (2007); Myburgh (2010) at 14-15. 
714
 Thus, matters involving jurisdictional questions or where commissioners have minimal discretion,  more 
intensive scrutiny would arguably remain appropriate; Garbers (2008) at 87-88; Tao Ying para 131.  
715
 Including, for example, disputes concerning the interpretation of collective agreements or unfair labour 
practices. 
716
 Le Roux & Young at 30; Ray-Howett at 1632; given the adjudicative (rather than policy-oriented) nature of 
CCMA proceedings, a more intensive level of scrutiny may in any event be appropriate; Garbers (2008) at 86. 
For the limited reach of reasonableness in pre-Constitutional South Africa, see Hoexter (2007) at 301. 
717
 Sidumo para 79. There remains, however, an inevitable link between the reasonable employer test and the 
grounds for review; Garbers (2008) at 81 & 84-85. See too Grogan (2007). 
718
 Le Roux & Young at 30; Ray-Howett at 1632; Garbers (2008) at 86. 
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implication is that while significant scrutiny may be acceptable, deference must be shown 
when determining whether to set administrative decisions aside.
719
 The principle pertains to 
judicial review generally, however, and enables the process of review to be distinguished 
from that applicable on appeal. In other words, Hoexter’s observations do not indicate that 
reasonableness is less intrusive in nature than rationality or rational justifiability.
720
 They 
simply provide reviewing courts with a way to envisage review comparative to appeal.
721
 As 
such, Navsa AJ’s reference to deference should not be seen to imply that reasonableness 
confined judicial powers beyond the extent already applicable.  
 
Returning to the second implication of Cheetham, the Judges’ concerns spoke to the function 
of judicial review in facilitating improved future decision-making.
722
 This function is well 
established in administrative circles. It further espouses an interpretation of reasonableness 
consistent with constitutional principles and values.
723
 Overturning substandard awards not 
only upholds parties’ rights but it enables the judiciary to direct commissioners towards more 
appropriate ways of resolving disputes.
724
 In turn, it is a pertinent consideration during all 
section 145 proceedings. 
 
3.2 An overview of reasonableness: Questions raised by Fidelity Cash Management 
Service v CCMA & others,
725
 Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 
& others
726
 and Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others
727
   
 
Following Cheetham, whether the Sidumo test had reduced reviewing courts’ powers was 
unclear. While confirming certain aspects of review, the LAC’s decision in Fidelity Cash 
Management Service v CCMA & others
728
 failed to clarify the confusion. In Fidelity, the 
                                                          
719
 Consider Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) (as discussed in chapter 2) and Ellerine Holdings at 11. Recall that 
too much deference is equally undesirable; Ray-Howett at 1628; Garbers (2008) at 86. 
720
 The implications of her sentiments are discussed more fully under Ellerine Holdings below. 
721
 For the traditional distinctions between review and appeal, consult Fergus (2010). 
722
 For the functions of judicial review, see Jowell (2006) 13 at 16-17; Hoexter in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) 
(2002) at 27; Corder in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 1-2 and Mureinik (1993). 
722
 For accepted grounds for review, see Myburgh (2009); Myburgh (2010); Myburgh (2011) and Du Toit 
(2010). 
723
 Consider Cheryl Saunders ‘Apples, oranges and comparative administrative law’ 2006 Acta Juridica 423 at 
429. 
724
 The supervisory role of review is canvassed more fully under Fidelity (as discussed below). For contrary 
views on the value of judicial intervention, compare Ray-Howett at 1628 with Quinot at 440. 
725
 Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC). 
726
 Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 26444 (LC).  
727
 Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others [2011] 4 BLLR 404 (LC). 
728
 Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC). 
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Court purportedly expounded the principles articulated in Sidumo. First was that the test of 
rational justifiability, as the threshold requirement for substantive review, had been dispensed 
with in favour of reasonableness.
729
 That standard had suffused section 145 of the LRA, 
requiring CCMA arbitrations (and associated awards) not only to be lawful and procedurally 
fair but also to be reasonable. Awards departing from these requisites were vulnerable to 
review.
730
 The enquiry in each case was whether the commissioner’s decision was one which 
a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. Reasonable awards were, nonetheless, to be left 
well alone.
731
 To this point, the LAC did little more than replicate Navsa JA’s comments. 
Yet, it later extrapolated thereon, usefully indicating additional features of reasonableness.  
 
To begin with, the Court asserted that the enquiry on review was whether the relevant award 
was one which a commissioner, acting reasonably, could not have reached. It was not 
whether the award was one which a reasonable commissioner would not have reached.
732
 
Ostensibly, the LAC saw a material distinction between ‘would’ and ‘could’. Precisely what 
the significance of that distinction was is still to be revealed. Grammatically, the former 
conception suggests a lack of capacity on the part of reasonable commissioners to render 
reviewable awards, whereas the latter indicates wilfulness. The first seems logical.
733
 By 
comparison, in so far as the second implies an association between reasonableness and 
misconduct, its rejection by the LAC was apt. Unreasonableness need not be linked to 
misconduct. In the absence of further explanation as to the rationale for the Court’s emphasis 
on ‘would’ rather than ‘could’, it is fortunate that the issue has not been pursued by 
subsequent courts. 
 
                                                          
729
 Sidumo para 110. 
730
 Fidelity para 92.  
731
 Ibid para 97. The LAC’s comments in this regard might be construed as suggesting that awards which are 
reasonable in outcome, but deficient in other respects, should be upheld.  The Court’s subsequent 
pronouncement that the section 145 grounds of review retain their validity, however, refutes this interpretation; 
Fidelity para 101. Thus, reasonableness in outcome will not necessarily remedy other reviewable irregularities; 
SAMWU paras 9 & 18. Note, however, Edcon and Clarence. 
732
 Fidelity para 97.  
733
 The difficulty with this conception of the test is that it might be interpreted as suggesting that the requirement 
for review is that the commissioner could not possibly have reached the decision in question.  In turn, the need 
for the outcome to be grossly unreasonable might be implied. Yet, the courts have repeatedly rejected gross 
unreasonableness as the threshold for review under section 33 and the interpretation would therefore be 
inappropriate; Bato Star paras 44-45; Roman at 284-285; Fidelity para 99. See too Myers v National 
Commissioner of the SAPS & others (SCA) unreported case no 425/2012 of 29 November 2012. There, while 
arguably misapplying the test for review, the SCA nonetheless confirmed that gross unreasonableness was not 
the standard propounded in Sidumo; Myers para 28. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
109 
 
Returning to the substance of Fidelity, the LAC recounted its words in Cheetham that 
determining fairness was a task principally entrusted to commissioners rather than courts. As 
such, simple disagreement between judges and commissioners would not inevitably warrant 
review. Here, the import of efficiency in dispute resolution was relevant. To the extent to 
which reviewing courts interfered too readily with CCMA awards, the efficacy of these 
specialist bodies would be lost.
734
  As a result, remarked the LAC: 
 
‘…Sidumo attempts to strike a balance between two extremes, namely, on the one 
hand, interfering too much or too easily with decisions or arbitration awards of the 
CCMA and, on the other, refraining too much from interfering with CCMA’s awards 
or decisions.’735 
 
Disappointingly, the Court did not explain how this fine balance was to be struck. Instead, it 
compounded the obscurity of its comments by expanding on them as follows:  
 
‘[The reasonableness standard] is a stringent test that will ensure that […] awards are 
not lightly interfered with. It will ensure that, more than before, and in line with the 
objectives of the Act and particularly the primary objective of the effective resolution 
of disputes, awards of the CCMA will be final and binding as long as it cannot be said 
that such a decision or award is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not have 
made in the circumstances of the case. It will not be often that an arbitration award is 
found to be one which a reasonable decision-maker could not have made but I also do 
not think that it will be rare that an arbitration award of the CCMA is found to be one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not, in all the circumstances, have reached.’736 
 
The Court’s observations are equivocal. Describing the test as both ‘stringent’ and preclusive 
of too much intrusion indicates a more restrictive measure of review than that previously 
applicable. For the reasons discussed under Cheetham, however, to the degree to which 
reasonableness narrowed the scope of review it did so in a limited sense only. Constitutional 
pointers demonstrate that reasonableness is more expansive in nature than rational 
justifiability.
737
 The uncertainty arising from Cheetham ought therefore to have been easily 
clarified in Fidelity. Still, the LAC failed to acknowledge the Constitutional factors 
demarcating the standard as having broadened reviewing courts’ powers. Its ambiguous 
                                                          
734
 Contrary to legislative intent; Fidelity para 98. 
735
 Fidelity para 99. 
736
 Ibid para 100. 
737
 As defined by Carephone; Hoexter (2007) at 306-309; Pillay at 425-429; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 
85; Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26; Value Logistics. 
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pronouncement that it would be neither common nor rare to encounter unreasonable 
awards
738
 took the matter no further. 
 
Fortunately, the Court’s later directives in Fidelity provide useful guidance in other respects. 
First, it emphasized that the Sidumo test did not detract from the significance of the statutory 
grounds of review.
739
 Consequently, in the event of a commissioner’s alleged excess of 
powers, for example, unreasonableness need not be established (or raised) to found review.
740
 
The same was true of other allegations of reviewable irregularities provided for in section 
145. Notably, the LAC did not locate the standard within section 145(2)(a)(iii) of the LRA, as 
Froneman DJP had in Carephone.
741
 Conceivably, the Court perceived no necessary nexus 
between reasonableness and excesses of power. Once again,
742
 it may be inferred that 
reasonableness comprises an autonomous basis for review which need not be associated with 
section 145 or related procedural irregularities.
743
  
 
Despite the LAC’s overt declaration of section 145’s continued role, courts have sometimes 
submitted that, following Sidumo, the sole ground of review is unreasonableness. A stark 
example of this appeared in Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others.
744
 
There, the applicant instituted review proceedings on numerous bases, including gross 
irregularity, misconduct and the lack of a rationally justifiable connection between the 
commissioner’s findings and the evidence presented.745 The LC ignored these grounds 
averring confidently instead that: 
 
                                                          
738
 Fidelity para 100. 
739
 In terms of section 145 of the LRA; Fidelity para 101; see too Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 
& others [2009] 11 BLLR 1128 (LC) paras 14 & 17 and Maepe para 22. 
740
 Fidelity para 101. Consider, however, SA Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & others v SA Rugby (Pty) 
Ltd & others; SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd v SARPU & another [2008] 9 BLLR 845 (LAC); Chabeli v CCMA & others 
[2010] 4 BLLR 389 (LC); Asara Wine Estate & Hotel (Pty) Ltd v van Rooyen & others (2012) 33 ILJ 363 (LC); 
Gabriel Tsietsi Banda v Emfuleni Local Municipality & others (LC) unreported case no J1214/08 and Gubevu 
Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Ruggiero NO & others [2012] 4 BLLR 354 (LC), in which unreasonableness and 
excess of powers appear to have been conflated. Emma Fergus ‘Circumventing review – When is a question 
jurisdictional?’ (2012) 129 SALJ 504; Du Toit (2010) at 3. 
741
 In relation to rational justifiability; Carephone para 24. 
742
 And consistently with Cheetham. 
743
 This remains a contested proposal; compare Du Toit (2010) at 3; Ellerine Holdings (as discussed below) and 
Fidelity para 101. 
744
 Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 26444 (LC). 
745
 Ibid para 21. 
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‘The test in review applications is whether the decision arrived at by the 
commissioner is one that no other reasonable decision-maker would [sic] have arrived 
at. The applicant has relied on grounds of review that are no longer part of our law.’746 
 
In light of Fidelity,
747
 the basis for the Court’s statement in Kievits is uncertain.748 Both the 
Constitutional foundations of judicial review and the functions thereof endorse this stance. 
First, section 33 of the Constitution expressly calls for procedural fairness and lawfulness, 
distinctively from reasonableness.
749
 By implication, each component of section 33 is 
material, and merging the three under the broad header of reasonableness is inappropriate. In 
addition, there are sound reasons for requiring all three facets of review and, by analogy, for 
permitting review of statutory defects independently of reasonableness. Foremost of these is 
the role of review in facilitating improved future decision-making.
750
 This ensures that legal 
certainty and the rule of law are maintained while simultaneously protecting parties’ rights to 
procedurally fair and lawful administrative action.
751
 Supplementing this are the 
Constitutional values of accountability, transparency and openness.
752
 To ensure the effective 
maintenance of these values, procedural defects in commissioners’ awards must be amenable 
to review. Finally, were reasonableness in itself sufficient to sustain these rights and values, 
the remaining requisites provided for in section 33 would be rendered superfluous, which 
could not have been the intention of the Constitution’s drafters. All told, regardless of the 
Court’s sentiments in Kievits, the LAC’s affirmation of section 145 in Fidelity must be 
preferred.
753
 
 
                                                          
746
 Ibid para 28. 
747
 And by implication procedurally based review; Fidelity para 101. 
748
 Consider Myburgh’s observation that gross irregularities have increasingly led reviewing courts to set awards 
aside on the basis of unreasonableness; Myburgh  (2009) at 16-17. 
749
 Section 33 of the Constitution, read with section 195(1)(f)’s mandate for accountability, transparency and 
openness in the public administration; see too Sidumo para 138. 
750
 Consistently with section 195(1) of the Constitution in particular; Jowell (2006); De Ville (2005) at 30; 
Solomon paras 19 & 21. In Solomon, the LC set an award aside which, while ostensibly correct in outcome, was 
flawed in process. When doing so, it emphasized that the purpose of review went beyond assessing the 
correctness of commissioners’ decisions. Instead, judicial review sought to ensure due process in arbitration 
proceedings and simultaneously to secure the ‘constitutional values of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness’ in the public administration. 
751
 Shoprite Checkers 3 para 31; Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 1789 (LAC) para 54; Clive Thompson 
'The 1995 Labour Relations Bill' IMSSA Bulletin (1995) at 23, as cited in Benjamin & Cooper at 275; the 
Explanatory Memorandum at 319. 
752
 Sections 1(d) and 195(1) of the Constitution. 
753
 Subsequent case law confirms this approach; Fidelity para 101; Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 14 & 17; 
Maepe para 22; Transnet Freight Rail. See too Kievits Kroon (LAC) para 21, in which the LAC upheld the LC’s 
decision but concurrently noted that the statutory grounds of review remain valid.  
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Looking once more to Fidelity, there is no clear statement in the judgment of the applicant’s 
precise grounds for review. It nevertheless appears from the decision that review was sought 
on account of the Commissioner’s failure to take relevant factors into account and the 
irrationality
754
 of his findings.
755
 In thoroughly assessing each ground, the LAC’s theoretical 
approach to review (and endorsement of section 145) was verified in practice.
756
 
Notwithstanding this, the Court has been criticised for construing the Sidumo test as 
tolerating substantively reasonable awards despite inadequacies in commissioners’ reasoning 
processes.
757
 The legitimacy of this critique is doubtful for several reasons. The first arises 
from the established ground of review of inadequate reasons. As any enquiry into this ground 
inescapably engages commissioners’ reasoning processes, it is illogical to assert that deficient 
processes are no longer susceptible to review if reasonableness in outcome is found. 
 
The significance of adequate reasons has been repeatedly attested to by courts and 
commentators alike. The rationale for adequate reasons is plain. As Garbers comments, 
reasons: 
 
‘…[e]nsure a higher quality of decision-making and foster the legitimacy of the 
institution in question. Any approach on review which in effect reduces reasoning to 
irrelevance, undermines such legitimacy.’758 
 
Similarly in Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others,
759
 when recounting its 
observations in Mpahlehle v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd, the CC held that 
reasons: 
                                                          
754
 And unjustifiability. 
755
 Fidelity paras 39-81. 
756
For subsequent affirmation of this approach, see Maepe paras 11 22, 24, 40 & 46-51; Myburgh (2009) at 22 
and Ray-Howett at 1629. Inevitably, nonetheless, there remains an overlap between gross irregularities and 
unreasonableness; New Clicks para 511; Reunert Industries; Clive Plasket The Fundamental Right to Just 
Administrative Action: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the Democratic South Africa (PhD Thesis, 
Rhodes University, 2002)  at 363; Anglo Platinum Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 25372 (LC) as discussed in 
Anton Myburgh Clarifying the review test Paper presented at the 2011 CCMA Commissioners Indaba; Lagoon 
Beach Hotel, Cape Town (December 2011); Myburgh’s paper has since been published as Myburgh (2011). 
Consider too Afrox Healthcare para 21. For procedural grounds of review closely linked to reasonableness, 
consult Value Logistics para 46; Kaefer Insulation (Pty) Ltd v President of the Industrial Court & others (1998) 
19 ILJ 567 (LAC) para 21; Standard Bank of Bophuthututswana Ltd v Reynolds NO & others (1995) 16 ILJ 1380 
(BG) at 1397; Pam Golding Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus & others [2010] JOL 24963 (LC) paras 5-6; Sidumo 
para 268; Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 329 (LAC) para 44; Ellerine Holdings at 13 and 
Southern Sun Hotel Interests. 
757
 Ray-Howett at 1621-22; Botma & van der Walt (Part 2) at 538-539. 
758
 Garbers (2008) at 86. See too Maepe paras 7, 8 & 22; Tao Ying para 140; De Ville (2005) at 30; Jowell 
(2006) at 16-17; Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others 2010 (2) SA 92 (CC) para 17; Mpahlehle v 
First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC) para 12 and Cape Bar Council para 30. 
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‘…explain[…] to the parties, and to the public at large which has an interest in courts 
being open and transparent, why a case is decided as it is. It is a discipline which 
curbs arbitrary judicial decisions.’760 
 
In other words, prescribing adequate reasons both guarantees better decision-making and 
promotes the Constitutional values of accountability, transparency and openness, 
underpinning section 33.
761
 Poor reasons ought therefore to be met with review.
762
  
 
The need not only for reasons to be adequate, but also for reasoning processes to be 
satisfactory has been acknowledged by the courts in recent cases too.
763
 In Bestel v Astral 
Operations Ltd and Others,
764
 for example, the LAC upheld the commissioner’s award,765 
recording that: 
 
‘[The commissioner had] ‘engaged in a careful analysis of the testimony presented to 
him.’766  
 
The implication is that the commissioner’s reasons demonstrated an adequate reasoning 
process and that this was germane to determining the reasonableness of his award. 
Consequently, both adequate reasons and satisfactory reasoning processes are pertinent to the 
enquiry on review. Whether these requisites fall under reasonableness generally or must be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
759
 Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others 2010 (2) SA 92 (CC) para 17. 
760
 Ibid, citing Mpahlehle v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC) para 12. The Court 
added:  
‘Then, too, [the provision of reasons] is essential for the appeal process, enabling the losing party to 
take an informed decision as to whether or not to appeal or, where necessary, seek leave to appeal. It 
assists the appeal Court to decide whether or not the order of the lower court is correct. And finally, it 
provides guidance to the public in respect of similar matters...’; Strategic Liquor Services  para 12.  
While the case was decided in the context of an appeal against the LC’s failure to give reasons for its decision, 
equivalent principles surely apply to CCMA arbitration awards. 
761
 Sections 1(d) & 195(1) of the Constitution. Based on their ordinary meaning, transparency and openness 
require commissioners to ensure clarity and honesty in their reasoning processes. Accountability, in turn, obliges 
them to provide explanations for their decisions; Strategic Liquor Services para 17. Consult further in this regard 
Fergus (2010); Solomon paras 19 & 21; Corder in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002); Hoexter in Corder & 
van der Vijver (eds) (2002); Mureinik (1993); Jowell (2006) and Cape Bar Council paras 25-30. 
762
 For the requisites of adequate reasoning and the need therefore, see section 138(7)(a) of the LRA and County 
Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others  (1999) 20 ILJ 1701 (LAC) at 1717C-E. Note, however, Zondo JP’s 
qualifying remarks in Maepe para 8.  
763
 In Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 14, the LC held that reasonableness consisted of both procedural and 
substantive elements implying the need for adequate reasons as well as a reasonable outcome. For comparable 
sentiments, consult Sasol Mining; Pam Golding para 8 and Myburgh (2009) at 19. 
764
 Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & others [2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC). 
765
 Ibid para 31 
766
 Ibid para 9. 
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alleged in relation to a specific statutory ground of review
767
 is uncertain. Equally 
indeterminate is the extent of commissioners’ obligations to engage in comprehensive 
reasoning processes. Potential solutions to these problems are proposed in later chapters.
768
 
 
Understanding the relationship between reasonableness in outcome and reasonableness in 
procedure is comparably tricky. Compounding the difficulty of disassociating processes from 
substance is the courts’ acknowledgment of reasonableness as comprising both procedural 
and substantive components.
769
 Ostensibly therefore, where a commissioner has followed an 
unreasonable procedure, the award may be set aside for procedural unreasonableness, 
sometimes regardless of defects alleged under section 145 and sometimes not.
770
 Sasol 
Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others
771
 illustrates the position well. There, 
the applicant contended that the commissioner’s gross irregularity had resulted in an 
unreasonable outcome.
772
 In addressing this contention, the Court began with Myburgh’s 
submission that: 
 
‘…if the act of process-related unreasonableness equates to a latent gross 
irregularity, then, in order to succeed on review, the applicant would have to 
establish no more than that the result of the award may (and not would) have 
been different if the commissioner had properly acquitted him or herself’.773  
 
Applying this principle to the facts, the LC concluded that the result would indeed have been 
different had it not been for the irregularity concerned; the award was consequently 
reviewable.
774
 When doing so, the Court made no further reference to the award’s 
                                                          
767
 In section 145 of the Act. 
768
 See, in particular, chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis. 
769
 Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 14; Sasol Mining para 11; Pam Golding para 8; Parmalat SA (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA & others (LC) unreported case no C486/10 of 2 December 2011 paras 14-16; Myburgh (2009) at 19; 
Calvin William Sharpe ‘Reviewing CCMA arbitration awards: Towards clarity in the Labour Courts’ (2000) 21 
ILJ 2160 at 2174; B Grant ‘The review of arbitration awards in terms of the Labour Relations Act’ (1999) 2 Stell 
LR 251 at 255-256; For the distinction between procedural and substantive irregularities in the context of the 
Carephone test, see Solomon paras 19 & 21. 
770
 Myburgh (2009) at 19. Consider too, the implications of Le Roux and Young’s comments; Le Roux & Young 
at 30. 
771
 Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others [2011] 4 BLLR 404 (LC). 
772
 Ibid para 1. 
773
 Ibid para 11, citing Myburgh (2010) at 16. In addition to the question of whether a commissioner’s error had 
deprived the parties of a fair hearing; Fipaza para 58. This test has repeatedly been accepted by the courts as 
determinative of whether a gross irregularity has occurred; Sidumo paras 267-268; Woolworths paras 19-23; 
Transnet Freight Rail para 14. For earlier comparable judgments, see Ellis v Morgan 1909 TS 576; Goldfields 
Investments Limited & another v City Council of Johannesburg & another 1938 TPD 551 and Telcordia 
Technologies. 
774
 Sasol Mining para 13; note too Myburgh’s reference to ‘SAA’, where the Court asserted that whether errors 
were reviewable depended on the materiality of those errors; Myburgh (Paper presented at the 2011 CCMA 
Commissioners Indaba). 
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reasonableness, holding merely that the gross irregularity justified review.
775
 As such, no 
clear guidelines on the association between section 145 and procedural unreasonableness 
were provided. Certain inferences may nonetheless be drawn. What appears is that the 
procedural component of unreasonableness limits review of procedural errors to those 
potentially affecting the outcome of the proceedings. Yet, as discussed below, whether this 
limitation actually explicates the Sidumo standard or simply confirms the principles 
applicable prior to Sidumo is questionable.
776
  
 
Still, Sasol Mining is useful in so far as it exemplifies the complex distinction between 
procedural and substantive review; in addition, it endorses the argument that section 145 of 
the LRA exists independently of reasonableness. Had the matter been determined on the basis 
of substantive unreasonableness, the Court would have been obliged to enter and analyse the 
merits. However, it appears to have been determined with reference to procedure and 
reasoning process alone. Specifically, the Commissioner had failed to resolve the factual 
dispute between the parties consistently with his duties. It was accordingly the 
Commissioner’s erroneous approach rather than an ‘unreasonable’ error or factual finding 
which was responsible for the award’s inadequacy. Thus, it may be inferred that while gross 
irregularities and unreasonableness are oft related, the section 145 grounds for review may 
apply autonomously too.
777
  
 
Returning to the contribution which the dual features of reasonableness make, while there can 
be no qualms with assessing procedural errors on review, whether there is a need to include 
reasonableness in the equation is arguable. As the courts have repeatedly held, an inescapable 
overlap exists between reasonableness and the statutory ground of gross irregularity.
778
 The 
problem arises from the notion that, in principle at least, the section 145 grounds are 
procedural in nature. By comparison, the reasonableness test is substantive and consists of an 
                                                          
775
 Ibid. 
776
 Consider Ellerine Holdings at 13 and Bestel para 14. For review of gross irregularities prior to Sidumo, 
consult Information Trust Corporation v Gous & others (2005) 26 ILJ 2351 (LAC) paras 9-10; Miladys v Naidoo 
& others (2002) 23 ILJ 1234 (LAC) para 30; Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 340 
(LAC) para 41; County Fair Foods and Reunert Industries. 
777
 For discussion of the substantive and procedural aspects of reasonableness, see Ray-Howett at 1628-1634; 
Myburgh (2009) at 16-17; Garbers (2008) at 87-88 and Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 13-17. 
778
 Whether in the form of failures to apply the mind, failures to take relevant factors into account or otherwise. 
For the overlap between unreasonableness and gross irregularites, see New Clicks para 511; Reunert Industries. 
Plasket discusses the grounds of review (listed in PAJA) which relate to the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness; Plasket at 363. Consider too Anglo Platinum (2010) (LC) as referred to in Myburgh (Paper 
presented at the 2011 CCMA Commissioners Indaba); Afrox Healthcare para 21; Value Logistics para 46; 
Kaefer Insulation para 21 and Standard Bank (1995) (BG) at 1397. 
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‘outcomes based enquiry’.779 Where courts have combined substantive and procedural 
review, they have done so primarily while acknowledging the overlap between gross 
irregularities and unreasonableness.
780
 Whether they needed to assess reasonableness at all in 
these instances is nevertheless questionable. If a gross irregularity is established, there should 
be no need to scrutinise the outcome – doing so only threatens the distinction between review 
and appeal.  
 
Having said that, the intersection between gross irregularities and reasonableness prevails. 
Given the nature of the remaining defects listed in section 145 of the LRA,
781the courts’ 
confinement of this overlap to gross irregularities, to the exclusion of the remaining grounds, 
is sensible.
782
 Arguably too, in so far as procedural unreasonableness (and the reasonableness 
standard generally) are linked to section 145, the link ends at gross irregularities. Even then, 
the association between this defect and the Sidumo test is constrained. On the strength of 
Sasol Mining, the notion of procedural unreasonableness merely describes defects in 
reasoning process which may have influenced the outcome of the particular award. However, 
as this has long been an accepted basis for review, its recognition under the header of 
procedural unreasonableness does nothing to extend the scope of review.
783
 To the extent to 
which it has affected the ambit of permissible scrutiny, additional clarification is required. 
The answers to these questions may lie in defining the boundary between reasonableness and 
gross irregularities more clearly. Currently, precisely where this boundary falls is an open 
debate. 
 
                                                          
779
 Ellerine Holdings at 14; Carephone para 37; Sidumo paras 106-110; Herholdt para 52; Fidelity; Discovery 
Health Limited v CCMA and others [2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC); Cheetham.  
780
 New Clicks para 511; Reunert Industries; Plasket at 363; Afrox Healthcare para 21; Value Logistics para 46; 
Kaefer Insulation para 21; Standard Bank (1995) (BG) at 1397. Compare too the LAC’s descriptions of gross 
irregularities and unreasonableness in Ellerine Holdings at 13 and Bestel para 14 respectively.  
781
 And their uncomfortable fit with substantive review depicted in chapter 2. For general principles and 
examples of these grounds, refer to Reunert Industries at 1634-1637; United National Breweries (SA) Ltd v 
Khanyeza & others [2006] 4 BLLR 321 (LAC); Sampson Associates (Pty) Ltd t/a Interbrand Sampson v Cities 
Shepherd & others [2010] 7 BLLR 746 (LC); Jafta v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & 
Others (2006) 27 ILJ 2368 (LC) and Moloi v Euijen & others [1997] 8 BLLR 1022 (LC). In Moloi, the Court 
noted that the ground of ‘misconduct’ (as distinct from improperly obtaining an award) implied an element of 
impropriety. Consider too Emma Fergus The Evolving Role of the Labour Court in Review Proceedings Paper 
presented at the 24
th
 Annual Labour Law Conference, Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg (June - July 
2011). 
782
 Notwithstanding the LAC’s location of rational justifiability under excess of powers in Carephone. Consider, 
in this regard, Reunert Industries at 1634-1637; Myburgh (2011) at 1518 and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v 
Ramdaw & others [2000] 7 BLLR 835 (LC) paras 48-55. 
783
 See Transnet Freight Rail para 17 and the discussion thereof below. Consult too Sidumo para 268; Gaga para 
44; Information Trust Corporation paras 9-10; Miladys para 30; Toyota SA Motors para 41; chapter 4 and the 
conclusion to this thesis. 
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The LAC’s final contribution in Fidelity was its attention to the distinctions between the 
Carephone and Sidumo standards.
784
 First, the Court confirmed the different Constitutional 
bases for each: whereas Carephone was decided under the interim Constitution,
785
 the final 
Constitution’s formulation of the right to just administrative action informed Sidumo.786 
Secondly, but less overtly, Sidumo clarified the power of reviewing courts to evaluate the 
reasonableness of commissioners’ findings with reference to all evidentiary material properly 
before them during arbitration proceedings.
787
 Thus, courts were not confined to appraising 
only those reasons and facts covered by commissioners in their awards.
788
 Instead, held the 
LAC, the enquiry was an objective one.
789
 Recalling the SCA’s definition of rational 
justifiability in Rustenburg Platinum Mines, the discrete attributes of reasonableness and 
rational justifiability should have been evident after Fidelity.
790
 Nonetheless, the tests have 
been frequently conflated by reviewing courts, which regularly use the terms 
interchangeably.
791
  
 
While the cited discrepancies between the standards may seem nominal, this is by no means 
the case. Determining whether awards are supported by the general body of evidence, rather 
than simply with reference to commissioners’ findings, exposes awards to a disparate 
measure of scrutiny.
792
 In so far as Carephone might have demanded more from 
commissioners, it did so primarily in respect of their written findings. Sidumo, on the other 
hand, permits more intrusive evaluations into the merits, rendering the likelihood of 
confusing appeal with review greater. In this way (particularly given the Constitutional 
                                                          
784
 Fidelity para 102.  
785
 Section 33 read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution; Carephone para 15. 
786
 Fidelity para 102. 
787
 For subsequent confirmation of this stance, consult Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 29; Fidelity para 102 
and Transnet Freight Rail para 10. The Court in Fidelity observed that, following Carephone, the bounds of 
courts’ powers of review were unclear; see too Benjamin (2009) at 42-43. Recall, however, Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines (SCA) paras 29-31. 
788
 For suggested qualifications to this approach, consult chapter 6 and the conclusion to this thesis. 
789
 Fidelity para 102. Both Landman at 1618 and Garbers (2008) question nonetheless whether Sidumo really 
endorsed the power of reviewing courts to entertain alternative reasons for awards. 
790
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 29-31. The argument is enhanced by the CC’s separation of 
reasonableness from rationality as a viable ground for review; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 85; New 
Clicks para 108; Sidumo para 140; Bel Porto; Value Logistics paras 38-44; Pillay at 425-429; Myburgh (2009) at 
24; Hoexter (2007) at 306-309; De Ville (2005) at 212-213 and chapter 4 of this thesis.  
791
 Consider, for example, Afrox Healthcare para 21; Parmalat paras 14-16; Tao Ying; Du Toit observes that this 
occurred prior to Sidumo too; Du Toit (2010) at 2. 
792
 Consider, however, Myburgh (2009) at 15-20. There, Myburgh submits that the likelihood of an award being 
overturned on review is determinable with reference to whether the disputed finding (in the relevant award) 
relates to the employer’s choice of sanction or to the procedures followed by the commissioner. In his view, the 
permissible scope of review of sanction determinations is narrower than that applicable to procedural 
irregularities.  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
118 
 
factors outlined above), reasonableness has expanded the ambit of review comparative to 
Carephone.
793
 However, that does not mean that applying reasonableness rather than rational 
justifiability will invariably increase the probability of finding reviewable defects. In certain 
matters, looking only to the presiding commissioner’s reasons (consistently with 
Carephone)
794
 could well reveal an irregularity, when applying the Sidumo test does not. In 
others, the opposite may be true. Unqualified assertions as to Sidumo’s expansion or 
confinement of judicial powers of review, relative to Carephone, must accordingly be 
interpreted with these factors in mind. 
 
3.3 The relationships between Carephone and Sidumo and reasonableness and the 
statutory grounds of review: Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others,
795
 Afrox 
Healthcare Limited v the CCMA & others
796
 and Boxer Superstores (Pty) Ltd v 
Zuma & others
797
 
 
The LAC’s decision in Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others798 demonstrates the courts’ 
hesitance about the relationship between Sidumo and Carephone well. The LAC opened its 
discussion with the following remark: 
 
‘…Sidumo decided, inter alia, that when a court deals with the question of an 
arbitrator exceeding her powers, it is obliged to adopt a Carephone type test.’799 
 
Presumably, this was subject to rational justifiability’s substitution with reasonableness.800 
The Court’s use of the phrase ‘Carephone type test’, rather than ‘Carephone test’, suggests 
that it recognized a measure of difference between the standards. Yet, despite that 
recognition, it used the terms reasonableness and justifiability interchangeably throughout its 
judgment.
801
 By failing to explicate their distinguishing features, the LAC left the existence 
                                                          
793
 Consult, for example, Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-31 and Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 
28, read with Currie & De Waal at 675-676. 
794
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26. 
795
 Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] JOL 22087 (LAC). 
796
 Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 1381 
(LAC). 
797
 Boxer Superstores (Pty) Ltd v Zuma & others [2008] 9 BLLR 823 (LAC). 
798
 Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] JOL 22087 (LAC). 
799
 Ibid at 10. 
800
 Ibid. 
801
 Ellerine Holdings at 15. See too Bestel paras 16-17 and Du Toit (2010) at 2. 
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of a distinction between the tests in doubt.
802
 Simultaneously, the validity of its 
pronouncements on the issue in Fidelity went unconfirmed.
803
 
 
Exacerbating the uncertainty evident in Ellerine Holdings was the Court’s initial location of 
reasonableness under the ground of excess of powers, comparatively to its later conclusions. 
In so far as Carephone drew the rational justifiability test from section 145(2)(a)(iii), the 
LAC’s reference to it in Ellerine Holdings is understandable. Still, in its subsequent 
application of reasonableness, it correlated the standard with gross irregularities, thus 
departing from its original placement of reasonableness under section 145(2)(a)(iii).
804
 
Apparently, its reference to excess of powers was remiss.
805
  
 
Afrox Healthcare Limited v the CCMA & others
806
 divulges equivalent uncertainty as to the 
relationship between Carephone and Sidumo. In Afrox, the LAC held the Commissioner’s 
award unreasonable on account of his failure to consider all relevant evidence.
807
 It reached 
this finding despite the applicant’s alleged basis for review, ‘that there was no rational 
connection between the evidence placed before the commissioner and his conclusion.’808 The 
allegation mimics the test delineated in Carephone. However, the Court preferred to apply 
reasonableness.
809
 When doing so,
810
 it repeated the substantive nature of this standard and its 
warrant for scrutinizing the merits of arbitration proceedings. According to the LAC, these 
features were particularly pertinent when determining: 
 
                                                          
802
 For the distinction between them, consult Hoexter (2007) at 306-309; Bato Star para 43; Grogan (2008) 3 at 
7-8; Currie & De Waal at 675-676; Fidelity para 102 and Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 29-31. 
Hoexter contends that to be rational: ‘a decision must be supported by the evidence and information before the 
administrator as well as the reasons given for it….’; Hoexter (2007) at 307. See also De Ville (2005) at 212-21 
and Myburgh (2009) at 24. 
803
 Fidelity para 102. 
804
 Ellerine Holdings at 14. 
805
 For critique of this decision and the relationship between reasonableness and the statutory grounds, see 
Garbers (2008) at 88; Le Roux & Young at 30 and Myburgh (2009) at 16-17. Consider too Tao Ying para 150, 
where O’Regan J held that failures to apply the mind (an accepted form of gross irregularity) may deprive an 
award of rationality. 
806
 Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 1381 
(LAC). 
807
 Ibid para 19. 
808
 Ibid para 4. According to the appellant, the Commissioner had ignored critical evidence; Afrox Healthcare 
para 9. 
809
 Afrox Healthcare para 5; consider too Parmalat paras 14-16 and Tao Ying para 150. 
810
 With reference to National Union of Mineworkers & Another v Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) & 
Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1618 (SCA) para 13; Afrox Healthcare para 20. 
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‘…whether the commissioner brought his mind to bear on the material before him 
before making his award. This is what this court said in Carephone…’ 811 
 
Conceding that the Carephone enquiry had been replaced by the Sidumo test,
812
 it then 
resolved that: 
 
‘[T]he reasonable decision-maker yardstick…is none other than that in the absence of 
a rational objective basis between the decision arrived at and the material properly 
placed before the decision-maker, the relevant decision is clearly not one which a 
reasonable decision-maker could have arrived at.’813  
 
The connotation is that reasonableness and rationality are equivalent.
814
 Yet, as discussed 
above, according to Rustenburg Platinum Mines,
815
 rather than emphasizing the outcomes of 
commissioners’ decisions, the Carephone standard examined the rationality of the 
connections made by commissioners between their reasons, the evidence and their 
findings.
816
 In other words, courts were precluded from evaluating awards with reference to 
all of the evidence presented during arbitration proceedings under Carephone. To this extent, 
the enquiries are discrete. As asserted above, Constitutional factors endorse their 
distinctiveness.
817
 In so far as it blurred the defining features of these standards, the LAC’s 
interchangeable use of the terms in Afrox Healthcare was accordingly regrettable. 
 
Comparable hesitance is apparent in subsequent decisions of the LAC. Just a day after 
Ellerine Holdings in fact, the Court gave judgment in Boxer Superstores (Pty) Ltd v Zuma & 
others.
818
 Referring neither to Sidumo nor to Carephone, it declared the relevant award 
‘irrational’. The irrationality arose from the Commissioner’s failure to provide reasons for 
granting only limited compensation to the employee.
819
 Unfortunately, in reaching this 
decision, the LAC did not expound the relationship between irrationality and inadequate 
reasoning; the question was again left hanging. Similarly, the Court offered no explanation 
for favouring the rationality enquiry over reasonableness, in contrast to its approach in Afrox 
                                                          
811
 Afrox Healthcare para 20. 
812
 Ibid. 
813
 Ibid para 21; see too Bestel paras 16-17. 
814
 This is implicit in many decisions; consider Parmalat paras 14-16; Tao Ying para 150. 
815
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 20 & 29. 
816
 Ibid. See also Fidelity para 102. 
817
 In addition, the latter has been held to allow assessment of both alternative reasons for awards and the 
reasonableness of outcomes reached; Fidelity para 102. The distinctions between these concepts are canvassed 
fully in chapter 4; consult too Hoexter (2007) at 306-309; Pillay and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 85. 
818
 Boxer Superstores (Pty) Ltd v Zuma & others [2008] 9 BLLR 823 (LAC). 
819
 Ibid para 11. Once again the need for adequate reasons is clear. 
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Healthcare. Once more, the implication is that the standards are indistinguishable 
notwithstanding Fidelity’s assertions to the contrary.820 
 
Returning to Ellerine Holdings, the LAC next expanded on its preliminary statements, 
commenting that the impact of Sidumo had been to dispense with the ‘red light approach’ to 
review.
821
 Consequently, the cautious attitude to review formerly adopted by the courts no 
longer applied. In turn, the reasonableness enquiry’s suffusion of section 145 had broadened 
judicial powers of scrutiny over commissioners’ awards.822 Precisely how it had done so was 
not explained. The LAC nevertheless warned future courts that awards which were 
inadequate in some respects would not invariably be unreasonable.
823
 Referring to Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others,
824
 it noted that setting merely ‘unsatisfactory’ 
determinations aside could hamper the essence – and particularly the efficiency – of the 
dispute resolution framework designed by the Act.
825
 To avoid this, deference was due to 
commissioners’ awards.826 
 
At a glance, the Court’s judgment in Ellerine Holdings appears contradictory: according to it, 
Sidumo had extended the reach of review, while concurrently prescribing deference. 
However, rather than combining these features of reasonableness inappropriately, Ellerine 
Holdings depicts the dilemma inescapably faced by courts on review.
827
 Applying a standard 
sufficiently intrusive to preserve parties’ Constitutional rights, while still respecting 
                                                          
820
 Fidelity para 102. Myburgh adds that Boxer is authority for the proposition that reasonableness exists 
independently of section 145; Myburgh (2009) at 22-23; compare this to Le Roux & Young at 30. 
821
 Ellerine Holdings at 10-11. 
822
 Consistently with the purposes of substantive review and the majority of judicial sentiment; Sidumo paras 
106-110 & para 140; Carephone para 37; Herholdt para 52; Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 28; Super Group 
Autoparts t/a Autozone v Hlongwane NO & others [2010] 4 BLLR 458 (LC) para 7; Value Logistics para 40. In 
Value Logistics, the Court held that reasonableness allowed for greater scrutiny than that permissible under the 
interim Constitution; according to the LC, Sidumo had set a ‘lower threshold for review and a higher standard for 
administrative action’; Value Logistics para 40. 
823
 Ellerine Holdings at 10-11, referring to Sidumo para 116 and Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC). For an 
interpretation of the Court’s judgment in this regard, consult Myburgh (2009) at 4. 
824
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) at 1636H-I. 
825
 Ibid, as cited in Ellerine Holdings at 11; see too section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA. 
826
 For the original conception of ‘deference as respect’, consult Dyzenhaus (2004); more recently, see Hoexter 
(2007) at 138-47. 
827
 Bryden eloquently describes the quandary which faces reviewing courts. He records that what is required is a 
resolution to the dissension:  
‘...between the desire of judges to develop a jurisprudence that is both principled and sufficiently 
flexible to address a broad range of administrative decision-making and the desire of administrative law 
practitioners (whether they be parties to administrative proceedings, lawyers or administrative decision-
makers) to operate in a legal environment that enables them to achieve practical solutions to their 
problems.’; P Bryden ‘Standards of review and sufficiency of reasons: Some practical considerations’ 
(2006) 19 Can J Admin Law 191 at 192, cited in G van Harten, G Heckman & D Mullan Administrative 
Law Cases, Texts and Materials 6 ed (2010) at 850. 
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legislative intent and the doctrine of SOP, is no easy task.
828
 It is surely this tension which is 
responsible for much of the confusion. 
 
Perhaps the most fitting theoretical construction of Ellerine arises from Hoexter’s proposal as 
to how the conflicting characteristics of reasonableness may be united.
829
 Hoexter submits 
that in so far as the constitutional standard of reasonableness restricts (rather than extends) 
judicial powers of review, the restriction is confined to determining applicable remedies. In 
other words, whereas intensive examination of administrative decisions is acceptable,
830
 
overturning awards on account of trivial defects alone, or where doing so would not influence 
the outcome,
831
 is unwarranted.
832
 The proposal is useful in theory but applying this 
conception of reasonableness in practice remains. Specifically, defining the point at which an 
error becomes sufficiently serious as to necessitate review is tricky.
833
   
 
To understand how the Court’s decision in Ellerine Holdings is aligned with Hoexter’s 
approach, it is necessary to consider the judgment in more depth. The LAC in Ellerine 
Holdings assessed the Commissioner’s findings with reference to the applicant’s contended 
grounds of review. When doing so, it did not confine itself to evaluating only the award and 
reasons provided for therein.
834
 Instead, it found the general body of evidence supportive of 
the award, engaging in measurable scrutiny of the merits in the process.
835
 While it identified 
various errors in the Commissioner’s decision, it refused to overturn the award. According to 
the majority, the errors did not amount to gross irregularities.
836
 Davis JA’s observations in 
this regard are important:  
 
‘The reasons why these questions must be answered in the negative, is in the first 
place, that a court must be careful to parse an award by second respondent in the same 
fashion as one would an elegant judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal or the 
Constitutional Court. These awards must be read for what they are, awards made by 
arbitrators who are not judges. When all of the evidence is taken into account, when 
there is no irregularity of a material kind in that evidence was ignored, or improperly 
                                                          
828
 Ibid; Sidumo paras 137 & 243-244; Herholdt para 52 & 54. 
829
 Hoexter (2007) at 318, read with the CC’s endorsement thereof; Sidumo para 109. 
830
 Consistently with the expansive nature of the reasonableness enquiry. 
831
 This seems aligned with the Court’s approach to review of gross irregularities in Sasol Mining. 
832
 Ellerine Holdings at 13-14. 
833
 Some assistance is provided by the approach adopted in Sasol Mining as discussed above. 
834
 Implying a distinction between Carephone and Sidumo at least to this extent. 
835
 Ellerine Holdings at 14. 
836
 Ibid at 12-13. 
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rejected, or where there was not a full opportunity for an examination of all aspects of 
the case, then there is no gross irregularity as urged upon us…’837  
 
In passing these remarks, the LAC again recognised the significance of context in defining 
the ambit of review.
838
 When measuring the reasonableness of awards, the context in which 
commissioners operate is accordingly germane.
839
 In so far as Hoexter’s submissions are 
concerned, it is plain from Ellerine Holdings that the Court did not refrain from investigating 
the facts thoroughly. It exercised deference only when it came to determining whether the 
award in question was unreasonable, demonstrating its adoption of Hoexter’s model of 
deference. 
 
Somewhat more questionably, the LAC then stated that as the award did not evince a gross 
irregularity,
840
 appraising its substantive reasonableness would not assist the respondents.
841
 
The statement is noteworthy but puzzling. In its expression, the Court acknowledged the 
substantive nature of reasonableness, defining it as an ‘outcomes based enquiry’.842 Still, in 
the same breath, it suggested that the procedural adequacy of the Commissioner’s findings 
rendered the reasonableness of the outcome irrelevant. As averted to above, there is 
inevitably an overlap between gross irregularities and unreasonableness.
843
 However, given 
the conceptions of the former as procedural and the latter as substantive, the grounds are 
theoretically distinct. Conflating them disregards their discrete origins; simultaneously, the 
Constitutional essence of reasonableness is obscured. In addition, attributing reasonableness 
to awards purely on the basis that they lack procedural irregularities renders the standard 
redundant – a result anomalous with Constitutional intent.844 To remedy this, a test capable of 
                                                          
837
 Ibid at 13. 
838
 Bato Star para 45; Hoexter (2007) at 315; De Ville (2005) at 212-214; Plasket at 339-363.  
839
 Ellerine Holdings at 13. 
840
 Nor was it unreasonable; instead, held the Court, it was ‘justifiable’; Ellerine Holdings at 14-15. 
841
 Specifically, the LAC held that doing so would not ‘be helpful to the respondents’; Ellerine Holdings at 14. 
842
 Ellerine Holdings at 14-15. 
843
 Ngcobo J’s remarks in New Clicks describe the overlap well:  
‘There is obviously an overlap between the ground of review based on failure to take into consideration 
a relevant factor and one based on the unreasonableness of the decision. A consideration of the factors 
that a decision-maker is bound to take into account is essential to a reasonable decision. If a decision-
maker fails to take into account a factor that he or she is bound to take into consideration, the resulting 
decision can hardly be said to be that of a reasonable decision-maker…’;  New Clicks para 511. 
Consider too Myburgh (2009) at 22; Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others [2002] 6 
BLLR 493 (LAC) para 58; Reunert Industries and Plasket at 363. For the association between reasonableness 
and excess of powers, see Garbers (2008) at 86-87 and Carephone. Note however, Myburgh (2011) at 1518 and 
Fergus (2012). 
844
 Consider the purposes of judicial review generally and the contents of the right to just administrative action; 
Jowell (2006) at 16-17; Hoexter in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 27; Corder in Corder & van der 
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differentiating between gross irregularities and unreasonableness is needed. Currently, no 
such test exists. Subsequent decisions reveal comparable sentiments and the issue is detailed 
more fully in later paragraphs of this chapter.
845
 
 
3.4 Maintaining the distinction between appeal and review 
 
Another theme apparent from many cases is the familiar challenge of maintaining the 
distinction between appeal and review. Aggravating the difficulties associated with it, have 
been the LAC’s frequent references to the ‘correctness’ (or ‘incorrectness’) of 
commissioner’s findings.846 Matters such as Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Turnbull,847 
Khanyile v Billiton Aluminium SA Ltd t/a Hillside Aluminium
848
 and Motsamai v Everite 
Building Products (Pty) Ltd,
849
 exemplify the problem. In Amazwi, while making no 
reference whatsoever to the Sidumo standard, the LAC upheld the Commissioner’s findings 
of unfairness as ‘correct’.850 Comparably, albeit with a contrary outcome, in Motsamai the 
Court held that by awarding re-employment the Commissioner had: ‘…clearly got it 
wrong.’851 In Khanyile, the LAC again deemed the Commissioner’s order ‘correct’.852 It 
concurrently asserted that there could ‘be no doubt’, in fact, of the award’s correctness.853 
Ironically too in Khanyile, the Court criticized the LC for having engaged in an appellate like 
procedure, rather than conducting a review.
854
 It nonetheless committed an analogous error.  
 
Whereas a court which upholds a commissioner’s award as correct is perhaps unlikely to find 
it unreasonable, the correctness of awards is not the enquiry on review.
855
 That enquiry is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Vijver (eds) (2002) at 1-2; Mureinik (1993); Garbers (2008) at 86; Ray-Howett at 1628-1634. Sidumo paras, 88, 
138 & 140; Carephone paras 9, 19 & 34-35. 
845
 See, for example, Tao Ying and the discussion thereof below. Consider too Parmalat paras 14-16. 
846
 Examples include CEPPWAWU v NBCCI & others [2011] 2 BLLR 137 (LAC) paras 22-23 and Samancor 
Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) (2011) (SCA) para 7. 
847
 Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Turnbull [2008] 9 BLLR 817 (LAC). 
848
 Khanyile v Billiton Aluminium SA Ltd t/a Hillside Aluminium (LAC) unreported case no DA24/06 of 24 
February 2009. 
849
 Motsamai v Everite Building Products (Pty) Ltd [2011] 2 BLLR 144 (LAC). 
850
 Amazwi Power Products para 21. For the absence of references to reasonableness, see paras 7-21. 
851
 Motsamai para 23. 
852
 Khanyile para 34. 
853
 Ibid. 
854
 Ibid. 
855
 Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) (2011) (SCA) paras 5, 7 & 15 and Bestel paras 16-17.  Admittedly, 
there are exceptions to this rule. Whether a commissioner has acted ultra vires, for example, ostensibly calls for 
an enquiry into the correctness of the commissioner’s decision; Myburgh (2011) at 1518; Southern Sun  Hotel 
Interests. For traditional conceptions of review and the distinctions between review and appeal, see Botma & van 
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confined to appeal proceedings.
856
 Regardless of the veracity of the LAC’s substantive 
findings in these matters,
857
 labelling awards as correct or incorrect should therefore be 
avoided. In the absence of doing so, the challenge of retaining the apposite boundaries 
between appeal proceedings and reasonableness review is just exacerbated.
858
 Samancor 
Manganese (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others
859
 overtly illustrates the quandary.
860
   
 
In Samancor Manganese, the review application was premised on the allegedly ‘erroneous’ 
findings of the relevant Commissioner.
861
 Given the nature of review as preclusive of 
enquiries into correctness,
862
 the legitimacy of the application was disputable. 
Disappointingly, however, neither the LC nor the LAC dismissed it on this basis.
863
 Instead, 
the application was dismissed on account of the accuracy of the Commissioner’s award.864 
Whereas the Court made brief mention of the reasonableness test, it ultimately relied on the 
award’s correctness in reaching its decision. Its reference to reasonableness accordingly 
comprised no more than formalistic compliance with the tenets of review; in truth an appeal 
was conducted.
865
   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
der Walt (Part 1) at 332; Fergus (2010); I Ellis & M Dendy 'Civil procedure: High Court' The Law of South 
Africa vol 3(1) 2 ed (2007) para 394; Transnet Freight Rail paras 74-75 and Herholdt paras 55-56. 
856
 Ibid. Note, however, that where an error of law is committed by a commissioner, this may amount to a 
reviewable gross irregularity. In such cases, reference may be made to the commissioner’s erroneous 
understanding of the law. Refer, in this regard, to Timothy v Nampak Corrugated Containers (Pty) Ltd [2010] 8 
BLLR 830 (LAC) at 833 and Pam Golding paras 12-16 & paras 17-20. In Pam Golding, while referring to State 
Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others 
(2008) 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC), the Court noted that minor mistakes of law will not, however, necessarily justify 
review. For errors of law generally, s e De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others [2000] 9 BLLR 995 
(LAC) para 55; Fipaza para 58; Hira & another v Booysen & another 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) and Liberty Life 
Association of Africa Ltd v Kachelhoffer & others [2004] 10 BLLR 1043 (C) paras 47-48. 
857
 Particularly where the nature of the offence involved is extreme; consider Motsamai. 
858
 Remembering that reasonableness does not require correctness or perfection and that there may be a range of 
permissible outcomes available to the presiding commissioner; Sidumo para 118; Garbers (2008) at 84. In 
Motsamai, Waglay AJA was ostensibly aware of this hazard but he held nonetheless that: 
‘I am mindful of the fact that this is an appeal of a review application and therefore what I may believe 
to be an appropriate sanction is irrelevant. However, having regard to all the facts and circumstances as 
set out above I do not believe that any person in the position of the Commissioner could reasonably 
arrive at a decision other than the one that the dismissal of the appellant was fair…’; Motsamai para 27.  
859
 Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others (LAC) unreported case no JA17/2009 of 24 February 
2009. 
860
 In CEPPWAWU, for example, the LAC referred to the ‘correctness’ of the commissioner’s findings; 
CEPPWAWU paras 22-23. 
861
 Samancor Manganese para 34. 
862
 Sidumo para 118; Garbers (2008) at 84. 
863
 Consider, in this regard, the SCA’s remarks in Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) (2011) (SCA) para 7 & 
15-16. 
864
 Samancor Manganese paras 39-63. 
865
 Ibid para 64. Note too Clarence para 26; in Clarence, the LAC unapologetically dismissed the 
Commissioner’s award and determined the matter of its own accord. See also Zono paras 14, 15 & 36 and 
Mutual Construction. 
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An even more severe example of conflating appeal with review appears from Dunwell 
Property Services CC v Sibande & others.
866
 There, the LAC held that, to succeed on review, 
the appellant employer was required to prove both the substantive and procedural fairness of 
its erstwhile employee’s dismissal.867 Yet, it is trite that the fairness of dismissals is the 
precise question before commissioners during arbitration proceedings.
868
 In framing the issue 
as such, the Court in Dunwell clearly confused correctness review with the Sidumo 
standard.
869
  
 
A related concern emerges from matters such as Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & 
others.
870
 In Rainbow Farms, the LAC pointed to the ‘inescapable conclusion’ which the 
Commissioner had not reached.
871
 The implication of the remark is that only one acceptable 
outcome was available to the Commissioner. Not only does this suggest that CCMA awards 
are required to be correct, but it offends a fundamental principle articulated in Sidumo – more 
than one reasonable outcome may exist in any given case.
872
  Thus, commissioners cannot be 
confined to single ‘reasonable’ conclusions.873 There are good reasons for limiting judicial 
power in this way. The notion of an ‘inescapable’ or ‘inevitable’ conclusion seemingly arises 
from the assumption that courts are better equipped to decide disputes than commissioners.
874
 
It further presumes that there is only one correct conclusion. However, neither of these 
assumptions is true of all cases.
875
  
 
                                                          
866
 Dunwell Property Services CC v Sibande & others [2012] 2 BLLR 131 (LAC). 
867
 Ibid para 18; the Court made this remark despite its formal affirmation of the reasonableness test; Dunwell 
para 17. For a further example of disguising appeal as review see Jordaan v CCMA & others [2010] 12 BLLR 
1235 (LAC). Consider too the SCA’s comments in Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) (2011) (SCA) paras 5, 
7 & 17, regarding the LAC’s approach in Samancor Tubatse Ferrochrome (2010) (LAC).  
868
 Sections 185, 188, 191 & 193 of the LRA; Van Niekerk et al at 231 & 437-439; Clarence paras 13-14. 
869
 Recall that reasonableness does not require correctness or perfection; Sidumo para 118; Garbers (2008) at 84. 
870
 Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2011] 5 BLLR 451 (LAC). 
871
 Ibid para 38. The connotation is that there was only one possible outcome available to the Commissioner, 
contrary to the principle that there may be a range of reasonable decisions available in any given case; Foschini 
Group (2010) (LAC) para 48. Similarly nonetheless, in South African Post Office Ltd v CCMA & others 
(‘SAPO’)(LAC) unreported case no JA56/06 of 3 August 2011, the LAC held that only one reasonable possible 
conclusion was available to the Commissioner; SAPO para 33. 
872
 Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 48. 
873
 Ibid. 
874
 For the inappropriateness of this assumption, consult chapter 6. 
875
 Consider that the LRA is based on the principles of natural justice and that the Labour Court was established 
as a court of law and equity; sections 1(d), 138 & 151 of the LRA; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and others [2008] 2 
BLLR 97 (CC) para 42; the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA at 318-319; chapter 1. Thus, strict legal 
principles are not necessarily appropriate, or inevitably suited, to resolving labour disputes; note too Mark 
Aronson, Bruce Dyer & Matthew Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3ed (2004) at 180. 
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Looking to the first, commissioners hear disputes de novo and on a daily basis. They are well 
versed in applying the Codes of Good Practice particularly when it comes to misconduct and 
incapacity dismissals.
876
 Conversely, judges of the Labour Courts do not have the benefit of 
such experience, nor that of hearing the parties’ testimonies first-hand. In addition, reviewing 
courts are frequently presented with incomplete records of proceedings,
877
 detracting from 
their ability to determine disputes fairly, relative to commissioners. As such, the perception 
that the judiciary is inevitably superior in its dispute resolution faculties should be treated 
with caution.
878
 
 
As for the second assumption, the terms of reference in labour disputes are pivotal. These 
include not only strict legal principles but also the flexible concepts of fairness and equity.
879
 
Neither fairness nor equity lends itself to scientific or succinctly quantifiable results. Instead, 
when assessing the two (just as with reasonableness) subjective value judgments are 
necessary. These judgments, by their nature, may vary from one court (and dispute) to the 
next; the assumption that in each case there is an ideal answer is therefore illogical.
880
  
 
Of course, the supervisory function of review remains important. While balancing these 
factors may be tricky, refraining from overzealous averments as to the ‘obvious’, ‘inevitable’ 
or ‘inescapable’ conclusions commissioners ought to have reached, would be a valuable 
starting point. Given the terms’ resemblance to correctness, their frequent use merely 
threatens the tenuous distinction between appeal and review further.
881
 
 
                                                          
876
 Dismissals constitute the majority of their work; Venter & Levy at 40; CCMA Annual Report 2010-2011; 
Paul Benjamin ‘Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)’ 
Publication pending (2013); Consider too, the LAC’s cautionary remarks in CWIU & Others v Sopelog CC 
(1994) 15 ILJ 90 (LAC) concerning appeals conducted under the 1956 LRA; Sopelog at 97B-E. 
877
 See, for example, Bestel para 24 and Shoprite Checkers 1 read with Shoprite Checkers 3 (as discussed below). 
878
 Sopelog at 97B-E. 
879
 Chirwa para 42; sections 138 & 151 of the LRA; the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA at 318-319; 
chapter 1. 
880
 For an informative illustration of two courts assessing very similar facts but reaching altogether different 
conclusions, consult the Shoprite Checkers trilogy discussed below. 
881
 For the distinction between appeals and reviews, refer to Fergus (2010). 
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3.5 The impact of judicial indecision on the outcome of review proceedings: the 
‘Shoprite Checkers’ trilogy 
 
Prior to Khanyile, the Shoprite Checkers trilogy had begun.
882
 Not only do these cases 
exemplify the themes of uncertainty depicted above, but they offer a useful illustration of 
how different attitudes to review may affect the outcome of any given matter.
883
 In the first of 
these matters, Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others (‘Shoprite Checkers 1’),884 the 
respondent employee had been dismissed for eating food belonging to his employer in 
prohibited areas of the workplace. Following two arbitrations and two review applications in 
which the courts had remitted the matter to the CCMA for arbitration afresh, the employer 
appealed to the LAC.
885
 The employee simultaneously instituted a cross-appeal.  
 
Shoprite contended that the Commissioner’s finding of unfair dismissal was unjustified.886 
The LAC disagreed, holding that: 
 
‘The decision of the commissioner that dismissal was too harsh as a sanction is, 
broadly speaking, reasonably reasoned. Even if one were to test it on the basis of 
whether it is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it, it would, without the 
slightest doubt, survive the test. If one tests it against the test of unreasonableness in 
accordance with the decision of the Constitution Court in Sidumo…, there is no doubt, 
that it is reasonable because it cannot be said that a reasonable decision-maker could 
not reach the same conclusion. In fact, I would go so far as to say that there is no 
prospect that a reasonable decision-maker, including a CCMA commissioner, could 
on the facts of this case find that dismissal was a fair sanction. Any attempt by the 
appellant to seek a forum that will make such a finding is, in my view, an exercise in 
futility.’887 
 
Several aspects of this statement are striking. First, the Court’s sentiment that there was ‘no 
prospect’ that a reasonable decision-maker could have reached a contrary conclusion on 
fairness again suggests an approach more like appeal than review. It is a fundamental trait of 
reasonableness review that more than one reasonable outcome may exist. As such, resolving 
                                                          
882
 Fergus & Rycroft. 
883
 Compare Shoprite Checkers 1 with Shoprite Checkers v CCMA & others [2008] 9 BLLR 838 (LAC) 
(‘Shoprite Checkers 2’) and Shoprite Checkers 3. 
884
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) (‘Shoprite Checkers 1’). 
885
 Ibid paras 1-9. 
886
 Specifically in light of the nature of the employee’s misconduct; Shoprite Checkers 1 para 19. 
887
 Shoprite Checkers 1 para 19. 
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that there is no alternative, acceptable finding offends the standard’s inherent nature and fits 
more comfortably within the paradigm of appeal.
888
 
 
Secondly, the LAC’s analysis of the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s findings on 
fairness was exceptionally brief relative to its evaluation of the cross-appeal. In fact, its 
discussion thereof was limited to the paragraph cited above. By comparison, it scrutinized the 
cross-appeal in detail.
889
 Finally, the Court’s comment, that ‘even if’ the decision were 
appraised with reference to the Carephone standard it would survive review,
890
 reveals a 
novel approach to the relationship between reasonableness and rational justifiability. 
Ostensibly, the LAC deemed the latter to impose greater constraints on commissioners than 
those compelled by the former. Given the discrete measures of review applicable under 
each,
891
 the Court’s statements should not be taken at face value. Instead, they should be 
understood with reference to the different emphases placed by each test on various elements 
of awards.
892
 
 
The Court in Shoprite Checkers 1 next examined the ‘justifiability’, ‘rationality’ and 
‘reasonableness’ of the Commissioner’s order of reinstatement without backpay,893 
essentially equating these terms in the process.
894
 Following an intricate assessment of the 
facts, Zondo JP
895
 concluded that the Commissioner’s failure to award retrospective 
reinstatement
896
 was neither justified nor reasonable.
897
 He therefore allowed the cross-appeal 
and ordered that the employee be retrospectively reinstated. In doing so, the Judge observed 
that consistently with the new standard of review, the LAC was entitled to consider all 
                                                          
888
 It further repeats the assumption of judicial superiority recorded above; see chapter 6 and Fergus (2010). 
889
 Shoprite Checkers 1 para 19 & paras 20-32. 
890
 Particularly when compared with its later affirmation of the award’s reasonableness. 
891
 As outlined above; the Carephone standard emphasized commissioners’ connections between awards, reasons 
and evidence while the Sidumo test is concerned with whether decisions are justifiable in relation to the evidence 
generally.  
892
 Together with the CC’s abandonment in Sidumo of the reasonable employer test; Sidumo paras 62-79. 
893
 Which the employee had challenged in its cross appeal. The cross appeal was instituted, in part, against the 
Commissioner’s decision to impose a final written warning. In the respondent’s opinion, that finding was 
irrational and unjustifiable. Zondo JP found no basis for this and dismissed the cross appeal in this respect. He 
nevertheless upheld it on other counts; Shoprite Checkers 1 para 21. 
894
 Shoprite Checkers 1 paras 22-23. 
895
 Writing for a unanimous court. 
896
 Or at the very least a measure of backpay. 
897
 Shoprite Checkers 1 para 26. 
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evidentiary material before it, hinting at the distinction between Carephone and Sidumo.
898
 
This was true notwithstanding that the full record of proceedings was not before the Court.
899
  
 
Still aggrieved, Shoprite turned to the SCA in an appeal confined to the appropriateness of 
the LAC’s order of retrospective reinstatement. The matter is reported as Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others (‘Shoprite Checkers 3’).900 At the outset, the SCA confirmed the 
Constitutional foundations of review. It then recited the danger associated with 
reasonableness of blurring the boundaries between appeal and review. The difficulty lay in 
the reasonableness test’s endorsement of substantive or merits based review. Review 
proceedings, held the Court, were accordingly to be approached with caution and with due 
respect for the LRA’s intentional exclusion of appeals from CCMA awards.901 
 
Applying these remarks to the facts of Shoprite Checkers 3, the SCA emphasized the broad 
discretion afforded to commissioners by the Act to determine the appropriateness of 
retrospective reinstatement.
902
 This discretion, held the Court, restricted the permissible scope 
of judicial interference.
903
 Of relevance too in the matter before it was the absence of a 
complete record of proceedings.
904
 The record’s deficiencies had placed the LAC in an even 
more inferior position to investigate the merits than would ordinarily have been the case. In 
the SCA’s opinion, this had constrained its authorized sphere of intrusion further. On the 
strength of the record before it, the Court then examined the LAC’s findings and reached a 
contrary conclusion. According to it, there was no evidence indicating that the Commissioner 
had acted upon an incorrect principle or capriciously.
905
 His award was instead reasonable
906
 
and the employee’s cross-appeal ought to have been dismissed.907 The SCA thus upheld the 
appeal. 
 
While the Court’s pronouncements in Shoprite Checkers 3 were largely trite, they are a 
critical reminder of the breadth of commissioners’ discretionary powers, particularly 
                                                          
898
 Ibid para 30. See also Transnet Freight Rail para 10; Fidelity para 102. 
899
 Shoprite Checkers 1 para 30. 
900
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] JOL 23356 (SCA). (‘Shoprite Checkers 3’) 
901
 Shoprite Checkers 3 paras 26-28. Consider too Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) (2011) (SCA) paras 5 
& 7. 
902
 Section 193(a) of the LRA. 
903
 Shoprite Checkers 3 para 32. See also Myburgh (2010) at 15-16. 
904
 Shoprite Checkers 3 para 30. 
905
 Ibid.  
906
 Ibid para 30. The appeal was accordingly upheld; Shoprite Checkers 3 para 35. 
907
 Ibid para 32. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
131 
 
regarding sanction. Arguably, the SCA’s refusal to interfere without palpable evidence of 
arbitrary or capricious decision-making is an attitude apposite to discretionary determinations 
in general.
908
 In addition, it conforms to the contextual nature of the reasonableness enquiry 
well. The matter is addressed more fully in subsequent paragraphs. 
 
In the interim between Shoprite Checkers 1 and Shoprite Checkers 3, Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Ltd v CCMA & others (‘Shoprite Checkers 2’)909 was decided. There, the LAC granted an 
appeal against the reviewing court’s decision to uphold the Commissioner’s award.910 The 
facts of Shoprite Checkers 2 imitate those of Shoprite Checkers 1: The respondent employee 
had been dismissed for consuming food belonging to Shoprite in unauthorized areas of the 
workplace. Following arbitration at the CCMA, the employee was reinstated – guilt had 
purportedly not been proven.
911
  
 
Nonetheless, on appeal, the employee conceded culpability. The review was consequently 
confined to the appropriateness of his dismissal.
912
 Following an examination of the 
Commissioner’s conclusions in this regard, the Court found them inadequate. Not only had 
the employee’s testimony in defence been uncritically accepted by the Commissioner (despite 
it being ‘unsatisfactory in the extreme’)913 but he had failed to account for all relevant factors 
before reaching his decision.
914
  
 
Typically, the matter would have been remitted to the CCMA for rehearing on the basis of 
the employee’s guilt. The LAC, however, preferred to determine it of its own accord.915  The 
Court began by reviewing the abundance of authority espousing the fairness of dismissals for 
theft. It then acknowledged the LAC’s earlier decision in Shoprite Checkers 1,916 in which it 
                                                          
908
 For a comprehensive discussion of the proper approach to review of discretionary determinations, refer to 
chapter 6. 
909
 Shoprite Checkers v CCMA & others [2008] 9 BLLR 838 (LAC) (‘Shoprite Checkers 2’). 
910
 Ibid paras 4 & 26. On review, the Commissioner’s order of reinstatement had been confirmed subject to a 
final written warning. 
911
 Shoprite Checkers 2 para 3. 
912
 Ibid paras 5 & 14. 
913
 Ibid para 11. 
914
 Ibid. 
915
 Whether this was appropriate given that the discretion has been expressly afforded to commissioners by the 
LRA is questionable. A full discussion of whether the LAC is empowered to do so is beyond the scope of this 
paper however. For the extent of the LAC’s powers in this regard, consult Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) 
(2011) (SCA) para 7. 
916
 Shoprite Checkers 1 para 30. 
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had departed somewhat from these authorities.
917
  In Davis JA’s opinion,918 the matters were 
distinguishable. Thus, it was fair to confirm the employee’s dismissal despite the trivial 
nature of the theft involved.
919
  
 
The Court’s conclusion in Shoprite Checkers 2 did not address the reasonableness of the 
Commissioner’s findings on sanction. Still, when read with its precursor, the cases divulge 
definite problems with the contentious nature of review. First, they illustrate the likelihood of 
reviewing courts reaching different outcomes during merits based review, despite comparable 
facts. In this way, they reveal the potential impact of inconsistent attitudes to review on 
substantive findings. Moreover, they demonstrate the futility of assuming that only one 
reasonable decision is available in every case.
920
   
 
Secondly, the Courts’ judgments display disparate levels of engagement with the law. In 
Shoprite Checkers 1, the LAC considered the fairness of sanction
921
 with minimal reference 
to case authorities.
922
 Comparatively, in Shoprite Checkers 2, the Court engaged extensively 
with the law, assuming a discrete approach to determining fairness. The distinctiveness of 
their attitudes raises questions about how commissioners are to determine the fairness of 
dismissals for misconduct.
923
 Specifically, the weight attributable to the Code for Dismissals 
relative to case law is indefinite.
924
 Should reviewing courts’ opinions in this area vacillate 
from one matter to the next, a key function of judicial review, as a supervisory and 
performance enhancing tool, may be lost.
925
 Rather than guiding commissioners, inconsistent 
judicial attitudes to the law only serve to confuse. To this end, in so far as the ambit of review 
                                                          
917
 Notably, no reference was made to these cases at all in Shoprite Checkers 1.  
918
 Writing for an unanimous court in Shoprite Checkers 2.  
919
 Shoprite Checkers 2 paras 15-25. 
920
 Consistently with the nature of the reasonableness enquiry which recognizes that more than one reasonable 
outcome may exist in any given case. 
921
 Albeit in the context of a purported enquiry into reasonableness. 
922
 Sidumo aside, the Court made only brief reference to case authority; specifically, it referred to Republican 
Press (Pty) Ltd v CEPPWAWU & Gumede & others [2007] 11 BLLR 1001 (SCA); Shoprite Checkers 1 para 29. 
The limited nature of the LAC’s appraisal of the case law is disparate from the Court’s extensive review thereof 
in Shoprite Checkers 2; Shoprite Checkers 2 paras 16-21.   
923
 For purportedly procedural clarity on this question, see the CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct arbitrations in 
GenN 602 GG 34573 of 2 September 2011 (‘the Guidelines’). Consider too the various Codes of Good Practice, 
promulgated under section 203 of the LRA which commissioners are obliged to consult when resolving disputes; 
Transnet Freight Rail paras 11-13. For proposed reconciliations of Shoprite Checkers 1 and Shoprite Checkers 2, 
consult DJ Meyer ‘Comparing apples with pears: Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others and Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA’ (2010) 43(2) De Jure 344 and Smit (2011) at 72-73. 
924
 This complicates the task before commissioners and exacerbates the difficulties they face when seeking to 
comply with their statutory and Constitutional obligations as depicted in Carephone and by Ngcobo J in Sidumo. 
925
 Garbers (2008) at 86; Ray-Howett at 1628. Sidumo paras, 88, 138 & 140; Carephone paras 9, 19 & 34-35; 
Jowell (2006); De Ville (2005) at 30. 
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affected the Courts’ findings in the Shoprite Checkers trilogy, it is crucial that the confines of 
review be clarified. 
 
3.6 Limiting review of discretionary findings: Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet 
Bargaining Council & others
926
 and National Union of Mineworkers obo 
Employees and Others v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others (‘NUM obo 112 Employees’)927  
 
Of related import, both to limiting judicial powers of review generally and assessing 
discretionary determinations, is the matter of Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining 
Council & others.
928
 In Transnet, the LC expressly stated that reasonableness did not permit 
judicial interference with commissioners’ allocations of weight to relevant considerations.929 
In other words, while commissioners were to account for all relevant factors when resolving 
disputes, reviewing courts were barred from reallocating the weight attributed by them to 
such factors. Considering the SCA’s observations in Shoprite Checkers 3, the notion seems 
valid.
930
 However, in light of the LAC’s decision in National Union of Mineworkers obo 
Employees and Others v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others 
(‘NUM obo 112 Employees’),931 its application to section 145 proceedings is questionable. 
 
In NUM obo 112 Employees, the Court was required to determine whether the Commissioner 
had attended to all relevant statutory considerations when making his award. Specifically, he 
had been obliged to consider item 6(1) of the Code for Dismissals, which lists the factors 
relevant to determining the fairness of dismissal for participating in wild cat strikes.
932
 Yet, 
rather than assessing simply whether the Commissioner had done so and had allocated weight 
to each, the LAC engaged in an extensive balancing act. In the process, it re-evaluated the 
weight assigned to the prescribed factors by the Commissioner, contrary to Transnet Freight 
Rail.
933
 Having done so, the Court concluded that a reasonable decision-maker would have 
                                                          
926
 Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC). 
927
 National Union of Mineworkers obo Employees and Others v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others [2012] 1 BLLR 22 (LAC) (‘NUM obo 112 Employees’). 
928
 Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC). 
929
 Ibid para 10. See also Relyant Retail paras 21-22. 
930
 For justification, consult chapter 6.  
931
 National Union of Mineworkers obo Employees and Others v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others [2012] 1 BLLR 22 (LAC) (‘NUM obo 112 Employees’). 
932
 Schedule 8 to the LRA read with section 68(5) of the LRA; NUM obo 112 Employees paras 10-11. 
933
 NUM obo 112 Employees paras 23-25. 
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found the dismissals to have been manifestly unfair; as a result, the award was 
unreasonable.
934
  
 
Given the LAC’s attitude, whether Transnet Freight Rail’s prohibition of judicial weight 
allocations stands, is unclear. Either way, the Court’s approach in NUM obo 112 Employees 
is concerning. First, it is beyond doubt that the power to determine fairness in dismissal 
disputes has been entrusted to commissioners and not to the courts.
935
 As such, 
commissioners enjoy a wide discretion to make these determinations; that discretion 
necessarily includes the allocation of weight to relevant factors when determining fairness. 
Provided therefore, that commissioners properly apply their minds to all pertinent 
considerations, with apt attention to both the applicable law and material facts, deference is 
due to their findings.
936
 Purely because a reviewing court might have allocated the weight 
differently to a particular commissioner does not entitle it to substitute his or her award with 
its own view of the matter.
937
 To the extent to which this occurred in NUM obo 112 
Employees, the legitimacy of the LAC’s decision is questionable.938  
 
3.7 The relationship between gross irregularities and unreasonableness: CUSA v 
Tao Ying Metal Industries & others,
939
 Anglo Platinum Ltd v CCMA & 
others
940
 and Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others
941
   
 
In the midst of the Shoprite Checkers cases, the CC gave judgment in CUSA v Tao Ying 
Metal Industries & others.
942
 Tao Ying concerned the interpretation of a collective agreement 
which the presiding Commissioner had construed in favour of the employees.
943
 The LC and 
                                                          
934
 Ibid
 
 paras 25-28.  
935
 Section 143(1) of the LRA. 
936
 See, in this regard, section 138 of the LRA and chapter 1 of this thesis. 
937
 Sidumo paras 110 & 119; Cheetham para 4. 
938
 Chan’s discussion of proportionality in European law could assist with explaining the approach adopted by 
the Court in NUM obo 112 Employees. Chan argues that where the legislature has stipulated specific factors for 
consideration and decision-makers fail to recognize the weight of one or more particularly important factors, 
their decisions will be unreasonable; Johannes Chan ‘A sliding scale of reasonableness in judicial review’ 2006 
Acta Juridica 233 at 255-256. The difficulty with this stance is that, as in NUM obo 112 Employees, there may 
be no statutory indication of the factors to which greater weight should be allocated.   
939
 CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC). 
940
 Anglo Platinum Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 25372 (LC). 
941
 Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC). 
942
 CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC). 
943
 Ibid para 1. 
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LAC had dismissed both the review application and subsequent appeal respectively. Based on 
the absence of jurisdiction, the employer’s appeal to the SCA had nonetheless succeeded.944 
 
The majority of the CC (led by Ngcobo J) disagreed with the SCA’s finding, thereby 
reinstating the Commissioner’s award.945 Due to the complexity of the decision, the 
discussion below addresses only the significant aspects of it. First, the Court recounted the 
LRA’s intentional preclusion of appeals against CCMA awards, denoting that interference 
with awards was justified in limited circumstances alone.
946
 As such, it was fitting to confine 
appeals to the issues raised by applicants in their initial papers. In effect, supplementary 
grounds for review were excluded from appraisal on appeal. In the majority’s opinion, 
adopting a contrary view would undermine efficient dispute resolution and the objects of the 
LRA.
947
 
 
The original review application in Tao Ying was founded on the Commissioner’s alleged 
failure to apply her mind to the parties’ dispute. As a legitimate ground of review, if proven, 
it would have warranted setting her award aside.
948
 According to the CC, however,
949
 this 
was not the case in Tao Ying. Relying on Ngcobo J’s decision in Sidumo,950 the Court 
resolved instead that the Commissioner’s findings had not deprived the parties of a fair 
hearing and that her findings were in any event ‘right’. She had suitably applied her mind to 
the matter and her award was therefore exempt from review.
951
 For the reasons detailed 
earlier, the CC’s reference to the correctness of the Commissioner’s decision is regrettable.952 
Still, its recognition of the continued relevance of traditionally ‘procedural’ grounds of 
review
953
 and its refusal to entertain new grounds of review on appeal, are instructive.
954
 
                                                          
944
 Ibid para 41. 
945
 Ibid para 107. 
946
 Ibid para 64. 
947
 Ibid para 67. The Court’s comments were subject to the proviso that where the parties had proceeded on the 
basis of a common misconception of the law, the court concerned would be obliged to raise that point of law 
mero motu. 
948
 Tao Ying para 76. For ‘failure to apply the mind’ as a ground of review, see Kaefer Insulation para 21; 
Standard Bank (1995) (BG) at 1397; Information Trust Corporation (LAC) para 10; Miladys; Toyota SA Motors 
para 41 and Maepe. For general principles in this regard, consult Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand 
Nigel Ltd 1988 (3) SA 132 (A) and Hira. 
949
 At least the majority of the CC. 
950
 In terms of which the Judge had held that a failure to apply the mind deprived the parties of their right to a 
fair hearing; Sidumo para 267; Fipaza (LC) para 58. 
951
 Tao Ying paras 76-82. 
952
 Reasonableness recognizes that there may be a range of permissible outcomes available to commissioners and 
so does not prescribe perfection for CCMA awards; Sidumo para 118; Garbers (2008) at 84. 
953
 Specifically, failures to apply the mind; Tao Ying para 150; consider too SAMWU paras 9, 10, 18 & 27 and 
Pam Golding. 
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In a dissenting judgment, O’Regan J preferred the SCA’s conclusion that the Commissioner’s 
award evinced a clear failure to apply her mind, thereby divesting the award of rationality.
955
 
Before doing so, she recorded her opposition to the majority’s finding that grounds of review 
omitted from the original papers should be excluded from consideration on appeal. In 
O’Regan J’s view, where such grounds concerned Constitutional rights (including the right to 
just administrative action), attending to them was crucial.
956
 The need to protect parties’ 
rights is indisputable. Nevertheless, the practical utility of the Judge’s sentiments is unclear. 
Judicial review is intrinsically designed to protect parties’ rights.957 At the very least, the right 
to administrative justice will be at stake in all review proceedings.
958
 So too will the right to 
fair labour practices be present.
959
 Thus, attempting to distinguish between grounds (or cases) 
associated with Constitutional rights, and those which are not, may be futile. The alternative 
possibility is equally problematic. Should no distinction be drawn at all, O’Regan J’s 
approach would expose all grounds of review which are raised for the first time on appeal to 
scrutiny. It is consequently unfortunate that the Judge failed to explicate her remarks. In the 
absence of explanation, the majority’s approach must be preferred.  
 
Returning to the defect alleged in Tao Ying, O’Regan J accepted that ‘failure to apply the 
mind’ was a legitimate basis for review. She then identified a related concern. According to 
her, commissioners who did not apply their minds appropriately acted unreasonably or 
unlawfully, in turn breaching the parties’ rights to just administrative action.960 In this 
instance, both the Commissioner’s findings and her reasoning process were unconvincing. As 
such, concluded the Judge, she had not applied herself adequately to the matter;
961
 this 
rendered her award irrational.
962
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
954
 For the CC’s earlier pronouncements on this debate, see Bato Star.  
955
 Tao Ying para 150. 
956
 Ibid paras 130-132. 
957
 Jowell (2006); De Ville (2005) at 30. 
958
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
959
 Section 23 of the Constitution. 
960
 Tao Ying para 134. In Myburgh’s view, O’Regan J’s remarks indicate that erroneous reasoning processes may 
still justify review in and of themselves; Myburgh (2010) at 16. 
961
 Tao Ying paras 139-141. 
962
 Ibid para 150. 
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The material aspects of O’Regan J’s decision are twofold. First, the Judge’s finding that the 
award was ‘irrational’,963 rather than ‘unreasonable’ again echoes the Carephone test. Given 
the uncertainty surrounding the relationship between Carephone and Sidumo, her failure to 
distinguish between these standards
964
 was disappointing; if anything, it added to the 
prevailing confusion. Secondly, O’Regan J’s observations imply that procedural irregularities 
are prerequisites for unreasonableness.
965
 As previously discussed, in light of the substantive 
nature of reasonableness and the traditionally procedural character of gross irregularities, the 
viability of the contention is doubtful.
966
 It further suggests a return to the doctrine of 
symptomatic unreasonableness despite its abandonment in South Africa’s Constitutional 
dispensation.
967
 Arguably therefore, O’Regan J’s decision should not be interpreted as 
indicating that procedural defects must be present to establish unreasonableness;
968
 a better 
construction is that her decision merely affirms the overlap between gross irregularities
969
 and 
substantive unreasonableness.
970
 
 
In Anglo Platinum Ltd v CCMA & others
971
 the LC addressed this convergence once more, 
albeit without reference to Tao Ying. In Anglo Platinum,
972
 the Commissioner was found not 
to have applied his mind to the parties’ dispute. Furthermore, he had impermissibly narrowed 
the issues for determination. Where commissioners did so, held the Court, disputes would not 
be ‘fully and fairly determined’ and: 
 
‘The ensuing decision inevitably [would] be tainted by dialectical unreasonableness 
(process-related unreasonableness), characteristically resulting in a lack of rational 
connection between the decision and the evidence and most likely an unreasonable 
                                                          
963
 Consistently with the SCA’s findings; ibid. 
964
 Together with her reasons for departing from the term ‘reasonable’. 
965
 For comparable sentiments, see Transnet Freight Rail para 57; Value Logistics paras 46 & 53-54; Ellerine 
Holdings at 14 and the applicant’s allegations in Sasol Mining para 1. 
966
 Carephone paras 30-31 & 37; Sidumo paras 105-110. For the dual features of reasonableness, consult Ray-
Howett; Myburgh (2009) at 16-17 and Roman at 281-282. 
967
 Hoexter with Lyster (2002) at 170-187; Standard Bank (1995) (BG); Yvonne Burns (original text by Marinus 
Wiechers) ‘Administrative Law’ The Law of South Africa vol 1 2 ed (2003) para 144.  
968
 Analogous decisions should similarly not be understood to suggest this; for an example thereof, consider 
Parmalat paras 14-16. 
969
 At least in the form of failures to apply the mind; Fidelity para 101; W Hutchinson ‘Grounds for review: 
Sections 145 and section 158(1)(g) of the Labour Relations Act’ (2009) 18(8) Contemporary Labour Law 79 at 
80. 
970
 New Clicks para 511; Plasket at 363; Anglo Platinum (2010) (LC) as discussed in Myburgh (Paper presented 
at the 2011 CCMA Commissioners Indaba); Afrox Healthcare para 21; For procedural grounds of review similar 
to reasonableness, compare Value Logistics para 46; Kaefer Insulation para 21; Standard Bank (1995) (BG) at 
1397 and Pam Golding para 5.  
971
 Anglo Platinum Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 25372 (LC). 
972
 Ibid. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
138 
 
outcome (substantive unreasonableness). There will often be an overlap between the 
ground of review based on a failure to take into consideration a relevant factor and 
one based on the reasonableness of a decision. If a commissioner does not take into 
account a factor that he is bound to take into account, his or her decision invariably 
will be unreasonable.’973 
 
By implication, at least some procedural grounds of review (including failures to take 
relevant considerations into account)
974
 necessarily lead to substantively unreasonable 
conclusions. Again the approach may be criticized. Where commissioners fail to consider 
certain factors in their awards, their resultant findings will not always be substantively 
unreasonable. Mitigating circumstances in misconduct dismissals provide a good example. 
Consider a commissioner who disregards an employee’s prolonged service history when 
determining the fairness of dismissal. As length of service has frequently been recognized as 
a pertinent mitigating factor in misconduct dismissals,
975
 to the extent to which the 
commissioner neglected it, he would have failed to take account of a relevant consideration 
and so committed a procedural irregularity. Yet, the remaining aggravating circumstances of 
the case might have far outweighed the employee’s lengthy period of employment. Whether 
the commissioner had considered this factor would then be immaterial to the outcome, 
leaving the award’s substantive reasonableness intact. The commissioner’s procedural 
irregularity
976
 could similarly not be held responsible for the award’s substantive 
reasonableness (or unreasonableness).
977
 Of course, had the Court’s comments in Anglo 
Platinum been based on the procedural component of reasonableness,
978
 an argument for the 
relationship between inadequate procedure and ensuing unreasonableness could be made. 
However, there is no evidence in its decision suggesting that was the case. 
 
The relationship between procedural defects (in the form of gross irregularities) and the 
reasonableness standard surfaced in Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & 
                                                          
973
 Ibid; see too Myburgh (Paper presented at the 2011 CCMA Commissioners Indaba). 
974
 Ibid. 
975
 Consani Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (2004) 25 
ILJ 1707 para 11; Shoprite Checkers 1 para 5; Shoprite Checkers 2 paras 23-25. Note, however, MEC for Health 
(Gauteng) v Mathamini & others (2008) 29 ILJ 366 (LC) paras 17-18 and Mutual Construction, in which the 
Courts ostensibly adopted an alternative view. 
976
 Of failing to take ‘relevant’ considerations into account. 
977
 Note too that commissioners are statutorily obliged to provide only brief reasons for their awards; Maepe 
paras 8 & 22; section 138(7)(a) of the LRA. For the limits of permissible brevity, refer to Tao Ying para 140. 
Requiring commissioners to cite all relevant legal factors (regardless of the factors’ impact on the outcome) thus 
burdens commissioners beyond the Act’s intentions. Yet, on the strength of Anglo Platinum (2010) (LC), it 
would seem that, to the extent to which commissioners fail to do so, their awards may be procedurally defunct; 
consider further SAMWU paras 9, 10, 18 & 27 and Value Logistics para 44.  
978
 Anglo Platinum (2010) (LC). 
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others
979
  too. There, the LC held that when determining whether a gross irregularity had 
occurred, the critical question was ‘…whether the conduct… complained of prevented a fair 
trial of issues.’980 In so far as it had done so materially, a gross irregularity would arise.981 To 
this point, the judgment accords with the principles enunciated in Sidumo and Fidelity, as 
well as those cited by the Court in Transnet Freight Rail itself. After concluding that the 
Commissioner had committed a material irregularity,
982
 the LC nonetheless proceeded 
ambiguously as follows:  
 
‘For the same reasons, second respondent’s arbitration award amounts to a decision 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not make.’983 
  
The connotation is that the tests for gross irregularities and unreasonableness are principally 
identical. Yet, the Court acknowledged that the procedural quality of the former dictated that 
the processes which commissioners follow during arbitration proceedings be evaluated on 
review. Read with Sidumo’s declaration that reasonableness review allows for substantive 
investigation into the merits of disputes,
984
 the incoherence of equating these enquiries is 
apparent.
985
 Clearly a means of differentiating between these grounds is needed. 
 
3.8 Reasonableness as a resolutive ground of review: Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO986 
and Clarence v The National Commissioner of the South African Police 
Service
987
 
 
Perhaps it was a similar rationale which informed the SCA’s findings in Edcon Ltd v Pillemer 
NO.
988
 In Edcon, the employee had been dismissed for dishonesty.
989
 Following arbitration 
                                                          
979
 Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC). 
980
 Ibid para 17. 
981
 Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the Commissioner’s misapplication of the law to 
the facts comprised a material gross irregularity; Transnet Freight Rail para 17. 
982
 Transnet Freight Rail para 17. 
983
 Ibid para 57. 
984
 Sidumo para 106 & 108; see also Carephone para 25. 
985
 Transnet Freight Rail para 57. The Court nevertheless reached comparable conclusions in respect of the 
remaining grounds of review, with the exception of the allegation that the commissioner had exceeded his 
powers by ordering rehabilitation; Transnet Freight Rail paras 65 & 66-75. In doing so, it implied that the test 
for excess of powers was correctness rather than reasonableness. For confirmation of this principle, see Myburgh 
(2011) at 1518 and Afrox Healthcare. 
986
 Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO & others [2010] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA). 
987
 Clarence v The National Commissioner of the SA Police Service (2011) 32 ILJ 2927 (LAC); for another case 
in which reasonableness was seemingly applied as a resolutive ground, see Joseph v University of Limpopo & 
Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2085 (LAC). 
988
 Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO & others [2010] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA). 
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proceedings, the Commissioner deemed the dismissal unfair and ordered reinstatement.
990
 
Both the LC and the LAC upheld the Commissioner’s findings and an appeal was 
subsequently instituted to the SCA.
991
 Edcon’s grounds for review are revealing; they 
included that: 
 
a) The Commissioner had misunderstood the severity of the employee’s dishonesty in 
light of Edcon’s policies;  
b) The Commissioner had admitted hearsay evidence without regard for applicable laws 
of evidence; and 
c) The Commissioner’s finding that no evidence had been led pointing to a breakdown 
in the parties’ trust relationship, was erroneous.992 
 
Commencing with the principles of review,
993
 the Court defined the question before it as 
whether the award was one which ‘a reasonable decision-maker could arrive at considering 
the material placed before him.’994 Once more, it confirmed that this enquiry directed 
reviewing courts to examine not only commissioners’ findings, but also all evidentiary 
material presented during the arbitration proceedings at hand.
995
 Despite the discrepancies 
between this depiction of reasonableness and the SCA’s former definition of rational 
justifiability,
996
 the Court in Edcon continued as follows: 
 
‘It is remarkable that the constitutional standard of ‘reasonableness’ propounded by 
the Constitutional Court in Sidumo is conceptually no different to what the LAC said 
in Carephone. The only difference is in the semantics – the LAC has preferred 
‘justifiability’ whilst the Constitutional Court has preferred the term 
‘reasonableness’.997 
 
As discussed above, the validity of the proposition is questionable. Were the standards 
identical in all but name, the CC’s replacement of rational justifiability with reasonableness 
would have been superfluous.
998
 Moreover, the drafters of the final Constitution would not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
989
 Ibid paras 3-6. 
990
 Ibid para 9; albeit without backpay; Edcon paras 1-2. 
991
 Edcon para 2. 
992
 Ibid para 10. 
993
 Ibid paras 11-16. 
994
 Ibid para 15. 
995
 Ibid para 16. See too Fidelity para 103. 
996
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26.  
997
 Edcon para 16. Consult too Afrox Healthcare para 21. 
998
 Sidumo para 110; Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) paras 26-28. 
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have bothered to reformulate the right to just administrative action as they did.
999
 The SCA’s 
preceding comments that the Sidumo test allowed for all evidentiary material to be examined 
on review, when the Court itself had expressly prohibited this under Carephone, only further 
undercuts the legitimacy of its remarks in this regard.
1000
  
 
Applying these equivocal sentiments to the facts nonetheless, the SCA held the 
Commissioner’s decision1001 reasonable. It accordingly dismissed the appeal, upholding the 
award in the process.
1002
 In doing so, the Court declared its conclusion dispositive of the 
matter; there was thus no need to consider the Commissioner’s allegedly inappropriate 
admission of hearsay evidence.
1003
 Notably therefore, the matter was decided purely on the 
strength of reasonableness, notwithstanding the standard’s absence from the employer’s 
initial application papers. The implication is that reasonableness comprises an overarching 
basis for review, incorporating at least some of the traditionally procedural grounds 
therefore.
1004
 Of associated import is the judgment’s implicit directive that reasonableness 
may remedy procedural deficiencies in awards.
1005
 
 
To this end, the validity of the SCA’s stance is again arguable on several fronts. First, both 
the LAC and the CC have confirmed the continued status of section 145.
1006
 While in certain 
cases, the nature of the contended grounds for review may fall within the scope of 
reasonableness
1007
 this will not be true of all matters. Inappropriate admissions of hearsay 
evidence, for one, will not necessarily relate to the reasonableness of an award’s outcome.1008 
Still, they may affect parties’ rights to procedural fairness. As such, where the grounds 
alleged by the applicant on review do not fit comfortably under the broad header of 
unreasonableness, the suitability of the Court’s approach in Edcon is doubtful. 
 
                                                          
999
 Compare section 24 of the interim Constitution with section 33 of the Constitution. 
1000
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 30. 
1001
 That there was no evidence of a breakdown in the trust relationship between the parties. 
1002
 Edcon paras 23-24. 
1003
 Ibid para 23. Similarly, in Clarence, the LAC upheld the Commissioner’s decision despite the 
Commissioner’s failure to resolve the matter in a rational manner; Clarence paras 26 & 41. Note that 
commissioners are obliged to apply the laws of evidence when resolving disputes; Transnet Freight Rail para 16; 
NUM & others v CCMA & others [2010] 6 BLLR 681 (LC) para 23 (‘NUM’). For an overview of the principles 
of hearsay evidence in this context, consult Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) paras 35-37.   
1004
 For challenges to this view, see Le Roux and Young at 30 and Du Toit (2010) at 4-6 & 8. 
1005
 The LAC’s decision in Clarence has comparable implications; Clarence paras 26 - 41. 
1006
 Fidelity para 101; Sidumo paras 164-165, read with Du Toit’s comments thereon; Du Toit (2010) at 5-6. 
Compare too Tao Ying paras 62-76; SAMWU paras 9, 10, 18 & 27 and Pam Golding.  
1007
 Examples include failing to take relevant considerations into account or considering irrelevant factors. 
1008
 Value Logistics paras 53-54.  
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Secondly, the approach defeats the functions of judicial review. Review is concerned not only 
with reasonableness but also with promoting accountability and competency in administrative 
decision-making.
1009
 By means of review, the quality of future decisions may be enhanced. 
Concurrently, lawfulness and procedural fairness are preserved.
1010
 Thus, paying nominal 
regard to commissioners’ procedural obligations during arbitration proceedings abrogates an 
essential tenet of review. As alluded to above, should procedurally defective awards be 
upheld on account of their substantive reasonableness, parties’ rights to procedural fairness 
may be thwarted.
1011
  Favouring substance over procedure as the Court in Edcon did, may 
similarly flout the right to fair labour practices. Reasonableness should therefore not be seen 
as a resolutive test, capable of absolving awards of procedural irregularities.
1012
 On the 
contrary, the status of procedural defects as legitimate bases for review must be 
maintained.
1013
  
 
Linked to the difficulties posed by Edcon are the problems revealed by Clarence v The 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service.
1014
 When conducting the review 
in Clarence, the LAC criticised the Commissioner’s award extensively, primarily on the basis 
of his inadequate appraisal of relevant criminal law principles before finding the dismissal 
unfair. Specifically, the Court recorded that the Commissioner had failed to: 
 
‘[C]onsider the crucial issue of private defence with the particularity which was 
required. The arbitrator seems to have arrived at his conclusion by accepting the 
version of the appellant who emphasized his subjective appreciation of the situation. 
This is not a rational way of deciding the issue. It was in the circumstances 
unreasonable for the arbitrator to have reached the decision which he did.’1015  
 
Whether the LAC deemed the Commissioner’s irrational approach or his neglect of specified 
principles the primary reason for interfering with his findings is unclear. Its vague references 
to ‘rationality’ are equally confusing. Notwithstanding the narrow scope of reviewing courts’ 
                                                          
1009
 Ray-Howett at 1628-1634; Cheetham; Garbers (2008) at 86 & 87; Sidumo para 138; section 33, read with 
section 195(1), of the Constitution.  
1010
 Consider, in this regard, Du Toit (2010) at 9. 
1011
 Ray-Howett 1630-1632; Tao Ying para 131; section 33 of the Constitution. 
1012
 For confirmation of the need to retain both procedural and substantive review, see SAMWU para 11 and 
Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 17. In Landman’s words: ‘…the issue of deference will not arise where 
imperative procedural issues have not been observed. This includes the rules of natural justice to the extent that 
they are applicable. The CCMA commissioner must be impartial and independent…’; Landman at 1618. 
1013
 For implicit affirmation of this approach, note Maepe para 22 and Tao Ying paras 76 & 150. See too 
Myburgh (2009) at 18. 
1014
 Clarence v The National Commissioner of the SA Police Service (2011) 32 ILJ 2927 (LAC). 
1015
 Ibid para 26. 
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authority, the Court determined the matter afresh. It began with the charges levelled against 
the employee, addressing complex principles of criminal law – in a highly technical and 
legalistic manner – in the process.1016 It concluded that the employee’s guilt had not been 
proven on a balance of probabilities.
1017
 In turn, despite the Commissioner’s failure to resolve 
the dispute in a ‘rational way’,1018 or to refer to purportedly relevant law, his award was 
upheld.
1019
 
 
Ambiguous references to rationality aside, the Court’s attitude in Clarence is both 
theoretically and practically questionable.  First, the LAC neglected the significance of 
context in review proceedings; in so doing, it disregarded the very nature of labour dispute 
resolution. CCMA commissioners are expressly obliged to resolve disputes on the basis of 
fairness,
1020
 in an informal and accessible way.
1021
 Consequently, the role of technical legal 
considerations in CCMA arbitrations is limited and generally confined to the field of labour 
law. It is for this reason that commissioners are not required to have legal training beyond 
this specialist sphere. Moreover, parties to proceedings are often unrepresented and 
commissioners usually receive little legal assistance as a result.
1022
 In most cases, reference to 
the Codes of Good Practice, as informed by common law principles, is sufficient to determine 
disputes fairly. Demanding thorough knowledge and consideration of law outside of this 
realm would render the requirement to issue awards within 14 days near impossible for 
commissioners.
1023
 Commissioners may further become obsessed with legal precision in their 
findings, impairing the intended efficiency and informality of the labour dispute resolution 
system.
1024
 Finally, demanding legal perfection would result in comparable difficulties for 
employers, who cannot fairly be expected to unravel complex legal issues before dismissing 
                                                          
1016
 Ibid paras 15-26. 
1017
 Ibid paras 27-41. 
1018
 Ibid para 26. 
1019
 Ibid para 41. 
1020
 In Chirwa, the CC confirmed the significance of fairness and equity to resolving labour disputes; Chirwa  
para 42. 
1021
 Section 138(10) of the LRA. Of assistance to commissioners when doing so are the various Codes of Good 
Practice (as discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis) and the Guidelines. 
1022
 Rule 25 of the Rules for the conduct of proceedings before the CCMA GNR 1448 GG 25515 of 10 October 
2003 (‘the CCMA Rules’), read with Venter & Levy at 36; the authors note there that in 66% of arbitrations 
conducted by the CCMA between 2008 and 2010, neither party had any form of representation. Recall, however, 
that the Rule has recently been declared unconstitutional; Law Society of the Northern Provinces. 
1023
 Section 138(7)(a) of the LRA. 
1024
 Sections 1(d)(iv) and 138 of the LRA; the Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319. Consider too Quinot at 
442. 
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employees.
1025
 The impact on the LRA’s labour dispute resolution processes may therefore 
be severe.  
 
Practical problems exist too. Labour Court judges, while possessed of greater legal expertise 
generally, lack many of the advantages of CCMA commissioners when determining disputes. 
First, they do not benefit from hearing parties’ testimonies first-hand during review 
proceedings. Frequently too, reviewing courts do not have complete records of the 
arbitrations proceedings in question. The courts’ ability to draw accurate inferences about 
witness credibility and the extent of the damage to the parties’ relationship1026 is accordingly 
constrained. Secondly, they do not engage with employers and employees on a daily basis as 
commissioners do. Such grassroots experience enhances commissioners’ proficiency to 
decide disputes consistently with the norms of labour law, fairness and equity.
1027
 
 
These norms attest to the limited role of technical legal principles in arbitration proceedings. 
Any advantage attributable to the courts in this regard is consequently narrow. As a result, 
commissioners are often better equipped to resolve disputes fairly than reviewing courts. 
Thus, interference to the extent engaged in by the LAC in Clarence is unfortunate. Ironically 
too, such extensive intrusion has the potential to jeopardise rather than protect parties’ rights 
to fair labour practices.
1028
 It similarly contravenes legislative intent. As such, courts should 
refrain from usurping commissioners’ functions in this way. 
 
Of course, despite the difficulties both Clarence and Edcon raise, devising reasonableness as 
a resolutive test may promote the efficiency of labour dispute resolution. Were courts 
permitted to ignore procedural defects on account of reasonableness in outcome alone, 
disputes could be finalized more quickly. The loss to parties’ rights to fair procedures1029 
cannot, however, be so easily condoned.
1030
 Given the inferior position of reviewing courts to 
                                                          
1025
 Without legal advice at least. 
1026
 Amongst other things. 
1027
 See Sopelog at 97B-E and Fergus & Rycroft. 
1028
 Remembering that commissioners are principally responsible for determining disputes for good reason; 
Sidumo para 119. 
1029
 And sometimes lawfulness too. 
1030
 To justify the violation, a full ‘section 36 analysis’ would be required; section 36 of the Constitution; Du Toit 
(2010) at 9. 
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that of commissioners,
1031
 prizing their assessments of reasonableness is even less 
appropriate.
1032
  
 
Nonetheless, in certain instances, the applicant’s purportedly procedural grounds of review 
may fall within the broad ambit of reasonableness.
1033
 Declaring an award reasonable without 
examining all of the contended grounds for review, may then be apt. Yet, in order to apply 
this approach effectively and consistently, clarity on the boundary between procedural defects 
unrelated to reasonableness and those within the standard’s scope must be obtained. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In Sidumo, the CC reformulated the substantive component of review previously described in 
Carephone. Rather than questioning the rational justifiability of the connections made by 
commissioners, the revised test assesses whether awards are ones which reasonable decision-
makers could reach. The test is substantive in nature and entails value judgments as to 
whether the relevant commissioner has reached a reasonable conclusion.
1034
 Importantly, the 
requisite standard for review is unreasonableness; gross unreasonableness need not be 
established. While the Sidumo test permits intensive scrutiny of the merits of disputes,
1035
 the 
standard simultaneously emphasizes that deference is due to commissioners’ findings. 
Deference is crucial to upholding the proper SOP between the executive, legislature and 
judiciary and espouses the distinction between appeals and reviews. In turn, reviewing courts 
must recall that more than one reasonable outcome may exist in any given case. Related to 
this principle is that reasonableness does not equate to correctness.
1036
 Augmenting these 
aspects of reasonableness is the context in which CCMA arbitrations are conducted.
1037
 That 
context is depicted in the Constitutional right to fair labour practices, read with the 
                                                          
1031
 As detailed above. 
1032
 Consider SAMWU para 11; Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 17 and Landman at 1618. 
1033
 Refer, in this regard, to De Ville’s depictions of reasonableness and grounds related thereto; De Ville (2005) 
at 213-214; see also Plasket at 363; Myburgh (2009); Myburgh (2010) and Myburgh (2011). 
1034
 Hutchinson (2009) at 79-80. 
1035
 Garbers (2008) at 85; Ray-Howett at 1632-1633. 
1036
 As Hoexter suggests: ‘…the ordinary dictionary meaning of reasonable – in accordance with reason or 
within the limits of reason – suggests an area of legitimate diversity, a space within which various reasonable 
choices may be made. It does not suggest that a decision is reasonable only when it is correct or perfect in the 
court’s eyes…To require less than reasonableness so defined would be to allow capricious decision-making. To 
require more – to require correctness or perfection – would be to allow the courts to substitute their own views 
for those of the administrator…’; Hoexter (2007) at 313. 
1037
 Sidumo para 118. 
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framework for labour dispute resolution provided for in the LRA.
1038
 Together they portray 
an informal, flexible, efficient, accessible, and cost effective system for resolving disputes 
which warrants judicial interference with the finality of awards in only limited 
circumstances.
1039
 Generally speaking, the dispute resolution mechanisms devised by the Act 
are better suited to protecting the right to fair labour practices than traditional court processes. 
They are therefore deserving of respect on review. 
 
These features of reasonableness have been repeatedly confirmed by the courts and are 
largely uncontroversial. The Constitutional foundations of reasonableness and the values 
underpinning it are comparably so. Foremost of these is the right to just administrative action, 
which requires administrative conduct to be reasonable, lawful and procedurally fair.
1040
 
Supporting this right are the Constitutional norms of accountability, transparency and 
openness in the public administration.
1041
 Coupled with the right to just administrative action, 
these values ensure that the rule of law is maintained.
1042
 In addition, they foster 
improvement in future administrative decision-making, divulging a key function of judicial 
review. Suitably balancing these considerations with the need for deference is the challenge 
reviewing courts face. Ultimately, it is the interplay between these factors which designates 
the scope of the reasonableness test.  
 
The CC has frequently stated that Constitutional rights must be interpreted harmoniously with 
another wherever possible.
1043
 As such, the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action should not be seen as contradictory. Instead, they ought to be construed 
as mutually supportive. Arguably, the most fitting construction of their relationship is that the 
right to just administrative action protects the right to fair labour practices. If read in this way, 
no conflict need arise between these rights.
1044
  
 
                                                          
1038
 Section 1(d) of the LRA and section 23 of the Constitution. 
1039
 In this way, the right to just administrative action is balanced with the right to fair labour practices; Sidumo 
para 110. This is consistent with the contextual approach to applying the reasonableness standard; De Ville 
(2005) at 212; FAWU. 
1040
 Section 33 of the Constitution; Sidumo para 88. 
1041
 Sections 1 and 195 of the Constitution. 
1042
 Cape Bar Council paras 25-26; Carephone para 9; Fedsure para 58; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 33.  
1043
 Rens at 1222-1223; De Ville (2005) at 80 and Mhlungu. Consider too Sidumo para 112. For Constitutional 
interpretation generally, see Du Plessis (2002) at 133-144. 
1044
 Recall Navsa AJ’s comments in Sidumo as discussed above; Sidumo para 110. 
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Whereas the Court in Sidumo articulated these principles, values and rights, it failed to 
provide a pragmatic sense as to when decisions would be unreasonable. Nor did it indicate 
how deference should be shown in practice. As a result, reviewing courts have found 
themselves with only theoretical guidelines as to the standard’s daily application. Confusion 
and inconsistency in judicial attitudes to the standard consequently persist.
1045
 Additional 
difficulties have similarly surfaced.  
 
The controversy centres around three principal issues. First, the relationship between section 
145 and reasonableness, and specifically whether they exist independently of one another, is 
unclear.
1046
 Linked to this, whether the grounds provided for in section 145 of the LRA 
endure as legitimate bases for review has been questioned. The overlap between gross 
irregularities and reasonableness partly resolves these issues but the boundary between these 
grounds remains obscure. Further related to these problems, is uncertainty about the courts’ 
formulation of reasonableness as comprising both procedural and substantive elements. 
Seemingly, while adequate reasons are necessary to sustain awards, a satisfactory reasoning 
process may not always be.
1047
 Secondly, the distinction between the Carephone and Sidumo 
tests, as well as the continued role (if any) of the former during review proceedings requires 
clarification. The meaning of the term ‘reasonable’ and its association (or equivalence) with 
rationality and justifiability is equally indeterminate. Finally, whether reasonableness has 
extended or limited the scope of review is in doubt. Without clarity on these issues and 
particularly the confines of reasonableness review, the distinction between appeal and review 
may be lost, legislative intent scuppered, and ultimately parties’ Constitutional rights 
threatened.  
 
Fortunately, with reference to judicial authority and the Constitution, some of these questions 
may be answered. First, despite occasional judgments to the contrary,
1048
 the continued 
viability of section 145 is plain. Not only has this principle been verified by the Labour 
Courts, but it is palpable in the Constitution’s definition of the right to just administrative 
                                                          
1045
 Nicola Smit ‘When is dismissal an appropriate sanction and when should a court set aside an arbitration 
award? Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC)’ (2008) 29 
ILJ 1635 at 1646. 
1046
 In some instances, courts have disregarded the section 145 grounds altogether while in others they have 
relied exclusively on statutory grounds. Compare, for example, Kievits Kroon (LC) and Edcon with Maepe. For 
further discussion of the issue, see Du Toit (2010). 
1047
 Consider Edcon, Clarence and Joseph. 
1048
 See Kievits Kroon (LC), for example. 
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action. That definition envisages the right as protective not only of reasonableness,
1049
 but 
also of procedural fairness and lawfulness in administrative decision-making. Evidently, the 
drafters of the Constitution saw a role for lawfulness and procedural fairness distinct from 
that which reasonableness plays. As the section 145 grounds were cast in a procedural light 
with lawfulness in mind, their enduring relevance lies in protecting the aspects of the right to 
administrative justice aside from reasonableness.
1050
 The Constitutional values of 
accountability, transparency and openness endorse the significance of section 145 and its 
potential to guide commissioners in subsequent disputes too.
1051
  
 
Secondly, subject to the provisos discussed more fully in the text,
1052
 section 145’s suffusion 
with reasonableness has extended rather than restricted the permissible ambit of review. Once 
more, the proposition is supported by the Constitutional values associated with administrative 
action and the history of the distinctions between the interim and final Constitutions’ 
formulations of section 33.
1053
 The submission that reasonableness has expanded judicial 
power is nonetheless subject to an important rider - the CC’s abandonment in Sidumo of the 
reasonable employer test.
1054
 The effect of the test’s rejection was to broaden the scope of 
commissioners’ discretionary powers to determine the fairness of employers’ sanctions. In so 
doing, the probability of finding a commissioner’s determination on sanction defective was 
reduced. As this did not result from the reasonableness standard itself but was due to the 
Court’s disavowal of the reasonable employer test, it is misleading to style the reasonableness 
standard as a restrictive one.
1055
 
 
Returning to the difficulties cited above, the first concerns the proper exchange between 
reasonableness and section 145 and whether the defects provided for in the latter apply 
autonomously of the former. Courts regularly establish unreasonableness with reference to 
specific defects in section 145.
1056
 There are several problems with this approach. For one, 
requiring evidence of a statutory defect to found unreasonableness fudges the procedural 
                                                          
1049
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
1050
 It may logically be inferred from Carephone and Sidumo that both Courts deemed section 145 of the LRA 
adequately protective of parties’ rights to procedural fairness and lawfulness already. 
1051
 Note Cheetham para 6 and the functions of judicial review described above. 
1052
 For contrary views, consult Shoprite Checkers 1 para 19; Cheetham para 6; Grogan (2008) at 3; Garbers 
(2008) at 85; Grogan (2007) at 22. 
1053
 Corder in van Wyk et al (1994) at 398.   
1054
 Sidumo para 79. 
1055
 Garbers (2008) at 81 & 84-85. 
1056
 Examples include Ellerine Holdings, Transnet Freight Rail and Tao Ying. 
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essence of section 145 with the substantive character of the Sidumo enquiry.
1057
 While, in 
some instances, the result of merging the two may be no different to applying them 
separately, this is by no means true of all cases.
1058
 Given section 145’s import in upholding 
the facets of the right to administrative justice distinct from reasonableness, acknowledging 
section 145 as an independent basis for review could remedy the issue.
1059
 On account of the 
inevitable interplay between gross irregularities and reasonableness,
1060
 however, doing so 
may not always be appropriate. Certainty on the boundaries between these grounds and 
reasonableness is accordingly needed.  
 
Contributing to this, whether awards which are substantively reasonable but which disclose 
procedural defects in reasoning process, are susceptible to review, is uncertain.
1061
 In light of 
the need for efficiency, it might be contended that awards within this category should not be 
set aside on review. Yet, section 33’s assurances of procedural fairness and lawfulness (and 
its supporting values of accountability, transparency and openness) point to the contrary. The 
supervisory function of judicial review in rectifying deficient administrative action equally 
connotes this.
1062
 Aggravating the debate are judicial depictions of reasonableness as 
encompassing both procedural and substantive elements. These depictions are not entirely 
inappropriate
1063
 but they contradict the notion of reasonableness as an outcomes based 
enquiry. To solve these controversies, the impact of procedural irregularities on the 
substantive reasonableness of awards requires explanation. Once more, identifying the 
grounds of review which fall within the standard’s reach and those which do not would assist. 
                                                          
1057
 Sidumo para 106 and Carephone para 25. 
1058
 Consider Edcon and the discussion on the admission of hearsay evidence above. 
1059
 Myburgh argues that reasonableness may also be an independent ground for review; Myburgh (2010) at 22-
23. Compare this, however, to Myburgh (2011), in which Myburgh ostensibly expressed a contrary view. See 
also Du Toit (2010) at 7-9; Le Roux & Young at 30; Botma & van der Walt (Part 2) at 535 & 541 and Toyota SA 
Motors. The difficulties with asserting that reasonableness is an entirely autonomous enquiry are twofold. First, 
the CC introduced the standard during the process of interpreting section 145 of the LRA. When doing so, it did 
not order that an amendment to the Act be made. Nor did it suggest that it was ‘reading in’ the ground of review 
of substantive unreasonableness. Thus, whether the standard can be cast independently of section 145 is 
questionable. Secondly, the overlaps between certain grounds of review and reasonableness make it difficult to 
explain the standard’s purported autonomy; New Clicks para 511. Nevertheless, in practice, courts sometimes 
apply the standard independently of the Act and sometimes not.  
1060
 There is a comparable overlap between excess of powers and reasonableness. Consider, in particular, Tao 
Ying; Carephone; Ellerine Holdings. 
1061
 See Edcon and Clarence and the discussion thereof above. 
1062
 Jowell (2006); De Ville (2005) at 30; Solomon paras 19 & 21. 
1063
 New Clicks para 511; Plasket at 363; Anglo Platinum (2010) (LC) as discussed in Myburgh (Paper presented 
at the 2011 CCMA Commissioners Indaba); Afrox Healthcare para 21; Value Logistics para 46; Pam Golding 
para 5. 
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The relationship (if any) between adequate reasons and adequate reasoning processes and the 
continued validity of each, would benefit from explication too.  
 
The contention around the meaning of reasonableness, its relationship with rationality and 
justifiability (or both) and its stated dual components, poses additional difficulties. While 
rationality has been recognized in the administrative sphere as comprising only one facet of 
reasonableness,
1064
 the Labour Courts have not consistently followed this approach.
1065
 In its 
stead, courts sometimes use the terms interchangeably and sometimes distinctively, with no 
indication of their reasons therefore.
1066
 Nor have the courts agreed upon the continued 
functionality (if at all) of the Carephone standard.
1067
 Answers are needed in these areas. 
 
Finally, maintaining the distinction between appeal and review when applying the 
reasonableness standard has proven tricky. Whereas the significance of the distinction in 
itself is debatable,
1068
 demarcating the confines of permissible judicial interference with 
administrative action in the labour sphere
1069
 is vital. In so far as the distinction describes the 
need to do so, the label is valid; thus, taking cognisance of it is worthwhile. Regrettably, 
precisely how reviewing courts should give effect to the distinction remains elusive. At the 
very least, references to the ‘correctness’ or ‘incorrectness’ of commissioners’ findings or 
awards should be avoided on review. 
 
In an attempt at resolving these issues and delineating the breadth of reviewing courts’ 
powers more clearly, chapter 4 examines contextual considerations associated with 
reasonableness in the labour arena. Thereafter, the meanings attributed to the standard in 
South African administrative law are appraised. In the process, the backdrop for devising a 
contextually appropriate, but nevertheless pragmatic test for review is set.
1070
  
  
                                                          
1064
 The CC has further repeatedly acknowledged that the concepts are distinct; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
para 85; see too Hoexter (2007) at 306-309; Pillay at 425-429. 
1065
 In Edcon, the SCA suggested that the only change introduced by the reasonableness test was the precise 
wording used in Sidumo; Edcon para 16. By implication, rational justifiability is conceptually equivalent to 
reasonableness.  
1066
 Compare, for example, Carephone para 37; Shoprite Checkers 1 para 23; Bato Star para 43 and Tao Ying 
paras 149-150. 
1067
 Compare Bestel, Fidelity, Tao Ying, Edcon and Ellerine Holdings and the critique thereof above. 
1068
 Fergus (2010). 
1069
 Or, for that matter, legislative and executive conduct. 
1070
 Whether a viable test for reasonableness may be derived from the appraisal of South African authorities, 
however, remains in doubt. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD CLARIFIED? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
While many courts seem unconcerned about the inconsistency with which the reasonableness 
standard has been applied in practice,
1071
 the precise confines of it remain elusive.
1072
 Given 
the implications of construing reviewing courts’ powers too generously and the need for legal 
certainty,
1073
 it is crucial that clarity and coherence be established. In seeking to delineate the 
nature and extent of permissible review in the aftermath of Sidumo & another v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd & others,
1074
 this chapter will first confirm the principles of 
reasonableness which are certain. Thereafter, contextual considerations relevant to 
formulating a succinct, reliable and pragmatic test will be addressed.  
 
It is anticipated, nonetheless, that while useful as a backdrop, these factors complicate the 
issue beyond accessible reach. In order to promote a consistent approach to reasonableness, a 
more tangible definition is necessary. The meaning ascribed to ‘reasonableness’ in South 
African administrative law will therefore be discussed, with specific reference to rationality, 
justifiability and proportionality. So too will the Labour and Labour Appeal Courts’ (‘LC’ 
and ‘LAC’ respectively) attempts at delineating review be appraised.  
 
                                                          
1071
 Note, however, Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] 11 BLLR 1128 (LC) where 
the Court acknowledged the uncertainty surrounding reasonableness; Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 13. See 
too Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 1789 (LAC); Anton Myburgh The LAC’s latest trilogy of review 
judgments: Is the Sidumo test in decline? Paper presented at the SASLAW Gauteng Chapter Seminar, Cliffe 
Dekker Hofmeyr Inc, Johannesburg (24 July 2012). 
1072
 C Garbers ‘Reviewing CCMA awards in the aftermath of Sidumo’ (2008) 17(9) Contemporary Labour Law 
84 at 84; PAK Le Roux & K Young ‘The role of reasonableness in dismissal: the Constitutional Court looks at 
who has the final say’ (2007) 17(3) Contemporary Labour Law 21 at 30. This is apparent from the diverse and 
often contradictory approaches of the courts to applying the reasonableness test. Compare, for example, Foschini 
Group v Maidi & others [2010] 7 BLLR 689 (LAC) with State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (2008) 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC) (‘SITA’).  
1073
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] JOL 23356 (SCA) (‘Shoprite Checkers 3’) para 31; 
the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA (1995) 16 ILJ 278 (‘the Explanatory Memorandum’). In the absence 
of certainty, neither workers nor employers may reliably identify their rights and obligations within the 
employment relationship. Equality and fairness in outcome and procedure are simultaneously threatened; 
consider J-M Servais ‘Labour conflicts, courts and social policy’ in R Blanpain (ed) Labour law, human rights 
and social policy (2001) 75 at 77. 
1074
 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
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Having done so, it is resolved that despite the value of academic and judicial descriptions of 
the concept, concrete definitions should be treated cautiously. Reasonableness is contextually 
dependent
1075
 and a measure of flexibility must inevitably be tolerated, regardless of the 
challenges it poses to certainty and coherence.
1076
 As a result, a balance between contextual 
variability and legal certainty must be struck. 
 
Finally, in concluding this chapter, it is argued that an approach to reasonableness less 
cumbersome than that mandated by Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism and others,
1077
 is vital to realising that balance consistently. Currently, 
no such approach exists in South African law. Fortunately, however, Canadian law offers a 
suitable alternative.
1078
 A discussion of the Canadian model is reserved for the final chapter 
of this thesis. 
 
2. DISCERNIBLE FEATURES OF REASONABLENESS 
 
In the preceding chapter, it was concluded that certain principles of reasonableness are 
theoretically clear. In addition, submissions were made in relation to particular areas of 
concern. What follows is a brief overview of these principles and contentions, setting the 
groundwork for the subsequent assessment of contextual considerations relevant to 
reasonableness. 
 
2.1 The foundations of the reasonableness enquiry  
 
First, the underlying basis for introducing reasonableness is evident. By suffusing section 
145
1079
 with the standard, the Constitutional Court (‘CC’) in Sidumo sought to give effect to 
section 33 of the Constitution.
1080
 CCMA arbitrations constitute administrative action and 
commissioners are accordingly subject to the imperatives imposed on administrators by 
section 33 of the Constitution. In turn, arbitrations are to be conducted lawfully, reasonably 
                                                          
1075
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 
(CC) paras 41 & 54; Sidumo para 118; Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) at 321; JR De 
Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa revised 1 ed (2005) at 211.  
1076
 Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetham & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 306 (LAC) para 6. 
1077
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 
(CC). 
1078
 Consult the discussion of Canadian law in chapter 6; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 para 64.  
1079
 Section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’ or ‘the Act’). 
1080
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’); Sidumo para 110. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
153 
 
and procedurally fairly.
1081
 Where commissioners fail to comply with these constraints, 
parties’ rights to just administrative action are threatened and resultant awards may be 
overturned.
1082
  
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the Court in Sidumo held that review for unreasonableness would 
give effect to the right to fair labour practices.
1083
 The implications of this remark are 
ambiguous. Rather than inferring that reasonableness alone offered adequate protection to 
parties’ rights, a more logical construction of the CC’s comment in this regard is that it 
merely confirms the supportive role which the right to administrative justice plays in 
protecting parties’ rights to fair labour practices.1084  
 
2.2   The test applicable 
 
The second clear aspect of the reasonableness enquiry is its formulation. The applicable test 
is that articulated by the CC in Bato Star.
1085
 Given its pertinence to this paper, the test is 
worth repeating: 
 
‘Is the decision reached by the Commissioner one that a reasonable decision-maker 
could not reach?’1086 
 
To be subject to review on the basis of this test, decisions need not be grossly or egregiously 
unreasonable – they need simply be unreasonable.1087  
                                                          
1081
 Sidumo para 89; CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) para 121. 
1082
 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) paras 24-32; Sidumo para 105. 
1083
 Sidumo para 110. 
1084
 The CC’s comments in this regard were analysed in the previous chapter and are therefore not recounted 
here. 
1085
 Sidumo para 110; Bato Star para 44; see too section 6(2)(h) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 (‘PAJA’) from which this standard was drawn. 
1086
 Sidumo para 110; Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC) paras 
92-97. Note Super Group Autoparts t/a Autozone v Hlongwane NO & others (2010) 31 ILJ 1248 (LC), where the 
Judge explained the test as follows:  
‘It seems to me the proper approach is to ask not whether the commissioner’s decision is one that a 
reasonable court (or reasonable decision-maker) could not reach but rather whether in light of the 
evidence advanced and having due regard to considerations of equity (after all, the Labour Court is 
primarily an equity court), the commissioner’s decision is one that can properly be said to be 
reasonable. Thus phrased, the standard avoids a review enquiry that leads inexorably to entanglements 
in appeal territory…’; Super Group para 10.  
1087
 This may be inferred from Bato Star; Hoexter (2007) at 314-315. See too Fidelity para 99. Compare this to 
Conradie JA’s judgment in County Fair Foods (Pty Ltd v CCMA & others [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC), where 
the Judge argued that review for irrationality (or unjustifiability) required that the challenged award induces a 
sense of shock or makes the court ‘whistle’. Consider too Cora Hoexter ‘The future of judicial review in South 
African administrative law’ (2000) 117(3) SALJ 484. 
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2.3   Reasonableness as a substantive enquiry 
 
Thirdly, the standard has added a substantive dimension to section 145 proceedings.
1088
 To 
this extent, the scope of reviewing courts’ powers has been extended1089 to permit 
investigations into the reasonableness of commissioners’ findings.1090 Determining 
reasonableness in outcome entails a value judgment.
1091
 However, while reviewing courts 
may scrutinise the merits of impugned decisions, they are limited to doing so for the purposes 
of ascertaining reasonableness. Courts must refrain from substituting their preferred findings 
for those of commissioners.
1092
 
 
The standard has at times been asserted as comprising both procedural and substantive 
elements.
1093
 In so far as unreasonableness overlaps with gross irregularities, the dual 
components of reasonableness must be acknowledged.
1094
 Still, as contended earlier, devising 
the test in this way poses several difficulties. It further contributes little to the principles of 
review applicable in the pre-Sidumo era.
1095
 As such, its value is doubtful. Understanding 
                                                          
1088
 Sidumo paras 108-110; Carephone para 38. 
1089
 Compare the current test to the Carephone standard, read with the procedural grounds listed in section 145 of 
the LRA; Carephone para 38; Sidumo paras 108-110; Grant Ray-Howett ‘Is it reasonable for CCMA 
commissioners to act irrationally?’ (2008) 29 ILJ 1619. For an alternative view, see Carli Botma & Adriaan van 
der Walt ‘The role of reasonableness in the review of labour arbitration awards (Part 2)’ 2009 Obiter 530 at 561-
562; note too Mutual Construction Co Tvl (Pty) Ltd v Ntombela NO & others (2010) 31 ILJ 901 (LAC) where 
the Court criticised the LC’s approach to reasonableness review as too narrow. 
1090
 Fidelity paras 92-101; Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] JOL 22087 (LAC) at 10-11. 
1091
 Carephone paras 32-37; Sidumo paras 105-110; Fidelity paras 92-101. 
1092
 Carephone paras 32-37; Sidumo para 41; Fidelity paras 92-101. 
1093
 Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 14; Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others [2011] 4 
BLLR 404 (LC) para 11; Anton Myburgh ‘Determining and reviewing sanction after Sidumo’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1 at 
16; Pam Golding Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus & others (2010) 31 ILJ 1460 (LC) para 8; Parmalat SA (Pty) 
Ltd v CCMA & others (LC) unreported case no C486/10 of 2 December 2011 paras 14-16; Anton Myburgh 
‘Sidumo v Rustplats: How have the courts dealt with it?’ (2009) 30 ILJ 1 at 19; Calvin William Sharpe 
‘Reviewing CCMA arbitration awards: Towards clarity in the Labour Courts’ (2000) 21 ILJ 2160 at 2174; B 
Grant ‘The review of arbitration awards in terms of the Labour Relations Act’ (1999) 2 Stell LR 251 at 255-256. 
For an instructive discussion of the distinction between procedural and substantive irregularities in the context of 
the Carephone test, consult Solomon v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others (1999) 
20 ILJ  2960 (LC) paras 19 & 21.    
1094
 For the overlap between gross irregularities and unreasonableness, see Minister of Health & another v New 
Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd & others (Treatment Action Campaign & another as amici curiae) 2006 (2) SA 
311 (CC) para 511; Clive Plasket The Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action: Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in the Democratic South Africa (PhD Thesis, Rhodes University, 2002)  at 363; Anglo 
Platinum Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 25372 (LC); Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation & Arbitration & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 1381 (LAC) para 21. For the procedural grounds of review 
which are similar to reasonableness, refer to Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2552 (LC) 
para 46; Kaefer Insulation (Pty) Ltd v President of the Industrial Court & others (1998) 19 ILJ 567 (LAC) para 
21 and Standard Bank of Bophuthututswana Ltd v Reynolds NO & others (1995) 16 ILJ 1380 (BG) at 1397.  
1095
 Or even the pre-Carephone era. 
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reasonableness as only substantive in nature
1096
 offers one means of resolving this difficulty. 
Yet, as this construction neglects the inescapable interplay between certain procedural 
grounds and unreasonableness, it is not ideal.
1097
 A more legitimate explanation of the dual 
features of reasonableness and the procedural grounds associated with it would be 
preferable.
1098
  
 
2.4   The relationship between reasonableness and correctness 
 
The fourth uncontroversial feature of reasonableness is that it does not equate to 
‘correctness’.1099 On the contrary, reasonableness presupposes that a range of acceptable 
outcomes exists in respect of any given dispute. Purely because an award is unsatisfactory in 
certain respects does not necessarily imply that it is unreasonable.
1100
 The legislature has 
given the decision-making power to commissioners rather than the courts and the doctrine of 
the separation of powers (‘SOP’) demands that its intentions be respected.1101 Consequently, 
while careful scrutiny is fitting, courts should not be overzealous in setting CCMA awards 
aside.
1102
 A measure of deference is due to their findings. 
 
                                                          
1096
 And thus focused on outcomes rather than procedures. The formulation suggests that the standard operates 
independently of the statutory grounds. For var ing opinions on the subject, consult Le Roux & Young at 30; 
Darcy Du Toit Reviewing CCMA arbitration awards: Has section 145 become academic? Paper presented at the 
13
th
 Annual SASLAW Conference, Vineyard Hotel, Cape Town (22 October 2010) at 7-9; Toyota SA Motors 
(Pty) Ltd v Radebe & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC) paras 33 & 40 and Garbers (2008). 
1097
 For illustrations of this interplay, consider Ellerine Holdings at 14; Sasol Mining paras 11-13; Tao Ying para 
134 and Myburgh (2010) at 16. 
1098
 An alternative approach is proposed in the conclusion to this thesis, read with chapter 6. 
1099
 Carephone paras 32-37; Ellerine Holdings at 10-11; Khanyile v Billiton Aluminium SA Ltd t/a Hillside 
Aluminium (LAC) unreported case no DA24/06 of 24 February 2009 para 34; Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & 
others [2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC) paras 16-17; Bernard Schwartz Lions over the Throne: The Judicial 
Revolution in English Administrative Law (1987) at 133 as cited in Bestel paras 16-17; Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2455 (LAC). Certain courts 
nonetheless continue to use the terms ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ in their assessments of reasonableness; Amazwi 
Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Turnbull [2008] 9 BLLR 817 (LAC) paras 7-21; Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA & others (LAC) unreported case no JA17/2009 of 24 February 2009 paras 39-63. Note too the majority 
decision in Tao Ying; Shoprite Checkers v CCMA & others [2008] 9 BLLR 838 (LAC) (‘Shoprite Checkers 2’) 
and SITA. 
1100
 Ellerine Holdings at 10-11 & 18; Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 48. 
1101
 Sidumo paras 105-110; Tao Ying paras 64-67; Bato Star paras 45-46; Carephone para 35; Engen Petroleum 
Ltd v CCMA & others [2007] 8 BLLR 707 (LAC) para 72. Recall, however, O’Regan J’s remarks in Sidumo 
regarding the doctrine of SOP and the discussion thereof in chapter 3; Sidumo paras 136-137. For this doctrine 
generally, consult Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 305; Hoexter (2007) at 49-54; Cora Hoexter 
with Rosemary Lyster The new Constitutional and administrative law vol 2 (2002) at 186 at 131-134; De Ville 
(2005) at 30; Emma Fergus ‘The distinction between appeals and reviews – Defining the limits of the Labour 
Court’s powers of review’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1556 at 1569-1570. 
1102
 Sidumo paras 105-110 & 178-9; Cheetham para 12; Garbers (2008) 85; Ray-Howett at 1632-33; Fidelity 
paras 98-99. 
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Intrinsically linked to the relationship between reasonableness and correctness is the tenuous, 
but purportedly strict, distinction between appeals and reviews. This distinction has 
traditionally been understood as obliging reviewing courts to defer to administrative 
determinations.
1103
 As argued elsewhere,
1104
 it is debatable whether the distinction (in itself) 
contributes meaningfully to the apposite application of the reasonableness standard.
1105
 
Nonetheless, in so far as it reminds reviewing courts to assess reasonableness and not 
correctness
1106
 and that respect is payable to commissioners’ findings, the distinction is 
useful.
1107
   
 
2.5  The power of reviewing courts to evaluate all evidentiary material before   
commissioners 
 
Fifth, when appraising awards for reasonableness, all evidentiary material presented during 
arbitration proceedings may be evaluated.
1108
 Reviewing courts are therefore not confined to 
assessing only the reasons offered by commissioners for their decisions when determining 
reasonableness.
1109
 Where reasons other than the commissioner’s justify the outcome in 
question, those reasons may also be considered. To this extent, the reasonableness enquiry is 
an objective one.
1110
 
 
2.6  Section 145’s enduring pertinence 
 
Despite the tendency of many courts to disregard alleged grounds for review in favour of 
general assessments of reasonableness, the continued relevance of section 145 has been 
                                                          
1103
 Carephone para 32-37; Sidumo paras 105-110; Fidelity paras 92-101. Note that the candidate has argued 
elsewhere that the distinction between appeals and reviews is somewhat superficial; Fergus (2010). 
1104
 Fergus (2010). 
1105
 Ibid. Nonetheless, the distinction serves as an important reminder to reviewing courts to refrain from 
overzealous interference with commissioners’ awards.  
1106
 Attributing terms such as ‘inescapable’, ‘obvious’ and ‘evident’ to the conclusions which commissioners 
‘ought to have reached’ should equally be avoided. Consult, in this regard, chapter 3, read with CEPPWAWU v 
NBCCI & others [2011] 2 BLLR 137 (LAC) paras 22-23; National Union of Mineworkers & Another v 
Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1618 (SCA) para 7; Amazwi Power Products para 
21; Khanyile (2009) (LAC) para 34 and Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2011] 5 BLLR 451 (LAC) 
para 38. 
1107
 Chapter 3; Bato Star para 48; Cheetham para 6; DM Davis ‘To defer and when? Administrative law and 
Constitutional democracy’ 2006 Acta Juridica 23. 
1108
 Fidelity para 102; Edcon para 16. 
1109
 Sidumo paras 105-110; Fidelity para 102; Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 29. In contrast to the position 
under Carephone; Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others [2006] 11 BLLR 
1021 (SCA) paras 29-31. 
1110
 Fidelity para 102. 
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repeatedly affirmed in theory.
1111
 In most instances, where courts have neglected contentions 
of statutory defects in applicants’ founding papers, the convergence between specific 
statutory grounds and reasonableness explains their attitudes.
1112
 Thus, judicial failures to 
address specific allegations of section 145 defects should not be understood to imply that the 
grounds provided for in the section are no longer valid. On the contrary, while the section’s 
relationship with reasonableness awaits definition, it is clear that the defects listed in section 
145 of the LRA remain viable grounds for review.
1113
  
 
3. REASONABLENESS IN THE CONTEXT OF LABOUR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION  
 
As the CC held in Bato Star, the scope of reasonableness is determinable only with reference 
to contextual considerations relevant to the decision at hand.
1114
 By implication, the standard 
is flexible in nature
1115
 and its appropriate application contextually dependent.
1116
 
Reasonableness will consequently vary from one case to the next. Generally too, the nature of 
reasonableness in section 145 proceedings will differ from that applicable in other 
administrative contexts. Various factors affect the traits of the standard. These were described 
by the Court in Bato Star.
1117
 In addition to them, factors specific to labour dispute resolution 
                                                          
1111
 Ibid para 101; Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 14 & 17; Maepe v CCMA & another [2008] 8 BLLR 723 
(LAC) para 22; Du Toit (2010) at 3. 
1112
 See New Clicks para 511; Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & 
others [1997] 12 BLLR 1632 (LC); Plasket at 363; Anglo Platinum (2010) (LC); Afrox Healthcare para 21; 
Value Logistics para 46; Kaefer Insulation para 21; Standard Bank (1995) (BG) at 1397 and Pam Golding para 
5. 
1113
 Fidelity para 101; Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 14 & 17; Maepe para 22; Transnet Freight Rail v 
Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC). 
1114
 Bato Star paras 41, 44 & 54; Sidumo para 118; De Ville (2005) at 30-31; Hoexter with Lyster (2002) at 66-7; 
Davis (2006) at 32-33; JR De Ville 'The rule of law and judicial review' 2006 Acta Juridica 62 at 63; Hoexter 
(2007) at 315. Consider too Shoprite Checkers 3 para 23. For the ‘ground rules’ relevant to applying 
reasonableness in practice, refer to Catherine O’Regan ‘Breaking ground: Some thoughts on the seismic shift in 
our administrative law’ (2004) 121 SALJ  424 at 435-436. 
1115
 Sidumo para 118; Hoexter (2007) at 321; De Ville (2005) at 211. For an example of the manner in which 
reasonable decisions based on similar facts may vary, compare Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others 
[2008] 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) (‘Shoprite Checkers 1’), Shoprite Checkers 2 and Shoprite Checkers 3  (‘the 
Shoprite Checkers trilogy’) as discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis. For further commentary on these cases, see 
DJ Meyer ‘Comparing apples with pears: Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others and Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA’ (2010) 43(2) De Jure 344. 
1116
 It is argued below that the contextual approach to reasonableness requires two levels of enquiry. The first 
entails an assessment of the Bato Star factors, while the second examines considerations germane to the labour 
and administrative spheres generally. For the pertinence of context and factors relevant thereto, see Sidumo para 
253; Ellerine Holdings at 11; Bato Star para 44; De Ville (2005) at 211-212 and Hoexter (2007) at 318-321. 
1117
 Recall that Bato Star concerned a decision taken outside the labour relations arena and that the review 
proceedings were instituted in terms of PAJA. When delineating reasonableness under section 145 therefore, 
factors unique to CCMA proceedings  must equally be appraised; Garbers (2008) at 86. 
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affect the ambit of reasonableness under section 145. The contextual considerations 
highlighted in Bato Star encompass: 
 
‘The nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range 
of factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the 
competing interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well 
being of those affected.’1118 
 
These criteria are largely unique to individual decision-makers in particular cases. They may 
conveniently be referred to as the first tier of the contextual enquiry into reasonableness. 
More universal considerations (arising primarily from the SOP and broad principles of 
administrative and labour law)
1119
 constitute the second. In spite of their seemingly separate 
foci, the two tiers are inherently related and in many respects overlap. What follows is a 
substantive discussion of both tiers – commencing with the Bato Star factors and ending with 
those pertinent to South African labour dispute resolution generally. By doing so, the 
framework for a practical and reliable test for review is cast. Whether reviewing courts can 
realistically be expected to address each of these factors in every case, however, will be 
questioned.
1120
 
  
3.1 The Bato Star Factors 
 
3.1.1. The nature of the decision  
 
The first of the Bato Star factors is the nature of the decision. CCMA awards are essentially 
adjudicative in nature. They involve identifying relevant facts and law and applying the 
applicable law to the dispute concerned.
1121
 In this way, they strongly resemble judicial 
decisions.
1122
 Given the need for deference to be paid to commissioners’ findings1123 and the 
variable nature of disputes entrusted to them, the scope of reasonableness in individual cases 
                                                          
1118
 Bato Star para 45. 
1119
 Sidumo paras 105-110; Tao Ying paras 64-67; Bato Star paras 45-46; Carephone para 35; Engen Petroleum 
para 72; Sidumo paras 136-137. 
1120
 Given the complexity and number of relevant contextual factors involved, requiring reviewing courts to 
assess each and every one of these factors during section 145 proceedings may be unduly burdensome and may 
ultimately hamper the efficiency of the process. 
1121
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others [2000] 7 BLLR 835 (LC) paras 88-90; Toyota SA 
Motors; Sidumo para 208. 
1122
 Cheetham para 6; Garbers (2008) at 86; Sidumo para 208. 
1123
 Which ensures that reviewing courts do not inappropriately interfere with policy-laden or legislative 
decisions or usurp the functions of the administration; for further discussion of deference, consult chapter 3 and 
the references cited therein. 
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will differ on this basis alone. In practice, this factor may indicate, for example, that where 
complex legal issues arise, the test should be more stringent than where purely factual 
findings are challenged.
1124
 Discretionary determinations might analogously see 
reasonableness assume an altogether different form, somewhere between intrusive and 
reverential review.
1125
 Comparably, where subjective value judgments are involved (rather 
than strict applications of law), the level of intrusion may be lowered.
1126
 
 
The critical role of fairness and equity in resolving labour disputes must nevertheless be 
recognised in all cases.
1127
 These norms direct that strict principles of law are not inevitably 
suited to resolving labour disputes. Commissioners at grassroots level are oft better equipped 
to decide labour disputes than reviewing courts in any event.
1128
 This is primarily due to their 
daily exposure to parties to employment relationships and the evidentiary advantages which 
they enjoy over reviewing courts.
1129
 Accordingly, where these principles have appropriately 
informed commissioners’ findings, scrutiny thereof should be minimised. 
 
Of related import is the content of awards and their impact on parties’ rights.1130 In certain 
jurisdictions, for example, the nature of reasonableness assumes greater breadth where 
decisions affect fundamental human rights.
1131
 Whereas this approach accords with the South 
African Constitution, applying it to section 145 proceedings may be redundant. The right to 
fair labour practices surfaces in all CCMA proceedings.
1132
 Similarly, the right to just 
                                                          
1124
 For commissioners’ errors of law to be set aside on review, proof that the error was material ought 
nonetheless to be required; Hira & another v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) at 90D-E; Hoexter with Lyster (2002) 
at 152-156; Hoexter (2007) at 258-260. For traditional administrative law approaches to reviewing policy-laden 
decisions (as opposed to adjudicative determinations), see De Ville (2005) at 214-216 and Plasket at 339 
onwards.  
1125
 Consider Roman v Williams NO 1998 (1) SA 270 (C) at 283; Lucky Horseshoe (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Mineral and Energy Affairs 1992 (3) SA 838 (T) at 848I-J; Shoprite Checkers 3 para 32 and Myburgh (2010) at 
15-16. Section 193 & 194 of the LRA grant commissioners a wide discretion to determine appropriate or ‘just 
and equitable’ relief; both are examples of discretionary determinations. Other provisions in the Act may, 
however, call for discrete levels of scrutiny; Myburgh (2009) at 4; Hoexter with Lyster (2002) at 154-155; 
Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 12 BLLR 1129 (CC) para 36. 
1126
 For review of value judgments, see Sidumo paras 178-179. 
1127
 Consider sections 1(d), 138 & 151 of the LRA; the Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319; Chirwa v 
Transnet Limited & others [2008] 2 BLLR 97 para 42; CWIU & Others v Sopelog CC (1994) 15 ILJ 90 (LAC) at 
97B-E and Emma Fergus & Alan Rycroft ‘Refining review’ 2012 Acta Juridica 170. 
1128
 Ibid. 
1129
 As tribunals of first instance. 
1130
 Naturally, this may overlap with the assessment of the impact of the decision on the lives of those affected 
by it.   
1131
 Johannes Chan ‘A sliding scale of reasonableness in judicial review’ 2006 Acta Juridica 233 at 236; see too 
UES Local 298 v Bibeault [1988] 2 SCR 1048, where the Supreme Court of Canada applied a ‘correctness’ 
standard of review to a matter involving the Constitutional right to associate. 
1132
 Section 23 of the Constitution. 
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administrative action is germane to all section 145 proceedings.
1133
 Differentiating between 
matters in which Constitutional rights are at stake, and those in which they are not, is 
therefore futile. Whether it would be fitting to permit more intensive review where rights 
other than these two arise, is questionable.
1134
 
 
Intrinsically linked to the aforementioned rights is the impact of the decision on the parties 
themselves. This factor suggests that decisions having dire consequences for one or more of 
the parties ought to be examined more closely than those less far-reaching.
1135
 Again, the 
proposition is best illustrated by an example. Consider an award refusing reinstatement, 
where the relevant employee had committed misconduct but had a family of 6 to feed. On the 
strength of this factor,
1136
 the award might face greater scrutiny than one refusing 
reinstatement of an employee guilty of misconduct and with a breadwinning wife and no 
children.
1137
 The notion is humane. Yet, distinguishing between parties on this basis implies 
that personal circumstances may dictate the degree to which people enjoy legal protection. 
The detriment to fairness is ironic. As such, it is doubtful whether this interpretation of the 
criterion is justified. 
 
3.1.2 The identity and expertise of the decision-maker 
  
When determining whether a commissioner’s decision is reasonable with reference to the 
identity and expertise of the decision-maker, legislative intent is paramount. Of significance 
here is the statutory depiction of arbitration proceedings as informal processes, the form of 
which is at the discretion of presiding commissioners.
1138
 Court-like procedures are generally 
inappropriate.
1139
 Furthermore, consistently with the purposes of the LRA, disputes are to be 
resolved expeditiously.
1140
 Legislative intent in this regard is apparent from section 138(1)
1141
 
                                                          
1133
 Section 33 of the Constitution; section 145 of the LRA. 
1134
 For further explanation of this submission, refer to chapter 3 and the discussion of Tao Ying therein. 
1135
 And vice versa. 
1136
 Being the impact of the decision on the parties to the dispute. 
1137
 Analogously, where the dispute arises from an unfair labour practice, rather than a dismissal, the impact of 
the commissioner’s award will be less far-reaching. As such, based on this criterion, the standard of review 
might be less intrusive.   
1138
 Section 138 of the LRA; the Explanatory Memorandum at 313-314; see too John Brand et al Labour Dispute 
Resolution 2 ed (2008) at 17 and chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
1139
 Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) paras 32-35; Naraindath v CCMA and others (2000) 21 ILJ 1151 (LC); Pep 
Stores Ltd v Laka NO and others (1998) 19 ILJ 1534 (LC); section 138 of the LRA; OK Bazaars (A Division of 
Shoprite Checkers) and Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1188 (LC). 
1140
 Paul Benjamin ‘Conciliation, arbitration and enforcement: The CCMA’s achievements and challenges’ 
(2009) 30 ILJ 26 at 26; Tao Ying para 65. 
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of the Act, which obliges commissioners to conduct arbitration proceedings ‘…in a manner 
that the commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and 
quickly, but [the commissioner] must deal with the substantive merits of the dispute with the 
minimum of legal formalities.’1142 The extent of commissioners’ discretionary powers under 
section 138 was detailed in chapter 1 and the discussion is not repeated here.
1143
 What was 
concluded, however, was that while commissioners’ acts of discretion enjoyed measurable 
leeway, commissioners remained bound to adopt certain features of adjudication during 
arbitration proceedings, to the extent necessary for fairness and efficiency.
1144
 As such, a 
degree of due process is required.
1145
 When defining reasonableness with reference to the 
identity of the decision-maker therefore, these counterbalances to informality, efficiency and 
accessibility are pertinent. Precisely how they translate into a test for reasonableness remains 
regrettably elusive. 
 
Returning to legislative intent and without detracting from commissioners’ obligations, it 
should not be forgotten that CCMA commissioners are not necessarily lawyers. Whereas 
most have experience in industrial relations, many commissioners have no formal legal 
training whatsoever.
1146
 In addition, they operate under severe pressure
1147
 and rarely benefit 
from the assistance of legal representatives as the courts do. Thus, they cannot be expected to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1141
 Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 32. Other relevant sections include section 138, section 1(d)(iv) and 
section 191 of the LRA. 
1142
 Section 138 of the LRA. Since then, the CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct arbitrations in GenN 602 GG 34573 
of 2 September 2011 (‘the Guidelines’) have been published; these provide comprehensive directions to 
commissioners tasked with resolving misconduct dismissal disputes. Note too Transnet Freight Rail para 16. 
1143
 For details thereof, consult Carephone para 21; The Code of Good Practice Dismissals, Schedule 8 to the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘Code for Dismissals’); Benjamin (2009) at 27; Darcy Du Toit et al Labour 
Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 4 ed  (2003) at 378; Myburgh (2009) at 2-12.  
1144
 Tao Ying paras 65 & 152; Carephone para 20; Sidumo para 208; Transnet Freight Rail. When resolving 
disputes, commissioners must consider the competing interests of the parties to the dispute, with reference to 
relevant labour law and principles of equity; Sidumo paras 76-77 & paras 168-184. 
1145
 Consider the Guidelines which, while helpful for commissioners, are somewhat cumbersome. If faultless 
compliance therewith is to set the tone for review, the Guidelines may have significant consequences. Not only 
may review proceedings be encouraged thereby but the likelihood of finding awards reasonable may be rendered 
negligible. In addition, reviews may become increasingly protracted, as reviewing courts trawl through trivial 
allegations of noncompliance by commissioners with the Guidelines. As such, while the Guidelines are 
instructive in many respects they should not constitute a principal contextual determinant of reasonableness. Of 
related relevance is the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration CCMA Practice and Procedure 
Manual 5 ed (November 2010), available at 
http://www.ccma.org.za/UploadedMedia/2010%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20Manual.pdf, accessed on 
11 June 2012 (‘the Manual’). 
1146
 The extensive training to which they are subject prior to their final appointment as commissioners ensures 
that they are equipped with the necessary skills to do the job; Paul Benjamin ‘Assessing South Africa’s 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)’ Publication pending (2013) at 14.  
1147
 And with limited resources. For an in-depth discussion of the CCMA’s daily operations, see Paul Benjamin 
‘Friend or foe? The impact of judicial decisions on the operation of the CCMA’ (2007) 28 ILJ 1 and Benjamin 
(2009). 
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have an intricate knowledge of all areas of the law
1148
 or to have addressed every possible 
legal issue. The reasonableness enquiry must account for these realities, failing which 
legislative intent will be thwarted.  
 
Furthermore, it must be recalled that awards were not envisaged to be impeccable.
1149
 As a 
result, reviewing courts should not approach them as they would judgments of the ordinary 
courts.
1150
  In Ellerine Holdings, Davis JA explained this principle as follows: 
 
‘…a [reviewing] court must be careful not to parse an award by [a commissioner] in 
the same fashion as one would an elegant judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
or the Constitutional Court. These awards must be read for what they are, awards 
made by arbitrators who are not judges.’1151 
 
In order to ensure fairness, tempering this respectful attitude may still be necessary in some 
cases.
1152
 Amongst other factors, the substantial constraints under which commissioners 
work
1153
 dictate, that while paying deference to awards, reviewing courts must intervene 
when warranted. A measure of deference is crucial but too little is not.
1154
  Not only does 
undue deference endanger parties’ rights, but it undermines the role and functions of judicial 
review.
1155
  
 
On another note, it might be contended that given the significance of the decision-maker’s 
identity on the scope of review, the nature of reasonableness should differ according to the 
skills, qualifications and seniority of respective commissioners. This is arguable in theory but 
                                                          
1148
 Sidumo para 118; Ellerine Holdings at 10-13.  
1149
 Sidumo para 118; note too Grogan’s submission (albeit in light of Carephone) that commissioners are not 
magistrates and that their role is to consider the fairness of sanctions imposed by employers rather than to select 
sanctions of their own accord; John Grogan ‘Death of the reasonable employer: the seismology of review’ 
(2000) 16(2) Employment Law 4 at 10. 
1150
 For an example of a case in which the court arguably did so nonetheless, see Clarence v The National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service (2011) 32 ILJ 2927 (LAC). 
1151
 Ellerine Holdings at 10-11; Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer & Matthew Groves Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action 3ed (2004) at 180. 
1152
 Remember that commissioners sit alone and the parties are not usually assisted by lawyers; Rule 25 of the 
Rules for the conduct of proceedings before the CCMA GNR 1448 GG 25515 of 10 October 2003 (‘the CCMA 
Rules’), read with Tanya Venter & Andrew Levy ‘Disputes at the CCMA, bargaining councils and Tokiso’ in 
Andrew Levy & Tanya Venter (eds) The Dispute Resolution Digest 2012 (2012) 23 at 36. Note, however, Law 
Society of the Northern Provinces v Minister of Labour and Others (NGHC) unreported case no 61197/11 of 15 
October 2012. 
1153
 Ibid; consider too section 138(7) of the LRA and the CCMA Annual Reports, available at www.ccma.org.za, 
accessed on 12 October 2012. 
1154
 Fidelity para 100; Hoexter (2007) at 501-502; Davis (2006). 
1155
 Sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution; Cheetham para 6 (and the discussion thereof in chapter 3); Ray-
Howett at 1628; Garbers (2008) at 86.  
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the logic of doing so in practice is dubious. Reviewing courts cannot realistically be expected 
to analyse commissioners’ curricula vitae, for example, during each and every enquiry into 
reasonableness. The influence of this criterion on reasonableness should consequently be 
limited to the skills, identity and expertise of CCMA commissioners generally. It should not 
affect the standard of review in individual cases. 
 
3.1.3 The range of factors relevant to the decision 
 
The factors relevant to the decision will vary from one dispute to the next. Reviewing courts 
will accordingly need to assess the reasonableness of awards with reference to these factors 
on a case by case basis. Certain factors will apply to the majority of disputes. As these factors 
illustrate the manner in which this criterion affects the ambit of reasonableness well, they are 
discussed below. 
 
Of pertinence to most CCMA arbitrations
1156
 are the codes of good practice provided for in 
section 138(6) of the LRA. Commissioners are obliged by the Act to address these codes 
when resolving disputes and they play a key role in most CCMA proceedings.
1157
 While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to consider each and every one of these codes, it is instructive 
to mention the principal one.
1158
 That code is the Code of Good Practice for Dismissals,
1159
 
which guides commissioners in both misconduct and incapacity dismissal disputes.
1160
 Item 7 
thereof, dealing with misconduct dismissals, directs them as follows: 
 
‘7.   Guidelines in cases of dismissal for misconduct.—Any person who is 
determining whether a dismissal for misconduct is unfair should consider— 
(a) whether or not the employee contravened a rule or standard regulating 
conduct in, or of relevance to, the work-place; and 
(b) if a rule or standard was contravened, whether or not— 
                                                          
1156
 The majority of disputes referred to the CCMA concern allegedly unfair dismissals for misconduct, thus 
bringing the Code for Dismissals into play. For relevant statistics, refer to Venter & Levy at 42; the CCMA 
Annual Report 2009-2010 Department of Labour RP: 84/2010 and the CCMA Annual Report 2010-2011 
Department of Labour RP: 58/2011. According to Rycroft, 46% of CCMA awards were taken on review to the 
Labour Court in 2010, confirming the significant role of the Code for Dismissals in review proceedings too; 
Alan Rycroft ‘An evaluation of the Labour Court’ in Andrew Levy and Tanya Venter (eds) Dispute Resolution 
Digest 2012 (2012) 61 at 65. 
1157
 Section 138(6) of the LRA. 
1158
 Undoubtedly the most commonly encountered Code in CCMA arbitration proceedings is the Code for 
Dismissals. Other codes of good practice include, for example, the Code of good practice: Who is an employee? 
GenN 1774 of 1 December 2006 and the Code of good practice on dismissal based on operational requirements 
GenN 1517 GG 20254 of 16 July 1999. The Guidelines are of equal pertinence.  
1159
 The Code for Dismissals; note too Sidumo para 173. 
1160
 The Code for Dismissals. 
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(i) the rule was a valid or reasonable rule or standard; 
(ii) the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to 
have been aware, of the rule or standard; 
(iii) the rule or standard has been consistently applied by the 
employer; and 
(iv) dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of 
the rule or standard.’1161 
 
Along analogous lines, item 9 of the Code outlines considerations germane to poor work 
performance dismissals, stipulating that: 
 
‘9.   Guidelines in cases of dismissal for poor work performance.—Any person 
determining whether a dismissal for poor work performance is unfair should 
consider— 
(a) whether or not the employee failed to meet a performance standard; 
and 
(b) if the employee did not meet a required performance standard whether 
or not— 
(i) the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to 
have been aware, of the required performance standard; 
(ii) the employee was given a fair opportunity to meet the required 
performance standard; and 
(iii) dismissal was an appropriate sanction for not meeting the 
required performance standard.’1162 
 
Thus, legal precedent aside,
1163
 commissioners are (at a minimum) bound to consider these 
factors when determining the fairness of misconduct and incapacity dismissals.
1164
 Reviewing 
courts ought similarly to address these considerations. Where additional legal principles arise, 
they too require attention.
1165
 Finally, the objects and underlying values of the LRA are 
relevant.
1166
 Given the critical relationship between these objects and the right to fair labour 
practices,
1167
 where commissioners disregard them, the reasonableness enquiry may 
potentially assume a more intrusive form. Once more, however, the precise extent of 
permissible judicial intrusion in these circumstances requires clarification. 
 
                                                          
1161
 Item 7 of the Code for Dismissals. 
1162
 Item 9 of the Code for Dismissals. 
1163
 Which some courts apply more strictly than others. For an example of a strict approach, see Clarence. 
1164
 The application of these factors by commissioners is not, however, without constraint; Sidumo paras 181-
182; Transnet Freight Rail paras 11-13; section 138 of the LRA. 
1165
 Ibid. 
1166
 For these, see section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA; the Explanatory Memorandum at 278-287 and the tenor of the Act 
as a whole. 
1167
 Section 23 of the Constitution. 
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Unfortunately, the complexities of applying this contextual criterion do not end there. As the 
cases of National Union of Mineworkers obo Employees and Others v Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others (‘NUM obo 112 Employees’) and 
Transnet Freight Rail demonstrate,
1168
 defining reasonableness with reference to 
commissioners’ assessments of relevant factors is not straightforward. In particular, while it 
is clear that commissioners who fail to account for relevant factors commit irregularities,
1169
 
whether courts may reweigh commissioners’ allocations of weight to relevant factors, 
notwithstanding due attention thereto, remains controversial. Canadian principles of review 
assist in this regard.
1170
 
 
3.1.4 The reasons for the decision 
 
The reasons offered by commissioners for their awards will differ from one dispute to the 
next. Yet, their obligation to provide adequate reasons is common to all. It is one which arises 
from the Act itself. As such, this factor has influenced review proceedings under section 145 
all along.  
 
Section 138(7) of the LRA requires commissioners to provide only ‘brief reasons’ for their 
awards.
1171
 While affording commissioners some latitude therefore, the requisite of brief 
reasons does not exempt them from being thorough. Nor are they immunised from properly 
applying their minds to the issues at hand.
1172
 In Maepe v CCMA & another, the LAC 
emphasised that commissioners’ reasons ought at least to include:1173 
 
‘…those matters or factors which he or she took into account which are of 
great significance to or which are critical to one or other of the issues he or she 
is called upon to decide.’1174 
 
                                                          
1168
 Note the discussion of these cases in chapter 3; National Union of Mineworkers obo Employees and Others v 
Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others [2012] 1 BLLR 22 (LAC) (‘NUM obo 112 
Employees’); Transnet Freight Rail; Relyant Retail Limited t/a Bears Furnishers v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation & Arbitration & others [2009] JOL 24327 (LC). 
1169
 Sidumo para 268; Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 329 (LAC) para 44; Ellerine Holdings 
at 13; Maepe para 11; Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 14-15; Pam Golding paras 5-6. 
1170
 These are addressed in chapter 6. 
1171
 Section 138(7) of the LRA. 
1172
 Maepe para 8. 
1173
 Maepe v CCMA & another [2008] 8 BLLR 723 (LAC) para 8. 
1174
 Ibid; see also Tao Ying para 140; Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others 2010 (2) SA 92 (CC) 
para 17, citing Mpahlehle v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC) para 12 and Garbers 
(2008) at 86. Together, they highlight the need for adequate reasoning in CCMA awards. 
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In other words, commissioners’ reasons must indicate the primary factors affecting their 
awards. Where they fail to do so, the inference may be drawn that they did not consider that 
factor at all.
1175
 The rationale behind this approach is sound. It was neatly expressed by the 
CC when reciting its observations in Mpahlehle v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd in 
Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others,
1176
 as follows: 
 
‘[Reasons] explain[…] to the parties, and to the public at large which has an 
interest in courts being open and transparent, why a case is decided as it is. It 
is a discipline which curbs arbitrary judicial decisions.’1177 
 
To summarise: reviewing courts should not expect commissioners to furnish extensive or 
elaborate reasons for their findings and the reasonableness standard should not be too severe 
in this respect. Nevertheless, reasons are central to maintaining accountability, transparency 
and openness in arbitration proceedings.
1178
 In turn, commissioners’ reasons must (at a 
minimum) disclose the principal grounds for their awards and evince well founded reasoning 
processes.
1179
 Naturally, this mandate discourages capricious decision-making consistently 
with Constitutional values. Adequate reasons undoubtedly remain obligatory therefore, but 
the boundary between them and a satisfactory reasoning process requires elucidation.
1180
 The 
degree to which commissioners’ reasoning processes may justify review where the outcome 
of their findings is substantively reasonable is equally unclear.
1181
 Again, Canadian principles 
of review offer guidance in these respects.  
 
                                                          
1175
 Maepe para 8. 
1176
 Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others 2010 (2) SA 92 (CC) para 17. 
1177
 Ibid, citing Mpahlehle v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC) para 12. The Court 
augmented this statement, with reference to the purposes of reasons, as follows:  
‘Then, too, [the provision of reasons] is essential for the appeal process, enabling the losing party to 
take an informed decision as to whether or not to appeal or, where necessary, seek leave to appeal. It 
assists the appeal Court to decide whether or not the order of the lower court is correct. And finally, it 
provides guidance to the public in respect of similar matters…’; Strategic Liquor Services para 12.  
While Strategic Liquor Services was decided in the context of an appeal against the LC’s failure to give reasons 
for its decision, equivalent principles apply to the CCMA. For the role of reasons on review generally, consult 
Cape Bar Council v Judicial Service Commission & another (Centre for Constitutional Rights & another as 
amici curiae) [2011] JOL 27947 (WCC) para 30.  
1178
 Consistently with sections 1(d) and 195(1) of the Constitution; Cape Bar Council paras 25-30. 
1179
 Consider Bestel para 9; Alternative reasons may nonetheless be found to justify the substantive findings of 
commissioners’ awards; Fidelity para 102; Benjamin (2009) at 43. 
1180
 Related to this is the indeterminate relationship between substantive and procedural unreasonableness as 
discussed in chapter 3. 
1181
 Consult further in this regard the discussion of Edcon and Clarence in chapter 3. 
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3.1.5 The nature of competing interests involved 
 
In almost all employment relationships, there exists an imbalance of power in favour of the 
employer.
1182
 The CCMA was designed to mitigate this.
1183
 As a result, the institution is 
readily accessible to the less empowered members of society; its services are free and legal 
representation is prohibited in the majority of dismissal disputes.
1184
 In this way, at least some 
of the problems associated with the imbalance are countered.  
 
The extent of the power disparity may differ markedly from one arbitration to the next. On 
the strength of Bato Star, the ambit of reasonableness should vary accordingly. Where the 
employer is a large organisation with extensive financial resources, for example, and the 
employee a non-unionised blue collar worker, the inequality is extreme. In such instances, 
more intensive scrutiny of awards may be justified. In comparison, where the parties are 
better matched,
1185
 a less rigorous approach to the reasonableness enquiry may apply.
1186
 
 
Still, given the structure of the CCMA and the need to find a reasonable equilibrium between 
both parties’ interests,1187 reviews must remain impartial and objective.1188 Whether 
preference should be afforded to either party on account of a perceived power imbalance is 
accordingly doubtful. This does not imply that the competing interests of the parties have no 
role to play at all. On the contrary, commissioners are obliged to address both parties’ 
interests when resolving disputes,
1189
 and where they fail to do so satisfactorily their awards 
may be unreasonable. Unfortunately, no tangible means of determining how this criterion 
                                                          
1182
 Sidumo para 72, citing PL Davies & M Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) at 18; 
Servais at 75-76 and E Barak ‘The principle of good faith in labour law’ in R Blanpain (ed) Labour law, human 
rights and social policy (2001) 227 at 232. 
1183
 Sidumo paras 72-74. 
1184
 Including misconduct and incapacity dismissal disputes; Rule 25 of the CCMA Rules; section 140 of the 
LRA. The Rule has recently been declared unconstitutional by the High Court but the declaration has been 
suspended for 3 years from the date of judgment; Law Society of the Northern Provinces. Compare, however, 
Law Society of the Northern Provinces with Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Mudau NO 
others [2009] 4 BLLR 299 (LAC). 
1185
 As might be the case, for example, where the employee is a senior manager and the employer is a 
comparatively small enterprise. 
1186
 For an example of circumstances in which the size of the employer may be relevant to the reasonableness of 
the Commissioner’s award, see Samancor Tubatse Ferrochrome v Metal & Engineering Industries Bargaining 
Council & others (2010) 31 ILJ 1838 (LAC) paras 12-13. 
1187
 Bato Star paras 48-50. 
1188
 Neither party’s interests should outweigh the others. 
1189
 In a manner which does not unduly favour one party’s interests over the other’s; Sidumo paras 72-77 & paras 
171-172. They are further required to do so fairly; Sidumo paras 77-79; Sidumo paras 181-182; Transnet Freight 
Rail paras 11-13; section 23 of the Constitution. 
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affects the scope of review exists. Together with many of the other contextual criteria, if 
anything, it only aggravates the complexity of defining reasonableness during review 
proceedings.  
 
3.1.6 The impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of those affected 
 
In dismissal disputes at least, commissioners’ decisions will invariably have a significant 
impact on the continuation of the parties’ employment relationship. For most South Africans, 
the consequences of losing their jobs are dire.
1190
 When delineating the reasonableness 
standard, the damaging effects of dismissal for an employee should resultantly be evaluated 
against the costs of reinstatement for his or her employer.
1191
 By implication, where the harm 
of dismissal vastly outweighs its costs, the reasonableness of an award upholding the 
dismissal may be more closely examined than otherwise. While factors germane to the 
award’s impact will vary from one dispute to the next they may include, for example, the age 
of the employee, the impact of the dismissal on the employee’s family,1192 and the need for 
large retailing employers to reduce stock losses.
1193
 
 
The impact of the decision is fundamental to disputes in which reinstatement is awarded or 
dismissal confirmed.  Where only compensation is at stake, it must nonetheless be cautiously 
approached. Should the quantum of awarded compensation be too readily interfered with, 
commissioners may limit awards to moderate amounts in order to escape review.
1194
 As the 
LRA provides for compensation to be awarded up to a maximum of 12 month’s 
remuneration,
1195
 awards designed to avoid review obstruct the Act’s full application; 
ultimately legislative intent is scuppered. As such, whether the extent of the reasonableness 
                                                          
1190
 Both unemployment and poverty in South Africa are rife; Statistics South Africa Statistical Release P0211: 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 2 2012 (31 July 2012) at v, available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2012.pdf, accessed on 22 August 2012; Consult 
too Law Society of the Northern Provinces paras 28-30. 
1191
 On the basis of Bato Star at least. 
1192
 Particularly where the dispute involves an allegedly unfair dismissal. 
1193
 In turn, they may dismiss employees for petty theft; consider the Shoprite Checkers trilogy. Pillay argues that 
by assessing both the competing interests of the parties and the impact of the decision on those affected by it, an 
element of proportionality is imported into the reasonableness enquiry, thus extending it beyond rationality; A 
Pillay ‘Reviewing reasonableness: An appropriate standard for evaluating state action and inaction?’ (2005) 122 
SALJ 419. 
1194
 Benjamin (2007) at 18. There is evidence to suggest that commissioners may already be doing so. For one, 
awards of compensation are often favoured over orders of reinstatement despite the Act’s prioritisation of the 
latter; Venter & Levy at 51, read with section 193(2) of the LRA. In addition, the average compensation award is 
4 months’ remuneration – a relatively limited amount; Benjamin (2009) at 40. 
1195
 Section 193 of the Act. 
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enquiry should succumb to manipulation on account of the impact of awards alone is 
questionable.
1196
  
 
3.1.7 The feasibility of the Bato Star factors 
 
As previously averted to, while these factors may be pertinent to the breadth of 
reasonableness in any given case, requiring reviewing courts to assess all 6 of them during 
section 145 proceedings is unduly burdensome. Imposing such a duty would likely increase, 
rather than reduce, the inconsistency already prevalent in reviews. It is consequently 
necessary to constrain the intricacies associated with the Bato Star criteria. A starting point 
may be to identify those considerations of greatest significance to the reasonableness 
standard. Fortunately once more, Canadian law provides direction.
1197
 
 
Turning to the second tier of contextual considerations relevant to reasonableness, both 
administrative and labour law items emerge. As many of these have been addressed in earlier 
chapters, the discussion which follows is abbreviated.  
 
3.2    Broader Contextual Considerations 
 
The first important factor is section 33 of the Constitution.
1198
 As discussed in earlier 
chapters, that section requires administrative action to be lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair. In so doing, it ensures that the public administration is held accountable for its 
decisions
1199
 and that transparency and openness are promoted.
1200
 As confirmed by the 
                                                          
1196
 Consider, however, Shoprite Checkers 1, where the impact of the decision on the employee was ostensibly 
prized over that of the employer. Compare this to the decision in Shoprite Checkers 2 and the discussion thereof 
in chapter 3. 
1197
 The utility of Canadian law is expounded in chapter 6. 
1198
 Sidumo para 89; Shoprite Checkers 3 paras 26-28.  
1199
 Sidumo para 138; Carephone para 35; Hugh Corder ‘Reviewing review: much achieved, much more to do’ in 
H Corder & L van der Vijver (eds) Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 1 at 1-2; see also Etienne Mureinik 
‘Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability’ 1993 Acta Juridica 35 at 43, where the author explains 
the significance of administrative accountability for democracy. 
1200
 Section 1(d) of the Constitution. For the requisites of administrative justice, consult Jeffrey Jowell ‘The 
democratic necessity of administrative justice’ 2006 Acta Juridica 13 at 16-17; Cape Bar Council paras 25-30 
and Cora Hoexter ‘The current state of South African administrative law’ in H Corder & L van der Vijver (eds) 
Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 20 at 27; note too Strategic Liquor Services para 17 citing Mpahlehle 
para 12 and Garbers (2008) at 86, which highlight the need for adequate reasoning in commissioners’ awards. 
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courts, there is no reason why the CCMA as an administrative body should not be held to 
account on the basis of these Constitutional imperatives.
1201
  
 
Intrinsically related to section 33 is the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(‘PAJA’): the legislation promulgated to give effect to the right to just administrative 
action.
1202
 CCMA arbitrations constitute administrative action.
1203
 It has therefore been 
proposed that the grounds for review provided for in section 6 of PAJA may be used to define 
the ambit of reasonableness during section 145 proceedings.
1204
 The difficulty with this is that 
the CC has explicitly rejected PAJA’s application to CCMA awards.1205 In any event, the test 
for reasonableness delineated in Sidumo is no different to that stipulated in PAJA.
1206
 The 
statute’s provisions accordingly contribute little to the enquiry.1207 To the extent to which 
PAJA includes grounds other than reasonableness (and grounds related thereto),
1208
 it 
nonetheless affirms the enduring import of parties’ rights to procedural fairness and 
lawfulness. In turn, the continued role of section 145 is verified.
1209
  
 
Associated with PAJA is the doctrine of SOP. This plays a crucial part in all proceedings for 
judicial review and it is plainly relevant to reasonableness.
1210
 In its most rudimentary form, 
the doctrine demands that reviewing courts show respect for administrative decisions.
1211
 
Excessive judicial interference is consequently inappropriate. That does not imply, however, 
that judicial deference should be extreme; on the contrary, excessive levels of deference may 
                                                          
1201
 Carephone paras 10, 19 & 34-35; Garbers (2008) at 86. 
1202
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
1203
 Sidumo para 88. 
1204
 Ray-Howett at 1625-1626; W Hutchinson ‘Grounds for review: Sections 145 and section 158(1)(g) of the 
Labour Relations Act’ (2009) 18(8) Contemporary Labour Law 79 at 80. For general administrative law 
principles in this regard, refer to Plasket at 363-364 and De Ville (2005) at 203-210.  
1205
 Sidumo para 98-104. Disregarding the CC’s pronouncement and delineating reasonableness with direct 
reference to section 6 of PAJA would plainly be inappropriate. 
1206
 Section 6(2)(h) of PAJA, read with Sidumo paras 105-110 and Bato Star para 44. For PAJA grounds of 
review linked to reasonableness, see De Ville (2005) at 213-214 and Plasket at 363 onwards. 
1207
 Ibid; compare section 145 of the LRA with section 6(2)(h) of PAJA. 
1208
 Section 6 of PAJA. For the relationship between these grounds and reasonableness, consult Plasket at 363. 
For illustrative cases in the labour context, see Value Logistics para 46; Kaefer Insulation para 21; Standard 
Bank (1995) (BG) at 1397; Pam Golding paras 5-6; Sidumo para 268; Gaga para 44; Ellerine Holdings at 13 and 
Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 14-15.  
1209
 For affirmation of this principle, note Fidelity para 101; Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 14 & 17 and 
Maepe para 22. 
1210
 Whether in the labour field or otherwise; recall, however, Sidumo paras 136-137 and the discussion thereof 
in chapter 3. 
1211
 Hoexter with Lyster (2002) at 69-76; Hoexter (2007) at 490 and Fergus (2010) at 1568-1573. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
171 
 
undermine the supervisory and guiding functions of review. Thus, where decisions are truly 
unreasonable
1212
 they ought to be set aside.
1213
  
 
Adding to these generic administrative law factors, are considerations specific to labour 
dispute resolution. Foremost of these is the right to fair labour practices
1214
 which reviewing 
courts are obliged to interpret harmoniously with the right to just administrative action.
1215
 
Secondly, just as PAJA was enacted to give effect to the right to just administrative action, 
the LRA was intended to realise the right to fair labour practices. Logically therefore, the Act 
evinces legislative intent as to the manner in which labour disputes are to be resolved.
1216
 
Such intent is best understood with reference to the prevailing themes of dispute resolution 
therein. The first of these appears in section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA, which provides that a key 
purpose of the Act is ‘to promote…the effective resolution of labour disputes.’1217 
 
Section 138 of the LRA and the Explanatory Memorandum to the Act reveal the residual 
themes of informality, cost-effectiveness and accessibility.
1218
 Through the simple procedures 
of conciliation and arbitration, disputes of right are decided in an accessible, speedy and 
inexpensive forum without the option of appeal.
1219
 These features of labour dispute 
resolution set the tone for section 145 review proceedings and must be accounted for when 
formulating a suitable test for reasonableness.
1220
 
 
                                                          
1212
 Or otherwise amenable to review. 
1213
 Bato Star para 48. O’Regan J’s explication of this principle in Bato Star is instructive; she held: 
‘A decision that requires an equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing interests or 
considerations and which is to be taken by a person or institution with specific expertise in that area 
must be shown respect by the courts. Often a power will identify a goal to be achieved, but will not 
dictate which route should be followed to achieve that goal. In such circumstances a court should pay 
due respect to the route selected by the decision-maker. This does not mean, however, that where the 
decision is one which will not reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not 
reasonably supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may 
not review that decision. A court should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of 
the complexity of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker…’  
1214
 The right to fair labour practices; section 23 of the Constitution.  
1215
 Sidumo para 148; section 39(2) of the Constitution; S v Mhlungu and others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) para 108. 
1216
 For the proper approach to interpreting the LRA, see NUMSA & others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & another 
[2003] 2 BLLR 103 (CC) paras 13 & 26-46 and Aviation Union of SA & another v SA Airways (Pty) Ltd & 
others [2012] 3 BLLR 211 (CC). 
1217
 Section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA. For the impact of efficiency on review, consult Food & Allied Workers Union 
on behalf of Mbatha & others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko Milling & Baking & others (2011) 32 ILJ 
2916 (SCA) (‘FAWU’) paras 19-21. For a contentiously distinctive stance, see Herholdt paras 52-56. 
1218
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 318; section 191 of the LRA; Sidumo para 85; chapter 1 of this thesis. 
1219
 Sidumo para 94; the Explanatory Memorandum at 317-320.  
1220
 Fidelity para 100; Ellerine Holdings at 13. 
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Attending to both tiers of contextual considerations when determining the bounds of this 
enquiry, acknowledges the variable nature of the reasonableness standard.
1221
 Ideally, in 
doing so, each of the aforementioned factors should be weighed and an appropriate balance 
struck between them, on a case by case basis. Yet, as noted above, the bulk, variability and 
complexity of these factors render the task of delineating reasonableness in this way, unduly 
onerous. To remedy this, a more structured approach to reasonableness which nevertheless 
allows for flexibility in application, is needed.  Whether such a test already exists in South 
African law requires consideration. Beginning with the terms assigned to the term 
‘reasonable’ by South African courts and commentators, the issue is addressed below. 
 
3.3    The meaning of ‘reasonableness’ 
 
Looking to the meanings attributed to the concept of ‘reasonableness’ in South Africa, it 
appears that defining the standard is no simple endeavour. As a result, its meaning is 
currently uncertain.
1222
 To understand the intricacies of reasonableness, it is necessary to 
assess the various definitions which have been proposed for it, both by reviewing courts and 
commentators. The discussion which follows opens with the relationship between rationality 
and reasonableness.
1223
 Thereafter, judicial and academic attempts at lending structure to 
reasonableness are described. 
 
As previously observed, since Sidumo, the courts have frequently used the terms ‘rationality’ 
or ‘justifiability’ and ‘reasonableness’ interchangeably.1224 There are several problems with 
doing so. First, equating these terms disregards the discrete characteristics of review under 
Carephone and Sidumo.
1225
 While the SCA in Edcon held that their differences were 
semantic, earlier in Rustenburg Platinum Mines,
1226
 the same Court had limited the enquiry 
                                                          
1221
 Bato Star paras 41 & 54; De Ville (2005) at 212; Hoexter (2007) at 315; Plasket at 339 onwards. Note, 
however, JR De Ville 'Deference as respect and deference as sacrifice: A reading of Bato Star Fishing v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs' (2004) 20 SAJHR 577. 
1222
 Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 13. In the context of section 145 proceedings specifically, compare 
Garbers (2008) at 85-88; Myburgh (2009) at 16-17; Tao Ying para 150 and Le Roux & Young at 30. See also 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC). 
1223
 Refer in this regard to chapter 3, in which the courts’ ostensible confusion about the relationship between the 
Carephone and Sidumo tests is canvassed. 
1224
 Afrox Healthcare para 21; Parmalat paras 14-16; Ellerine Holdings at 15; Bestel paras 16-17; Du Toit 
suggests that this occurred prior to Sidumo; Du Toit (2010) at 2. Note further Etienne Mureinik ‘A bridge to 
where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 at 40-43; Mureinik seemingly conflates the 
terms rationality, reasonableness and justifiability too.   
1225
 Compare Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26 with Sidumo and Fidelity para 102. 
1226
 Edcon para 16; Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26.  
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under Carephone to preclude reviewing courts from evaluating reasons other than those 
offered by commissioners as justification for their awards.
1227
 Moreover, the intentions of the 
drafters of the final Constitution cannot be ignored. Those intentions are clear from the 
discernibly distinct definitions of the right to just administrative action contained in the 
interim and final Constitutions respectively.
1228
 It is consequently illogical to equate the two 
standards; their distinctiveness must be recognised at some level.
1229
 A useful point of 
departure here is Froneman DJP’s description of ‘justifiable’ in Carephone; the Judge defined 
the concept as: ‘…able to be legally or morally justified, able to be shown to be just, 
reasonable or correct; defensible.’1230 
 
Froneman DJP therefore conceived a distinction between reasonableness and justifiability. 
Justifiability required only that a decision be capable of being shown to be reasonable; it did 
not demand that the decision actually be reasonable (as the standard of ‘reasonableness’ 
does).
1231
 Despite his delineation’s apparent potential to achieve lucidity, Froneman DJP’s 
definition of justifiability was criticised
1232
 and ultimately disregarded by the LAC. In 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others
1233
 that Court held: 
 
‘…although the terms ‘justifiable’ and ‘rational’ may not, strictly speaking, be 
synonymous, they bear a sufficiently similar meaning to justify the conclusion that 
rationality can be said to be accommodated within the concept of justifiability as 
used in Carephone. In this regard I am satisfied that a decision that is justifiable 
                                                          
1227
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26. 
1228
 See also Mureinik (1994) at 40 ftnt 34. There, Mureinik addresses the reasons for the facile use of 
‘justifiable’ rather than ‘reasonable’ in section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 
1993 (‘the interim Constitution’). He submits that the terms are interchangeable and that the phrase ‘justifiable in 
relation to the reasons given for it’ was favoured over the term ‘reasonable’ in the interim Constitution to 
alleviate the fears of certain stakeholders. See also Corder in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 11 and 
Plasket at 354-355. 
1229
 Recall the principles of statutory interpretation including that ‘language is not used unnecessarily’, and that 
‘statute law is (presumed) not (to be) invalid or purposeless’; LM du Plessis ‘Statute law and interpretation’ The 
Law of South Africa vol 25(1) 2 ed (2011) paras 353, 342 & 347. Consider also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) 
SA 674 (CC) para 85; Hoexter (2007) at 306-309 and Pillay at 425-429. 
1230
 Carephone para 32; for criticism of Froneman DJP’s formulation (primarily on account of the Judge’s use of 
the word ‘correct’), consult County Fair Foods para 10. Compare these sentiments to the Court’s views in 
Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order and Another 1994 (1) BCLR 75 (E) at 90. Debatably, it might be inferred 
from Qozeleni that proportionality formed part of the test for rational justifiability. Grogan (2000) at 5-6.  
1231
 Nor did it require justifiable decisions to be just or correct; Carephone para 32. This seemingly coheres with 
the Courts’ formulations of reasonableness in matters such as Transnet Freight Rail para 10; Relyant Retail paras 
19-23 and Bestel paras 15-17. 
1232
 County Fair Foods para 10. 
1233
 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC). 
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cannot be said to be irrational and a decision that is irrational cannot be said to be 
justifiable.’1234 
 
No further explanation of the terms’ meanings was offered however, leaving the validity of 
Froneman DJP’s sentiments in doubt. Instead, for practical purposes, rationality and 
justifiability were deemed identical. Again, there are difficulties with this view. The first is 
the established principle that justifiability and reasonableness bear corresponding 
meanings.
1235
 If rationality and justifiability are equally comparable, the scope for 
distinguishing between rationality and reasonableness disappears. In turn, the differences 
between the Sidumo and Carephone
1236
 standards are ignored.
1237
 
 
Notwithstanding these problems, courts continue to conflate the terms. In Shoprite Checkers 
1, for example, Zondo JP held the Commissioner’s decision to be neither ‘justifiable, rational 
[n]or reasonable’.1238 As recorded above, the SCA in Edcon depicted reasonableness as 
conceptually no different to rational justifiability under Carephone.
1239
 Later, in Tao Ying, 
O’Regan J found that the Commissioner had failed to apply her mind to the dispute before 
her and that her award was irrational on that count.
1240
 When read with the Judge’s decision 
as a whole, it might be inferred that rationality is indistinguishable from reasonableness.
1241
 
Yet, in light of Bato Star
1242
 and the judgments canvassed below, the inference would be 
misguided.
1243
 
                                                          
1234
 Ibid para 25; see also R McLachlan ‘Lack of justifiability or rationality as a ground for review of private 
arbitration awards’ (2002) 5 De Rebus 49.  
1235
 When defining the term ‘reasonable’, certain courts and commentators have aligned it with ‘rational’ or 
‘justifiable’ but others maintain that its scope extends beyond these concepts; consider Pillay at 420-426; 
Hoexter (2007) at 301-321; Mureinik (1994) at 41; Carephone paras 32 & 37; McLachlan (who describes 
rationality and justifiability as conceptually equivalent); Grogan (2000) at 5-6 & 10 (who hesitantly equates 
reasonableness with fairness); Plasket; Lourens du Plessis & Hugh Corder Understanding South Africa’s 
transitional Bill of Rights (1994) at 169; Hugh Corder ‘Without deference, with respect: A response to Justice 
O’Regan’ (2004) 121 SALJ  438 at 442; Corder in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 8; Bel Porto School 
Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Province, Western Cape and Another 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC) at 
427; Bestel para 18 and Kievits Kroon Country Estate v MMoledi & others  (LAC) unreported case no JA78/10 
of 24 July 2012 para 20. 
1236
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26; Sidumo paras 105-110; Carephone para 37. 
1237
 Consider too the intentions of the drafters of the interim and final Constitutions; Mureinik (1994) at 40 ftnt 
34; Corder in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 11; Plasket at 354-355; see also Pillay at 424. 
1238
 Shoprite Checkers 1 paras 23 & 26; for a comparable approach, see Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC). 
1239
 Edcon para 16; Pillay would likely disagree; Pillay at 429. 
1240
 Tao Ying para 150.  
1241
 Ibid paras 108-153. 
1242
 In which O’Regan wrote the majority judgment. Note that beyond the courtroom, O’Regan J has argued that 
rationality (as defined in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for one) constitutes but one measure of reasonableness. 
Thus, more invasive forms of scrutiny may be appropriate in other contexts; O’Regan (2004) at 435-437. 
1243
 Consider, for example, the CC’s description of rationality (as it applies to executive conduct) in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers; the Court held:  
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By comparison, in Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd and Others,
1244
 the LAC emphasised that 
the crucial enquiry on review was whether awards were justified,
1245
 suggesting a return to 
the Carephone position.
1246
 This did not permit reviewing courts to replace commissioners’ 
findings with those of their own preference.
1247
 In Davis JA’s view, decisions were merely 
required to be rationally connected to the evidence presented.
1248
 The implications of this 
pronouncement are uncertain – specifically, whether the Court saw justifiability as equivalent 
to reasonableness, or as comprising but one facet thereof, is unclear. Arguably, rather than 
implying that the Carephone and Sidumo tests were identical, the LAC relied on Carephone 
purely for the principles espoused therein. Given that many of these principles remain 
valid,
1249
 the Court’s endorsement of Carephone in Bestel is instructive.  
 
In Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & Others
1250
 the LC attempted to unscramble the indefinite 
link between rationality and reasonableness further. First, with reference to New Clicks, it 
confirmed that reasonableness allowed for a more intrusive measure of analysis than that 
permitted by the interim Constitution.
1251
 In other words, Carephone’s test of rational 
justifiability had been expanded on following its substitution with reasonableness – to adopt 
the Court’s expression, the latter set ‘a lower threshold for review and a higher standard for 
administrative action’ than that previously applicable.1252  
 
The LC then progressed to cases and commentary expounding the tests’ differences. 
Foremost of these was Bato Star. While the concepts of rationality and reasonableness had 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the Executive and other 
functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the 
power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement...’; 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 85. 
 The CC added that rationality was not an intrusive enquiry and merely obliged reviewing courts to determine 
whether the decision taken was ‘rationally related to the purpose for which it was given.’ Consult and compare 
further in this regard Bato Star para 43; Value Logistics paras 38-44; Boxer Superstores (Pty) Ltd v Zuma & 
others [2008] 9 BLLR 823 (LAC) para 11; Plasket at 338 onwards and Cora Hoexter Administrative law in 
South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 340. 
1244
 Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & others [2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC). 
1245
 Note too Kievits Kroon (2012) (LAC) para 20. 
1246
 Bestel para 18. 
1247
 Ibid. 
1248
 Ibid paras 16-17. 
1249
 With the exception of the rule that reviewing courts may not refer to reasons other than those provided by 
commissioners in order to justify their awards; Fidelity para 102 read with Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA). 
1250
 Value Logistics Ltd v Basson & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2552 (LC). 
1251
 Ibid para 40. 
1252
 Ibid. For an ostensibly alternative approach, refer to Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 30.  
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seemingly been equated therein, the CC had acknowledged reasonableness to be ‘no less than 
… rationality…’1253 In contrast, observed the LC in Value Logistics, Hoexter’s definitions of 
the terms indicated that rationality comprised only one element of reasonableness.
1254
 Of 
additional import were the SCA’s findings in Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director-General, 
Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism: Branch Marine & Coastal Management & 
others.
1255
 There, the Court had declared the impugned conduct ‘irrational and inexplicable 
and consequently unreasonable’.1256 On the basis of these descriptions, the LC resolved that 
(at a minimum) reasonableness incorporated rationality
1257
 but was not necessarily confined 
to it.
1258
  
 
Hoexter’s proposals are edifying in explicating the LC’s findings. Specifically, she submits 
that while reasonableness encompasses rationality, it also includes proportionality.
1259
 In 
Hoexter’s view, the requisite of rationality dictates that decisions be: 
 
‘…supported by the evidence and information before the administrator[s] as well as 
the reasons given for [them].’1260  
 
Proportionality in turn seeks to: 
 
‘…avoid an imbalance between the adverse and beneficial effects…of an action and 
to encourage the administrator to consider both the need for the action and the 
possible use of less drastic or oppressive means to accomplish the desired end. Two of 
its essential elements, then, are balance and necessity, while a third is suitability – 
usually referring to the use of lawful and appropriate means to accomplish the 
administrator’s objective.’1261 
 
                                                          
1253
 Value Logistics para 41, citing Bato Star para 43. 
1254
 Value Logistics para 41; Hoexter (2007) at 306-307. The remaining elements are proportionality and 
necessity. 
1255
 Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director-General, Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism: Branch 
Marine & Coastal Management & others 2006 (2) SA 191 (SCA). 
1256
 Value Logistics para 43, citing Foodcorp para 12. Once again, this implies either that the standards are 
equivalent in meaning or that irrational conduct is a necessary precursor to unreasonableness. 
1257
 As formulated in Carephone. 
1258
 Value Logistics para 44. 
1259
 Both of which are to be applied with due regard for the principle of deference; Hoexter (2007) at 301-321 & 
224-292; Fergus (2010). 
1260
 Hoexter (2007) at 307; note also Hoexter (2012) at 340. 
1261
 Hoexter (2007) at 309-310; see too Hoexter (2012) at 343-346; De Ville (2005) at 203; Roman at 282; 
Wayne Hutchison ‘Is the Labour Appeal Court succeeding in its endeavours to create certainty in our 
jurisprudence?’ (2001) 22 ILJ 2223 at 2225 and R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 
AC 532 at 547. 
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Pillay analogously advances a conception of reasonableness inclusive of these elements. She 
adds that rationality and reasonableness are necessarily distinct.
1262
 Her argument proceeds 
along the following lines: All executive action is amenable to review on the basis of 
irrationality.
1263
 Judicial review of administrative action, by definition, calls for a more 
rigorous degree of scrutiny than that appropriate to proceedings challenging executive 
conduct. Logically as such, reasonableness must entail something more than rationality.
1264
 
In support of her view, Pillay recounts the provisions of PAJA. Those provisions sanction 
review on the bases of both unreasonableness and irrationality, demonstrating the 
legislature’s recognition of the standard’s differences.1265 In turn, she argues, establishing a 
rational connection between a decision and the manner in which it was reached constitutes 
but one aspect of reasonableness.
1266
 Proportionality makes up the other.
1267
 Pillay concludes 
that:  
 
‘Reasonableness…begins at rationality, as the minimum threshold, moves on to 
proportionality, and ends with a value judgment on what the best approach in a 
particular case would be.’1268 
 
What appears is that while reasonableness in the broadest sense may incorporate rationality 
and proportionality, the notion takes various forms – in some instances it may be more 
constrained than in others. By implication, reasonableness and rationality inescapably 
intersect. Suggesting that rationality is no longer a ground of review, when reasonableness is, 
is therefore nonsensical. Rather than eliminating Carephone style review, the reasonableness 
standard has enveloped it.  This solution is useful to a degree but it does not explain the 
principle endorsed in Sidumo that substantive review is no longer confined to evaluating 
commissioners’ reasons.1269 How this declared change in the law impacts on section 145 
proceedings requires explanation. Fortunately, Canadian law assists with unravelling the 
issue.
1270
 
 
                                                          
1262
 Pillay at 424. 
1263
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 85. 
1264
 Pillay at 420-421, 424 & 427. 
1265
 Ibid at 427. 
1266
 Ibid at 420-421.  
1267
 Ibid. 
1268
 Ibid at 439. Corder apparently agrees, asserting that proportionality is notably missing from PAJA; Corder 
(2004) SALJ at 441. Consult also Chan. 
1269
 Fidelity para 102; Foschini Group (2010) (LAC) para 29; Transnet Freight Rail para 10. 
1270
 Canadian law is detailed in chapter 6. 
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Of additional concern is how to determine whether the requisites of reasonableness have 
been met. While Hoexter’s definitions offer some direction, both raise discernible problems. 
The principal difficulty with her description of rationality is its failure to indicate how 
rationality differs from correctness, in practical terms. Merely alluding to the need for 
deference, while legitimate in theory, contributes little to the search for a pragmatic measure 
of reasonableness. 
 
Turning to proportionality,
1271
 in the general administrative law context this may well inform 
reasonableness. Its functionality in section 145 proceedings is nevertheless restricted. The 
restriction arises from the concept’s constitutive elements. First of these is necessity, which 
obliges courts to enquire whether the decision-maker’s findings were necessary. 
Commissioners are statutorily compelled to reach decisions favouring one party over another 
in all arbitration proceedings.
1272
 Thus, the need for a decision in every case is unavoidable 
and this feature of proportionality is superfluous in section 145 proceedings. The second 
component of proportionality is balance. This directs decision-makers to strike an 
appropriate balance between the competing interests of parties to disputes. Again, 
commissioners are legislatively obliged to seek a fair balance between the parties’ interests 
before issuing their awards.
1273
 Hence, neither necessity nor balance adds much to the 
existing framework of reasonableness in the labour sphere. 
 
In contrast, the suitability component of proportionality offers some bearing. Whereas 
commissioners have a wide discretion to determine relief,
1274
 the appropriateness of awarded 
relief is relevant to the enquiry on review. At a practical level, this feature of proportionality 
bars commissioners from ‘using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.’ Instead, their awards should 
be commensurate with disputes before them. Not only does imposing this duty improve the 
prospects of awards being fair, but it is aligned with Bato Star’s emphasis on the impact of 
decisions as contextually pertinent to the scope of reasonableness.
1275
 To this end at least, 
proportionality is valuable. 
                                                          
1271
 At least as defined by Hoexter (2007). For alternative depictions thereof (some of which are comparable to 
Hoexter’s), consult R (Daly) at 547; Chan at 248 & 254; De Ville (2005) at 203 and Plasket at 363-367. 
1272
 Section 115 of the LRA. 
1273
 See the discussion of commissioners’ roles in earlier paragraphs and chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis. 
1274
 Section 193 of the LRA. Given the breadth of commissioners’ discretionary powers, reviewing courts should 
be cautious in their attitudes to reallocating weight to relevant factors appraised by commissioners during 
arbitration proceedings; Transnet Freight Rail para 10, read with chapter 3. 
1275
 Bato Star para 45. See too Hoexter (2007) at 315; De Ville (2005) at 212-214; Plasket at 339-363 and 
Ellerine Holdings at 13. 
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Two supplementary hurdles concerning the proposed elements of reasonableness
1276
 present 
themselves. The first is the proposal’s failure to acknowledge that notwithstanding theoretical 
distinctions between rationality and reasonableness, reviewing courts continue to equate them 
in practice.
1277
 Provided courts disagree on whether these terms are interchangeable, it is 
unhelpful to formulate reasonableness as submitted, regardless of the potential validity 
thereof. Arguably, a test devoid of labels such as ‘rationality’, ‘justifiability’, 
‘reasonableness’ and ‘proportionality’ would be preferable.1278 
 
Second, assuming too firmly that proportionality is the second aspect of reasonableness and 
rationality the first negates the standard’s nature as a flexible enquiry, the scope of which is 
contextually dependent.
1279
 Rigidity and formalism in defining its boundaries should thus be 
avoided.
1280
 Given the variability of reasonableness, its components need to be pliable. 
Neither rationality
1281
 nor proportionality is capable of clinical or static definition and 
different measures of reasonableness must accordingly remain available in discrete settings.  
 
De Ville offers an informative depiction of the variability of reasonableness, in his analysis of 
the grounds of review listed in PAJA.
1282
 He submits that: 
 
‘…the provisions in PAJA providing for arbitrariness, capriciousness, irrationality, 
unreasonableness (and disproportionality) should be read in the above light. PAJA 
should be read as inviting different degrees of scrutiny on the basis of 
unreasonableness (understood in a broad sense), depending upon the factors 
mentioned above… These should not be read as watertight categories as they 
inevitably flow i to each other.’1283  
 
                                                          
1276
 As described by Hoexter (2007) and Pillay and detailed above. 
1277
 Consider Value Logistics para 43, citing Foodcorp para 12; Bestel para 18 and Kievits Kroon (2012) (LAC) 
para 20. Baxter similarly observes that the concepts of rationality and reasonableness are readily identified with 
one another; Baxter at 484-5. 
1278
 Consider the difficulties with circular reasoning, as discussed with reference to Bestel below; Southern Sun 
Hotel Interests para 13.  
1279
 Bato Star paras 41, 44 & 45; Hoexter (2007) at 502; Cora Hoexter ‘The principle of legality in South African 
administrative law’ (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 165 at 166-169 & 177; O’Regan (2004) at 432-436. 
1280
 Note this is Hoexter’s own submission; Hoexter (2007) at 502; Cora Hoexter ‘Administrative action in the 
courts’ 2006 Acta Juridica 303 at 303-304 & 318-319. 
1281
 Compare, for one, the various formulations of rationality in matters such as Pharmaceutical Manufacturers; 
Carephone and Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA). 
1282
 Section 6 of PAJA. 
1283
 De Ville (2005) at 213-214. For related sentiments, consider Plasket at 363. While De Ville’s discussion of 
these grounds arose prior to Bato Star, it remains pertinent to the debate at hand. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
180 
 
In other words, reasonableness (regardless of its precise formulation)
1284
 will demand 
differing levels of scrutiny in distinct contextual environments. Understanding the term as 
reflecting any number of associated concepts gives sensible effect to its contextual 
character.
1285
 In light of the courts’ inconsistent attitudes to reasonableness, however, lending 
some structure to the standard remains necessary.
1286
 
 
De Ville’s words address reasonableness under PAJA and so apply to administrative action 
generally – a vast category. Debatably therefore, his remarks need not be construed as 
countering the suitability of more concrete tests for reasonableness in specific arenas – 
including that of labour dispute resolution. The need for enhanced clarity in this area is clear. 
It is particularly important for legal certainty. Resultantly, when refining the test for review, 
while some room for manoeuvre is necessary, the dispute resolution framework established 
by the LRA must be accounted for.
1287
   
 
To this end, the contextual indicators detailed above are an instructive point of departure. 
Coupled with germane principles of Canadian law, from these it is hoped that an objective 
and pragmatic test,
1288
 capable of consistent application by reviewing courts, may be 
formulated. Certain courts have begun this process and their decisions are revealing. Their 
judgments are appraised in the ensuing paragraphs. 
 
3.4    Practical guidance from the courts 
 
The first significant decision in this regard was the CC’s in Bato Star. There, O’Regan J 
found that decisions would be reasonable where the reviewing court was: 
 
‘…satisfied that the […decision-maker…] did take into account all the factors, struck 
a reasonable equilibrium between them and selected reasonable means to pursue the 
identified legislative goal in the light of the facts before him...’1289  
 
                                                          
1284
 Whether as rationality, justifiability, proportionality or a combination thereof. 
1285
 Bato Star para 45. 
1286
 Certain courts have attempted to do so with partial success; examples include the LC in Sasol Mining and the 
LAC in Bestel. 
1287
 Consistently with the contextual nature of reasonableness. 
1288
 Which is distinguishable from appeal. 
1289
 Bato Star para 50. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
181 
 
Le Roux and Young have summarised O’Regan J’s conception of reasonableness, with 
reference to her judgment as a whole. They suggest that, in Bato Star, the CC held that 
decisions would be unreasonable if they: 
 
a) Cannot reasonably achieve the objectives in relation to which the decision was first 
undertaken; 
b) Are not reasonably supported by the evidence and factual material which was before 
the decision-maker, when the decision was taken; and 
c) Are not reasonable, when regard is had to the reasons proffered by the decision-maker 
for the decision.
1290
  
 
This depiction of reasonableness is accessibly concise. Yet, the repetitive use of the phrase 
‘reasonable’ renders it somewhat circular.1291 Defining a term with reference to itself leaves 
the definition empty.
1292
 What can be drawn from it nonetheless are the aspects of awards 
requiring evaluation; these include the purpose of the decision, the role of evidentiary 
material and the import of reasons. In brief, purpose, evidence and reasons should all be 
accounted for in any professed test for reasonableness. 
 
Building on these parameters in Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd and Others,
1293
 the LAC 
examined review based on Sidumo comprehensively. It opened with reference to an article by 
Myburgh,
1294
 in which the author contended that commissioners’ factual determinations 
would be unreasonable where they were: 
 
‘i. Unsupported by any evidence; 
ii. Based on speculation by the commissioner; 
iii. Entirely disconnected from the evidence; 
iv. Supported by evidence that is insufficiently reasonable to justify the decision; or 
v. Made in ignorance of evidence that was not contradicted.’1295 
 
                                                          
1290
 Le Roux & Young at 29; Bato Star paras 44-50. 
1291
 Garbers (2008) at 85; Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 13; Hoexter (2007) at 311.  
1292
 Ibid; Fergus & Rycroft at 191-192. 
1293
 Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & others [2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC). Note, however, that the Court did not 
expressly refer to Bato Star in its decision. 
1294
 Ibid paras 13-15; Myburgh (2009). 
1295
 Bestel para 14; Myburgh (2009) at 13. In support of these criteria, Myburgh cited Sil Farming CC t/a 
Wigwam v CCMA (LC) unreported case no JR3347/05 of 2005; Bestel para 15. Note further that these criteria 
were purported to apply to commissioners’ factual findings specifically. 
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In so far as these indicators offer a more advanced and practical outline of unreasonableness, 
their utility is apparent. Difficulties still remain. First, items (i) and (iv) appear contradictory. 
The former implies that any degree of evidence supporting a commissioner’s findings may 
redeem otherwise faulty awards. Yet, the latter sets a higher standard - that of adequate 
(‘sufficiently reasonable’) evidence;1296 in turn, item (i) is declared redundant. The 
specification of ‘sufficiently reasonable’ raises the concern identified in relation to the Bato 
Star criteria cited above.
1297
 Here again, ‘reasonable’ is defined with reference to itself, 
leaving the formulation circular. What remains is an indicator no better or more objective 
than that available before: awards will be unreasonable if they cannot be justified in light of 
the material before the commissioner concerned. Comparably, item (ii) seems equivalent to 
the longstanding ground of review of arbitrary or capricious decision-making.
1298
 Finally, 
items (i) and (iii) are difficult to distinguish, challenging their existence as distinctive bases 
for review. As such, while commendable as an outline, these indicators are unfortunately of 
lesser value than might otherwise appear.
1299
  
 
Still, analogously to Bato Star, the LAC’s focus in Bestel on the evidence before 
commissioners as crucial to determining reasonableness is affirming. Pertinently, it asserts 
the substantive nature of the standard comparative to that of section 145.
1300
 As the Court’s 
delineation of reasonableness focused on commissioners’ factual findings, its emphasis on the 
evidence presented is unsurprising.
1301
 From it, it may be inferred that discrete forms of 
                                                          
1296
 Ibid. 
1297
 Le Roux & Young at 29; Bato Star paras 44-50. The Court in Bestel nevertheless applied this indicator and 
confirmed the reasonableness of the award. It concluded:‘[The employer’s] speculation is insufficient to justify a 
conclusion that third respondent’s findings, on facts supported by the evidence was insufficiently reasonable to 
justify his decision or made in ignorance of uncontradicted evidence.’; Bestel para 30.  
1298
 Consider the Court’s reference to ‘capricious decision-making’ in Shoprite Checkers 3 para 32. Earlier in 
Shoprite Checkers (2001) (LAC) paras 18-19, the LAC had emphasized that rationality required that decisions 
were not arbitrary and that commissioners’ statutory powers were exercised in an objectively rational manner. 
Note also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 85. 
1299
 Fergus & Rycroft at 191-192. Furthermore, the list is near identical to the test for gross irregularities set out 
in Ellerine Holdings as follows: ‘When all of the evidence is taken into account, when there is no irregularity of 
a material kind in that evidence was ignored, or improperly rejected, or where there was not a full opportunity 
for an examination of all aspects of the case, then there is no gross irregularity as urged upon us…’; Ellerine 
Holdings at 13. 
1300
 Section 145 of the LRA. Reviewing courts have nonetheless repeatedly held that reasonableness consists of 
both procedural and substantive elements; Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 14-17; SAMWU v South African 
Local Government Bargaining Council & others [2012] 4 BLLR 334 (LAC) (‘SAMWU’) para 10.  
1301
 In light of the connections made by commissioners between the evidence and their awards at least; Bestel 
paras 16-17. 
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reasonableness may apply to different findings and issues.
1302
 Identifying which findings and 
which issues call for which forms of reasonableness, is a separate endeavour. Once more, 
Canadian jurisprudence provides assistance with tackling this task.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
Notwithstanding the Court’s attempts in Sidumo at clarifying review, the decision has caused 
further disquiet. Fortunately, specific features of the standard are clear. These include the 
foundations of reasonableness, the precise formulation of the test, the substantive nature of 
reasonableness, and the enduring relevance of section 145.
1303
 In addition, it is evident that 
reasonableness does not equate to correctness and that reviewing courts are now permitted to 
evaluate all evidentiary material before commissioners when assessing reasonableness – 
awards may therefore be justified on the basis of reasons other than those of the presiding 
commissioner.
1304
 Yet, on account of the difficulties of applying these principles in practice, 
coupled with inconsistent judicial attitudes thereto, confusion prevails. There is accordingly 
an urgent need for clarity.  
 
Seeking clarity must begin by acknowledging the contextual variability of reasonableness.
1305
 
This entails accounting for contextual considerations relevant to both labour and 
administrative law, when delineating the scope of reasonableness during section 145 
proceedings. To these must be added the criteria identified in Bato Star as pertinent to 
defining reasonableness.
1306
 Together, these contextual factors set the backdrop for review at 
a theoretical level. However, obliging reviewing courts to assess all 6 of the Bato Star 
criteria, as well as broader, generic considerations in every case, is unduly burdensome. 
Imposing such a duty on the courts may exacerbate, rather than remedy, the controversies 
surrounding review.  Canadian law offers guidance in reducing the list of contextual 
considerations applicable to review.  That law is detailed in subsequent chapters.  
                                                          
1302
 In other words, as the nature of the question in dispute varies from one case to the next, the ambit of 
reasonableness may change accordingly. Contriving reasonableness in this way is consistent with the contextual 
character of the standard confirmed in Bato Star paras 41 & 54. 
1303
 Sidumo paras 106-107; Carephone para 25. 
1304
 As was the case under Carephone; Rustenburg Platinum Mines (SCA) para 26. Fidelity para 102; Edcon para 
16. For the principle that reasonableness does not equate to correctness, see Bestel paras 16-17, citing Schwartz 
at 133; Carephone paras 32-37; Ellerine Holdings at 10-11; Khanyile (2009)(LAC) para 34 and Woolworths. 
1305
 Bato Star paras 41 & 54; De Ville (2005) at 212; Hoexter (2007) at 315; Plasket at 339 onwards. Note, 
however, De Ville’s contrary remarks; De Ville (2004) at 579-580. 
1306
 Bato Star para 45. 
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Before examining Canadian principles, it is instructive to consider the definitions ascribed to 
reasonableness in South African law by courts and commentators. For the most part, these 
indicate that rationality constitutes one element of reasonableness.
1307
 Proportionality, 
according to Hoexter and Pillay at least,
1308
 comprises the second. While helpful to a 
degree,
1309
 problems with this description appear. For one, the contextual dependency of 
reasonableness dictates that rigid delineations of the standard be avoided.
1310
 On the contrary, 
reasonableness must be capable of assuming discrete forms in discrete circumstances.
1311
 
Whereas limits may be necessary for consistency, the standard’s contextual flexibility 
requires respect. When formulating a test for review, some allowance for variation between 
cases must therefore be retained. Given the unique characteristics of labour dispute resolution 
comparative to administrative action generally,
1312
 when reviewing CCMA proceedings this 
principle is paramount. 
 
In addition to the difficulty of defining reasonableness in a suitably contextual fashion, 
confusion persists in other spheres. First, the relationship between reasonableness and the 
grounds of review stipulated in section 145 is controversial.
1313
 Similarly, the distinctions (if 
any) between rational justifiability under Carephone and reasonableness under Sidumo are 
unclear. In so far as rationality constitutes an element of reasonableness,
1314
 Carephone must 
still apply in part. The precise degree to which it does so
1315
 nonetheless awaits definition. 
Thirdly, the sensibility and practicality of construing reasonableness as comprising both 
procedural and substantive aspects is doubtful.
1316
 While the need for adequate reasons might 
                                                          
1307
 Consult and compare Pillay at 420-426; Hoexter (2007) at 301-321; Mureinik (1994) at 41; Carephone paras 
32 & 37; McLachlan; Grogan (2000) at 5-6 & 10; Plasket at 354-358; Du Plessis & Corder at 169; Corder (2004) 
SALJ at 442 and the minority decision in Bel Porto. 
1308
 Hoexter (2007) at 224-292 & 301-321; Pillay at 439. 
1309
 Particularly in understanding the relationship between Carephone and Sidumo. 
1310
 Hoexter (2007) at 502; Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica at 303-304 & 318-319; De Ville (2004) at 579-580. 
1311
 Ibid. 
1312
 For relevant considerations and the unique nature of labour dispute resolution generally, refer to Chirwa; 
Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security & others [2009] 12 BLLR 1145 (CC) and Brand et al (2008). 
1313
 For further discussion of the controversy, see chapter 3 and the cases considered therein, including Kievits 
Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 26444 (LC); Edcon and Maepe. Consult also Du 
Toit (2010). 
1314
 And proportionality the other; Hoexter (2007) at 301-321 & 224-292; Pillay at 439. 
1315
 Particularly in light of the uncomfortable relationship between procedural reasonableness and the entitlement 
of reviewing courts to entertain alternative reasons for commissioners’ awards. 
1316
 For one, it is difficult to extricate procedural unreasonableness from the statutory grounds prescribed by 
section 145 relating to defective procedures. Inconsistent applications of the standard consequently prevail. If the 
standard is cast in this way, however, confusing overlaps between these grounds and reasonableness are 
inevitable. For the overlap between gross irregularities and reasonableness generally, see Sasol Mining paras 11-
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be seen as comprising the procedural aspect of reasonableness, the LAC’s declared 
distinction between Carephone and Sidumo pertaining to reasoning process presents 
problems.
1317
 What is needed therefore is a clear indication of the boundaries between 
procedural and substantive unreasonableness. Not only would this elucidate the association 
between gross irregularities and unreasonableness,
1318
 but it may simultaneously explain the 
circumstances in which reasonableness may be resolutively applied.
1319
   
 
As alluded to above, the Canadian approach to review assists with resolving these issues. The 
meanings attributed to reasonableness in Canada inform the development of a more 
structured, reliable and practical test for review too. On account of their apparent utility, 
relevant principles of Canadian law are canvassed in chapters 5 and 6. Before doing so, 
whether British, Australian and New Zealand principles of administrative law and labour 
dispute resolution are of equivalent, comparative value is considered. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13; Pam Golding para 5; Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 17; New Clicks para 511; Afrox Healthcare para 21; 
Value Logistics para 46. 
1317
 Fidelity para 102. 
1318
 And arguably between excesses of power and unreasonableness. 
1319
 For examples of cases in which reasonableness was applied in a resolutive manner, see Edcon and Clarence.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE COMPARATIVE COMPATIBILITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S, 
AUSTRALIA’S, NEW ZEALAND’S AND CANADA’S LEGAL SYSTEMS  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been proposed that Canadian law be used as a reference from which to construe and 
revise the Sidumo test for review.
1320
 However, given the dangers of indiscriminate legal 
comparisons,
1321
 guidance should not be sought from Canadian law before the country’s 
comparative compatibility has been confirmed. Thus, whether Canada’s legal system1322 is 
indeed compatible with South Africa’s requires attention. Before focusing exclusively on 
Canadian principles of review, it is prudent to consider the potential utility of alternative 
commonwealth countries too.
1323
 Particularly pertinent in this regard are the United 
Kingdom’s, Australia’s and New Zealand’s systems of review. What follows is an 
assessment of these four jurisdictions’ comparative values in turn.  
 
2. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The United Kingdom (‘the UK’)1324 currently has a dual system of dealing with employment 
disputes. Unfair dismissals may first be referred to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (‘ACAS’)1325 for conciliation.1326 Should conciliation fail, parties have an election to 
refer these matters to adjudication by the Employment Tribunal (‘ET’)1327 or to arbitration by 
an arbitrator appointed by ACAS.
1328
 Where the latter route is adopted, the process follows a 
                                                          
1320
 As set out by the Constitutional Court (‘CC’) in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & 
others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 109. 
1321
 Otto Kahn-Freund ‘On uses and misuses of comparative law’ (1974) 37 Mod L Rev 1; M Reimann & R 
Zimmerman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006); K Zweigert & H Kotz An Introduction to 
Comparative Law 3 ed (1998); HW Arthurs ‘Compared to what? The UCLA comparative labor law project and 
the future of comparative labor law’ (2007) 28 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 591; Cheryl Saunders 
‘Apples, oranges and comparative administrative law’ 2006 Acta Juridica 423 at 423-426. 
1322
 Specifically with reference to Canadian principles of administrative and labour law. 
1323
 Which share certain founding principles of administrative law; Saunders at 448. 
1324
 For the purposes of this chapter, the abbreviation ‘the UK’ is used to describe only England and Wales. 
1325
 The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (‘ACAS’) was established by the Employment 
Protection Act 1975 (‘EPA’). 
1326
 Although they must first be instituted in the ET; Simon Deakin & Gillian S Morris Labour Law 5 ed (2009) 
at 69; Section 2 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (‘ETA’). 
1327
 See sections 2-9 in particular of the ETA; Norman Selwyn Selwyn’s Law of Employment 16 ed (2011) at 9. 
1328
 Section 7 of the Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998 (‘ERDRA’). 
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path markedly similar to that of CCMA
1329
 proceedings.
1330
 Appeals from ACAS arbitrations 
are not allowed and the scope of judicial review of ACAS determinations is narrow.
1331
 The 
UK system would therefore seem an ideal comparator. However, there are a number of 
factors detracting from its suitability. First, the availability of arbitration by ACAS is a 
relatively new feature of UK employment law.
1332
 As a result, the principles of review 
applicable to its decisions are poorly developed. Second, adjudication by the ET remains the 
preferred method of dispute resolution in most employment disputes.
1333
 Thus, while the 
potential for effective comparison exists, there is little in the way of case law available for 
critique. When determining the comparative worth of the UK’s system, consulting the ET’s 
decisions is more useful. 
 
Similarities and differences between the South African and British models of judicial review 
of labour tribunals’ decisions are again revealed.1334 Both the ET and the CCMA have 
jurisdiction to hear unfair dismissal disputes and these disputes form the majority of their 
workloads.
1335
 In addition, these bodies were equally designed to provide accessible, 
inexpensive, efficient and relatively informal dispute resolution services.
1336
 Yet, the ET is 
                                                          
1329
 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (‘the CCMA’). 
1330
 Deakin & Morris at 76-83. 
1331
  Arbitrators’ decisions may be challenged on the basis of either lack of substantive jurisdiction or certain 
designated irregularities which may lead to substantial injustice; sections 67 & 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 
c23 read with the ACAS Arbitration Scheme SI2004/753; Deakin & Morris at 77. 
1332
 The right to have matters determined by arbitration at ACAS was established by section 4 of the ERDRA 
1998. However, the necessary systems were not put in place until 2001; Deakin & Morris at 76. 
1333
 In fact, as Deakin and Morris point out, by 2008 following 7 years of the availability of ACAS arbitration, 
only 60 disputes had been heard by it. Since then, the incidence of ACAS arbitration has risen marginally but not 
significantly. During the 2010-2011 period, the institution heard 31 disputes, of which approximately one third 
concerned unfair dismissals and disciplinary matters; Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service Annual Report and Accounts 2010/2011 HC 1172 (2011) at 13, available at 
http://www.acas.org.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=2867&p=0, accessed on 13 December 2012; Deakin & Morris at 
77 & 82-3 & 513; Comparatively, during the same period, ETs heard 10 300 unfair dismissal disputes; The 
Ministry of Justice Employment Tribunals and EAT Statistics 2010-11 (1 April 2010-31 March 2011) 1 
September 2011 at 9 Table 3, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/statistics/mojstats/employment-
trib-stats-april-march-2010-11.pdf, accessed on 13 December 2012. 
1334
 The term ‘review’ is used here in its general sense, as covering both appeal and review. 
1335
 See the ETs & EATs Statistics; the CCMA Annual Report 2009-2010 Department of Labour RP: 84/2010, 
available at www.ccma.org.za, accessed on 12 October 2012 and the CCMA Annual Report 2010-2011 
Department of Labour RP: 58/2011, available at www.ccma.org.za, accessed on 12 October 2012; Deakin & 
Morris at 67; Paul Benjamin ‘Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA)’ Publication pending (2013) at 1.  
1336
 Deakin & Morris at 69 referring to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 
1965-1968: Report Cmnd 3623 (1968) para 578; Sir William Wade & Christopher Forsyth Administrative Law 9 
ed (2004) at 906. However, notwithstanding Parliament’s intention to create such a system, the formality with 
which ET proceedings are conducted is on the increase; Simon Honeyball & John Bowers Textbook on Labour 
Law 8 ed (2004) at 11-12; Deakin & Morris & 513. 
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entrusted with adjudicating disputes in an adversarial manner in contrast to the CCMA.
1337
 
While the processes it follows remain less formal than those of the courts, it is not as flexible 
as its South African counterpart.
1338
 Moreover, in all matters before the ET, two lay persons 
and one legal chairman preside.
1339
 The chairman is required to have been qualified and 
practising as a barrister or solicitor for at least 7 years.
1340
 By comparison, only one CCMA 
commissioner presides over arbitrations and there is no requirement that commissioners have 
formal legal qualifications. Plainly, the two institutions are in this respect discrete. 
Augmenting this distinction is the right of all parties to ET proceedings to legal 
representation.
1341
 It may therefore be reasonably assumed that the ET is better equipped to 
deal with matters of both law and fact than the CCMA.
1342
 Coupled with the publicity of ET 
adjudications
1343
 lending greater accountability to the institution’s findings, the quality of ET 
determinations is better assured than those of the CCMA. This assurance suggests that the 
nature of review of ET decisions may validly be less exacting than that suited to reviews of 
CCMA awards. 
 
Notwithstanding its vulnerability to judicial review, the ET was established as an inferior 
court rather than as an administrative tribunal.
1344
 The division between inferior courts and 
administrative bodies in the UK is often recognised as superficial
1345
 but the courts have 
stated that the test for review of courts’ decisions is less rigorous than that applicable to 
administrative institutions.
1346
 As a result, there are important differences between the CCMA 
and the ET in this regard too – again calling into question the suitability of the UK as a useful 
comparator. Supporting this conclusion are several additional factors. First, parties to ET 
proceedings have a right of appeal on points of law to the Employment Appeals Tribunal 
                                                          
1337
 Deakin & Morris at 73. 
1338
 Honeyball & Bowers at 11-12 & 17; Deakin & Morris at 513. 
1339
 Each with an equal vote; Deakin & Morris at 68; Selwyn at 9. 
1340
 Deakin & Morris at 68. 
1341
 Section 6 of the ETA; Deakin & Morris at 66-67; Honeyball & Bowers at 11-12. According to Deakin and 
Morris, this right is frequently exercised too; Deakin & Morris at 73. 
1342
 Given the presence of two lay persons on the tribunal’s panel as well as an experienced lawyer. 
1343
 In the absence of exceptional circumstances warranting confidentiality, ET hearings are generally open to the 
public; Deakin & Morris at 72; Honeyball & Bowers at 17. 
1344
 At least for the purposes of the Supreme Court Act 1981; Peach Grey & Co v Sommers [1995] IRLR 363 
(QB Div Ct); Vidler v UNISON [1999] ICR 746; Michael Wynn ‘Contempt powers of Industrial Tribunals’ 
(1995) 24(3) Ind Law J 278 at 278; Selwyn at 9. 
1345
 Wade & Forsyth at 909-910. 
1346
 Ibid; Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374 at 382-383; Paul Craig Administrative Law 6 ed (2008) 
at 458 & 467, 14-040; According to Craig, this approach was followed in R v Hull University Visitor Ex p Page 
[1993] AC 682; Craig (2008) at 459-460, 14-033. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
189 
 
(‘EAT’).1347 While limiting appeals to ‘questions of law’ curbs this right, the meaning of the 
phrase remains broad.
1348
 According to Deakin and Morris, errors of law may arise where an 
Employment Tribunal misdirected itself in law, misunderstood the law, misapplied the law, 
reached a factual conclusion unsupported by any evidence,
1349
 or made a perverse 
decision.
1350
 Perversity occurs where the decision was ‘patently wrong’ or was ‘one which no 
reasonable decision maker, properly applying itself in terms of the law, could have 
reached’.1351 
 
Whereas the last of these errors is semantically identical to the South African notion of 
reasonableness,
1352
 unreasonableness in the UK is a more stringent standard, requiring 
perversity, absurdity, gross unreasonableness or outrageousness.
1353
 Piggot Bros & Co Ltd v 
Jackson
1354
  provides an instructive example. There, the Court described perversity as 
permitting review in case of decisions based on absolutely no evidence or incorrect 
applications of law only.
1355
 When engaged in unreasonableness review, the weight 
attributable to evidentiary considerations is accordingly not a matter for judicial scrutiny or 
interference.
1356
 This is distinct from the standard of reasonableness applicable to section 145 
                                                          
1347
 Section 21 of the ETA; Deakin & Morris at 66-67 & 74; Selwyn at 583; Honeyball & Bowers at 16. The 
EAT was established in terms of section 87 of the EPA. The EAT is a superior court of record which falls 
outside the scope of administrative law – its decisions are therefore not subject to review in the High Court as 
those of the ET are; section 20 of the ETA; Wade & Forsyth at 908. 
1348
 Deakin & Morris at 74. 
1349
 Compare this to the South African test; Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & others [2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC) 
paras 14-18.  
1350
 For an example of a defect not amounting to a legal error, see Yearwood v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis and another [2004] ICR 1660 para 52, read with Housing Corpn v Bryant [1999] ICR 123 at 130. 
1351
 Deakin & Morris at 75. For more on the scope of appeal, consult Noorani v Merseyside TEC Ltd [1999] 
IRLR 184 (CA) and Selwyn at 12 & 58. Selwyn records that in Hereford and Worcester County Council v Neale 
[1986] IRLR 168 (CA), the Court held that appeals would be allowed (in the absence of a clear error of law) 
only where the ET’s decision led the court to say: ‘Oh my goodness, that was certainly wrong!’ 
1352
 Wade & Forsyth at 363; their description mimics the Sidumo test; Sidumo para 109. 
1353
 Noorani; Yeboah v Crofton [2002] IRLR 635 (CA) paras 92-93; Deakin & Morris at 75; Selwyn at 584. See 
also British Telecommunications v Sheridan [1990] IRLR 27 at 30; Melon v Hector Powe Ltd [1980] IRLR 477 
at 479; Piggot Bros & Co Ltd v Jackson [1991] IRLR 309 at 312; Watling v William Bird & Son (Contractors) 
Ltd (1976) 11 ITR 70 at 71; East Berkshire Health Authority v Matadeen [1992] ICR 723. This is true in the 
field of administrative law too; Wade & Forsyth at 364; Cora Hoexter with Rosemary Lyster The new 
Constitutional and administrative law vol 2 (2002) at 186. 
1354
 Piggot Bros & Co Ltd v Jackson [1991] IRLR 309. 
1355
 Ibid. 
1356
 Eclipse Blinds Ltd v Wright [1992] IRLR 133; Selwyn at 585. Bear in mind that the proceedings of the ET 
are not formally recorded. There is therefore no transcript available to the EAT during appellate proceedings, 
making it far easier for the court to refrain from reweighing the merits of the dispute; Yeboah para 13. 
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proceedings,
1357
 where the Labour Courts frequently do not refrain from assessing the weight 
allocated by commissioners to relevant evidentiary factors.
1358
 
 
As such, despite the ostensible breadth of the concept of ‘error of law’, UK courts will not 
readily interfere with ET determinations. Not only will disputes of fact disguised as errors of 
law be dismissed but unreasonableness will be found only where there is ‘an overwhelming 
case’ for it.1359 Demanding such extensive evidence clearly resembles a standard akin to gross 
unreasonableness or irrationality, further distancing the UK approach from that applicable in 
South Africa.
1360
 In addition, procedural irregularities do not fall within the ambit of appeals 
to the EAT.
1361
 They may instead either be challenged on review in the ET itself (should they 
fall within the ET’s designated powers of review)1362 or referred to the High Court for 
ordinary judicial review.
1363
 Aggrieved parties consequently have various avenues of relief 
available to them, in contrast to their South African contemporaries.
1364
 
 
Clearly then, allegations of unreasonableness may arise in review proceedings in British High 
Courts too.
1365
 Yet, the absence of a Constitutional basis for review in the UK denotes that 
                                                          
1357
 Section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’ or ‘the Act’). 
1358
 Whether reviewing courts have the authority to do so is questionable. It might be inferred from their 
entitlement to take alternative reasons into account when assessing the reasonableness of CCMA awards; 
Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC) para 102. Note, however, 
Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC) para 10. For cases in 
which courts have seemingly reweighed the evidence before commissioners nonetheless, see Zono v Gruss NO 
& others [2011] 9 BLLR 873 (LAC); Clarence v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service (2011) 32 ILJ 
2927 (LAC) and National Union of Mineworkers obo Employees and Others v Commission for Conciliation 
Mediation and Arbitration and Others [2012] 1 BLLR 22 (LAC) (‘NUM obo 112 employees’).  
1359
 Yeboah paras 92-93; consider too Yeboah para 174. Still, where a tribunal reaches a finding unsupported by 
any factual evidence, it may be held to have committed an error of law; Wade & Forsyth at 942. 
1360
 Construing unreasonableness in this manner has been expressly rejected by the Labour Appeal Court 
(‘LAC’); Fidelity para 99. Compare this approach to UKAPE v ACAS [1981] AC 424; Craig (2008) at 618. 
1361
 For a case in which procedural irregularities were (unsuccessfully) alleged on appeal, see Yeboah para 86. 
1362
 Selwyn at 580-581; ET decisions may be challenged by way of review proceedings instituted in the ET itself 
but only in the following circumstances: 
1. where the decision was wrongly made as a result of the ET’s staff’s conduct; 
2. where one of the parties was not properly notified of the proceedings; 
3. where the decision was made in the absence of one of the parties to the dispute; 
4. where new evidence becomes available, of which the parties could not have been aware prior to the 
proceedings; or 
5. where the interests of justice call for review. 
Clause 34(3) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004 SI 
2004/1861 as amended. 
1363
 Wade & Forsyth at 33-34. 
1364
 See Sidumo para 104, where the Constitutional Court (‘CC’) held that parties to CCMA disputes are 
precluded from instituting judicial review proceedings based on the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (‘PAJA’) or in the High Courts, when challenging commissioners’ awards. 
1365
 Unreasonableness arises where the applicant contends that the ET unreasonably exercised its discretion and, 
in so doing, exceeded its jurisdiction; Wade & Forsyth at 35-37 & 349-350. 
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the scope of review there may legitimately be narrower than it is in South Africa.
1366
 In other 
words, a less intensive measure of scrutiny may be applied by British courts than that 
prescribed by section 33 of the Constitution.
1367
 
 
Naturally some parallels may be drawn between the UK administrative standard of 
unreasonableness and the South African one. Both tests accept the need for deference to be 
paid to administrative decisions.
1368
 They further focus on reasonableness as distinct from 
correctness, emphasizing that simple differences of opinion between administrators and 
reviewing courts do not justify review.
1369
 However, unreasonableness in British 
administrative law is a stricter standard, often compared to gross unreasonableness, perversity 
or irrationality.
1370
 In fact, Wednesbury
1371
 unreasonableness remains the standard officially 
preferred by the courts when assessing discretionary determinations.
1372
 Where legal findings 
                                                          
1366
 Given the right to just administrative action in section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (‘the Constitution’). The courts’ powers of judicial review in the UK are inherent powers and do not arise  
from legislation or a Constitution as such. The purpose of judicial review there, as in all commonwealth nations, 
is to ensure that the rule of law is maintained and that administrative bodies exercise their powers within the 
confines of the law; Wade & Forsyth at 33-34. 
1367
 The Constitution. 
1368
 Wade & Forsyth at 362 and 369. This is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. 
1369
  Yeboah paras 11 & 106. For a description of unreasonableness (and the limited scope of appeal) in the 
context of the ET’s decisions, see Noorani; G v G [1985] 1 WLR at 647; Wade & Forsyth at 363. 
1370
 Deakin & Morris at 75. For the nature of appeal, consult Noorani and Selwyn at 12 & 584-5. 
1371
 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. Wednesbury 
unreasonableness requires absurdity or gross unreasonableness; Wade & Forsyth at 364 & 371-372. In 
formulating this test, Lord Greene held: ‘It is true to say that, if a decision on a competent matter is so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere. That, I think, 
is quite right; but to prove a case of that kind would require something overwhelming…’; Wednesbury at 230. 
Gross unreasonableness has comparably been denoted as requiring an outrageously illogical decision or one 
which is contrary to moral principles; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 
All ER 935 para 410. Note that this test was equated with irrationality by the House of Lords in Council of Civil 
Service Unions. Wednesbury unreasonableness has essentially been cast as equivalent to gross unreasonableness 
in both South Africa and the UK; Hoexter with Lyster (2002) at 186; PP Craig Administrative Law 4 ed (1999) at 
537; Peter Cane An Introduction to Administrative Law 3 ed (1996) at 209.  
1372
 At least to the extent that fundamental rights (which do not include the right to fair labour practices in the 
South African sense), European Community or European human rights law are not at stake. Where these rights 
are threatened, differing standards of reasonableness or of proportionality may apply; Wade & Forsyth at 367-
368; Craig (2008) at 619, 19-005; Johannes Chan ‘A sliding scale of reasonableness in judicial review’ 2006 
Acta Juridica 233 at 235-237. While the test has been slackened in certain cases, this has only consistently 
occurred where fundamental rights are affected by the decision; Craig (2008) at 617-619; Wade & Forsyth at 
367-368; R v Lord Saville of Newdigate [2000] 1 WLR 1855 at 1867 para 37, cited by Chan at 235. In addition 
to these flexible interpretations of the test, calls to extend the limited nature of Wednesbury unreasonableness 
have arisen; R v Chief Constable of Sussex Ex p International Trader’s Ferry Ltd [1999] 2 AC 418 at 452, R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Daly [2001] 2 AC 532 at 549; R (on the application of Louis 
Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 WLR 481; R (Alconbury Development Ltd) v 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389 at 1406. These calls are 
yet to be heeded by the House of Lords. As such, the Wednesbury standard remains the official delineator of 
reasonableness review in the UK; Craig (2008) at 618; 19-004; Wade & Forsyth at 353-354, 371-372 & 906; R 
(Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] QB 1397; 
Chan at 235-236. For minor concessions made by the courts, refer to Craig (2008) at 617-618, 19-00.  
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are contested, correctness review applies.
1373
 There is thus little in the way of a middle 
ground in the UK, again distinguishing it from South Africa.
1374
 
 
In summary,
1375
 findings of unreasonableness in both the administrative and appellate
1376
 
contexts in Britain are rare.
1377
 While certain South African Labour Courts adopt an 
analogously reverent attitude to review, unreasonableness is by no means an uncommon 
conclusion.
1378
 Moreover, conceptualising the standard as requiring gross unreasonableness 
(in the Wednesbury sense) has been rejected by both South Africa’s Constitutional and 
Labour Appeal Courts;
1379
 importing principles associated with a standard of reasonableness 
overtly denounced by the courts would evidently be inappropriate. As such, the comparative 
value of the UK model for the purposes of revising section 145 is limited. Whether the 
Australian system may be of greater assistance is evaluated below.  
 
3. AUSTRALIA  
 
Fair Work Australia (‘FWA’) is the dispute resolution body responsible for resolving labour 
disputes (including unfair dismissal disputes) in Australia.
1380
 Like ACAS, FWA is similar to 
the CCMA in numerous respects. Foremost o  these is its nature – FWA was intended to 
provide an accessible, inexpensive, informal and efficient forum for dispute resolution. It 
                                                          
1373
 To the extent to which they arise during appeal proceedings; Selwyn at 584-5; Wade & Forsyth at 33-34. 
Where points of law are raised on review, they are challenged on the basis of unlawfulness; Wade & Forsyth at 
33-34, 917 & 941; R (Prolife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corp [2003] 2 WLR 1403 at 75-76. 
1374
 For arguments in favour and against a third standard of review, refer to Craig (2008) at 471-472, 14-043. 
1375
 And as unreasonableness in EAT proceedings is limited to perversity; Deakin & Morris at 75; Yeboah; 
Noorani; Selwyn at 12; British Telecommunications at 30; Melon at 479; Piggot Bros at 312; Watling at 71; 
Selwyn at 584-585. 
1376
 In the context of appeals against ET determinations. 
1377
 Yeboah para 95; Derbyshire and others v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council [2006] ICR 90 para 19. 
1378
 For examples, consult chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. Consider too Alan Rycroft ‘An evaluation of the 
Labour Court’ in Andrew Levy and Tanya Venter (eds) The Dispute Resolution Digest 2012 (2012) 61. Rycroft 
records that 46% of reviews are successful and, of these, 63% succeed because the decision is found to be 
unreasonable; Rycroft at 66-67; note too Fidelity para 100. 
1379
 As non-compliant with section 33 of the Constitution; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) paras 42-45; Sidumo para 107, citing Bato 
Star; Roman v Williams NO 1998 (1) SA 270 (C) at 284-285; Fidelity para 99. 
1380
 It was established by the Fair Work Act 2009 (‘FW Act’) and came into effect on 1 January 2010; 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, Australian Government Australia’s Fair Work 
System (July 2010), available at 
http://www.deewr.gov.au/WorkplaceRelations/NewWorkplaceRelations/Pages/FactSheets.aspx, accessed on 26 
January 2012. 
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further has a broad discretion as to the manner in which it does so.
1381
 Specialist ‘Fair Work 
Divisions’ of the Federal Courts have also been established to hear matters arising from the 
Fair Work Act 2009 (‘FW Act’).1382 To this extent, Australia’s framework for labour dispute 
resolution is comparable to that of the LRA. Nevertheless, the systems are disparate in 
important respects.
1383
 First, appeals from decisions of the FWA against unfair dismissal 
determinations may be instituted to a full bench of the FWA itself.
1384
 Appeals constitute 
hearings de novo and the full bench may therefore admit additional evidence in specified 
circumstances.
1385
 While appeals against unfair dismissal decisions are available in a 
confined set of circumstances,
1386
 the mere presence of this right renders the countries’ labour 
dispute resolution models distinct. Compounding their differences, in Australia, matters of 
law or ‘stated cases’ may be referred1387 to the Federal Courts for final determination,1388 
either during or after the FWA’s decision on the same matter.1389 The FWA is then bound to 
vary its findings in accordance with the Federal Court’s judgment.1390 This enables judicial 
intervention with the FWA’s functions at a more intrusive level than that appropriate to 
reviews of CCMA awards. 
 
                                                          
1381
 Australia’s Fair Work System; The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia: House of Representatives 
Fair Work Bill 2008 Explanatory Memorandum (2008); consider clauses 589, 593 & 595 of the FW Act in 
particular. 
1382
 Australia’s Fair Work System; clauses 560, 562-563 & 566-567 of the FW Act. 
1383
  Consider clauses 593 & 595 of the FW Act, for example. For further differences, see clauses 365, 368-371, 
read with 725-773 of the FW Act. For a case in which these clauses applied, see Manchin v Miners Tipper 
Services Pty Ltd [2011] FMCA 485. 
1384
 Thereafter, aggrieved parties may approach the courts for relief; clause 613, read with clauses 604 & 607 of 
the FW Act. Note that the FW Act does not provide for review of FWA determinations by the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal; the FW Act read with section 25 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.  For an 
overview of the administrative tribunals system in Australia generally, refer to Lord Justice Carnwath et al ‘An 
overview of the tribunal scenes in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom’ in Robin Creyke 
(ed) Tribunals in the Common Law World (2008) 1 at 2-7. 
1385
 Fair Work Bill 2008 Explanatory Memorandum at 353-354. Clause 607 of the FW Act; appeals against 
discretionary determinations are nevertheless unlikely to succeed in the absence of evidence that FWA:  
a) ‘acted upon a wrong principle; 
b) [was] guided by  irrelevant factors; 
c) [mistook] the facts; or 
d) failed to take some material consideration into account.’  
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 488. Whereas these grounds resemble irregularities which oft arise during 
section 145 proceedings, the absence of unreasonableness as a specific ground renders the Australian approach 
unhelpful to this thesis. 
1386
 Permission to appeal will only be granted in case of unfair dismissal disputes where FWA made a significant 
error of fact during the initial hearing (or determination process) or where it is in the public interest to allow an 
appeal; clause 400 read with clause 604 of the FW Act. 
1387
 By the President of FWA. 
1388
 With the Court sitting as a court of first instance. 
1389
 Clause 608 of the FW Act; Australia’s Fair Work System; Fair Work Bill 2008 Explanatory Memorandum at 
356. 
1390
 Ibid. 
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Decisions of the full bench of FWA remain subject to common law judicial review in the 
Supreme Courts of Australia.
1391
 As there are certain similarities between Australian and 
South African principles of common law review, Australia’s compatibility should again be 
considered here. What appears, however, is that Australia (like the UK) does not recognize 
unreasonableness in a manner comparable to South Africa.
1392
  
 
Grounds overlapping with unreasonableness – including irrationality or illogicality in the 
reasoning process and allegations that the decision was based on ‘literally no evidence’1393 – 
do exist in Australia. Still, courts interfere on these grounds in exceptional circumstances 
only.
1394
 Thus, the Australian standard may be likened to Wednesbury or gross 
unreasonableness at best.
1395
 As discussed in the context of the British system, the legitimacy 
of importing principles premised upon a standard expressly rejected by both the Labour 
Appeal and Constitutional Courts is questionable.
1396
  
 
Moreover, given the restricted scope of review comparative to appeal, judicial review of 
FWA decisions is likely to be uncommon.
1397
 It is consequently anticipated that there will be 
minimal case law on the subject available for appraisal. In addition, and once more, in light 
of parties’ rights to appeal, the test for review of FWA decisions may justifiably be less 
exacting than that suited to reviews of CCMA awards.
1398
  
 
Finally, the relative youth of the legislation governing FWA renders the Australian system 
somewhat unhelpful as a comparator.
1399
 The jurisprudence applicable to the FW Act has had 
                                                          
1391
 Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer & Matthew Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3 ed (2004) at 16 & 
46. Ordinarily, judicial review proceedings would proceed in terms of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJRA’). However, Schedule 1, section 3(a) of ADJRA, read with section 19 thereto, 
excludes decisions taken in terms of the FW Act from its ambit. 
1392
 At common law at least; in terms of section 6(2)(g) of ADJRA, review proceedings may be instituted on the 
basis that the decision taken was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it. This 
test is akin to the irrationality test explained in Aronson, Dyer & Groves at 179. 
1393
 Aronson, Dyer & Groves at 179. 
1394
 Ibid. 
1395
 See the discussion on the Wednesbury standard above. 
1396
 Roman at 284-285; Bato Star paras 44-45; Fidelity para 99. 
1397
 This is exacerbated by the fact that parties to dismissal disputes have an election to institute proceedings in 
the courts following the initial FWA conference. Should they choose to do so (rather than pursue the matter 
further via FWA), the relevant court sits as a court of first instance; clauses 365, 368-371, read with 725-773 of 
the FW Act. 
1398
 As the legitimacy of FWA’s initial hearing would, by then, already have been reviewed. Accountability of 
the institution is accordingly better assured (as are the parties’ rights to fairness), where an appeal is allowed.   
1399
 It was passed in 2009 and came into effect on 1 January 2010. 
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little time to develop when compared to other commonwealth jurisdictions.
1400
 On account of 
these numerous discrepancies between the Australian and South African systems, Australia 
does not constitute a viable jurisdiction from which to draw guidance on reformulating 
section 145 and the standard of reasonableness.
1401
 Whether New Zealand does is addressed 
below. 
 
4. NEW ZEALAND  
 
The Employment Relations Authority (‘ERA’) (established in terms of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000)
1402
 (‘the ER Act’) is the dispute resolution service entrusted with 
resolving dismissal disputes
1403
 in New Zealand. Analogously to FWA, ACAS, and the 
CCMA, it was designed to provide an informal, flexible, accessible and efficient system for 
the resolution of disputes.
1404
 Mediation is further favoured over other forms of dispute 
resolution in the ER Act.
1405
 Where a hearing is convened by the ERA, disputes are to be 
decided on the merits, and without regard to trivial technicalities.
1406
 In this way the 
characteristics of the ERA resemble those of the CCMA.
1407
 In addition, New Zealand law 
obliges employers to ensure that dismissals are both substantively and procedurally 
justifiable, similarly to the South African position.
1408
 
 
However, there are again important differences between the two institutions indicating their 
incompatibility. First, the ERA has the power to refer questions of law to the Employment 
                                                          
1400
 Simply because the Explanatory Memorandum to the FW Act indicates that for the purposes of appeals 
against FWA’s decisions, pre-existing jurisprudence remains applicable, does not justify extensive reliance 
thereon; Fair Work Bill 2008 Explanatory Memorandum at 353-354. Note that the principles enunciated in Coal 
and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194, in particular, 
still constitute binding precedent. 
1401
 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
1402
 Section 156 of the ER Act. 
1403
 Unjustified dismissals fall within the personal grievance category (section 103(1)(a)), over which the ERA 
has jurisdiction; section 161 of the ER Act. Unjustified dismissal disputes make up the majority of personal 
grievance disputes referred to the ERA; Department of Labour, Government of New Zealand Personal 
Grievance Determinations in the Employment Relations Authority 17 July – 18 August 2006 (2007) as cited in 
Paul Roth ‘Employment law’ 2008 NZL Rev 159 at 160; see also Gordon Anderson Reconstructing New 
Zealand’s labour law: Consensus or divergence? (2011) at 206. 
1404
 Section 101, read with section 143 of the ER Act; Anderson at 145-146. 
1405
 Ibid. 
1406
 The ER Act nevertheless takes the approach that difficult points of law and, in certain circumstances, 
employment disputes are better determined by courts of law; sections 177-178 of the ER Act. 
1407
 Section 101, read with section 143 of the ER Act; consult too M Timmins ‘In search of good faith: The 
Employment Relations Act 2000’ (2000-2003) 9 Auckland UL Rev 300 at 300-301. 
1408
 Section 103, read with section 103A of the ER Act; see also Roth at 164-170 and the cases cited therein. 
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Courts (‘EC’)1409 for determination during the course of dispute resolution proceedings.1410 
Following receipt of an ERA decision, parties aggrieved by it may challenge the finding by 
way of an appeal to the EC.
1411
 The EC is a specialist court tasked with hearing only labour 
matters and with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals and reviews of ERA determinations.
1412
 
In this respect, it compares to South Africa’s Labour Court. Yet, the permissible scope of EC 
appeals is far broader than that sanctioned by section 145 of the LRA. Whereas parties may 
not contest procedural aspects of ERA proceedings on appeal,
1413
 they may request full 
hearings de novo on the facts. Alternatively, parties may choose to limit their appeals to 
particular questions or legal issues.
1414
 Where procedural challenges are raised to ERA 
decisions, review proceedings may be instituted in the EC.
1415
  
 
Notably, hearings de novo do not require the EC to refer to the ERA’s decision at all; rather 
they entitle the court to conduct full re-hearings of the dispute between the parties.
1416
  
Generally speaking, where a hearing de novo is requested, the EC will proceed on that 
basis.
1417
 The court’s findings will then replace those of the ERA.1418 Evidently, the scope of 
this right is broad and cannot reasonably be likened to review under section 145 of the LRA. 
Needless to say, it consequently bears minimal comparative value for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
 
                                                          
1409
 Section 186 of the ER Act established the EC as a court of record. 
1410
 Section 177 of the ER Act. 
1411
 Section 179 of the ER Act. While the term ‘appeal’ is used here, according to Anderson, proceedings 
instituted against decisions of the ERA do not strictly equate to appeals; Anderson at 146. 
1412
 Section 187 of the ER Act. 
1413
 Section 179(5) of the ER Act. 
1414
 Section 179(4) of the ER Act; Anderson at 146. 
1415
 In terms of section 183(3), read with section 194, of the ER Act. Appeals against ERA’s determinations are 
therefore distinct from reviews conducted under the ER Act; Telecom New Zealand Ltd v Nutter [2004] ERNZ 
315 (CA) para 2. Compare section 179 of the ER Act with section 145 of the LRA, read with Sidumo. Note that 
appeals against decisions of the EC may nonetheless be instituted on the limited basis of legal error; section 214 
of the ER Act; Telecom para 57. However, review proceedings may not be instituted where the party has a right 
of appeal on the same issue and has not yet exercised that right. Applications for review are further confined to 
jurisdictional issues and are conducted according to the provisions of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, No 
130 by the EC; sections 179, 184, 187 & 194 of the ER Act.   
1416
 Rawlings v Sanco NZ Ltd CHCH CC 2A/06 (23 June 2006) para 1 read with para 12; according to the Court 
in Rawlings, an ordinary appeal is in fact more limited than a hearing de novo. Thus, challenges to ERA 
decisions in this context are equivalent to fresh determinations of the relevant disputes. 
1417
 In limited circumstances, the EC may refuse to do so and may instead confine the scope of appeal; section 
182 of the ER Act; Rawlings.  
1418
 Section 183 of the ER Act. 
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Given the breadth of the right of appeal as well as the fact that review proceedings may not 
be instituted where a right of appeal exists,
1419
 appeals are the primary mechanism conceived 
of by the ER Act to challenge ERA determinations.
1420
 As such, to the extent to which the 
ERA’s decisions are contested, any resulting case law will invariably canvass the nature of 
EC appeal and not that of review. Jurisprudence governing review of the ERA’s 
determinations is accordingly expected to be scarce.
1421
 The presence of the right of appeal 
will further have a confining influence on the permissible ambit of review.
1422
 For these 
reasons, New Zealand’s system of labour dispute resolution seems an inappropriate 
comparator for South Africa. Fortunately, Canadian law has more to offer. Evaluating 
Canadian administrative and labour law principles in turn, the comparative worth and 
compatibility of the jurisdiction’s legal system is detailed below. 
 
5. CANADA 
 
5.1 Canadian administrative law 
 
The Canadian courts’ powers of judicial review originate from the Constitution Act, 1867 
(‘the Canadian Constitution’) and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘the Charter’).1423 
Section 7 of the Charter grants the courts the inherent power to review procedural 
irregularities;
1424
 the authority to review substantive decisions is in turn derived from section 
96 of the Canadian Constitution. While section 96 does not explicitly entitle courts to review 
administrative decisions for substantive defects,
1425
 it has been interpreted as doing so. The 
rationale for this construction is that the legislature does not intend to afford administrators 
the authority to act beyond their conferred powers.
1426
 In other words, to the extent to which 
administrators exceed their statutory grants of authority, they contravene legislative intent, 
                                                          
1419
 And which has not been exercised. 
1420
 Section 194 of the ER Act. 
1421
 For an informative discussion of deference in New Zealand generally, consult Michael Taggart 
‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ 2008 NZ L Rev 423. 
1422
 In this regard, Timmins surmised (at the time of the legislation coming into effect) that the broad authority of 
the ERA, while subject to judicial review, might restrict the likelihood of review proceedings succeeding; 
Timmins at 305. For the ERA’s statutory authority, see sections 161 & 162 of the ER Act.  
1423
 Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982; together the Charter and the Canadian Constitution will be referred to as 
‘the Constitution Acts’. 
1424
 Section 7 reads as follows: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not 
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.’ 
1425
 Section 96 states: ‘The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and Country 
Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.’ 
1426
 When passing legislation conferring such powers. 
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thereby justifying review.
1427
 As the South African judiciary equally derives its powers of 
review from the Constitution,
1428
 the countries’ foundations are aligned in this regard. 
 
Due to Canada’s status as a parliamentary sovereignty, however, the supremacy of the 
Canadian Constitution is more compromised than South Africa’s.1429  The appropriateness of 
importing Canadian principles into the South African context might thus be questioned. 
Fortunately,
1430
 numerous similarities between the jurisdictions persist, alleviating this 
concern. First, the relationship between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary is 
governed by the doctrine of the separation of powers analogously to South Africa.
1431
  In 
addition, the Canadian conception of reasonableness
1432
 is significantly similar to the 
meaning attributed thereto by the South African courts.
1433
 Parallels between the countries’ 
jurisprudence are further apparent in the permissible grounds for review. 
 
Broadly speaking, the grounds on which judicial review proceedings may be instituted in 
Canada
1434
 include procedural impropriety, illegality,
1435
 unreasonableness and 
unconstitutionality.
1436
 These imitate the grounds provided for in sections 33 and 36 of the 
Constitution. Procedural impropriety encompasses defects arising from the procedure adopted 
by the relevant decision-maker, while unconstitutionality arises where violations of the 
                                                          
1427
 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 para 131; Crevier v Attorney General of Quebec [1981] 2 
SCR 220 paras 237-238. In the absence of justification, there would be no available remedy for administrative 
excesses of jurisdiction.  
1428
 Section 33, read with section 165, of the Constitution.  
1429
 Whereas parliament is bound by the provisions of both the Constitution Acts, it has the right to suspend 
certain sections of the Charter for a renewable period of 5 years; section 33 of the Charter. Fortunately, this right 
has only been exercised once; Herbert M Kritzer (ed) Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social, and 
Cultural Encyclopeadia 1: A-D (2002) at 254-255.  
1430
 Given the difficulties with unscrupulous comparisons; Kahn-Freund. 
1431
 In other words, the legislature drafts legislation, the executive implements it and the judiciary interprets it; 
JM Keyes ‘Judicial review and the interpretation of legislation: Who gets the last word?’ (2006) 19 Can J Admin 
L & Prac 119 at 121. 
1432
 In the context of judicial review proceedings. 
1433
 Sidumo paras 109-110, read with Fidelity and Bato Star. This is distinct from other commonwealth 
jurisdictions. 
1434
 For further discussion of these grounds, consult G van Harten, G Heckman & D Mullan Administrative Law 
Cases, Texts and Materials 6 ed (2010) at 26-27; Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 
[1999] 2 SCR 817. In various jurisdictions, as well as federally, provincial governments have enacted judicial 
review legislation stipulating the grounds of review on which administrative decisions may be challenged; 
examples include Ontario’s Judicial Review Procedure Act RSO 1990 cJ1; British Columbia’s Administrative 
Tribunals Act SBC 2004 c45 (‘ATA’) and the Federal Courts Act RSC 1985 c F-7 (‘FCA’). 
1435
 Included within the ground of illegality or unlawfulness are both jurisdictional errors and abuses of 
discretion; van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 954-955; DP Jones & AS de Villars Principles of Administrative 
Law 5 ed (2009) at 7-8. 
1436
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 26-27. 
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Constitution Acts are alleged.
1437
 Administrative conduct taken without lawful authority to do 
so may be challenged for illegality. Finally, reasonableness addresses the need for 
administrative powers to be exercised reasonably.
1438
  For reasons apparent from preceding 
chapters,
1439
 the grounds of illegality and unreasonableness are most relevant to this paper. 
The nature of review applicable to these grounds is described below.  
 
The Canadian grounds of review may be divided into procedural challenges
1440
 and 
allegations of substance.
1441
 The principles applicable to substantive determinations
1442
 are 
again of greater import to this thesis than those associated with procedural defects; as such, 
they form the focus of the ensuing discussion.
1443
 Substantive decisions are scrutinised on 
either a reasonableness or correctness standard.  In determining the standard applicable (and 
therefore the extent to which the reviewing court may delve into the merits) Canadian courts 
engage in an enquiry termed ‘the standard of review analysis.’1444 In essence, this analysis is 
concerned with contextual factors purportedly indicative of legislative intent. When 
undertaking the analysis, courts accordingly seek to identify the body which was intended by 
the legislature to be the final arbiter of the dispute in question.
1445
  
 
                                                          
1437
 Ibid. 
1438
 Ibid. 
1439
 Consider in particular, the overlap between excess of powers and reasonableness, referred to in Carephone 
(Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) and later alluded  to in cases such as Ellerine 
Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] JOL 22087 (LAC) and CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others 
[2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC). 
1440
 Procedural fairness incorporates the principles of natural justice, audi alteram partem and the rule against 
bias; Jones & de Villars at 8. See, however, DM Mullan ‘Establishing the standard of review: The struggle for 
complexity?’ (2004) 17 Can J Admin L & Prac 59 at 86. 
1441
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 69. Jones  & de Villars describe judicial review in Canada as essentially 
concerned with ‘jurisdictional defects’, which incorporate the following grounds of review: ‘a) substantive ultra 
vires… b) exercising a discretion for an improper purpose, with malice, in bad faith or by reference to irrelevant 
considerations…c) not considering relevant factors; d) making serious procedural errors; and e) making an error 
of law, in certain circumstances.’; Jones & de Villars at 7-8. The difficulties with defining the term ‘jurisdiction’ 
(as described in chapter 6) render the utility of their description debatable. For an alternative formulation of the 
grounds of review, consult G Gall The Canadian Legal System 5 ed (2004) at 545.  
1442
 Which would include allegations relating to unreasonableness or illegality. 
1443
 Reviewing procedural fairness has its own set of rules, details of which will not be addressed here. For 
relevant principles of procedural fairness, consult Jones & de Villars at 572-575; van Harten, Heckman & 
Mullan at 77-254; DJM Brown & JM Evans Judicial review of administrative action in Canada (1998; updated 
loose-leaf) at 7-65-70; Baker; Moreau-Berube c Nouveau-Brunswick [2002] 1 SCR 249 (SCC); Canadian Union 
of Public Employees v Ontario (Minister of Labour) 2003 SCC 29 para 103 (‘CUPE (2003)’). 
1444
 Consult the discussion of Dunsmuir in chapter 6 (and below) for this analysis. 
1445
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 72-73; Dunsmuir paras 30-31; Gall at 545; David Elliot ‘Khosa – Still 
searching for that star’ (2009) 33(2) Man LJ 14; CUPE (2003) para 149. This approach is not foreign to South 
African law or even to South African labour law; Hira & another v Booysen & another 1992 (4) SA 69 (AD) at 
93C–H; Irvin & Johnson Ltd v CCMA & others [2006] 7 BLLR 613 (LAC) paras 48-49. 
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Once the apposite standard of review has been ascertained, the legitimacy of the relevant 
decision (in light of that standard) is assessed.
1446
 Where correctness applies, courts 
determine the matter of their own accord, independently of the decision-maker’s findings. 
Should their conclusions differ from those of the decision-maker, the latter’s findings may be 
quashed.
1447
 In contrast, where reasonableness applies – as in South Africa – the correctness 
of the determination is immaterial and deference is due. Further, in considering whether a 
decision is indeed reasonable, courts look both to the reasoning process adopted by decision-
makers and the adequacy of their reasons therefore.
1448
 These assessments are conducted with 
reference to the context in which the decision was taken and the decision-maker operates.
1449
 
To this extent, the Canadian standard of reasonableness appears compatible with that 
applicable in section 145 proceedings.
1450
 Adding to this, Canada’s understanding of the 
distinction between appeals and reviews reflects that of the South African Labour Courts’.1451 
Given these similarities, it may be appropriate to incorporate the more structured features of 
the Canadian approach into South African labour law. To do so of course, a more 
comprehensive analysis is necessary. Before undertaking that discussion in the following 
chapter, the Canadian framework of labour dispute resolution is addressed.
1452
 There too, 
certain connections are evident. 
 
                                                          
1446
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 680. 
1447
 Dunsmuir para 50. Correctness review therefore resembles the concept of appeal as it is traditionally cast in 
Canada and South Africa; N Lambert ‘The nature of Federal Court jurisdiction: Statutory or inherent?’ [2010] 23 
Can J Admin L & Prac 145 at 149-150. Lambert submits that, given the inevitable overlap between these 
processes, appeal is better understood as a species of review; for comparable sentiments, consult Emma Fergus 
‘The distinction between appeals and reviews – Defining the limits of the Labour Courts’ powers of review’ 
(2010) 31 ILJ 1556.  
1448
 Dunsmuir paras 47-50. The principle purpose of this evaluation is to determine whether the outcome is 
‘reasonable’ and the reasons ‘justifiable, transparent and intelligible’. 
1449
 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa 2009 SCC 12 paras 28 & 59. 
1450
 In so far as reasonableness gives effect to the Constitutional values of accountability, openness and 
transparency in administrative decision-making; sections 1, 33 and 195 of the Constitution. Compare the 
descriptions of reasonableness in chapter 6 with those in chapters 3 & 4. 
1451
 Analogously to South Africa, judicial review is distinct from appeal – while review is concerned with the 
legality of administrative determinations, appeal examines the correctness of decisions; Lambert at 149-150. 
Note, however, Lambert at 150, read with Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 
[2003] 1 SCR 226. See also Fergus (2010) and the references cited therein. 
1452
 Specifically with a view to affirming its compatibility with South Africa’s. 
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5.2 Canadian labour law 
 
Amplifying the parallels between Canadian and South African administrative law are 
similarities between the jurisdictions’ systems of labour dispute resolution.1453 Several 
differences naturally exist too. However, while visible in theory, these differences do not 
pose insurmountable obstacles for associating Canadian principles with those of South 
Africa.
1454
 The rationale for this view is explained with reference to the more pertinent of 
these principles below. 
 
Canada has three discrete systems of labour law and regulation. The first governs organised 
or unionised employees, all of whom are covered by collective agreements. The employment 
relationships between these employees and their employers are regulated entirely by these 
agreements and the common law is completely excluded.
1455
 As is the case in South Africa, 
parties to collective agreements may neither strike nor lockout for the duration of the relevant 
agreement’s currency.1456 Generally speaking,1457 labour relations boards and labour 
arbitrators are responsible for resolving disputes between employers and unionised 
employees.
1458
 Distinctively, employment relationships in case of non-unionised employees 
are governed by the employees’ individual contracts of employment, to which the common 
law applies. Disputes between non-unionised employees and their employers are further 
resolved in the ordinary course - through adjudication by the courts.
1459
 The third system of 
                                                          
1453
 For labour law and labour arbitration in Canada generally, consult HW Arthurs, RM Brown & B Langille 
(eds) Labour Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary 6 ed (1998) The Labour Law Casebook Group Labour 
and Employment Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary 8 ed (2011); Mort Mitchnick & Brian Etherington 
Labour Arbitration in Canada (2006); Mort Mitchnick & Brian Etherington  Leading Cases on Labour 
Arbitration (2005; updated loose-leaf); Donald JM Brown & David M Beatty Canadian Labour Arbitration 4 ed 
vol 1 (2009; updated loose-leaf). 
1454
 Arthurs would likely disagree; Arthurs (2007). Even to the extent to which political, legal and Constitutional 
conditions in Canada differ from South Africa, however, Canada’s structured conception of reasonableness and 
its relationship with individual grounds of review may assist with defining the standard more clearly in South 
Africa. 
1455
 Donald D Carter et al Labour Law in Canada 5 ed (2002) at 361 para 779. 
1456
 This is generally compelled by statute. Consider, for example, section 46 of Ontario’s Labour Relations Act 
1995 SO c1 as amended (‘OLRA’); Carter et al at 361 para 779. For the South African position, refer to section 
65 of the LRA. 
1457
 With the exception of Ontario, Saskatchewan, Quebec and Prince Edward Island, all provincial jurisdictions 
provide for disputes to be resolved either by arbitration or an alternative means. The exceptional jurisdictions 
declare arbitration compulsory in their labour relations legislation; see EB Willis & WK Winkler Willis and 
Winkler on Leading Labour Cases (2010) at 38. 
1458
 For general principles of Canadian labour law, see Carter et al; Mitchnick & Etherington (2006); Mitchnick 
& Etherington (2005; updated loose-leaf); Arthurs, Brown & Langille and the Labour Law Casebook Group. 
1459
 Carter et al at 366-367 paras 793-794. 
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regulation governs statutory employment standards and provides for the monitoring and 
enforcement thereof by selected administrative and judicial bodies.
1460
  
 
Whereas this divided structure is distinct from South Africa’s more inclusive approach, 
important similarities between them prevail. The first of these is the role of Canadian labour 
arbitrators and boards in resolving disputes, comparably to that of the CCMA.
1461
 Boards and 
arbitrators together perform equivalent functions to those of the CCMA and its 
commissioners.
1462
 They further conduct proceedings in an analogously flexible, efficient and 
informal manner. As a result, the Canadian courts adopt a reverent attitude to reviewing their 
determinations comparable to the reasonableness standard here.
1463
 Thus, it is instructive to 
consider these institutions in more detail. By doing so, additional parallels between the South 
African and Canadian labour dispute resolution fora are revealed.  
 
5.2.1 Labour relations boards and labour arbitrators 
 
In the realm of labour relations, whether a dispute is heard by a labour relations board or 
arbitrator in Canada depends on the nature of the dispute in question. Generally speaking, 
labour arbitrators preside over matters arising from collective agreements,
1464
 while disputes 
concerning organisational rights proceed to the relevant board.
1465
 As collective agreements 
invariably prohibit dismissals ‘without just cause’,1466 dismissal disputes are frequently heard 
by labour arbitrators. These hearings take a form comparable to that of CCMA proceedings. 
Both boards’ and arbitrators’ findings are final. While they are subject to judicial review, they 
                                                          
1460
 Carter et al at 40 para 47. These include legislation governing minimum wages, benefits and working 
conditions and occupational health and safety requirements, as well as various statutes prohibiting discrimination 
in the workplace and regulating pay and employment equity; examples include the Canadian Human Rights Act 
RSC 1985 cH-6; British Columbia’s Human Rights Code RSBC 1996 c210 (‘Human Rights Code’) and 
Ontario’s Human Rights Code RSO 1990 cH-19. 
1461
 Each province or territory in Canada has a provincial labour relations board; for examples of their functions, 
consult the OLRA and British Columbia’s Labour Relations Code RSBC 1996 c244 (‘BC LRC’). 
1462
 Still, as specific legislation does not govern judicial review of labour disputes exclusively in Canada, it is 
impossible to understand review in Canada without reference to general administrative law matters. As such, the 
case law addressed in this thesis is not confined to reviews of labour matters. 
1463
 Consider, for example, Toronto (City) v CUPE Local 79 [2003] 3 SCR 77 para 68 (‘Toronto (City)’) and Art 
Hauser Centre Board Inc (City of Prince Albert) v CUPE Local No 882 2008 SKCA 121 para 23. 
1464
 Carter et al at 370 para 806 & at 396 para 884. 
1465
 Carter et al at 44 para 61. Union certification powers and the power to grant relief in case of unfair labour 
practices are conferred on all labour relations boards. Broader powers are afforded to labour boards in certain 
jurisdictions too.  
1466
 Details of the phrase ‘just cause’ are discussed below, as is the frequency of ‘just cause’ provisions in 
collective agreements. 
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are not open to appeal.
1467
 Other than between the parties themselves, these decisions further 
do not constitute binding precedent.
1468
 In these respects, Canadian arbitration proceedings 
and awards are analogous in both status and form to those of the CCMA.
1469
 
 
Whereas labour boards are provincial governmental entities, labour arbitrators
1470
 are private 
individuals offering arbitral services for a fee.
1471
 As such, they operate independently of 
government. Due to their statutorily conferred authorities,
1472
 however, both arbitrators and 
boards are administrative institutions and thus liable to review as aforementioned. To this 
extent, their authority is again similar to that of CCMA commissioners.
1473
 While in contrast 
to South Africa, Canadian arbitrators are appointed by agreement between the parties,
1474
 
parties remain compelled to resolve their disputes by arbitration.
1475
 Arguably therefore, this 
distinction does not pose a substantial barrier to employing Canadian law as a comparative 
tool.   
 
5.2.2 Judicial Review of labour boards’ and arbitrators’ decisions 
 
In addition to the associations between Canadian labour arbitrators and CCMA 
commissioners, the Canadian judiciary’s deferential approach to reviewing arbitrators’ 
decisions resembles that of the Labour Courts. While parties aggrieved by boards’ or 
                                                          
1467
 Carter et al at 44 para 61. British Columbia’s Labour Board has only very limited authority to review the 
decisions of arbitrators however; section 99 of the BC LRC. 
1468
 Keyes at 139; as Keyes records with reference to Lethbridge College v Lethbridge College Faculty 
Association 2008 CarswellAlta 911 (Alta QB), they nonetheless remain influential in both judicial and arbitral 
proceedings.  
1469
 CCMA awards are final and binding and no right to appeal lies against them; sections 143 & 145 of the 
LRA; the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA (1995) 16 ILJ 278 (‘the Explanatory Memorandum’) at 318-
319; Paul Benjamin & Carole Cooper ‘Innovation and continuity: Responding to the Labour Relations Bill’ 
(1995) 16 ILJ 258 (A) at 275. 
1470
 With the exception of those appointed by the Minister in terms of certain statutes; consider, for one, CUPE 
(2003). 
1471
 For a practical illustration of arbitrators’ operations, visit the website of the Ontario Labour Management 
Arbitrators Association, available at http://www.labourarbitrators.org/, accessed on 28 January 2013. 
1472
 Consult the various provincial Labour Codes for their statutory authority; section 48 of the OLRA is one 
example. 
1473
 Section 145 of the LRA, read with section 33 of the Constitution. 
1474
 And parties may choose to appoint either one or three arbitrators. Note, however, that only very occasionally 
are three arbitrators appointed; one arbitrator usually presides over disputes; Carter et al at 371-372 para 809. 
Where agreement is not forthcoming, the parties may approach the Minister to appoint an arbitrator; Carter et al 
at 372 para 809. For the process in Ontario, consult section 49 of the OLRA; for deviations from the general 
principle, consider New Brunswick’s Industrial Relations Act RSNB 1973 c1-4 as amended and Nova Scotia’s 
Trade Union Act RNS 1989 c475 as amended. 
1475
 By applicable provincial and territorial legislation. 
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arbitrators’ decisions may institute review proceedings,1476 due to their expertise in the field 
of labour relations, decisions of these bodies enjoy greater deference than that afforded to 
most other administrative decision-makers.
1477
 The courts’ approach is endorsed by the 
design of the Canadian labour dispute resolution system which, like its South African 
equivalent, was established with flexibility, expeditiousness and cost-effectiveness in 
mind.
1478
 The Canadian judiciary’s attitude consequently mimics that of the Labour Courts 
during section 145 proceedings.
1479
 In Toronto (City) v CUPE, Local 79,
1480
 LeBel J 
explained the relationship between the characteristics of labour dispute resolution and review 
in the following terms: 
 
‘This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of judicial deference in the context 
of labour law. Labour relations statutes typically bestow broad powers on arbitrators 
and labour boards to resolve the wide range of problems that may arise in this field 
and protect the decisions of these adjudicators by privative clauses. Such legislative 
choices reflect the fact that, as Cory J noted in Toronto (City) Board of Education v 
OSSTF District 15, [1997] 1 SCR 487, at para 35, the field of labour relations is 
‘sensitive and volatile’ and ‘[it] is essential that there be a means of providing speedy 
decisions by experts in the field who are sensitive to the situation, and which can be 
considered by both sides to be final and binding.’ …The application of a standard of 
review of correctness in the context of judicial review of labour adjudication is thus 
rare.’1481 
 
In addition to illustrating the countries’ comparable approaches, Canada’s deferential stance 
counters a potential objection to the jurisdictions’ compatibility. Specifically, as the LRA 
                                                          
1476
 In the Superior Provincial Court governing their jurisdiction. Recall the limited powers of courts in British 
Columbia however; section 99 of the BC LRC. 
1477
 Gall at 565; Toronto (City); CUPE (2003); Dunsmuir; Piper Henderson ‘Supreme Court of Canada’s new 
‘reasonableness’ standard of review applied in recent education cases’ (2008) 18 Educ & L J 179 at 180. See 
also David E Gruber ‘Judicial review advocacy in the post-Dunsmuir era’ (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 303 
at 306-307; G Huscroft ‘Judicial review from CUPE to CUPE: Less is not always more’ in G Huscroft & M 
Taggart M (eds) ‘Inside and Outside Administrative Law: Essays in Honour of Mullan’ (2006) 297 at 296 and 
Willis & Winkler (2010) at 105.  
1478
 Dunsmuir para 69; Henderson at 180; CUPE (2003). The purposes of the OLRA, for one, include the 
expeditious resolution of labour disputes; Schedule A to the OLRA. For the analogous characteristics of the 
CCMA, consult the Explanatory Memorandum at 327-330; Benjamin & Cooper at 274-275 and chapter 1 of this 
dissertation. 
1479
 Sidumo paras 105-110; Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetham & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 306 (LAC) paras 4-7 
& 12-13 and Fidelity paras 96-103; consider too chapters 3 and 4. 
1480
 Toronto (City) v CUPE Local 79 [2003] 3 SCR 77 para 68 (‘Toronto (City)’. 
1481
 Ibid para 68; Art Hauser para 23; Dunsmuir paras 68-69; for a more extreme view, see Harry Arthurs ‘The 
Constitutionalisation of labour rights’ Institute for Development and Labour Law Occasional Paper 1/2004 
(reprinted March 2005) at 8-11. Compare these sentiments to Huscroft at 311-312 and David Mullan (ed) 
Administrative Law: Cases, Texts and Materials 5 ed (2003) at 698. A similar downhill trend in the quality of 
CCMA awards was alluded to in Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others [2011] 4 BLLR 404 
(LC) para 7. 
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governs reviews of CCMA awards exclusively,
1482
 Canada’s generic application of the 
common law to all administrative decisions
1483
 may be seen as detracting from its 
comparative worth. Yet, given the Canadian judiciary’s acknowledgment of the unique 
exigencies of labour dispute resolution, the generality of Canadian principles need not defeat 
their compatibility with South Africa’s in this sphere.  
 
5.2.3 No right to fair labour practices 
 
The parallels between judicial review of labour boards’ and arbitrators’ decisions and the 
principles applicable to section 145 proceedings are plain. On the basis thereof, the 
jurisdictions’ systems seem well suited. However, one important discrepancy persists – 
neither of the Constitution Acts expressly recognises the right to fair labour practices. As 
such, employees in Canada do not enjoy Constitutional protection against the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed as South African workers do.
1484
 Given the fundamental role of this right 
in South African labour law, it is necessary to address this difference before examining the 
intricacies of Canadian judicial review. 
 
In addition to the absence of Constitutional protection, Canadian employees are afforded no 
statutory protection from unfair dismissal. Nonetheless, the common law does prohibit 
dismissals of non-unionised employees without ‘just cause’.1485 Equally in case of unionised 
employees, collective agreements routinely include a provision to the effect that ‘just cause’ 
is a prerequisite for lawful dismissal. ‘Just cause’ in each case is accordingly premised on 
discrete causes of action. Despite their distinctive origins, the common law principles 
associated therewith are largely aligned.
1486
 Furthermore, while Canadian courts have 
refrained from importing an implied duty of fairness into employment contracts,
1487
 the 
notion of ‘just cause’ remains akin in many respects to the South African concept of ‘fair 
dismissal’. Carter et al describe the components of ‘just cause’ as follows: 
                                                          
1482
 And precludes reviews of CCMA awards under PAJA; Sidumo paras 94-104. PAJA (with a few exceptions) 
is otherwise universally applicable to administrative action in South Africa. 
1483
 Regardless of the grounds of review provided for in applicable legislation; refer, in this regard, to Khosa and 
the discussion thereof in chapter 6. 
1484
 Section 23 of the Constitution; sections 187 & 188 of the LRA. 
1485
 Carter et al at 189 para 350. 
1486
 Ibid. 
1487
 Carter et al at 155-156 para 302A; Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd [1998] 3 SCR 701. Consult further 
G England, R Wood & I Christie Employment Law in Canada 4 ed (2005) at chapter 14. Canadian courts’ 
reluctance to acknowledge an implied term of fairness in employment contracts again resembles South African 
law; SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie (2010) 31 ILJ 529 (SCA). 
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‘(1) The employer’s decision must be rational in the sense that the employee’s 
conduct must cause demonstrable and substantial harm to the production process or to 
management’s symbolic authority to command before cause will be grounded….1488 
 
…(2) The penalty of dismissal must not be disproportionately severe on the worker in 
relation to the degree of harm sustained by the employer as a result of the employee’s 
behaviour… 
 
…(3) The employer’s actions must be procedurally fair.’1489  
 
Clearly, just as South African employers may dismiss employees for fair reasons alone,
1490
 
Canadian employers are prohibited from dismissing employees irrationally, on discriminatory 
grounds or in bad faith.
1491
 The proportionality component of ‘just cause’ further obliges 
Canadian employers to take mitigating circumstances into account before terminating 
employment contracts.
1492
 Moreover, they are required to implement corrective and 
progressive disciplinary measures prior to dismissal. Procedural fairness in turn dictates that 
employees should be forewarned of their employers’ dissatisfaction with their conduct or 
performance.
1493
 In light of items 4, 8 and 9 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals
1494
 in 
particular, the similarities between proportionality and procedural fairness in Canada and 
South Africa are evident. As such, the key elements of ‘just cause’ appear sufficiently 
analogous to those informing the concept of ‘fair dismissal’ in South Africa, to affirm the 
countries’ comparative suitability in this regard.1495 
 
                                                          
1488
 Incompetence, insubordination and serious misconduct may seemingly therefore all constitute ‘just cause’; 
Colliar v Robinson Diesel Injection Ltd (1988) 89 CLLC 14037 (Sask QB); Veer v Dover Corp (Canada) Ltd 
(1999) 99 CLLC 210037 (Alta QB); Lee v Parking Corp of Vancouver (1999) 39 CCEL (2d) 135 (BCSC), as 
cited by Carter et al. Note too Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v Alberta 2010 ABCA 216; there, the 
Court of Appeal referred to the arbitrator’s finding that the employee’s conduct ‘…was serious enough to 
undermine the employment relationship beyond repair, justifying discharge.’ and that the employer accordingly 
had just cause for dismissal; AUPE 2010 ABCA para 45. 
1489
 Carter et al at 189 para 350; England, Wood & Christie at chapter 14. 
1490
 See sections 187 & 188 of the LRA. 
1491
 Ibid; consider too the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (‘EEA’). 
1492
 Ibid. 
1493
 Ibid at 189-190. 
1494
 See the Code of Good Practice Dismissals, Schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
1495
 Ibid. For general principles of unfair dismissal law in South Africa, refer to Darcy Du Toit et al Labour 
Relations Law: A comprehensive guide 5 ed (2006); John Grogan Workplace Law 10 ed (2009) and Andre Van 
Niekerk et al Law@Work (2008). For the impact of just cause on employees’ rights to notice of termination, 
consult Carter et al at 189 para 350; England, Wood & Christie at chapter 14. Compare this to the South African 
position; section 37 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (‘the BCEA’). 
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Supporting these parallels are certain Canadian statutes, which expressly oblige arbitrators to 
take account of the Human Rights Code
1496
 when interpreting collective agreements.
1497
 In 
jurisdictions in which these statutes exist, employers are barred from disregarding their 
employees’ rights by relying directly on the provisions of otherwise relevant collective 
agreements. Violations of basic rights are therefore impermissible in the employment context, 
notwithstanding agreement to the contrary.
1498
 Once more, this reflects the position in South 
African law.
1499
 Given the Human Rights Code’s1500 standing, together with the similarities 
between ‘just cause’ and ‘fair dismissal’, South African employees’ Canadian counterparts 
are afforded at least a comparable measure of protection from dismissal.  
 
When holistically assessed, the numerous links between the countries’ systems of labour 
dispute resolution counter the criticisms which may be levelled against their compatibility, 
due to the lack of Constitutional protection from unfair dismissal in Canada.
1501
 Endorsing 
this argument is the administrative principle of fairness, which infuses and informs Canadian 
judicial review generally.
1502
 In this way, fairness is granted a measure of Constitutional 
recognition in Canada too.
1503
 There is accordingly no reason why the absence of an express 
right to fair labour practices in Canada should preclude a comparison of the respective 
jurisdictions’ approaches.1504 Consequently, Canadian principles may legitimately be used as 
a basis from which to revise the South African test for review.
1505
 In order to do so, a 
                                                          
1496
 The Human Rights Code RSO 1990 c H19 (‘Human Rights Code’). Note, however, that this code does not 
expressly recognize the right to fair labour practices as a fundamental human right.  
1497
 Consider, for example, section 48(12)(j) of Schedule A to the OLRA; the effect of the section is to 
incorporate the rights contained in the Human Rights Code into all collective agreements; Parry Sound (District) 
Social Services Administration Board v OPSEU, Local 324 [2003] 2 SCR 157. 
1498
 Parry Sound; Alberta (Soliciter General) and AUPE (Jungwirth) [2010] AGAA No 5 (QL) (Ponak). 
1499
 Section 189 of the LRA declares dismissal for discriminatory reasons automatically unfair; consider too the 
EEA which specifically prohibits discrimination in the workplace. 
1500
 The Human Rights Code. Every Canadian province and territory has now introduced human rights 
legislation; Carter et al at 102-103 para 198. 
1501
 The dangers of inappropriate comparative analyses are canvassed by both Kahn-Freund and Arthurs (2007). 
1502
 Adding a further Constitutional element to labour dispute resolution in Canada is the authority of labour 
arbitrators to award Charter remedies; Weber v Ontario Hydro [1995] 2 SCR 929; David Mullan ‘Recent 
developments in administrative law – The apparent triumph of deference!’ (1998-1999) 12 Can J Admin L & 
Prac 191 at 203-204; for critique of Weber, consult Ray Brown & Brian Etherington ‘Weber v Ontario Hydro: A 
denial of access to justice for the organized employee?’ (1996) 4 Canadian Labour & Employment Law Journal 
183. 
1503
 For the implications of the Constitution Acts and parties’ rights to procedural fairness, consult Baker and 
Gruber; Gruber avers that reviewing courts in Canada are ultimately concerned with determining whether 
challenged decisions are unjust or unfair. 
1504
 At the time of writing, Malawi was the only other known jurisdiction in which a right to fair labour practices 
was expressly incorporated into its Constitution; section 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
1505
 Of CCMA arbitration awards under section 145 of the LRA at least. 
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comprehensive appraisal of Canadian principles of judicial review is necessary. This is 
conducted in the chapter which follows.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE CANADIAN LAW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The appropriate application of reasonableness has been contentious in Canada for some 
time.
1506
 While the details of reasonableness continue to challenge the judiciary, the wealth of 
Canadian jurisprudence on the subject forms an accessible and broad base from which to 
draw guidance. In addition, the Canadian courts have developed increasingly pragmatic and 
reliable measures of scrutiny. By analysing Canadian law and commentary, many of the 
questions arising from Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others
1507
 may 
be resolved. Specifically, the boundaries between the section 145 grounds of review and 
reasonableness,
1508
 and reasonableness and rational justifiability,
1509
 may be clarified. The 
relationship between the procedural and substantive features of the standard and the 
circumstances in which reasonableness may be resolutively applied are similarly explained. 
Finally, Canadian contextual criteria, analogous to those described in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others,
1510
  reveal the most 
important of these for the purposes of delineating the scope of review. In turn, a more reliable 
and apposite formulation of reasonableness under section 145 may be devised.  
 
The jurisdictions’ comparative compatibility was established in the preceding chapter.1511 
This chapter will focus on the substance of Canadian case law and commentary on judicial 
review, together with the insights these offer into understanding reasonableness under 
Sidumo. The value of these principles and their potential manner of application in South 
                                                          
1506
 See Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 paras 132-133. 
1507
 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
1508
 In particular, the boundaries between gross irregularities and reasonableness and reasonableness and excess 
of powers; section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’ or ‘the Act’). 
1509
 As defined in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC), read with 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others [2006] 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA) paras 29-
30. 
1510
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 
(CC) para 45. 
1511
 For difficulties with comparative analysis generally, see Otto Kahn-Freund ‘On uses and misuses of 
comparative law’ (1974) 37 Mod L Rev 1; M Reimann & R Zimmerman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (2006); K Zweigert & H Kotz An Introduction to comparative law 3 ed (1998) and HW 
Arthurs ‘Compared to what? The UCLA comparative labor law project and the future of comparative labor law’ 
(2007) 28 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 591. 
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Africa will then be examined. Finally, a revised approach to reasonableness under section 
145 will be proposed.
1512
 By means of this approach, the uncertainty and inconsistency
1513
 
surrounding reviews of CCMA
1514
 awards may be alleviated. 
 
Amongst the most significant Canadian cases in this arena are New Brunswick (Board of 
Management) v Dunsmuir
1515
 and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v 
Khosa.
1516
 They are therefore discussed in depth below. Together, Dunsmuir and Khosa 
define both the nature of reasonableness and the relationship between common law principles 
and statutory grounds of review. They further outline the tenets of judicial review and many 
of the difficulties associated with it in Canada.  Adding to these, the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s (‘SCC’) earlier judgment in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)
1517
 is informative. So too are the Federal Courts Act (‘FCA’) and British 
Columbia’s Administrative Tribunals Act (‘ATA’) germane.1518 Both Baker and these statutes 
are consequently appraised following the analyses of Dunsmuir and Khosa. Before doing so, 
however, it is necessary to provide an overview of the principles applicable to review, prior 
to Dunsmuir.  
 
2. STANDARDS OF REVIEW PRIOR TO DUNSMUIR  
 
Before Dunsmuir, three standards of review were available to reviewing courts assessing 
allegedly substantive irregularities.
1519
 These included patent unreasonableness,
1520
 
reasonableness simpliciter
1521
 and correctness.
1522
 Whereas patent unreasonableness required 
                                                          
1512
 Note that unless otherwise stated, references to ‘section 145’ are references to section 145 of the LRA. 
1513
 In relation to both substantive law and the manner in which the standard is to be applied. 
1514
 The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (‘the CCMA’). 
1515
 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190. 
1516
 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa 2009 SCC 12. 
1517
 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
1518
 Federal Courts Act RSC 1985 cF-7 (‘FCA’); Administrative Tribunals Act SBC 2004 c45 (‘ATA’). 
1519
 Substantive irregularities include the grounds of review relating to unreasonableness and illegality, as 
discussed in chapter 5. 
1520
 The concept of patent unreasonableness was first introduced by the SCC in CUPE, Local 963 v New 
Brunswick Liquor Corp [1979] 2 SCR 227 (‘CUPE (1979)’). The Court indicated that to survive the test, 
decisions should not be ‘so patently unreasonable that [the] construction [thereof … could not] be rationally 
supported by the relevant legislation and demands intervention by the court upon review.’; CUPE (1979) at 237. 
1521
 Reasonableness simpliciter was recognized for the first time in Canada (Director of Investigation & 
Research) v Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748. In the Court’s view, unreasonable decisions were those which were 
not ‘…supported by any reasons that [...could…] stand up to a somewhat probing examination.’; Southam para 
57. 
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extreme deference to administrative determinations,
1523
 correctness allowed for consideration 
afresh, with reasonableness simpliciter falling somewhere in between.
1524
  Generally 
speaking, when determining the appropriate standard
1525
 courts engaged in a ‘pragmatic and 
functional analysis’.1526 This entailed evaluating the following aspects of the dispute in 
question: 
 
a) The presence (if any) of a privative or preclusive clause in the governing 
legislation;
1527
 
b) The nature of the question facing review; 
c) The decision-maker’s expertise;1528 and 
d) The purpose of the governing legislation and the framework in which it operated.1529 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1522
 For examples of these standards, see Southam; Baker and Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982. For the distinctions between the standards, consult Ryan v Law Society 
(New Brunswick) [2003] 1 SCR 247 para 50. 
1523
 Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia [2003] 1 SCR 226 para 35. 
1524
 Dunsmuir para 34. According to the Court in Southam, while patent unreasonableness would be obvious and 
apparent on the face of the decision, unreasonableness simpliciter would only be detectable following a more 
searching examination. Similarly, in Ryan, the SCC held that unreasonable decisions included those containing 
‘no line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to 
the conclusion at which it arrived.’ A patently unreasonable decision, on the other hand, would be one suffering 
from a severe and obvious defect, ‘…so flawed that no amount of curial deference [could] justify letting it 
stand.’; Ryan paras 52-53. 
1525
 The purpose of the analysis was (and still is) to determine whether the legislature intended the question in 
dispute to be decided by an administrative decision-maker or by the courts; G Cartier ‘The Baker effect: A new 
interface between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and administrative law – The case of discretion’ 
in David Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law  (1999) 61 at 64; Grant Huscroft ‘Judicial review from CUPE 
to CUPE: Less is not always more’ in G Huscroft & M Taggart M (eds) ‘Inside and Outside Administrative Law: 
Essays in Honour of Mullan’ (2006) 297 at 310-311; David Elliot ‘Khosa – Still Searching for that Star’ (2009) 
33(2) Man LJ 14.  
1526
 For recent discussions of the pragmatic and functional approach, refer to L Sossin & C Flood ‘The 
contextual turn: Iacobucci’s legacy and the standard of review in administrative law’ (2007) 57 UTLJ 581; P 
Bryden ‘Understanding the standard of review in administrative law’ (2005) 54 UNBLJ 75. The most significant 
decisions in this regard are Pushpanathan; UES, Local 298 v Bibeault [1988] 2 SCR 1048 at 1083-1087; Suresh 
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3 (Can); Ryan and Dr Q. Consider too DP 
Jones ‘Two more decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada on the standard of review’ (2003) 48(3d) Admin LR 
71. In both Suresh and Dr Q, the SCC suggested that it was necessary to apply a pragmatic and functional 
analysis in every case.  
1527
 Strong privative clauses usually indicated the need for greater deference, while the absence of a privative 
clause suggested review for correctness. Note, nonetheless, that even a statutory right of appeal did not always 
warrant correctness review; Dr Q para 27; Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent Brokers) [1994] 2 SCR 
557 (SCC); Jones (2003) was one of many who questioned the validity of this approach, however. 
1528
 In numerous decisions, the Courts indicated that expertise was the critical factor in this analysis; Southam 
para 50; United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joinders of America, Local 579 v Bradco Construction Limited 
[1993] 2 SCR 316; in Bradco, the importance of expertise in the context of labour relations specifically was 
emphasized; Bradco para 32. See also National Corn Growers Association v Canada (Import Tribunal) [1990] 2 
SCR 1324; Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop [1993] 1 SCR 554 and Dr Q. Expertise was assessed relatively 
to that of the reviewing court; DM Mullan ‘Establishing the standard of review: The struggle for complexity?’ 
(2004) 17 Can J Admin L & Prac 59 at 73; JM Keyes ‘Judicial review and the interpretation of legislation: Who 
gets the last word?’ (2006) 19 Can J Admin L & Prac 119 at 125. 
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Both the multiplicity of the available standards and the ‘pragmatic and functional analysis’ 
were severely criticised.
1530
 The primary basis of the attack against the former was the 
difficulty of distinguishing between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness 
simpliciter.
1531
 Exacerbating the contention was the anomaly associated with patent 
unreasonableness, which allowed unreasonable decisions (provided they were not grossly or 
‘patently’ unreasonable) to survive judicial scrutiny.1532 The ‘pragmatic and functional 
analysis’, on the other hand, was condemned for its distracting quality as a threshold enquiry. 
Rather than emphasising the merits of review proceedings, courts became preoccupied with 
the analysis, neglecting the true substance of disputes as a result.
1533
 In responding to these 
challenges in Dunsmuir, the SCC re-evaluated Canadian principles of judicial review 
comprehensively, purportedly overhauling the test in the process. The Court’s decision is 
detailed below. 
 
3. NEW BRUNSWICK (BOARD OF MANAGEMENT) V DUNSMUIR1534 
 
In brief, the facts of Dunsmuir were as follows: Dunsmuir was employed as a legal officer by 
the Department of Justice in New Brunswick. During his tenure,
1535
 he was repeatedly 
warned of the need to improve his performance. He was similarly reprimanded for working 
outside of his public office in the private sector.
1536
 After failing to rectify his behaviour, 
Dunsmuir’s employment was terminated with 4 months’ notice. While reference to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1529
 G van Harten, G Heckman & D Mullan Administrative Law Cases, Texts and Materials 6 ed (2010) at 679; 
Pushpanathan; Bibeault. For a summary of the role of the ‘nature of the question in dispute’ in this analysis, 
consult Keyes at 129, 136-138 & 147. The pragmatic and functional analysis factors are comparable to those 
applicable in South Africa; Hira & another v Booysen & another 1992 (4) SA 69 (AD) at 93-95; Bato Star. 
1530
 Toronto (City) v CUPE Local 79 [2003] 3 SCR 77 (‘Toronto (City)’); Chamberlain Surrey School District 
No 36, 2002 SCC 86; Voice Construction v Construction & General Workers Union, Local 92, 2004 SCC 23; 
Council of Canadians with Disabilities v VIA Rail Canada Inc 2007 SCC 15; Dunsmuir para 32; Mullan ‘The 
struggle for complexity?’ (2004); Elliot. For further criticism of the state of judicial review at that time, see the 
references cited in Toronto (City) para 61 onwards. 
1531
 In principle, the magnitude and immediacy of the defect distinguished patent unreasonableness from 
reasonableness simpliciter; Ryan paras 52-53; Southam; Toronto (City). 
1532
 Toronto (City) para 108; Dunsmuir paras 42 & 97; Voice Construction; DM Mullan ‘Recent developments in 
the standard of review’ in Canadian Bar Association (Ontario) Taking the Tribunal to Court: A Practical Guide 
for Administrative Law Practitioners (2000) at 25; David E Gruber ‘Judicial review advocacy in the post-
Dunsmuir era’ (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 303 at 308. 
1533
 Dunsmuir para 133; for an extensive commentary on critiques of this approach, see Mullan ‘The struggle for 
complexity’ (2004); While these were not the only criticisms of the system, a comprehensive analysis thereof is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1534
 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190. 
1535
 Of approximately two and a half years. 
1536
 Dunsmuir paras 2-7. 
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unsatisfactory skill level was made in the notice of termination, the reasons for his dismissal 
were not clearly stipulated.
1537
  
 
In response, Dunsmuir instituted grievance proceedings under the provisions of the Public 
Service Labour Relations Act (‘PSLRA’).1538 His complaints included that he had not been 
given reasons for his dismissal, he had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond 
to his employer’s concerns of poor performance, his dismissal had been procedurally unfair 
and his notice period had been inadequate.
1539
 His grievance was unsuccessful, however, and 
Dunsmuir subsequently referred the matter for adjudication by an adjudicator appointed by 
the Labour and Employment Board.
1540
 The principal issues were twofold. The first 
questioned the adjudicator’s jurisdiction to determine whether Dunsmuir’s dismissal had been 
for cause, while the second addressed the procedural fairness of the termination of his 
employment.
1541
 Following an assessment of the law, the adjudicator concluded first that he 
did, indeed, have authority to consider whether the dismissal had been for cause.
1542
 
Secondly, he found that Dunsmuir had been entitled to procedural fairness but had been 
denied that entitlement.
1543
 The termination of his employment was accordingly void ab initio 
and reinstatement was warranted.
1544
 Furthermore, ruled the adjudicator, should his decision 
be overturned on review the appropriate notice period would be 8 months.
1545
  
 
Dunsmuir’s employer successfully instituted review proceedings in the Court of the Queen’s 
Bench.
1546
 The matter was then taken on appeal, where New Brunswick’s Appellate Court1547  
                                                          
1537
 Ibid para 7. 
1538
 Public Service Labour Relations Act RSNB 1973 cP-25 (‘PSLRA’).  
1539
 Dunsmuir para 9. 
1540
 While appointed by the Labour and Employment Board, the adjudicator was selected by agreement between 
the parties in accordance with the provisions of the PSLRA. 
1541
 Dunsmuir paras 10-17. 
1542
 Ibid para 12; for confirmation that Dunsmuir has not detracted from parties’ rights to procedural fairness in 
the general administrative sphere, see Canada (Attorney General) v Mavi [2011] 2 SCR 504. 
1543
 Ibid para 15.  
1544
 Ibid. 
1545
 Ibid para 16. 
1546
 New Brunswick v Dunsmuir 2005 NBQB 270 (CanLII); Dunsmuir paras 17 & 20. There, the Court had 
applied a correctness standard to the adjudicator’s jurisdictional finding, holding that he had exceeded his 
jurisdiction by entertaining an inquiry into the reasons for Dunsmuir’s dismissal. His preliminary ruling was 
consequently quashed. The adjudicator’s determination on the merits was similarly overturned. In the Court’s 
view, the determination did not meet the reasonableness simpliciter standard. Only his direction to award 
Dunsmuir 8 months’ notice was upheld. 
1547
 Dunsmuir v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of New Brunswick, as represented by the Board 
of Management 2006 NBCA 27 (CanLII); Dunsmuir para 21. 
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confirmed the lower Court’s findings, albeit on the basis of discrete grounds of review.1548 An 
aggrieved Dunsmuir proceeded to the SCC.
1549
 The Court began by stating that a thorough re-
assessment of Canadian judicial review was necessary.
1550
 From the outset, it emphasized the 
significance of review to the rule of law, describing it as follows:  
 
‘By virtue of the rule of law principle, all exercises of public authority must find their 
source in law. All decision-making powers have legal limits, derived from the 
enabling statute itself, the common or civil law or the Constitution. Judicial review is 
the means by which the courts supervise those who exercise statutory powers, to 
ensure that they do not overstep their legal authority. The function of judicial review 
is therefore to ensure the legality, the reasonableness and the fairness of the 
administrative process.’1551  
 
The SCC cautioned, nonetheless, that the value of review was to be balanced against the 
supremacy of the legislature and the principles of democracy. As such, courts were to abstain 
from undue interference with administrative conduct.
1552
 The primary role of reviewing 
courts was to establish whether the relevant decision-maker had kept within the confines of 
its statutorily granted authority. Only where it had not, would its decision be reviewable.
1553
 
Thus, when determining the applicable standard of review, held the SCC, the principal 
inquiry was directed at identifying the extent of the authority conferred upon the relevant 
decision-maker, with reference to the dispute concerned.
1554
 That required ascertaining the 
legislature’s intent when conferring the administrative powers in question.1555  
 
                                                          
1548
 The Court applied the reasonableness standard to reviewing the adjudicator’s preliminary ruling and the 
correctness standard to his decision on the merits. It concluded that both his preliminary decision and his factual 
findings were reviewable and the appeal was accordingly dismissed; Dunsmuir paras 22-23. 
1549
 The SCC is the highest court in Canada with the final authority to determine disputes; Herbert M Kritzer (ed) 
Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social, and Cultural Encyclopeadia 1: A-D (2002) at 255-257; see also 
section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (‘the Canadian Constitution’), read with the Supreme Court Act RSC 
1985 cS-26. 
1550
 Dunsmuir paras 24-26; in the SCC’s view, the case required an assessment of judicial review principles 
applicable to both substance and procedure. 
1551
 Ibid para 28. Note once more the similarity between this formulation and section 33 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’). 
1552
 Ibid para 27. To this end, there is again an association between the foundations of Canadian and South 
African judicial review; adding to this, the Canadian Courts’ authority to engage in judicial review of 
administrative decisions is analogously based on the Canadian Constitution and the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part 2 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (‘the Charter’) (collectively hereinafter ‘the Constitution Acts’); 
Dunsmuir paras 31-32. 
1553
 Evidently, corresponding principles apply in South Africa. These were discussed in chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation. 
1554
 Dunsmuir para 29. 
1555
 This approach reflects the long accepted jurisprudence of the Court; consider Toronto (City).  
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In the majority’s opinion, the Canadian system of judicial review was in desperate need of 
revision.
1556
 Most concerning to the Court was that the existing approach failed to provide 
practical guidance as to when decisions were inadequate.
1557
 What was needed therefore was:  
‘… a test that offer[ed] guidance, [wa]s not formalistic or artificial, and permit[ted] review 
where justice require[d] it, but not otherwise.’1558 
 
To begin with, the SCC dispensed with the dual concepts of reasonableness, collapsing 
reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness into a single standard of 
reasonableness.
1559
 Importantly, remarked Bastarache and LeBel JJ,
1560
 reducing the available 
standards from three to two did not invite lesser deference to administrative determinations – 
the purpose of doing so was merely to redirect judicial attention from the standard of review 
analysis to the substance of cases.
1561
 Though the flexibility associated with multiple 
measures of reasonableness was laudable, the benefits thereof could equally be achieved by 
an adequate definition of the concept.
1562
  In seeking this definition, the Court turned to the 
characteristics of reasonableness. First, reasonableness acknowledged that not all questions 
lent themselves to but one result. Instead, a range of rational outcomes might exist in any 
given case. When scrutinising decisions on the basis of alleged unreasonableness, courts were 
accordingly to: 
 
‘…inquire into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the 
process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes.’1563  
 
In addition, and comparably to the South African standard, reasonableness comprised both 
procedural and substantive features. From the Court’s expression of these features, it may 
broadly be inferred that procedural reasonableness governs reasons while substantive 
reasonableness addresses findings.
1564
 The implications of this for understanding Sidumo are 
                                                          
1556
 Dunsmuir para 33. 
1557
 As Gruber records: ‘A common argument raised by commentators is that Dunsmuir and Khosa do not 
provide a precise formula for determining either the applicable standard of review or the outcome from applying 
the standard.’; Gruber at 312. Note too Jones (2003) at 126. 
1558
 Dunsmuir para 43. 
1559
 Ibid paras 44-45. 
1560
 Writing for the majority of the Court.  
1561
 Dunsmuir para 48. 
1562
 Ibid paras 44-45. 
1563
 Ibid para 47. 
1564
 Note, however, Bastarache’s criticism of this view which is examined below; Michel Bastarache 
‘Modernising judicial review’ (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 227. Comparably, in South Africa, both 
procedure and substance may be scrutinized when engaged in reasonableness review; Anton Myburgh 
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explained in later paragraphs. Expanding thereon in Dunsmuir, the SCC remarked that 
reasonableness was ultimately concerned with: 
 
‘…the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-
making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a 
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts 
and the law.’1565  
 
In other words, the essence of reasonableness in Canada is that, to pass muster, the decision-
maker’s reasoning process must be justifiable, clear and comprehensible. Secondly, the 
decision-maker’s conclusion – while not obliged to be correct – must be supported by the 
evidence and the purportedly applicable law.
1566
 Whereas South African Labour Courts have 
failed to formulate reasonableness in terms precisely identical to these, the similarities 
between the jurisdictions’ constructions of reasonableness are plain.1567 As alluded to above, 
of greatest utility for South African courts, is the SCC’s pronouncement on the dual elements 
of reasonableness. By emphasizing the need for both aspects of reasonableness, the inability 
of substantive reasonableness in Canada to invariably remedy procedural defects is 
evident.
1568
 Moreover, the Court’s attention to the articulation of reasons when establishing 
reasonableness provides a starting point from which to identify the boundaries between 
substantive and procedural unreasonableness, while maintaining the distinctions between 
Carephone and Sidumo cited in Fidelity.
1569
 Additional clarity on these issues may be 
garnered from Khosa’s discussion of Dunsmuir. The manner in which they do so, is 
addressed in detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
Having defined reasonableness in these terms, the SCC in Dunsmuir considered the related 
concept of deference. In Canada, the notions of reasonableness and deference are as 
intimately connected as they are in South Africa. There, deference will not be paid to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Reviewing the review test: Recent judgments and developments’ (2011) 32 ILJ 1497; Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner Nggeleni & others [2011] 4 BLLR 404 (LC) para 11. 
1565
 Dunsmuir para 47. 
1566
 Ibid para 47. This again reflects the South African position; consider section 33 of the Constitution; Fidelity 
Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC) paras 96-99 and chapter 3. 
1567
 For reasonableness review in South African labour dispute resolution, consult Fidelity paras 96-10; Myburgh 
(2011); Anton Myburgh ‘Sidumo v Rustplats: How have the Courts dealt with it?’ (2009) 30 ILJ 1 and Anton 
Myburgh ‘Determining and reviewing sanction after Sidumo’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1; see too chapters 3 and 4 hereof. 
1568
 The reach of substantive reasonableness (in so far as it may excuse procedural errors) is considered in later 
paragraphs; note, however, Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador 
(Treasury Board) [2011] 3 SCR 708. 
1569
 Fidelity paras 102-103. In turn, the limits of the intersection between gross irregularities and reasonableness, 
and section 145 and reasonableness generally, may be revealed. 
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decision-maker or its decision unless the reasonableness standard applies.
1570
 As the Court 
noted in Dunsmuir, deference does not require complete judicial subservience to 
administrative decisions or interpretations; it merely proscribes undue intrusion. A suitable 
balance between the two must nevertheless be struck. In this regard, held the SCC, 
Dyzenhaus’s depiction of ‘deference as respect’ as requiring from the courts ‘not submission 
but a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a 
decision…,’1571 was apt. So too was Mullan’s description of the relationship between 
reasonableness and deference. According to Mullan, deference:  
 
‘…recognizes the reality that, in many instances, those working day to day in the 
implementation of frequently complex administrative schemes have or will develop a 
considerable degree of expertise or field sensitivity to the imperatives and nuances of 
the legislative regime.’1572  
 
As such, surmised the majority, deference obliged reviewing courts to respect legislative 
allocations of decision-making power whether to the judiciary, executive or administration. 
Moreover, the notion demanded that respect be paid to the expertise and experience of 
administrative bodies, the processes and decisions in which they were involved, and the 
discrete functions assigned to the branches of government respectively.
1573
 Yet, deference did 
not refute the need for correctness review in appropriate circumstances. On the contrary, 
observed the Court, the standard of correctness was crucial when reviewing jurisdictional and 
specified legal questions.
1574
  
 
From the Court’s discussion of deference, clear parallels between Canadian and South 
African law are discernible. In the context of section 145 proceedings, both the expertise of 
CCMA commissioners and the conditions in which they operate are important considerations 
                                                          
1570
 In contrast, correctness does not usually warrant a deferential approach to administrative decisions. In both 
Pezim and Southam, nonetheless, the SCC attested to the need for deference notwithstanding the presence of 
statutory rights of appeal in the relevant enabling statutes. There has thus been debate since Dunsmuir as to 
whether deference may continue to apply despite the absence of privative clauses from, or the presence of 
statutory rights of appeal in, enabling legislation; Mullan ‘The struggle for complexity’ (2004) at 76-78; David 
Quayat ‘The correctness battle rages: Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ 
Association’ (2012) 25 Can J Admin L & Prac 179 at 189-190. 
1571
 Dunsmuir para 48; see also David Dyzenhaus ‘The politics of deference: Judicial review and democracy’ in 
Michael Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279 at 286; Baker para 65 and Ryan para 49. 
1572
 Dunsmuir para 49, citing Mullan ‘The struggle for complexity?’ (2004) at 93. For comparable sentiments in 
the South African setting, consider Sidumo para 118 and Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] JOL 
22087 (LAC) at 13. 
1573
 Dunsmuir para 49. 
1574
 Ibid para 50. 
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on review.
1575
 However, in so far as the SCC referred to the role of correctness in evaluating 
legal findings, the jurisdictions’ positions are discrete.1576 The Labour Court’s attitude to 
scrutinizing legal errors is unpredictable – in some instances correctness is applied while in 
others reasonableness is.
1577
 Given the implications of inconsistency for substantive law, 
clarity on the proper approach is needed. How Canadian law assists in achieving this clarity is 
revealed through further analysis of Dunsmuir. 
 
Having thoroughly canvassed deference, the SCC next revised the pragmatic and functional 
approach to determining the applicable standard of review. It began by formulating a set of 
guidelines for preliminary consideration. These guidelines pointed to but did not dictate the 
appropriate standard. Factors typically indicative of reasonableness included first, the 
presence of a privative clause in the decision-maker’s home statute.1578 Where the question 
for determination involved interpreting enabling legislation (or legislation intimately 
connected to the relevant decision-maker’s daily functions), reasonableness was equally 
likely to apply.
1579
 So too would deference be fitting in case of specialist decision-makers 
having particular experience or expertise. Notably, the Court stressed the experience and 
skills of labour adjudicators as exemplars of such expertise.
1580
 In contrast, questions of law 
                                                          
1575
 Ibid. Sidumo para 118; Ellerine Holdings at 13. 
1576
 Whether the Labour Courts do so depends on the formulation they attribute to the error in question. Refer, in 
this regard, to Myburgh (2011) at 1518.  Yet, South African courts frequently conflate ordinary legal questions 
with true questions of jurisdiction (or alleged excesses of power), thereby unduly enabling correctness review. 
Arguably, this occurred in SA Rugby Players Association & others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd & others [2008] 9 
BLLR 845 (LAC) (‘SARPA’) paras 39-40; Chabeli v CCMA & others [2010] 4 BLLR 389 (LC) paras 8-10; 
Gabriel Tsietsi Banda v Emfuleni Local Municipality & others (LC) unreported case no J1214/08 and Asara 
Wine Estate & Hotel (Pty) Ltd v van Rooyen & others (2012) 33 ILJ 363 (LC) amongst others. For further 
discussion of this issue, consult Emma Fergus ‘Circumventing review – When is a question jurisdictional?’ 
(2012) 29 SALJ 504. For the confusion surrounding jurisdictional questions generally, consider Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd and others [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC); Makhanya v University of Zululand [2009] 4 All SA 146 
(SCA) and Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security [2009] 12 BLLR 1145 (CC).   
1577
 Compare, for example, Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2010] JOL 26444 (LC); 
Clarence v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service (2011) 32 ILJ 2927 (LAC); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) 
Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) (‘Shoprite Checkers 1’); Shoprite Checkers v CCMA & 
others [2008] 9 BLLR 838 (LAC) (‘Shoprite Checkers 2’) and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others 
[2009] JOL 23356 (SCA) (‘Shoprite Checkers 3’) (collectively, the ‘Shoprite Checkers trilogy’) as discussed in 
chapter 3. 
1578
 Dunsmuir para 52. This factor was held not to be determinative, however. 
1579
 Ibid para 54. Since Dunsmuir, the SCC has indicated that reasonableness should be presumed to apply where 
decision-makers are interpreting their ‘home statutes’. Seemingly, the presumption may be rebutted where ‘true’ 
questions of jurisdiction arise; Alberta Teachers’ Association v Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) 
2011 SCC 61 para 39. For critique of this decision, see Quayat.  
1580
 Ibid. Note that expertise ostensibly constitutes the principal reason for paying deference to labour arbitrators’ 
adjudicators’ and boards’ decisions in Canada. While expertise and daily engagement have a role to play in 
justifying the need for deference in section 145 proceedings, the dominant justifications therefor in South Africa 
are efficiency and flexibility. The distinction may partly be explained by the fact that reviewing courts in Canada 
do not specialize in labour law as the Labour Courts in South Africa do.  
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of both ‘central importance to the legal system…and outside the… specialized area of 
expertise’ of the decision-maker would attract correctness review.1581 So too would 
jurisdictional
1582
 and Constitutional determinations.
1583
 Correctness review of legal, 
jurisdictional and Constitutional findings, remarked the SCC, was pivotal to ensuring 
coherence and predictability in administrative decisions.
1584
 It was further vital to maintaining 
the rule of law. Nonetheless, whereas many legal questions would be appraised on the basis 
of correctness, this would not be true of all cases.
1585
 Where the question was one of mixed 
law and fact or of minimal import to the greater community,
1586
 reasonableness would be 
warranted.
1587
 Finally, factual, discretionary and policy based determinations would also 
invite reasonableness review.
1588
  
 
To the extent to which these guidelines direct that labour boards’ and arbitrators’ decisions be 
reviewed for reasonableness, they reflect the principles associated with section 145. 
However, as alluded to above, the same cannot be said for the jurisdictions’ attitudes to legal 
findings. In South Africa, the approach to assessing commissioners’ legal determinations on 
review is contentious.
1589
 The Dunsmuir directives consequently offer a valuable point of 
departure. Of greatest utility are the distinctions drawn by the SCC between the standards of 
review applicable to discrete forms of legal error. For various reasons, applying different 
measures of review to different types of legal error may be useful.
1590
  
 
                                                          
1581
 Dunsmuir para 55. See too Toronto (City) para 62. 
1582
 Dunsmuir para 57; the SCC added that: ‘…true jurisdiction questions arise where the tribunal must explicitly 
determine whether its statutory grant of power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter. The tribunal 
must interpret the grant of authority correctly or its action will be found to be ultra vires or to constitute a 
wrongful decline of jurisdiction.’; Dunsmuir  para 59.  
1583
 Dunsmuir paras 57-59 & 123-124. Consider too Westcoast Energy Inc v Canada (National Energy Board) 
[1998] 1 SCR 322. For general principles of Constitutional review in Canada, consult Multani c Marguerite-
Bourgeoys (Commission scolaire) [2006] 1 SCR 256; David Mullan ‘Dunsmuir v New Brunswick: Standard of 
review and procedural fairness for public servants: Let’s try again!’ (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 117 ftnt 
40; David Mullan ‘Section 7 and administrative law deference: No room at the inn?’ (2006) 34(2d) Sup Crt L 
Rev 227 and David Mullan ‘Administrative tribunals and judicial review of charter issues after Multani’ (2006-
2007) 21 NJCL 127; compare too Mullan ‘The struggle for complexity’ (2004) at 77. 
1584
 For further debate in this regard, see Keyes at 134-135. 
1585
 Dunsmuir para 51. 
1586
 Or, as previously noted, one pertaining to the decision-maker’s enabling statute or a statute intimately 
connected thereto. 
1587
 Dunsmuir para 53. For review of statutory interpretations before Dunsmuir, consult Keyes. Keyes validly 
questions whether reviewing courts are necessarily better equipped to interpret enabling (and related) statutes 
than administrative decision-makers are; Keyes at 121 & 149. 
1588
 Dunsmuir para 53. Consider too Mossop at 559-600; for discretionary decisions, refer to Baker and Mullan’s 
critique thereof; Mullan ‘The struggle for complexity’ (2004) at 64.  
1589
 Compare, for example, Clarence, Kievits Kroon (LC) and the Shoprite Checkers trilogy; for review of legal 
errors prior to Sidumo, see Irvin & Johnson Ltd v CCMA & others [2006] 7 BLLR 613 (LAC). 
1590
 Or at least purported errors; the proposal is expounded in later paragraphs and the conclusion to this thesis.  
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These reasons stem from the intended efficiency and informality of CCMA proceedings, the 
absence of legal representation from most arbitrations, and the circumstances in which 
commissioners function.
1591
 Of additional significance are the breadth of commissioners’ 
discretionary powers and the role of ‘soft law’ in resolving labour disputes.1592 The 
implications of these characteristics of CCMA proceedings are twofold. First, given the 
conditions in which they operate and the statutory constraints imposed upon them, 
commissioners cannot be expected to refer with meticulous precision to every legal principle 
and technicality in their awards.
1593
 Secondly, the boundaries between legal and discretionary 
decisions are often unclear; the nature of any given question may therefore easily be 
manipulated by reviewing courts.
1594
 As such, permitting correctness review of all legal 
errors could result in inappropriate and excessive use of appellate style scrutiny. 
Notwithstanding these important factors, however, legal certainty and the rule of law remain 
crucial. To this end, the SCC’s pronouncement that legal questions of ‘central importance to 
the legal system…and outside the… specialized area of expertise’1595 is instructive. In light of 
this, it may be apt to assign correctness review to commissioners’ findings in relation to 
common law principles only. Yet, where decisions concern the Codes of Good Practice, the 
LRA and any associated principles of labour law, the reasonableness standard should be 
retained. This would uphold legislative intent while simultaneously countering the threats to 
legal certainty posed by the Labour Courts’ unpredictable1596 approaches to review.  
 
Returning to Dunsmuir, after devising the aforementioned guidelines, the majority noted that 
analysing each guideline fully, in every case, would not always be necessary. In particular, 
where the standard of review applicable to the issue in dispute had already been definitively 
determined, no such assessment would be required.
1597
  
 
                                                          
1591
 Consult, in this regard, chapter 1. 
1592
 Ibid; consider too the various codes of good practice promulgated under section 203 of the LRA. 
1593
 Arguably nonetheless, the LAC in Clarence evaluated the relevant award in an unduly formal and legalistic 
manner. 
1594
 This is addressed in more detail below. For discretionary decisions in South Africa, consult JR De Ville 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa revised 1 ed (2005); De Ville defines discretionary 
decisions as those in which the decision-maker ‘…is required to take into account considerations of policy or 
desirability in the general interest or where opinion or estimation plays an important role’; De Ville (2005) at 
151. See also Hira at 93D-94A; Cora Hoexter Administrative law (2007) at 258. 
1595
 Dunsmuir para 155. 
1596
 And sometimes unduly intrusive or deferential attitudes to review; consider Kievits Kroon (LC) and 
Clarence. 
1597
 Dunsmuir para 57. 
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The SCC then explained the refined approach to review as encompassing two stages. First, 
courts were to consider whether precedent indicated the appropriate standard already. To the 
extent to which it did, that standard would apply. In the absence thereof, reviewing courts 
were to proceed to the second stage: ‘the standard of review analysis.’1598 This enquiry, 
which replaced the ‘pragmatic and functional’ approach,1599 involved an examination of the 
following factors: 
 
‘…(1) the presence or absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as 
determined by interpretation of enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at 
issue, and; (4) the expertise of the tribunal.’1600 
 
Clearly, the contextual approach to reasonableness prevalent in South African law
1601
 is 
reflected in the Canadian system.
1602
 While the complexity and ambit of the Bato Star factors 
counteract their efficacy, Canada’s parallel factors are accessibly concise. As a result, they 
offer assistance with extracting the more significant of the Bato Star factors for the purposes 
of establishing reasonableness. In fact, when regard is had to the Canadian criteria, only two 
of them may vary during section 145 proceedings. The reasons for this are apparent. In all 
such proceedings, a privative clause will be present
1603
 and there will be no room for 
manoeuvre there; similarly, the purposes of the enabling legislation
1604
 will remain 
constant.
1605
 Whereas differentiating between decisions of commissioners with differing 
levels of skill and experience might be sanctioned by Bato Star, the difficulties with 
distinguishing between them on this basis negates the potential value of this factor. If 
anything, attempting to draw such distinctions would compound the current confusion rather 
than alleviate it;
1606
 consistency would then be further undermined. Comparatively, the nature 
                                                          
1598
 Ibid paras 62-63. Note that in numerous decisions since Dunsmuir the SCC has neither referred to nor 
applied this analysis at all; consider Plourde v Wal-Mart Canada Corp [2009] 3 SCR 465 (SCC); Syndicat de la 
function publique du Quebec v Quebec (Attorney General) 2010 SCC 28 (SCC); MiningWatch Canada v 
Canada (Fisheries and Oceans) [2010] 1 SCR 6; Gerald Heckman ‘Developments in administrative law: The 
2009-2010 term’ (2010) 52(2d) Sup Crt L Rev 25 at 38 onwards. 
1599
 Established in Bibeault. As repeatedly noted, the enquiry is essentially identical to its predecessor: the 
‘pragmatic and functional analysis’; Bastarache at 232. 
1600
 Dunsmuir para 64; prior to the promulgation of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(‘PAJA’), a comparable approach was propounded by the Appellate Division in Hira at 93C–H. 
1601
 Consult chapter 4 for details thereof; see too Bato Star para 45. 
1602
 Compare these considerations to the contextual factors discussed in chapter 4 and Bato Star para 45. 
1603
 Section 145 of the LRA clearly constitutes a privative clause in so far as it restricts courts’ powers of review. 
1604
 The enabling legislation is the LRA; sections 112 and 115 of the LRA.  
1605
 Section 1(d) of the LRA. 
1606
 Consider, for example, the difficulty of distinguishing between different commissioners’ skill levels. 
Reviewing courts cannot realistically be expected to analyse individual commissioners’ curricula vitae in detail 
and then devise the standard of review accordingly. As such, the skill and expertise of the decision-maker (as 
referred to in both Bato Star and Dunsmuir as a relevant contextual factor) must be understood to refer to the 
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of the question in dispute is both a feasible consideration and a variable one. If properly 
defined, it need not demand complicated assessments of commissioners’ qualifications. The 
utility of this factor only strengthens the submission that the SCC’s distinctions between 
standards of review applicable to different questions
1607
 should be moulded to fit reviews of 
CCMA awards.  
 
That is not to suggest that the remaining Bato Star considerations are irrelevant. On the 
contrary, they assist in setting the tone for review in the labour sphere generally. They simply 
cannot be used to determine the nature of reasonableness on a case by case basis. Focusing on 
the nature of the question in dispute alone, when delineating the scope of the courts’ powers 
during section 145 proceedings, is more viable. The residual factors discussed in Bato Star 
and Dunsmuir, together with those addressed in previous chapters,
1608
 should nevertheless 
continue to inform the framework for section 145 proceedings.  
 
Having revised its approach to review, the SCC in Dunsmuir applied it to the facts. Its 
conclusions illustrate how the aforementioned principles apply in practice. The Court began 
with the adjudicator’s preliminary ruling confirming his jurisdiction. As this had required 
interpreting the PSLRA, a question of law related to the adjudicator’s enabling legislation 
arose. That legislation - the PSLRA – contained a full and complete privative clause, 
expressly prohibiting review.
1609
 Together, held the SCC, these served as convincing 
indicators of reasonableness.
1610
 Of additional import was that the adjudicator operated in the 
labour relations arena. Given the superior expertise and experience of labour arbitrators in 
interpreting collective agreements and their enabling legislation, reasonableness was typically 
appropriate in this field.
1611
  The PSLRA’s purposeful establishment of timeous and cost-
effective dispute resolution procedures, observed the Court, further supported this 
conclusion.
1612
 Finally, while the question before the adjudicator was legal in nature, it was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
skill and expertise of CCMA commissioners (or labour boards and arbitrators) generally. Consider too, in this 
regard, Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council & others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC) paras 7-17. 
1607
 Dunsmuir para 53. 
1608
 Specifically, the ‘second tier’ criteria as discussed in chapter 4. 
1609
 Section 101(1) of the PSLRA provides that: ‘…every order, award, direction, decision, declaration or ruling 
of…an adjudicator is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court.’ Section 101(2) further states 
that: ‘No order shall be made or process entered, and no proceedings shall be undertaken in any court, whether 
by way of injunction, judicial review, or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain…an adjudicator in 
any of its or his proceedings.’ 
1610
 Dunsmuir para 67. 
1611
 Ibid paras 68-69. 
1612
 Ibid. 
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not of fundamental significance to the legal system as a whole. As such, the majority had no 
doubt that the standard of reasonableness applied.
1613
 
 
In applying the standard, the Court first assessed the reasoning process which the adjudicator 
had followed. According to it, that process was radically flawed.
1614
 Furthermore, his 
interpretations of the PSLRA fell outside the range of permissible ones, refuting the ruling’s 
substantive reasonableness. The decision therefore failed on both counts of 
reasonableness.
1615
 In light of the ruling’s doubly poor performance, it is unclear from the 
decision whether reasonableness in outcome could have cured the unreasonable procedure. 
The SCC’s attention to both features of reasonableness suggests, however, that this might not 
have been the case.
1616
  
 
Much of Binnie J’s concurring judgment endorses the principles set out by the majority. 
Certain of his assertions are nonetheless distinct. The most pertinent of these are discussed 
below. The Judge began by noting that a more extensive revision of the Canadian system of 
review
1617
 was necessary.
1618
 In Binnie J’s opinion, the system was unnecessarily 
complicated and led to inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes. Given parties’ entitlements 
to efficient and relatively inexpensive relief, inconsistency was unacceptable. Clarity was 
consequently needed.
1619
 As comparable concerns exist in the context of section 145 
proceedings,
1620
 the suitability of transporting elements of Canada’s system into those 
proceedings is again divulged. 
 
According to the Judge, in recasting the system, the fundamental tenets of judicial review 
were crucial. First amongst these was the legislature’s Constitutional authority to empower 
                                                          
1613
 Ibid paras 70-71. 
1614
 For one, the adjudicator had not accounted for the legislative context in which the decision was to be made. 
1615
 Dunsmuir paras 72-76. 
1616
 The SCC addressed the second issue in dispute (concerning procedural unfairness) distinctively from the 
adjudicator’s jurisdictional finding; Dunsmuir para 76. Without explanation as to why a standard of review 
analysis was unnecessary, the Court simply applied pertinent legal principles to the question. It concluded that 
Dunsmuir had not been entitled to a hearing before being dismissed. Thus, the adjudicator’s finding was 
incorrect and the appeal was dismissed; Dunsmuir paras 79 –117. The implication is that the correctness standard 
applies to questions of procedural fairness; for Binnie J’s thoughts, see Dunsmuir para 119. Consult too Khosa 
para 43 and Alberta v Alberta Union of Provincial Employees 2008 ABCA 258 (‘AUPE 2008 ABCA’) para 24. 
1617
 Than that undertaken by the majority. 
1618
 Dunsmuir paras 119-122. 
1619
 Ibid paras 132-133; Binnie J remarked further that the outcomes of review proceedings frequently turned on 
the chosen standard of review. The lack of predictability in the standard of review analysis therefore had a 
substantial impact on review proceedings generally; for similar sentiments, see Khosa paras 97-98. 
1620
 For the uncertainty and complexity prevalent in section 145 proceedings, refer to chapters 3 & 4.  
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non-judicial bodies to make certain decisions. Those decisions were, in turn, worthy of 
deference.
1621
 This did not allow decision-makers to act beyond the confines of the law. Yet, 
it simultaneously did not imply that judicial conclusions as to the proper outcomes of matters 
would inevitably be correct. On the contrary, remarked Binnie J, the common submission that 
decision-makers had ‘the right to be wrong’1622 was ‘unduly court-centred’. As he put it: ‘[A] 
disagreement between the court and an administrator [did] not necessarily mean that the 
administrator [was] wrong.’1623  
 
In the context of CCMA proceedings, the Judge’s assertions are noteworthy. The Labour 
Courts’ oft inflexible approach to commissioners’ applications of the Codes of Good 
Practice,
1624
 for one, exemplifies the common assumption depicted by Binnie J.
1625
 That is 
not to suggest that courts are never better equipped to resolve questions in dispute – disputes 
concerning complex or technical legal principles may well be better suited to judicial 
determination. However, commissioners engage with the various Codes of Good Practice on 
a daily basis and have greater experience in interpreting those Codes than reviewing courts 
do.
1626
 In addition, reviewing courts do not benefit from the vive voce evidence of the parties 
during review proceedings; frequently instead, they lack complete records of the arbitrations 
under review.
1627
 As such, when it comes to factual and discretionary findings in particular, 
commissioners are in a superior position to the courts. 
 
                                                          
1621
 Dunsmuir paras 123-124. 
1622
 Presumably in the context of reasonableness review; ibid para 125. 
1623
 Dunsmuir para 125. For comparable views of South African commentators see Hoexter (2007) at 252; 
Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 468; De Ville (2005) at 153 and JR De Ville Constitutional and 
statutory interpretation (2000) at 8-14. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local 796 [1970] SCR 425 was based on an equally problematic premise. There, the Court asserted 
that legislative provisions were necessarily capable of but one correct interpretation and that the judiciary was 
invariably better equipped to ascertain that interpretation than (even expert) administrative decision-makers; Van 
Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 805-806. For a similar case in South Africa, see Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA & others [2011] 5 BLLR 451 (LAC). 
1624
 Paul Benjamin ‘Friend or foe? The impact of judicial decisions on the operation of the CCMA’ (2007) 28 
ILJ 1at 17-19. 
1625
 That in the event of a disagreement between a commissioner and a court, the court’s view is implicitly 
preferable. Consider Clarence and National Union of Mineworkers obo Employees and Others v Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others [2012] 1 BLLR 22 (LAC) (‘NUM obo 112 employees’) and 
the discussions thereof in chapter 3. Note also Housen v Nikolaisen 2002 SCC 33 para 22; Alberta Union of 
Provincial Employees v Alberta 2010 ABCA 216 (‘AUPE 2010 ABCA’) para 47. 
1626
 Refer, in this regard, to CWIU & Others v Sopelog CC (1994) 15 ILJ 90 (LAC) at 97B-E; Emma Fergus & 
Alan Rycroft ‘Refining review’ 2012 Acta Juridica 170. 
1627
 Illustrative cases include Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & others [2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC) para 24 and 
Shoprite Checkers 1. 
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Binnie J’s qualifications to these sentiments are worthy of consideration too. In those he 
emphasized that decision-makers were bound by the limits of their statutory powers and that 
courts were authorised only to confirm decision-makers’ compliance therewith.1628 
Accordingly, held the Judge, reviewing courts should be the final arbiters of all legal 
questions.
1629
 The single exception would arise in case of administrative interpretations of 
enabling statutes (and statutes intimately associated with them); rather than the standard of 
correctness, reasonableness ought to be the standard applicable to those interpretations.
1630
 
Restricting correctness review of legal questions to issues of central importance to the entire 
legal system, noted the Judge, was unduly complex.
1631
 Barring the aforementioned exception 
therefore, in Binnie J’s view, deference was not to be paid to legal findings at all. All residual 
questions (procedural fairness aside)
1632
 would nevertheless warrant a deferential attitude.
1633
  
 
Whereas Binnie J’s approach to legal findings is important for maintaining the rule of law 
and legal certainty, its broad reach should be cautiously approached. Specifically, to the 
extent to which a similar stance might be assumed in South Africa, it should not permit 
correctness review of decisions taken under the LRA or Codes of Good Practice, where 
incidental reference to common law principles of labour law is necessary. Provided the 
question in dispute falls within the purported expertise of commissioners, reasonableness 
should be indicated.  
 
The need to adapt the Judge’s remarks in this way arises from the LRA’s mandate of quick, 
informal and inexpensive dispute resolution, which is grounded in fairness and equity.
1634
 
Were reasonableness confined to clean interpretations of the LRA and the Codes, almost all 
legal questions would become appealable.
1635
 In turn, the essence of CCMA arbitrations 
would be scuppered.
1636
 Moreover, legislative intent in entrusting labour dispute resolution to 
CCMA commissioners would be undermined. As fairness and equity inevitably involve value 
judgments and are subjectively debatable, applying reasonableness to such questions is, in 
                                                          
1628
 Dunsmuir paras 127-129; section 97 of the Canadian Constitution. 
1629
 Recall, however, Keyes, who questions the validity of this statement; Keyes at 121 & 149. 
1630
 Consult too, in this regard, Voice Construction para 29; Pushpanathan para 34. 
1631
 Dunsmuir paras 127-128. 
1632
 To which correctness review applied. 
1633
 Dunsmuir paras 127-129. 
1634
 Sections 1 & 151 of the LRA; the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA (1995) 16 ILJ 278 (‘the 
Explanatory Memorandum’) at 318-319; Paul Benjamin & Carole Cooper ‘Innovation and continuity: 
Responding to the Labour Relations Bill’ (1995) 16 ILJ 258 (A). 
1635
 Correctness review is comparable to appeal. 
1636
 See chapter 1 for a full discussion of the features of CCMA proceedings. 
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any event, apt.
1637
 Naturally, there may be instances in which doing so defies important 
principles or leaves parties uncertain of the true legal position. In those cases, a more invasive 
measure of assessment may be required. It is at this juncture that the majority’s directive to 
distinguish between different types of legal error is instructive.
1638
 Formulating a test for 
review with analogous factors in mind would both preserve legal certainty
1639
 and maintain 
the purposively efficient, informal and flexible nature of CCMA proceedings.
1640
  
 
Binnie J next evaluated the controversy surrounding reasonableness and its allowance for 
judicial scrutiny of the merits of disputes.
1641
 He cautioned in this regard that: 
 
‘The danger of labeling the most deferential standard as ‘reasonableness’ is that it 
may be taken (wrongly) as an invitation to reviewing judges not simply to identify the 
usual issues, such as whether irrelevant matters were taken into consideration, or 
relevant matters were not taken into consideration, but to reweigh the input that 
resulted in the administrator’s decision as if it were the judge’s view of 
reasonableness that counts. At this point, the judge’s role is to identify the outer 
boundaries of reasonable outcomes within which the administrator is free to 
choose.’1642  
 
In closing, the Judge proposed a set of presumptions applicable to determining the relevant 
standards of review.
1643
 After applying these to the facts, he agreed with the majority that the 
adjudicator’s findings should be quashed. 
 
Of final pertinence to this thesis is Deschamps J’s concurring judgment in Dunsmuir. The 
crux of her decision was that the only determinant in standard of review analyses ought to be 
                                                          
1637
 Particularly in light of Binnie J’s earlier observation that courts should refrain from assuming that they are 
necessarily more capable of resolving resolve disputes ‘correctly’ than administrative decision-makers. 
1638
 Dunsmuir para 54. 
1639
 Consistently with the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action; section 33 of the 
Constitution. Hoexter submits that the requisite of ‘lawfulness’ could be interpreted to imply that all 
administrative errors of law are reviewable; Hoexter (2007) at 252. For a contrary view, see Margaret Beukes 
‘Review as a tool for the development of a culture of accountability in the public administration’ 2002 SAPL 244 
at 256-257, as cited by De Ville (2005) at 153. Consult too Yvonne Burns (original text by Marinus Wiechners) 
‘Unreasonable administrative action’ LAWSA vol 1, 2 ed (2003) paras 174-175 and Arthur Chaskalson ‘Legal 
control of the administrative process’ 1985 SALJ 419 at 426-427. 
1640
 Section 1(d) of the LRA; the Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319. 
1641
 Dunsmuir paras 127-129. He then criticized the majority for failing to reduce the complexity associated with 
review in this respect; Dunsmuir paras 130-131. 
1642
 Dunsmuir para 141. 
1643
 Of these, the most significant was Binnie J’s recognition of the expertise of labour arbitrators; this, held the 
Judge, rendered it necessary for arbitrators’ interpretations of their enabling statutes (or statutes closely 
connected thereto) to be treated with substantial deference; Dunsmuir paras 146-147. 
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the nature of the question in dispute.
1644
 All other factors were superfluous. Deschamps J’s 
endorsement of the significance of the nature of the question in dispute reaffirms this 
criterion’s role in defining reasonableness in a variable manner.1645 Once more, the proposal 
that this factor should be the primary consideration when delineating the scope of review 
under section 145 is strengthened.
1646
  
 
4. EVALUATING DUNSMUIR 
 
4.1 Criticism of Dunsmuir 
 
The SCC’s re-appraisal of the standard of review analysis has attracted both criticism and 
praise from numerous sources.
1647
 Before evaluating the Canadian approach and its potential 
value for South African labour law, it is necessary to address this critique.  There are four 
criticisms of the judgment which are particularly germane. The first is the SCC’s failure to 
introduce more radical reforms.
1648
 Just what reform might have been introduced, however, 
remains undefined. A second and related concern is that the revised standard of review 
analysis does little more than defer the difficulties associated with identifying the appropriate 
standard to a later stage of the process; this gives rise to an equally complex debate about the 
degree of deference due.
1649
 To this extent, it has been contended that the SCC failed in its 
endeavours to simplify the system.
1650
 It further neglected to refine the meaning of 
reasonableness with any meaningful degree of specificity.
1651
  
 
                                                          
1644
 Underhill essentially agrees; Mark Underhill ‘Dunsmuir v New Brunswick: A rose by any other name?’ 
(2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 247 at 254. Still, he adds that the expertise of the reviewing court relative to 
that of the decision-maker remains relevant. 
1645
 Given the relative constancy of the remaining considerations. 
1646
 Deschamp J’s view that discrete standards of review should not apply to different types of legal question is 
nonetheless debatable; Dunsmuir paras 158-173. 
1647
 Heckman (2010) at 26; Alice Woolley ‘The metaphysical court: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick and the 
standard of review’ (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 259 at 259; Quayat at 180; consider too David Mullan 
‘The McLachlin Court and the public law standard of review: A major irritant soothed or a significant ongoing 
problem?’ in David A Wright & Adam M Dodek Public law at the McLachlin Court (2011) 79.  
1648
 Underhill submits, however, that the SCC simplified the issues as much as could be expected; Underhill at 
247; see also Bastarache; Woolley at 269 and Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008).  
1649
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 125; Piper Henderson ‘Supreme Court of Canada’s new ‘reasonableness’ 
standard of review applied in recent education cases’ (2008) 18 Educ & I J 179 at 181. 
1650
 Ibid; R Goltz ‘Patent unreasonableness is dead and we have killed it - A critique of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir’ (2008) 46 Alta L Rev 253 at 261; Gruber at 312.  
1651
 David Mullan ‘Proportionality – A proportionate response to an emerging crisis in Canadian judicial review 
law?’ 2010 NZ L Rev 233 at 262-264. 
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Third, the SCC’s application of reasonableness to the facts of Dunsmuir’s case has been 
criticized for implying that administrative decisions now attract lower degrees of 
deference.
1652
 Mullan submits in this regard that while the adjudicator’s decision in Dunsmuir 
might well have been incorrect, it was not unreasonable.
1653
 In his view, the Court’s 
conclusion was anomalous with the principles of reasonableness. In light of the majority’s 
express stipulation that collapsing the standards of reasonableness simpliciter and patent 
unreasonableness into a single standard did not invite greater judicial scrutiny, it was also 
ironic.
1654
 These controversies have been exacerbated by the distinctively more reverent 
attitude of the SCC in Khosa.
1655
 Given the context of labour relations in which Dunsmuir 
was decided,
1656
 justifying the discrepancies between these matters is difficult.
1657
  
 
Fourth, whereas jurisdictional errors may demand correctness review, identifying those errors 
is by no means straightforward.
1658
 It is alleged under this critique that, rather than clarifying 
the complexities associated with the enquiry, the SCC’s definition of ‘jurisdictional’ 
aggravated them.
1659
 Instead of affirming the former and simpler conception of jurisdictional 
issues as those attracting correctness review following a pragmatic and functional 
analysis,
1660
 the Court in Dunsmuir provided only a vague description of the term 
‘jurisdictional’ – one easily manipulated by interventionist courts.1661 The tendency of South 
African courts to manipulate the term ‘jurisdictional’, together with the proposal that the 
nature of the question in dispute be the key determinant of the standard of review, 
necessitates that the proper approach to defining jurisdictional issues be ascertained. The 
                                                          
1652
 Notwithstanding the majority’s express stipulation to the contrary; Dunsmuir para 48; Henderson at 181; 
Jennifer A Klinck ‘Reasonableness review: Conceptualising a single contextual standard from divergent 
approaches in Dunsmuir and Khosa’ (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 41 at 45-49; Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ 
(2008). 
1653
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 137-140; for a comparably questionable approach, consider Rolling River 
School Division v Rolling River Teachers Association of the Manitoba Teachers’ Society 2008 CarswellMan 394 
(Man QB) and Henderson’s critique thereof; Henderson at 184-185. A full analysis of whether the adjudicator’s 
decision in Dunsmuir was unreasonable is beyond the scope of this thesis however. 
1654
 Dunsmuir para 48. 
1655
 Klinck at 44. Khosa is appraised in detail below. 
1656
 Comparatively to that of Khosa (which involved a decision concerning immigration law and policy). 
1657
 Klinck submits that the divergence in the Courts’ attitudes is explicable with reference to the discretionary 
nature of the challenged determination in Khosa and the decision-maker’s particular expertise; Klinck at 45. 
1658
 Susan L Gratton ‘Standing at the divide: The relationship between administrative law and the Charter post 
Multani’ (2008) 53 McGill LJ 477. Gratton criticized the SCC in Dunsmuir for its formalistic approach to 
distinguishing between jurisdictional, legal, factual, policy-based and discretionary decisions; Gratton at 487. 
Consider further Alberta Teachers’ Association para 42. 
1659
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 126-128. 
1660
 Pushpanathan para 28. 
1661
 Gerald Heckman ‘Substantive review in Appellate Courts since Dunsmuir’ (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 751 
at 770-771. 
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subject is accordingly examined in subsequent paragraphs of this chapter.  Before doing so, 
the positive attributes of the Dunsmuir decision are considered.  
 
4.2  Acclaim for Dunsmuir  
 
The Court’s decision in Dunsmuir is not without merit and it has been praised in various 
respects. Foremost here, the SCC’s attempt at redirecting judicial attention from the standard 
of review analysis towards the merits of challenged decisions has been welcomed.
1662
 The 
basis for this is that by reducing the need for full scale standard of review analyses in every 
case,
1663
 judicial attention will be focused on the substance of disputes rather than threshold 
enquiries.
1664
 Secondly, Dunsmuir has been applauded for easing the complexities associated 
with identifying the standard of review.
1665
 Specifically, the Court’s articulation of finite 
principles governing the circumstances in which each standard should apply is valuable and 
offers useful instruction to lower courts tasked with review.
1666
 Finally, the decision has been 
commended for reiterating the significance of the rule of law and parties’ rights to 
administrative justice during review proceedings, while concurrently recognising legislative 
intent.
1667
  
 
Still, certain questions remain.
1668
 These include whether there is a variable scale of 
reasonableness (or merely a single standard)
1669
 and whether statutory rights of appeal 
dispense with the need for deference entirely.
1670
 The relationship between reasonableness 
                                                          
1662
 Particularly useful was the SCC’s indication that a full standard of review analysis may not always be 
required; Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 149; David Corry ‘Dunsmuir v New Brunswick: Standards of review 
and employment contracts’ 28 April 2008, available at http://ablawg.ca/author/dcorry/, accessed on 6 December 
2012. 
1663
 Specifically, where precedent already indicated the applicable standard of review. According to Underhill, 
this has undoubtedly simplified the process; Underhill at 256. Note too Heckman (2009) at 784. 
1664
 Underhill at 256. 
1665
 Klinck at 52-54. 
1666
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008)  at 149. It has further simplified the process of review; Bastarache at 233-
234. For an alternative view, refer to DP Jones Preliminary thoughts on Dunsmuir Notes for a Talk to the 
Canadian Bar Association, Administrative Law Section, Northern Alberta (18 March 2008).  
1667
 In respect of the legislature’s allocations of administrative power; Heckman (2009) at 784-785. 
1668
 Laverne Jacobs ‘Developments in administrative law: The 2007-2008 term - The impact of Dunsmuir’ 
(2008) 43(2d) Sup Crt L Rev 1 at 1-34. 
1669
 Mullan submits that Binnie J attested to the need for a sliding scale of reasonableness in his concurring 
decision; without such variability, the standard of reasonableness could become dangerously inflexible; Mullan 
‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 132; Dunsmuir paras 135-141. Note, however, Mills v Ontario (Workplace Safety and 
Appeals Tribunal) 2008 ONCA 436. 
1670
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 150. For the purposes of this thesis, it is unnecessary to explicate these 
here. For further commentary, refer to Bastarache at 234; Woolley at 266-267 and DP Jones ‘Annotation to 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
230 
 
review, review of reasons and review of outcomes is equally obscure. Furthermore, neither 
the true meaning of ‘jurisdictional questions’1671 nor whether the principles enunciated by the 
Court apply to both adjudicative and policy-based determinations is certain.
1672
 Finally, the 
relationship between statutory grounds of review and the common law principles depicted in 
Dunsmuir is unclear. If Canadian law is to assist with revising the Sidumo test, it is necessary 
to investigate these issues more fully. The more pertinent of these are addressed shortly.
1673
 
Given that some of the confusion was remedied by the SCC’s decision in Khosa, however, 
that decision will first be appraised.
1674
 
 
5. KHOSA V CANADA (MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION)1675 
 
In Khosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration),
1676
 judicial review proceedings 
were instituted against a decision of the Immigration Appeal Division (‘the Division’) of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (‘the Board’). Khosa had applied to the Division 
to reverse the Board’s order that he return to India, but had been refused on the basis that 
there were insufficient humanitarian grounds for doing so.
1677
 On review in the Federal 
Court, the Division’s decision was upheld. Yet, it was later overturned on appeal by the 
Federal Court of Appeal, where the decision was found to have been unreasonable.
1678
 The 
matter was then referred to the SCC.
1679
  Binnie J, writing for the majority, described the 
question before the Court as: ‘…the extent to which, if at all, the exercise by judges of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Khosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)’ (2009) 82(4) Admin LR 123 at 123. Compare these 
views to Southam, Pezim and Dr Q para 27. 
1671
 Heckman suggests that this has since been resolved; Heckman (2010) at 29. So too has the question of when 
precedent should be applied. In support of these contentions, Heckman cites Nolan v Kerry (Canada) Inc [2009] 
2 SCR 678 (SCC). For additional questions arising from Dunsmuir, see van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 691-
696. 
1672
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 150.  
1673
 Another concern is whether the Dunsmuir guidelines have ‘presumptive force’ and if so, whether those 
presumptions are rebuttable; Heckman (2009) at 768; Idahosa v Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency 
Preparedness) (2008) 385 NR 134 (FCA). Note, however, Alberta Teachers’ Association para 39 and Quayat. 
1674
 In particular, the relationship between the grounds of review prescribed by the FCA and the principles 
articulated in Dunsmuir was clarified. At the time of writing, the position in British Columbia nevertheless 
remained uncertain; Underhill at 247. Consider the conflicting judgments of the Courts in Howe v 3770010 
Canada Inc 2008 BCSC 330 and Carter v Travelex Canada Ltd 2008 BCSC 405, as cited by Underhill at 257.  
1675
 Khosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 2009 SCC 12. 
1676
 Ibid. For further analysis of Khosa, consult Laverne Jacobs ‘Developments in administrative law: The 2008-
2009 term: Contemplating legislative (im)precision’ (2009) 48 Sup Crt L Rev 43 at 43-70. 
1677
 In accordance with the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001 c27 (‘IRPA’). 
1678
 Khosa paras 10-14; Khosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 1218 (CanLII); 
Khosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2007] 4 FCR 332. 
1679
 While the Division’s decision did not concern a labour dispute, as the SCC’s analysis in Khosa addressed the 
relationship between statutory grounds of review and applicable standards of review, it is instructive to consider 
it in detail. 
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statutory powers of judicial review…is governed by the common law principles lately 
analysed by our Court in [Dunsmuir].’1680 
 
The statutory powers in question were those provided for in section 18.1 of the Federal 
Courts Act (‘FCA’).1681 Of particular import was section 18.1(4) of the FCA, which lists the 
grounds for review of administrative decisions.
1682
 The section reads as follows: 
 
‘Grounds of review 
18.1…(4) The Federal Court may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that 
the federal board, commission or other tribunal: 
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to 
exercise its jurisdiction; 
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other 
procedure that it was required by law to observe; 
(c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error 
appears on the face of the record; 
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a 
perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it; 
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or 
(f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law.’ 
 
Evidently, these grounds are distinguished by the nature of the question in dispute; again, the 
relevance of this factor is espoused. In applying for review, Khosa had relied on subsection 
18.1(4)(d) of the FCA regulating errors of fact – specifically, he alleged that the Division had 
made its decision in a perverse and capricious manner.
1683
 In response to Khosa’s allegations, 
the Minister contended that the common law principles had been displaced by the statutorily 
prescribed grounds.
1684
 As such, the Court’s findings in Dunsmuir had no application.1685 
Instead, the standard of review applicable to factual determinations was patent 
unreasonableness, as indicated by section 18.1(4)(d). Patent unreasonableness was analogous 
to the statutory conception of ‘perverse or capricious’ errors of fact.1686 As the decision was 
not patently unreasonable, the Minister argued, the appeal ought to be upheld. 
 
                                                          
1680
 Khosa para 1. 
1681
 Federal Courts Act RSC 1985 cF-7 (‘FCA’). 
1682
 The specific ground relied upon by Khosa was that provided for in section 18.1(4)(d) of the FCA. 
1683
 This was the only ground of review available to him. 
1684
 Khosa para 3. 
1685
 Ibid. 
1686
 Or those made by administrative decision-makers without regard to the material before them. 
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In responding to these submissions, Binnie J acknowledged Parliament’s entitlement to 
stipulate standards of review applicable to statutory grounds.
1687
 Those stipulations were 
nevertheless subject to interpretation with reference to the Constitution Acts and the statute’s 
wording, context and purpose.
1688
 Judicial review legislation was generally drafted in light of 
common law principles and it was fitting to consider those principles when interpreting the 
legislation concerned. In Binnie J’s opinion therefore, Dunsmuir’s depictions of deference 
and reasonableness applied to section 18.1(4) of the FCA.
1689
  
 
Considering the legislative framework in which the FCA operated and the act’s objectives, 
the majority resolved that the grounds provided for in section 18.1(4) were of flexible 
application. As a result, assigning concrete standards to each was inappropriate.
1690
 The 
Dunsmuir guidelines were key to understanding the FCA. These guidelines, held the Court, 
revealed that the grounds listed in both subsections 18.1(4)(a) and (b) of the FCA would 
attract correctness review.
1691
 Similarly, section 18.1(4)(c) governing errors of law would 
usually indicate correctness. Only where a decision-maker was interpreting its enabling 
legislation (or legislation intimately connected thereto), would reasonableness apply.
1692
 In 
contrast, section 18.1(4)(d) provided for factual errors to be reviewed in case of perversity, 
capriciousness or the failure to account for presented evidence. Consequently, held the SCC, 
the legislature had clearly intended factual findings to attract a high degree of deference, 
consistently with the Dunsmuir approach.
1693
 Finally, the grounds under sections 18.1(4)(e) 
and (f) would give rise to correctness review.
1694
 In the Court’s view, construing the 
legislative grounds in this way accorded not only with the common law but also with 
legislative intent.  
 
The primary utility of Khosa arises from its practical illustration of the relationship between 
reasonableness, correctness and statutory grounds of review. From this, parallels may be 
drawn between the judgments’ findings and section 145’s association with reasonableness. 
                                                          
1687
 See also R v Owen [2003] 1 SCR 779. 
1688
 Khosa para 19. 
1689
 Ibid paras 19-25; see also Khosa para 26.  
1690
 Ibid paras 28 & 33. 
1691
 Recall Dunsmuir’s prescription that questions of jurisdiction and procedural fairness were to be tested 
against the standard of correctness. Furthermore, held the Court in Khosa, neither of these subsections expressly 
stipulated the applicable standard of review; Khosa paras 42-43. 
1692
 Ibid para 44. 
1693
 Ibid paras 45-46. 
1694
 Ibid paras 47-48. 
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The essence of Khosa is simple - different standards may apply to different legislative 
grounds of review. In addition, when differentiating between the standards applicable to each 
ground, the question in dispute forms the principal criterion.  
 
Understanding the defects provided for in section 145 as attracting discrete measures of 
scrutiny in distinct circumstances is useful. In particular, it may clarify the uncertainty around 
the relationship between section 145 and reasonableness and whether either exists 
independently of the other. Construing the two in this way, the permissible degree of judicial 
intrusion would differ depending on the nature of the defect alleged. Where an applicant 
contends that a commissioner committed a substantive error of fact, law
1695
 or discretion, 
reasonableness would apply. On the other hand, in case of jurisdictional defects or allegedly 
faulty procedures, the correctness standard would be indicated. Doing so would acknowledge 
the substantive nature of reasonableness while simultaneously maintaining the procedural 
role of the section 145 defects. The difficulties presented by the overlap between gross 
irregularities and reasonableness would regrettably remain.
1696
 Looking to the FCA’s 
grounds, resolving these difficulties may necessitate a complete revision of section 145. 
Precisely how this could be achieved is discussed in the conclusion to this thesis.   
 
The SCC’s decision in Khosa is equally instructive in its affirmation of the contextually 
dependent character of review. The Court’s statements regarding appropriate standards of 
review must accordingly be interpreted in a flexible manner. In turn, when reformulating 
section 145, scope for variation should be accounted for. Given the pertinence of the nature 
of the question in dispute to context, it is here that room for manoeuvre may be made. 
Contextual variation in this sense would permit distinctions between correctness and 
reasonableness review; arguably too, distinctions between discrete forms of reasonableness 
could be applied.
1697
  
 
                                                          
1695
 With the exceptions discussed in the conclusion to this thesis.  
1696
 For the overlap, consult Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment 
Action Campaign and Innovative Medicines SA as Amici Curiae) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para  511; Pam 
Golding Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus & others [2010] JOL 24963 (LC) paras 5-6; Sidumo para 268; Gaga v 
Anglo Platinum Ltd & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 329 (LAC) para 44; Ellerine Holdings at 13 and Southern Sun Hotel 
Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] 11 BLLR 1128 (LC). 
1697
 Given the difficulties experienced in Canada with distinguishing between different degrees of 
unreasonableness, when revising the test for review under section 145 of the LRA, the boundaries between 
applicable standards of review must be clearly defined. 
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Section 18.1(4)(d) of the FCA depicts different measures of reasonableness.
1698
 Factual 
determinations are reviewable only in case of perversity, capricious decision-making or 
where no regard was had to the material before the decision-maker concerned. Due to this 
legislative prescription, prior to Khosa, reviewing courts evaluated factual findings against 
the standard of patent unreasonableness.
1699
 The test for reasonableness in relation to these 
findings was therefore more limited than in other cases. There are clear parallels between 
patent unreasonableness and gross unreasonableness.
1700
 As the latter has been explicitly 
rejected by South African courts,
1701
 the legitimacy of implementing such a test in the South 
African context may be questioned. However, implicit in the contextual essence of 
reasonableness is that the standard may look different in different circumstances.
1702
 
Consequently, regardless of the label attached to the test, reviewing commissioners’ factual 
findings in a manner equivalent to section 18.1(4)(d) of the FCA may be fitting. 
 
The suitability of restricting review in case of factual determinations is apparent.
1703
 First, it 
enables adequate deference to be paid to commissioners’ awards and so recognises the need 
for efficiency and informality in labour dispute resolution.
1704
 As the allowable reach of 
deference ends at decisions devoid of precedential or legal implications, no risk is posed to 
legal certainty or the rule of law.
1705
 Whereas it might be argued that reducing the ambit of 
                                                          
1698
 Section 18.1(4) as a whole attests to the sense of differentiating between standards of review with reference 
to the nature of the question in disput . 
1699
 Consult the Federal Court’s and Federal Court of Appeal’s decisions in Khosa, referred to above. Allegations 
based on the remaining grounds in section 18.1(4) of the FCA were assessed either on the basis of correctness or 
following a pragmatic and functional analysis. Note too the general approach to evaluating factual findings 
during both trials and review proceedings, which affirms the need for reviewing courts to defer to tribunals’ 
determinations; Housen para 22; AUPE 2010 ABCA para 47. 
1700
 Consider the analogy between patent unreasonableness and Wednesbury unreasonableness impliedly drawn 
by Mullan in Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 233. See too Huscroft at 309. Canadian Courts have not invariably 
accepted the concepts’ equivalence, however; Victoria Times Colonist, a Division of Canwest Mediaworks 
Publications Inc v Communications, Energy and Paperworks Union of Canada, Local 25-G 2009 BCCA 229; 
Woods v British Columbia (Workers Compensation Board) 2009 BCJ 2018; Westergaard v Registrar of 
Mortgage Brokers 2011 BCCA 344 and Pacific Newspaper Group Inc v CEP, Local 2000 (2009) 2010 CLLC 
220-009 (BCSC), where the Courts applied the rationality standard rather than section 58(3)’s formulation of 
patent unreasonableness. Irrationality is arguably akin to gross or Wednesbury unreasonableness; De Ville 
(2005) at 154 ftnt 499. 
1701
 Bato Star para 44; Myers v National Commissioner of the South African Police Services and Others (SCA) 
unreported case no 425/2012 of 29 November 2012 para 28. 
1702
 Khosa paras 28 & 59. 
1703
 Housen para 22; AUPE 2010 ABCA para 47. 
1704
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 327-330; Benjamin & Cooper at 274-275; chapter 1. 
1705
 For the import of legal certainty and parties’ rights thereto, refer to Food & Allied Workers Union on behalf 
of Mbatha & others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko Milling & Baking & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2916 (SCA) 
(‘FAWU’) paras 19-21. 
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reasonableness detracts from the parties’ Constitutional right to administrative justice, failing 
to do so may detract just as severely from their right to fair labour practices.
1706
  
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the inferior position of reviewing courts relative to 
commissioners in resolving factual disputes is plain. Review proceedings do not entail the 
presentation of viva voce evidence and presiding judges neither hear the parties’ testimonies 
first hand nor witness the relationship between them.
1707
 Judicial conclusions of fact during 
section 145 proceedings are based entirely on the records of proceedings,
1708
 which are 
frequently incomplete.
1709
 In the absence of arbitrary or capriciousness decision-making 
therefore, it is improbable that courts’ factual findings will be superior to commissioners’.1710 
To the extent to which they are not, permitting courts to engage in intensive scrutiny of 
commissioners’ factual decisions, may lead to awards being inappropriately quashed. Parties’ 
rights to fair labour practices may then be threatened. By comparison, constraining the reach 
of the reasonableness standard in case of factual questions need not be conceived as 
detracting from parties’ rights to just administrative action. It is merely an apposite 
consequence of the standard’s contextual dependency.1711 Section 18.1(4)(d)’s formulation of 
reasonableness is thus both useful for revising section 145 of the LRA and critical to 
protecting parties’ rights to fair labour practices. 
 
Returning to Khosa, Binnie J then considered the standard of review applicable to the case at 
hand. Consistently with Dunsmuir’s two step analysis, he found judicial precedent pointed 
cleanly towards reasonableness.
1712
 This test’s suitability was endorsed by the second stage of 
the enquiry – the standard of review analysis.1713 In re-affirming the contextual essence of the 
analysis,
1714
 the Judge described reasonableness as a single standard. Nonetheless, he 
                                                          
1706
 Sections 33 and 23 of the Constitution respectively. 
1707
 The Explanatory Memorandum at 327-330; Benjamin & Cooper at 274-275; chapter 1.  
1708
 In Canada, judicial review proceedings proceed purely on the records of proceedings before the relevant 
decision-maker; Gruber at 304. In contrast to South Africa, however, in most cases, witness testimonies are not 
formally recorded and so do not form part of the records. 
1709
 See, for example, Shoprite Checkers 1 and Bestel. 
1710
 Housen para 22; AUPE  2010 ABCA para 47. 
1711
 De Ville (2005) at 212, read with his cautionary remarks in JR De Ville 'Deference as respect and deference 
as sacrifice: A reading of Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs' (2004) 20 SAJHR 577. 
1712
 In all other instances involving decisions taken in accordance with the same provisions of the IRPA, 
reviewing courts had applied the reasonableness standard. 
1713
 Khosa paras 52-54. 
1714
 Ibid paras 28 & 59. 
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remarked, it ‘would take its colour from the context’.1715 The implications of this statement 
are unclear. They are accordingly evaluated in more detail, in later paragraphs.  
 
Of further significance in Khosa was the Court’s recognition of the Division’s expertise and 
broad discretion under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (‘IRPA’)1716 to decide the 
question before it. Considerable deference to the Division’s findings was therefore due. When 
paying such deference, observed the SCC, courts were precluded from re-weighing the 
evidence before decision-makers. Attributing weight was an exclusively administrative 
function, beyond the powers of the judiciary.
1717
 Applying these principles to the facts, 
Binnie J concluded that as the decision disclosed the Division’s reasons, referred to all 
pertinent legal principles and was both clear and comprehensible,
1718
 it fell within the range 
of permissible decisions available to it. As such, the decision was immune from review.
1719
  
 
While the majority’s judgment is helpful in many respects, certain issues remain. The first is 
illustrated by Fish J’s dissenting judgment in which he contested the prohibition against 
judicial allocations of weight.
1720
 While Fish J agreed with Binnie J’s conception of the law, 
he dissented from the Court’s eventual finding of reasonableness. According to him, the 
Division had inappropriately ‘fixated’ upon a single factor for consideration.1721 In Fish J’s 
words:  
 
‘The majority’s inordinate focus on [an isolated consideration] and its failure to 
consider contrary evidence do not ‘fit comfortably with the principles of justification, 
transparency and intelligibility’ that are required in order to withstand reasonable 
review.’1722 
 
Evidently, before resolving the matter in favour of Khosa, the Judge re-assessed the 
Division’s allocation of weight to the evidence which had been before it. The majority’s 
assertion that weight allocations were reserved for administrative decision-makers alone 
                                                          
1715
 Ibid. 
1716
 IRPA. 
1717
 Khosa paras 59-62; note too Suresh and the discussion of discretionary decisions (and Baker) below. 
1718
 Khosa paras 63-64. 
1719
 Ibid para 67. 
1720
 See also Rothstein J’s dissenting judgment; Khosa paras 70-137. 
1721
 Khosa paras 139-161. 
1722
 Ibid para 156. As the Division’s task had been to evaluate all the circumstances of Khosa’s case in order to 
ascertain whether there were sufficient humanitarian and compassionate grounds on which to allow relief from 
his removal order, the Division’s nominal regard for all but one consideration demonstrated that the decision had 
not been taken in accordance with reason. 
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renders his argument questionable.
1723
  Still, Fish J’s contentions expose an important 
concern: disproportionate emphasis by decision-makers on single or specific factors may be 
as harmful to parties’ rights as complete disregard therefore.1724 Thus, a balance must be 
struck between unwarranted interference with weight allocations and formalistic attention 
thereto. Alongside outstanding questions arising from Dunsmuir and Khosa, potential means 
of achieving that balance are examined below. 
 
6. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
 
6.1   Is reasonableness a variable enquiry? 
 
The extent of the standard’s variability is the first of the obscurities associated with 
reasonableness.
1725
 In Dunsmuir, the Court stated that reasonableness entailed a contextual 
enquiry,
1726
 implying flexibility in its application.
1727
 Then in Khosa, the same Court 
remarked that the standard, while single in nature, ‘would take its colour from the 
context’.1728 The connotation is again that the standard’s boundaries may vary from one 
dispute to the next. Yet in earlier judgments, the SCC had condemned the notion that the 
standard ‘float[ed] along a spectrum of deference’.1729 The Court’s pronouncement in Law 
Society of New Brunswick v Ryan
1730
 is telling; in Ryan it held: 
 
‘The suggestion that reasonableness is an ‘area’ allowing for more or less deferential 
articulations would require that the court ask different questions of the decision 
depending on the circumstances and would be incompatible with the idea of a 
meaningful standard.’1731  
 
                                                          
1723
 Khosa paras 4 and 65- 67; see further Suresh paras 29 & 34; Dunsmuir para 47 and the discussion on judicial 
weight allocations below. For the view that indiscriminate disregard for administrative exercises of discretion is 
equally undesirable; refer to Klinck at 55; Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 257-258.  
1724
 Ibid. 
1725
 Consider, for one, the Court’s construction of Dunsmuir in Manz v Sundher 2009 BCCA 92. 
1726
 Dunsmuir paras 30 & 52-62. Binnie J and Deschamps J ostensibly endorsed this view too. 
1727
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008)  at 133-135; Lorne Sossin ‘Dunsmuir – Plus ca change’ The Court 17 March 
2008, available at http://www.thecourt.ca/2008/03/17/dunsmuir, accessed on 6 December 2012. 
1728
 Khosa paras 52-58.  
1729
 Ryan paras 43-47. 
1730
 Ryan v Law Society (New Brunswick) [2003] 1 SCR 247. 
1731
 Ibid para 47; the SCC explained the metaphor of a spectrum as follows: ‘The metaphor suggests standards 
arranged along a gradient of deference but it was never meant to suggest an infinite number of possible 
standards. That the metaphor relates to a spectrum of deference not a spectrum of standards has become 
increasingly clear since the use of the term ‘spectrum’ in Pezim….’; Ryan para 45. 
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Bastarache supports this view, submitting that the SCC in Dunsmuir did not suggest that 
reasonableness existed on a sliding scale. According to him, the contextual essence of the test 
implied only that context dictates the breadth of the range of reasonable decisions 
available.
1732
 In this way, flexibility may be maintained and multiple measures of 
reasonableness avoided.
1733
 Expanding on this approach, Heckman asserts that the range of 
reasonable outcomes will be broader in matters involving ‘policy-infused discretion[s]’, for 
instance, than in those incorporating straightforward legislative interpretations.
1734
 
 
Bastarache’s logic is appealing in so far as it purports to synchronise the various approaches. 
It has further been judicially endorsed.
1735
 In Mills v Ontario (Workplace Safety and Appeals 
Tribunal),
1736
 for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed reasonableness to be a 
single standard. Writing for the majority in Mills, Rouleau J rejected the submission that 
reasonableness implied fluctuating degrees of deference, observing instead that: 
 
‘The existence of varying degrees of deference within the single reasonableness 
standard suggests that a decision made by a tribunal will be found to be unreasonable 
if the court accords the tribunal a low degree of deference but that the same decision 
will be found to be reasonable if the court decides to accord the tribunal a high degree 
of deference. I do not read the decision of the majority in Dunsmuir as encompassing 
any such approach.’1737 
 
Implicit in the Judge’s remarks is the assumption that defining reasonableness as a single 
standard is irreconcilable with varying levels of deference. However, whether adopting this 
view is distinct from acknowledging a spectrum of deference is doubtful.
1738
 It is difficult to 
see how reviewing courts can reasonably be expected to avoid discrete levels of deference, 
while still defining the range of reasonable outcomes with greater or lesser breadth in any 
                                                          
1732
 And the extent of coherence and comprehensiveness required of the reasons; Bastarache at 235. Klinck 
validly argues that if the notion of reasonableness as a single but contextual enquiry is to be reconciled with 
variability in the range of reasonable outcomes available, contextual factors should be limited to the nature of the 
question in dispute and the expertise of the relevant decision-maker; Klinck at 42, 49 & 52.  
1733
 Bastarache at 235; Woolley observes that, despite the demise of patent unreasonableness, reviewing courts 
will inevitably be more deferential on some occasions than on others; Woolley at 266-267. 
1734
 Heckman (2009) at 759 & 784; consult too Heckman (2010) at 27 ftnt 19 and Klinck at 49. 
1735
 See, for example, Mills paras 14-24 and Khosa para 59. 
1736
 Mills v Ontario (Workplace Safety and Appeals Tribunal) 2008 ONCA 436 paras 14-24. 
1737
 Ibid para 19. 
1738
  EB Willis & WK Winkler Willis and Winkler on Leading Labour Cases (2008-2009) at 37. 
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given case.
1739
  Equally tricky to conceive is how precedent may be applied consistently with 
Dunsmuir’s mandate, without accepting that distinctive degrees of reasonableness persist.1740  
 
An Alberta court’s decision in Lethbridge College v Lethbridge College Faculty 
Association
1741
 exemplifies the conundrum. There, the Alberta Court of the Queen’s Bench 
expressly cast reasonableness as a single standard. Yet, it simultaneously held that labour 
arbitrators were entitled to higher degrees of deference than most other administrative 
decision-makers.
1742
 Given that prior to Dunsmuir, the standard of patent unreasonableness 
generally applied to labour boards’ and arbitrators’ determinations,1743 just how reviewing 
courts may apply precedent to such cases (without offending Ryan)
1744
 is uncertain.
1745
  
 
Whether the notion of reasonableness as a single standard may truly be aligned with variable 
levels of deference is therefore doubtful. Arguably, the debate is a matter of semantics rather 
than of substance.
1746
 At the very least, it must be conceded that distinctive degrees of 
deference may apply to discrete administrative determinations.
1747
 As such, for the purposes 
of section 145 review proceedings, adopting distinguishable standards with reference to the 
nature of the question in dispute remains viable.  
 
                                                          
1739
 Van Harten, Heckman and Mullan’s explanation of the variability of reasonableness assists to a degree; the 
authors submit that: ‘…a court, applying the reasonableness standard, has determined that it should show 
deference, although the manner in which it defers will depend on the circumstances...’; Van Harten, Heckman 
and Mullan at 861.  
1740
 Given that prior to Dunsmuir two standards of reasonableness existed; Heckman (2009) at 775-776; Mills 
para 22. Heckman records that the Federal and Alberta Courts of Appeal have adopted similar attitudes; 
Heckman (2009) at 780-781. Consider too Lake v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2008] 1 SCR 761, where the 
SCC arguably applied ‘considerable deference’ to the Minister’s policy-laden decision, implying that 
reasonableness is indeed a flexible test; Heckman (2009) at 777-778.   
1741
 Lethbridge College v Lethbridge College Faculty Association 2008 CarswellAlta 911 (Alta QB); note also 
Henderson at 184-185. 
1742
 Ibid. Comparably, in Khosa, the SCC both confirmed reasonableness to be a single standard of review and 
repeatedly referred to ‘degrees of deference’; Khosa paras 4, 19, 46 & 59. 
1743
 Henderson at 180; note, however, Henderson at 185. 
1744
 As prescribed by the Court in Dunsmuir para 57; Ryan  para 47. 
1745
 This is particularly true in British Columbia where the ATA expressly provides for patent unreasonableness 
in certain circumstances; consider Evans v University of British Columbia 2008 BCSC 1026 para 11. 
1746
 As Willis and Winkler comment, the new standard of reasonableness is intended: ‘…to encompass the same 
span of deference offered by its predecessors, now its components: the intellectually distinct but operationally 
indistinct standards of patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter…’; Willis & Winkler (2008-2009) 
at 37. 
1747
 In addition, regardless of whether reasonableness is variable in nature, the benefits of collapsing the former 
two standards into one, are hindered by the complexity of the enquiry and the questions it has raised; van Harten, 
Heckman & Mullan at 847. 
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6.2   The relationship between reasonableness, review of reasons and review of    
outcomes 
 
Just as the constituents of procedural and substantive unreasonableness in South Africa are 
vague, Bastarache and LeBel JJ’s emphases on the dual features of reasonableness have 
sparked debate. In order to uncover the true nature of reasonableness, it is necessary to 
address this controversy. By doing so, some of the uncertainty surrounding section 145 may 
be remedied. The majority’s observation in Dunsmuir that reasonableness ‘…refer[s] both to 
the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes’1748 is a useful starting point in this 
regard.  
 
On the basis of this observation, Mullan submits that the coherence and intelligibility of a 
decision-maker’s reasoning process alone are insufficient to found reasonableness.1749 
Instead, both reasonableness in process and reasonableness in substance are necessary. In 
addition, when assessing substantive reasonableness, reviewing courts are not confined to 
analysing decision-maker’s reasons. As Mullan notes, when emphasising the duality of 
reasonableness, the SCC in Dunsmuir endorsed Dyzenhaus’s notion of ‘deference as respect’ 
as requiring: ‘…not submission but a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which 
could be offered in support of a decision.’1750 Thus, argues Mullan, where the reasons given 
for a decision are poor,
1751
 the decision may still be upheld if reasons other than those 
provided by the decision-maker support it.
1752
 The decision-maker’s reasons need not 
therefore constitute the sole justification for his or her ruling.
1753
 More important is that the 
outcome of the dispute falls within the range of reasonable ones identified by the reviewing 
court.
1754
 Mullan adds in this regard that reasons do not assure reasonableness. Rather, 
                                                          
1748
 Dunsmuir para 47. 
1749
 Instead, according to Mullan, to meet the requisites of coherence and intelligibility, decision-makers’ reasons 
should comprise ‘…a reasoned and reasonable articulation of the conclusion reached’; Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ 
(2008) at 136. 
1750
 Dunsmuir para 48; Dyzenhaus in Taggart (ed) (1997) at 286.  
1751
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 136. Reasons must still be coherent and intelligible, however. 
1752
 Heckman agrees with reference to Mills and Gagne c Autorite des Marches Financiers [2008] JQ no 7830 
(CA) (QL); Heckman (2009) at 782-783. For the circumstances in which decision-makers are obliged to provide 
reasons, see Baker paras 20-28 and van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 67 onwards. 
1753
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 136; Bastarache at 232. 
1754
 Ibid; Heckman (2009) at 776-777. This view has since been confirmed by the SCC in Newfoundland and 
Labrador Nurses’ Union paras 14 &15. 
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reasonableness must be defined substantively, with reference both to the statutory context and 
the alleged grounds for review.
1755
   
 
The implications of Mullan’s formulation of reasonableness are debatable. One construction 
is that the substantive component of reasonableness is capable of remedying faulty reasoning. 
Conceivably, this might be inferred from the SCC’s statement in Newfoundland and 
Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board)1756  that reviewing 
courts may entertain alternative reasons for decisions where the relevant decision-maker’s 
reasons do not justify its findings.
1757
 Adding to this, the Court held that the mere inadequacy 
of administrative reasons would not necessarily warrant review.
1758
 Thus, it might be 
assumed that satisfactory reasons
1759
 have become irrelevant to the enquiry on review. 
 
Yet, when the judgment is examined more closely, vital qualifications to this inference 
appear, rendering its validity doubtful. The SCC’s explanation of the circumstances in which 
reasons would meet the Dunsmuir requisites of ‘justification, transparency and intelligibility’ 
illustrates the point well.
1760
 It noted in this regard: 
 
‘…if the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its 
decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of 
acceptable outcomes, the Dunsmuir criteria are met.’1761 
 
By doing so, the Court acknowledged the continued functionality of administrative reasons 
and the need for reasons to meet certain basic standards in order to ensure that the purposes 
thereof are served. Logically then, where reasons fall short of these standards decisions 
resulting therefrom may be set aside.  
 
In any event and as previously contended, the legitimacy of proposing that following 
Dunsmuir,
1762
 the quality of administrative reasons is unimportant is dubious. On the 
                                                          
1755
 Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 251. 
1756
 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board) [2011] 3 SCR 
708 para 14. 
1757
 Ibid paras 12-14 & 17. 
1758
 Ibid para 14. 
1759
 And by implication, satisfactory reasoning processes. 
1760
 Dunsmuir para 47. 
1761
 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 16. 
1762
 And by analogy Sidumo. 
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contrary, the import of adequate reasoning is plain.
1763
 As such, reasonableness in outcome 
should not be capable of overriding poor reasoning processes, where the poverty in process 
renders the decision-maker’s reasons inadequate.1764 Canadian courts since Dunsmuir have 
confirmed the need for satisfactory reasons,
1765
 and Mullan’s acknowledgment of both 
features of reasonableness does too. Understanding his submissions as negating the 
significance of reasoning (and, by inference, of procedural unreasonableness) is consequently 
paradoxical. A preferable interpretation is reached by emphasizing Mullan’s recognition of 
the dual features of reasonableness and the materiality of each. Adopting this approach 
accords both elements of the test due weight. One proviso to it is nonetheless necessary. Only 
where administrative reasons are inadequate on account of deficiencies other than the 
substantive rationale for the decision, should those deficiencies supersede substantive 
conclusions. Construing the duality of reasonableness in this way ensures that both deference 
and the need for adequate administrative reasoning are acknowledged during review 
proceedings.
1766
  
 
Bastarache disagrees with Mullan’s stance. First, he contests Mullan’s depiction of 
reasonableness as comprising two distinct features, doubting the power of reviewing courts to 
cite alternative reasons when validating otherwise irregular decisions.
1767
 According to him, it 
is difficult to conceive of ‘rational and coherent reasons’ leading to unreasonable results.1768 
Further, in his view, Mullan’s interpretation of reasonableness misconstrues the SCC’s 
endorsement of ‘deference as respect’.1769 Bastarache avers in this regard that: 
 
                                                          
1763
 Consider Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others 2010 (2) SA 92 (CC) para 17, citing 
Mpahlehle v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC) para 12 and the discussion thereof in 
chapter 4. 
1764
 In the sense that the reasons in question do not serve the purposes for which they were given or do not meet 
the prescribed minimum standards. 
1765
 Khosa para 63; Clifford v Ontario (Attorney General) (2009) 188 LAC (4
th
) 97 (Ont CA) para 31; LSUC v 
Neinstein [2010] ONCA 193; Walsh v Council for Licensed Practical Nurses [2010] NJ No 41 (CA.). 
1766
 Given the import of judicial review to facilitating improved decision-making; Jeffrey Jowell ‘The democratic 
necessity of administrative justice’ 2006 Acta Juridica 13 at 16-17; Cora Hoexter ‘The current state of South 
African administrative law’ in Hugh Corder & Linda van der Vijver (eds) Realising Administrative Justice 
(2002) 20 at 27; Hugh Corder ‘Reviewing review: much achieved, much more to do’ in Hugh Corder & Linda 
van der Vijver (eds) Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 1 at 1-2 and Etienne Mureinik ‘Reconsidering 
review: participation and accountability’ 2006 Acta Juridica 35. 
1767
 Recall Mullan’s contention that, following Dunsmuir, even where decision-makers’ reasons are coherent, 
reviewing courts remain obliged to assess reasonableness in outcome; Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 136. 
1768
 Bastarache at 236; Heckman disagrees, citing Baker as an example of a case in which the reasoning process 
of the decision-maker was rational but the outcome was nevertheless unreasonable; Heckman (2009) at 777 ftnt 
114; Consider further Canadian Union of Public Employees v Ontario (Minister of Labour) 2003 SCC 29 para 
103 (‘CUPE (2003)’) and Montreal (City) v Montreal Port Authority [2010] 1 SCR 427. 
1769
 Dunsmuir para 48. 
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‘What was intended [instead] is that a court may consider the reasons that could have 
been offered as a means of evaluating the coherence of the reasons provided. The 
reasons that could have been offered thus serve to highlight any deficiencies in the 
reasons of the administrative decision-maker. A court is not invited to substitute such 
reasons for those provided.’1770  
 
Whereas in some cases Bastarache’s depiction of reasonableness1771 may be true, Heckman 
names several matters in which the reasoning process of the relevant decision-maker was 
starkly rational but the resultant decision still unreasonable.
1772
 In Montreal (City) v Montreal 
Port Authority,
1773
 for example, the SCC held both that the decision-maker’s reasons were 
transparent and intelligible (in that they had been clearly explained to the grievant) and that 
the decision-makers’ conclusions were unreasonable.1774 Willis and Winkler, referring to the 
decision in Clifford v Ontario (Attorney General),
1775
 similarly espouse the dual elements of 
reasonableness. They aver that, since Dunsmuir, there is an evident distinction between 
adequacy of reasons and reasonableness of outcomes.
1776
  
 
Consequently, both judicial and theoretical statements proclaim the legitimacy of assessing 
adequacy in reasoning as well as reasonableness in outcome.
1777
 That is not to suggest that 
the two enquiries are cleanly separable. There is a necessary and inevitable overlap between 
them.
1778
 Nonetheless, it remains useful, when conceptualising the dual features of 
reasonableness,
1779
 to distinguish between the concepts at some level. Thus, where reasons do 
not serve the purposes for which they are given and so fall short of the stipulated minimum 
                                                          
1770
 Bastarache at 236. 
1771
 Which effectively reduces the standard to a requirement for adequate reasoning. 
1772
 See Baker; Heckman (2009) at 777 ftnt 114; CUPE (2003) and Montreal (City). For a decision evincing an 
inadequate reasoning process, see Walsh. 
1773
 Montreal (City) v Montreal Port Authority [2010] 1 SCR 427. 
1774
 The decision-makers’ conclusion flowed from their interpretation of the relevant statute. In the Court’s view, 
that interpretation was materially erroneous and the decision-makers’ exercise of discretionary powers was 
accordingly inconsistent with the statutory principles at stake; Heckman (2009) at 777. 
1775
 Clifford v Ontario (Attorney General) (2009) 188 LAC (4
th
) 97 (Ont CA). 
1776
 EB Willis & WK Winkler Willis and Winkler on Leading Labour Cases (2010) at 25-26. According to Willis 
and Winkler there are now two components of reasonableness – the first concerns the process of articulating 
reasons and the second requires reasonableness in outcome: decisions must therefore be defensible in terms of 
the facts and the law; Willis & Winkler (2008-2009) at 35. 
1777
 Ibid; see too Khosa para 63; Dunsmuir para 47 and Audmax Inc v Ontario Human Rights Tribunal 2011 
ONSC 315, where the Ontario Divisional Court evaluated both the adequacy of the Tribunal’s reasons and the 
reasonableness of its findings. 
1778
 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 14; Raj Anand, Mark Edelstein & Christine Wong-Chong 
‘A survey of recent developments on judicial review of professional discipline’ (2012) 25 Can J Admin L & 
Prac 147 at 158-161. 
1779
 That reasonableness comprises both substantive and procedural elements has been repeatedly confirmed by 
the Labour Courts in South Africa too and so cannot be ignored; Southern Sun Hotel Interests paras 14-17; 
SAMWU v South African Local Government Bargaining Council & others [2012] 4 BLLR 334 (LAC) 
(‘SAMWU’) para 10. 
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standards for adequate reasoning, the procedural element of reasonableness will not be met; 
the ensuing decision would then be vulnerable to review. Comparably, where the outcome is 
unreasonable, the decision may be overturned for substantive unreasonableness. Defining 
reasonableness in this manner
1780
 accords well with the characteristics of the test under 
section 145.
1781
 Pertinently too, it recognises the susceptibility of both poor reasoning and 
unsatisfactory outcomes to review. In turn, the Constitutional values of accountability, 
transparency and openness are secured, and the function of review in facilitating improved 
future decisions is acknowledged.
1782
 The qualification to this construction, however, as 
discussed under Mullan’s submissions above, remains critical: substantive reasonableness 
should be capable of remedying inadequate reasons only in relation to substantive 
inadequacies in those reasons. Defects in reasoning other than those which affect the outcome 
therefore remain reviewable. Doing so reconciles the tension between reviewing courts’ 
powers to consider alternative reasons and the role of satisfactory reasoning. In addition, it 
divulges the distinction between Carephone and Sidumo: while the Carephone test conforms 
to Bastarache’s stance, the Sidumo standard is consistent with Mullan’s. Additional clarity on 
the uncertainties surrounding section 145 may be obtained from further analysis of the 
procedural and substantive features of reasonableness. That analysis follows.  
 
6.3 When will reasons be adequate?  
 
If the proposed construction of the boundaries between substantive and procedural 
reasonableness is to be adopted, the constituents of adequate reasoning require definition. In 
Canada, the principal obligation in this regard is that decision-makers explain their decisions. 
Those explanations must be articulate and comprehensible.
1783
 In Khosa,
1784
 the Court 
discussed the features of adequate reasoning with reference to its findings in Dunsmuir.
1785
 
First, it recounted the function of reasons in securing administrative accountability.
1786
 
Accountability was owed not only to affected parties but also to reviewing courts and the 
                                                          
1780
 Coupled with the qualification explained above with reference to Mullan’s interpretation of the Canadian 
test. 
1781
 Sasol Mining; Strategic Liquor Services para 17, citing Mpahlehle para 12; chapters 3 & 4. 
1782
 Sections 1(d) & 195 of the Constitution; Jowell (2006) at 16-17; Corder in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) 
(2002) at 1-2; Hoexter in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 27; Mureinik (2006). 
1783
 Bastarache at 236. For the constituents of ‘coherence’ and ‘rationality’ (or ‘intelligibility’) in the context of 
administrative reasons, consult Mullan (Let’s try again!) (2008) at 136; Dunsmuir para 47 and Bastarache at 237. 
1784
 Khosa para 63. 
1785
 Where the requisites of ‘justifiability, transparency and intelligibility’ had been emphasized; Dunsmuir para 
47. 
1786
 Ibid; Khosa para 63. See also Clifford para 31; Baker para 43. 
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public at large.
1787
 As for the stipulation that decisions be ‘justifiable, transparent and 
intelligible’,1788 Heckman instructively summarizes the SCC’s directives in Khosa as to when 
reasons will meet these requirements. He submits that the Divisions’ reasons did so as they: 
 
‘…disclosed with clarity the considerations in support of both points of view, 
considered the appropriate factors, reviewed the evidence and attributed significant 
weight
1789
 to the respondent’s evidence of remorse and prospects for rehabilitation, 
and came to their own conclusions based on their appreciation of that evidence.’1790  
 
As such, the requirements of justifiability, transparency and intelligibility ostensibly infuse 
both elements of reasonableness. For the purposes of ascertaining the sufficiency of a 
decision-maker’s reasons specifically, the Court’s emphases on clarity and disclosure are key. 
Together they reveal that reasons must be clear and must indicate precisely what the decision-
maker took into account when reaching its findings. Where these requisites are met, 
administrative reasons will be adequate.
1791
  
 
In Lake v Canada (Minister of Justice),
1792
 the SCC expanded on the detail required of 
administrative reasons, with specific reference to the purposes of reasons. It held: 
 
‘[The decision-maker’s] reasons need not be comprehensive. The purpose of 
providing reasons is twofold: to allow the individual to understand why the decision 
was made; and to allow the reviewing court to assess the validity of the decision. The 
[decision-maker]’s reasons must make it clear that he considered the individual’s 
submissions against extradition and must provide some basis for understanding why 
those submissions were rejected. Though the [decision-maker’s] Cotroni analysis was 
brief in the instant case,
1793
 it was in my view sufficient.  The [decision-maker] is not 
required to provide a detailed analysis for every factor. An explanation based on what 
                                                          
1787
 Given the significance of satisfactory reasoning, Dunsmuir’s endorsement of ‘deference as respect’ was not 
to be understood as detracting from the need for adequate reasons; Khosa para 63, read with Dunsmuir. 
1788
 Dunsmuir para 47. 
1789
 Note, however, that with the exception of Constitutional matters and legal questions of central importance to 
the legal community as a whole, reviewing courts are not generally entitled to reweigh the evidence before the 
relevant decision-maker; Dunsmuir para 60; Toronto (City) para 62; Suresh para 37; Dr Q paras 16 & 17. Thus, 
while the SCC in Khosa made express reference to the Division’s attribution of ‘significant weight’ to certain 
factors, the reference should be construed with this limitation in mind; consider the discussion of discretionary 
decisions below. 
1790
 Heckman (2009) at 782; Khosa paras 66-67. 
1791
 Heckman’s appraisal of the Court’s findings concerning substantive unreasonableness is addressed in later 
paragraphs. 
1792
 Lake v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2008] 1 SCR 761. 
1793
 The reference to the Cotroni analysis is a reference to the factors the decision-maker was obliged to take into 
account in light of earlier case law. 
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the [decision-maker] considers the most persuasive factors will be sufficient for a 
reviewing court to determine whether his conclusion was reasonable.’1794  
 
Read with Khosa, from these sentiments the core features of adequate reasoning may be 
extracted.
1795
 First, reasons must serve the purposes for which they are given.
1796
 They must 
accordingly be sufficiently clear and comprehensive as to inform both the parties and the 
reviewing court
1797
 of the raison d’etre for the decision.1798 Every trivial detail need not, 
however, be recorded.
1799
 Reasons must simply demonstrate due consideration of relevant 
factual and legal factors and offer legitimate bases for the conclusions drawn. After all, 
deference dictates that a measure of leeway remains available to decision-makers.
1800
 As the 
Court of Appeal in Clifford v Ontario (Attorney General) described this requirement, the 
tribunal must ‘grapple with the substance of the matter’, and that engagement must be 
apparent from the reasons provided.
1801
 In other words, the decision-maker’s reasoning path 
should be evident and lucid and the basis for its findings should be satisfactorily explained 
and logically linked to the outcome.
1802
 Where reasons comply with these requirements, the 
procedural aspect of reasonableness will be met.
1803
 
 
Given that the Labour Courts have frequently recalled the need for adequate reasons while 
acknowledging that minor details need not be recorded in awards,
1804
 adopting a comparable 
attitude during section 145 proceedings would accord with CCMA commissioners’ current 
obligations.
1805
 For the reasons discussed above, doing so need not impinge upon the declared 
distinctions between Carephone and Sidumo.
1806
 
                                                          
1794
 Lake para 46; see too Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 16; Anand, Edelstein & Wong-
Chong at 159. 
1795
 As Jones & de Villars observe, unreasonableness may or may not be evident from the reasons themselves; 
DP Jones & AS de Villars Principles of Administrative Law 5 ed (2009) at 576-577. 
1796
 Lake para 46; Khosa para 63; Maritime Paper Products Ltd v CEP, Local 1520 (2009) 183 LAC (4
th
) 289. 
1797
 Audmax para 8. 
1798
 Lake para 46; Khosa paras 63-65; Clifford para 31; Maritime Paper Products para 36. 
1799
 Sufficiency rather than perfection is the threshold; Willis & Winkler (2010) at 25-26; Limestone District 
School Board v Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation 2008 CanLII 63992 (ON SCDC) para 24; 
Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 16. 
1800
 Khosa para 63. 
1801
 Clifford para 31. 
1802
 Ibid; see also Willis & Winkler (2010) at 25-26.  
1803
 And the reasons will be adequate. 
1804
 C Garbers ‘Reviewing CCMA awards in the aftermath of Sidumo’ (2008) 17(9) Contemporary Labour Law 
84 at 86; Strategic Liquor Services para 17 citing Mpahlehle para 12. 
1805
 Consult, in this regard, section 138(7)(a) of the LRA; County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others  (1999) 
20 ILJ 1701 (LAC) at 1717C-E, read with Zondo JP’s qualifying remarks in Maepe v Commission for 
Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation and another (2008) 29 ILJ 2189 (LAC) para 8 and CUSA v Tao Ying 
Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) para 140. 
1806
 Fidelity paras 102-103. 
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6.4 When will a decision be substantively reasonable?  
 
Following Dunsmuir, in addition to the confusion around the constituents of reasonableness, 
the meaning of substantive unreasonableness was uncertain. Delineating the boundaries of 
this concept is challenging. As Woolley comments: ‘No test can tell one how to be 
deferential; since deference is neither capitulation nor substitution of judgment it necessarily 
requires the drawing of fine lines in particular cases.’1807 Moreover, as argued in preceding 
chapters, defining the standard too clearly may detract from its contextual nature.
1808
 
Attempting to describe its limits should therefore be undertaken with caution. Provided, 
however, that any description of reasonableness makes suitable allowance for contextual 
variation, the standard’s character need not be undermined. Given the benefits to consistency 
and predictability in review proceedings should a more structured approach to reasonableness 
be devised, demarcating the standard more concisely is crucial. 
 
When doing so,
1809
 it is informative to begin with the guiding principles of reasonableness in 
Canada generally. The first of these is that reasonableness does not equate to correctness.
1810
 
Supplementing this is the principle that administrative determinations will be unreasonable 
only where they fall outside the range of permissible ones.
1811
 Whereas decision-makers may 
be empowered to decide disputes,
1812
 reviewing courts are tasked with identifying the range 
of reasonable findings available.
1813
 Finally, the directive that decisions should be defensible 
in terms of both the facts and applicable law is pertinent.
1814
 Findings riddled with legal and 
factual errors, or which are illogical or unsupportable, may consequently be overturned for 
substantive unreasonableness.
1815
 
 
                                                          
1807
 Woolley at 269. 
1808
 De Ville (2005) at 213-214. Consider too chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
1809
 Particularly in so far as Canadian courts’ inconsistent attitudes to the concept divulge the difficulties 
associated with it; Heckman (2010) at 38. Compare, for example, Plourde; Desbiens v Wal-mart Canada Corp 
[2009] 3 SCR 540 (SCC); Syndicat de la function publique du Quebec; MiningWatch Canada and Montreal 
(City), read with Heckman (2010) at 43-46. 
1810
 Dunsmuir para 47. As the Court in UNA, Local 301 v Capital Health Authority (2009) 184 LAC (4th) 193 
(CA) remarked, the outcome need not even be the most likely one; it must simply fall within the range of 
reasonable outcomes available; UNA Local 301 paras 8-9.   
1811
 Ibid. 
1812
 Provided they are acting within the confines of their jurisdiction. 
1813
 Dunsmuir para 47. 
1814
 Ibid; for further references to these principles, consult Dunsmuir itself. 
1815
 For a comprehensive discussion of findings riddled with errors, see Audmax. 
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While these principles are established not only in Canada but also in South Africa,
1816
 their 
apposite application is tricky. As a result, they require qualification. Binnie J’s caveat in 
Khosa, that a simple disagreement between an administrative decision-maker and a court is 
insufficient to warrant review, provides a valid starting point.
1817
 Klinck expands on the 
notion with reference to Dunsmuir itself. According to her, the SCC’s rigid articulation of 
what it deemed the suitable statutory interpretation to be was incongruent with the spirit of 
reasonableness.
1818
 In presuming the existence of a singularly correct interpretation of the 
legislation, the Court had erroneously implied that: 
 
‘…‘the range of reasonable outcomes’ is somehow determined with reference to the 
court’s own assessment of the correct result. That is, ‘that the range of acceptable 
outcomes’ might simply be the acceptable ‘margin of error’ for administrative 
decision-makers under a reasonableness standard.’1819 
 
As Klinck observes, crafting reasonableness review as a means of condoning decision-
maker’s mistakes both detracts from Dyzenhaus’s conception of ‘deference as respect’1820 
and encourages unwarranted interference with administrative determinations.
1821
 Rather than 
defining a reasonable decision with reference to judicial opinions of the ‘correct’ outcome, 
reasonableness should be understood with reference to the acceptable outcomes available.
1822
 
These outcomes need not resemble each other. In Klinck’s view, two perfectly reasonable 
findings may actually be contrary in conclusion.
1823
 Given the contextual dependency of 
reasonableness,
1824
 the theoretical legitimacy of Klinck’s sentiments is apparent. In addition, 
envisaging reasonableness in this way ought to discourage appellate-like review under the 
guise of deference. Her formulation of the standard is thus an edifying conception of 
reasonableness, of value to section 145 proceedings.   
 
                                                          
1816
 At least in part; consider, for example, the LAC’s synopsis of reasonableness in Fidelity and chapter 3. 
1817
 Khosa para 125. Note too Halifax (Regional Municipality) v NSUPE, Local 13 (2009) 187 LAC (4
th
) 353 
para 79. 
1818
 Klinck at 48; for a comparable view, see Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008)  at 137-140. 
1819
 Klinck at 49; for analogous judicial sentiments, see Ryan para 54. 
1820
 Dyzenhaus in Taggart (ed) (1997). 
1821
 Klinck at 49. 
1822
 Ibid; Klinck agrees with Bastarache’s view that the contextual nature of reasonableness does not imply a 
spectrum but instead connotes the span of permissible, reasonable outcomes and processes available. 
1823
 Ibid. 
1824
 As not requiring correctness. 
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Of related consequence when refining the test is Dunsmuir’s declaration that reasonable 
decisions must be defensible in terms of both the facts and the relevant law.
1825
 To the extent 
to which the parameters of the applicable law are unclear, legislative intent as to whom the 
power to identify the law has been granted must be ascertained.
1826
 Only where the legislature 
has granted that power to the courts, should the standard of review be correctness. Contrarily, 
where decision-makers have been entrusted with deciding the issue at hand, reasonableness 
should apply.
1827
 It is at this point that recalling Binnie J’s and Klinck’s advice is vital. South 
African courts would do well to take heed of that advice, remembering that the applicable law 
in any given case may not be as amenable to finite definition as judicial assertions might 
otherwise suggest. 
 
These principles are fundamental to reasonableness review. Yet, if consistency and reliability 
during section 145 proceedings are to be achieved, an even more succinct configuration of 
reasonableness is necessary. Reading the SCC’s pronouncements in Dunsmuir together with 
its discussion in Khosa as to when decisions will be ‘transparent, intelligible and 
justifiable’,1828 offers some direction.1829 In brief, these indicate that to be reasonable, 
decisions must evince: 
 
a) Consideration and acknowledgement of both parties’ accounts of the dispute; 
b) Appraisal of all relevant legal principles; 
c) Application of these principles to the core facts and allocation of weight thereto;1830 
and 
d) Conclusions independently reached.1831 
 
In other words, for a decision to be reasonable, the decision-maker must have recognised and 
understood the principal facts, identified the applicable law, related the facts to the law by 
balancing the key factors for consideration, and resolved the dispute impartially. Importantly, 
                                                          
1825
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 872; Audmax. 
1826
 Consult the discussion on jurisdictional questions below; see too CUPE (2003), where the impact of 
legislative intent on the standard of review was emphasized; CUPE (2003) para 149; Huscroft at 310.  
1827
 Ibid. 
1828
 As described above; Heckman (2009) at 782; Khosa paras 66-67. 
1829
 Dunsmuir para 47. 
1830
 This accords with the Labour Courts’ current approach to review, evinced in matters such as Astore Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 1 BLLR 14 (LC) paras 32-33. Recall the prohibition in Canada against 
judicial re-allocations of weight however; Dunsmuir para 60; Toronto (City) para 62; Suresh para 37 and Dr Q 
paras 16 & 17. 
1831
 This criterion flows logically from the requisites of natural justice, one of which is impartiality.  
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it is the decision-maker’s ‘appreciation of the evidence’1832 which is germane, rather than that 
of the courts. Augmenting this is the principle that reviewing courts are precluded from re-
allocating the weight attributed by decision-makers to relevant factors.
1833
 It might be 
contended that this interpretation of reasonableness neglects the standard’s substantive 
character. However, that is not the case. Identifying ‘relevant’ legal principles and ‘core’ 
facts invariably involves value judgments,
1834
 necessitating evaluations of the merits of 
disputes. It is here that the contextual variability and substantive nature of reasonableness 
may be accounted for on review. 
 
Certain Canadian judicial review statutes provide additional assistance in defining 
reasonableness. Judicial review legislation has been passed both in the federal and provincial 
spheres; there is accordingly a wealth of statutory provisions from which to draw.
1835
 For the 
purposes of this chapter, in addition to the FCA,
1836
 British Columbia’s Administrative 
Tribunals Act (‘ATA’) is most useful.1837 Distinctively to other review acts, the ATA 
expressly provides for the standards of review applicable to each ground.
1838
  It adds to these 
prescriptions a concise definition of ‘patent unreasonableness’ – the standard stipulated for 
discretionary determinations.
1839
 It also distinguishes between review proceedings where a 
decision-maker’s enabling statute is covered by a privative clause and where it is not.1840 
While section 58 of the ATA governs the former category, section 59 addresses the latter. As 
section 145 of the LRA constitutes a form of privative clause, section 58 of the ATA is of 
greater comparative pertinence than section 59. The relevance of section 58 to labour disputes 
is supported by British Columbia’s Labour Relations Code, which itself contains a privative 
                                                          
1832
 Heckman (2009) at 782; Khosa paras 66-67. 
1833
 Dunsmuir para 60; Toronto (City) para 62; Suresh para 37; Dr Q paras 16 & 17. As expounded in the 
conclusion to this thesis, should judicial re-assessments of weight be prohibited in section 145 proceedings, the 
prohibition should be subject to the proviso that commissioners’ weight attributions may not be manifestly 
disproportionate in light of the facts and pertinent law. 
1834
 In Baker, for one, the SCC conceded that discretionary and legal determinations necessarily entailed 
subjectivity; Baker paras 54-56. 
1835
 Not all provincial jurisdictions have done so however; Jones & de Villars (2009) at 663. 
1836
 The relevant provisions of which have been addressed under Khosa above. 
1837
 Administrative Tribunals Act SBC 2004 c45 (‘ATA’). 
1838
 Jones (2009) at 123. In contrast to the FCA; Khosa. 
1839
 Section 58(3)(d) of the ATA. Given Dunsmuir’s abandonment of this standard, the impact of Dunsmuir and 
Khosa is more pronounced in British Columbia (‘BC’) than in other provinces; Elliot at 16. For the confusion 
caused by Khosa in BC, see Khosa paras 59 & 108, read with Jones
 
(2009) ftnt 4. 
1840
 For a brief critique of BC’s adoption of the ATA, consult JM Evans ‘Administrative justice reform in 
England and Wales: Some Canadian reflections’ (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 11. 
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clause.
1841
 In other words, the section applies to reviews of labour boards’ and arbitrators’ 
decisions there. The significant provisions of the ATA read as follows: 
 
 ‘Standard of review if tribunal's enabling Act has [a] privative clause 
58  (1) ...
1842
 
(2) In a judicial review proceeding relating to expert tribunals under subsection 
(1) 
(a) a finding of fact or law or an exercise of discretion by the 
tribunal in respect of a matter over which it has exclusive 
jurisdiction under a privative clause must not be interfered with 
unless it is patently unreasonable, 
(b) questions about the application of common law rules of 
natural justice and procedural fairness must be decided having 
regard to whether, in all of the circumstances, the tribunal acted 
fairly, and 
(c) for all matters other than those identified in paragraphs (a) and 
(b), the standard of review to be applied to the tribunal's decision 
is correctness. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) (a), a discretionary decision is patently 
unreasonable if the discretion 
(a) is exercised arbitrarily or in bad faith, 
(b) is exercised for an improper purpose, 
(c) is based entirely or predominantly on irrelevant factors, or 
(d) fails to take statutory requirements into account.’1843 
 
Due to Dunsmuir’s removal of patent unreasonableness from the landscape of review, the 
continued validity of sections 58(2)(a) and 58(3) is contentious.
1844
 In particular, the proper 
approach to reviewing factual, discretionary and legal questions in British Columbia is 
indefinite.
1845
 The meaning of statutory patent unreasonableness and its relationship to 
                                                          
1841
 Section 138 of the Labour Relations Code RSBC 1996 c244. 
1842
 Section 58(1) reads: ‘If the tribunal's enabling act contains a privative clause, relative to the courts the 
tribunal must be considered to be an expert tribunal in relation to all matters over which it has exclusive 
jurisdiction.’  
1843
 Prior to Dunsmuir, in British Columbia, only discretionary decisions attracted the statutory definition of 
patent unreasonableness; the common law conception of patent unreasonableness applied to factual and legal 
determinations therefore; Underhill at 256-257.  
1844
 Simon Ruel ‘The top administrative law cases of 2011 and why they matter’ (2012) 25 Can J Admin L & 
Prac 25 at 26. In Ruel’s opinion, the position has been largely clarified by cases such as Manz, Victoria Times 
Colonist and Kerton v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal) 2011 BCCA 7. In Kerton, 
the Court of Appeal held that while common law principles are informative, ‘particular attention must be paid to 
the governing legislative provisions…’, including section 58 of the ATA; Kerton para 29. The statement is 
useful to a degree. Still, the precise relationship between the legislative standard and the common law test for 
reasonableness remains indeterminate. In addition, it is unclear whether the common law principles applicable to 
patent unreasonableness in the pre-Dunsmuir era have retained their relevance or whether reviewing courts are 
now obliged to apply patent unreasonableness with reference to the general standard of reasonableness 
enunciated in Dunsmuir. 
1845
 Compare Manz; Asquini v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal) 2009 BCSC 62; 
Victoria Times Colonist; Woods; Westergaard and Pacific Newspaper Group; Marcia McNeil British 
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common law principles is similarly uncertain.
1846
 Despite the lack of clarity in these areas, the 
standard’s statutory definition1847 offers a practical means of refining the features of 
reasonableness under section 145. Of comparable utility are the ATA’s directives as to the 
standards applicable to different types of question. Read with Dunsmuir and Khosa, they 
elucidate the relationship between section 145 defects and the reasonableness enquiry. The 
statute’s provisions further attest to the logic of distinguishing between standards of review 
applicable to administrative findings and those regulating procedure. In terms of the ATA, 
while substantive findings attract reasonableness review in varying degrees,
1848
 questions of 
procedural fairness are assessed against the standards of fairness and natural justice. The test 
prescribed for procedural fairness is aligned with that applicable to South African labour 
disputes – in essence, the test asks whether the procedures followed (or neglected) deprived 
the parties of a fair hearing.
1849
 Finally, all residual (and allegedly defective) administrative 
conduct may be challenged on the basis of correctness.  
 
Before recasting the aforementioned principles into a composite test for review, Canadian 
courts’ approaches to reviewing discretionary and jurisdictional determinations require 
attention. These are discussed below.  
 
6.5 Reasonableness review of discretionary determinations 
 
Given the controversy around judicial allocations of weight in South Africa
1850
 and the link 
between administrative weight allocations and reviews of discretionary decisions in Canada, 
a suitable method of evaluating discretionary findings must be found. While the Court in 
Dunsmuir affirmed the need for deference to be paid to these findings, it failed to expound its 
remarks in this regard. It is therefore difficult to discern from the judgment precisely how 
administrative exercises of discretion should be examined. Fortunately, the SCC’s earlier 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Columbia’s exercise in sampling, the ‘Administrative Tribunals Act’, Dunsmuir and Khosa Paper presented at 
the National Administrative Law and Labour and Employment Law CLE Conference, Fairmont Chateau Laurier 
Hotel, Ottawa (20-21 November 2009) at 4-7; Elliot. For the position prior to Dunsmuir, consider R Junger 
‘British Columbia’s experience with the Administrative Tribunals Act’ (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 51 at 
65; see also Allman v Amacon Property Management Services Inc 2006 BCSC 725 paras 46-49. 
1846
 Ibid. According to Ruel, however, the position has now largely been clarified; Ruel at 50-52. Kerton para 29.  
1847
 In section 58(3) of the ATA. 
1848
 With the exception of jurisdictional conclusions. Note too (for the purposes of revising section 145) that 
legal questions of significant importance to the legal fraternity as a whole, or which concern common law 
principles unrelated to labour law, should give rise to correctness review; Dunsmuir para 53. 
1849
 Transnet Freight Rail para 17; Fipaza v Eskom Holdings Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 2903 (LC) para 58. 
1850
 Refer, in this regard, to chapters 3 and 4; Transnet Freight Rail and NUM obo 112 Employees. Note also the 
inevitable relationship between reasonableness and discretionary decisions; Burns (2003) para 142.  
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decision in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
1851
 provides some 
bearing. 
 
Prior to Baker, abuses of discretion
1852
 were reviewable for want of correctness, distinctively 
to errors of law.
1853
 The Court in Baker saw the anomaly of this distinction, noting that both 
legal and discretionary findings inevitably involved statutory or legal interpretation; 
differentiating between them was accordingly nonsensical.
1854
 Provided a pragmatic and 
functional analysis pointed to reasonableness, held the Court, deference was due to 
discretionary determinations. In turn, the correctness standard was no longer apt.
1855
 The 
implication of this was that judicial re-allocations of weight were inappropriate. In the SCC’s 
view nonetheless, this did not exempt discretionary findings which were inconsistent with 
enabling legislation, principles of administrative law and the rule of law, fundamental values 
of Canadian society or the Charter, from review.
1856
  
 
Applying these principles to the facts in Baker, the Court concluded that the decision-maker 
there had failed both to consider particular factors and to attribute ‘significant weight’ to 
them.
1857
 Specifically, certain fundamental values of Canadian society had not been 
accounted for.
1858
 This rendered its decision contrary to legislative intent and susceptible to 
review.
1859
 In theory, it was plain following Baker that reviewing courts were barred from re-
evaluating decision-makers’ attributions of weight.1860 Yet, the SCC’s qualification and 
application of this principle to the facts left the extent of the prohibition debatable. 
                                                          
1851
 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
1852
 For abuses of discretion as a ground of review, consult van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 954-955; for the 
origin of courts’ powers to review abuses of discretion, see Roncarelli v Du Plessis [1959] SCR 121 (Que) at 
140. 
1853
 Errors of law were reviewed on the standard of either patent unreasonableness or unreasonableness 
simpliciter; van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 955; Cartier at 61; Gratton at 483. In specified cases, however, 
the Wednesbury standard was applied; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 
[1948] 1 KB 223 (CA); Baker para 53. For review of discretionary determinations in the labour context, see 
National Bank v Canada v Retail Clerks International Union [1984] 1 SCR 269 (Can). 
1854
 Interpreting legislation invariably involves a measure of subjectivity; Baker paras 54-56. 
1855
 Baker paras 54-56; note, however, Mullan’s cautionary remarks in ‘The struggle for complexity’ (2004) at 
66.  
1856
 Baker para 53. 
1857
 Ibid paras 74-77. 
1858
 The decision-maker had been obliged to account for the best interests of the children, with reference to the 
guidelines in Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Government of Canada Immigration Manual: Examination 
and Enforcement, available at www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/index.asp, accessed on 14 January 2013 
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 28 ILM 1448 (1989), but had failed to do so; 
Baker at 72-73. For the difficulty of reviewing decisions based on soft law, consider Gratton at 509. 
1859
 Baker paras 74-76. 
1860
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 955; Cartier at 61. 
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In Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
1861
 the Court sought to clarify 
the issue. It began by rejecting the view that courts were permitted to re-assess administrative 
allocations of weight during reviews of discretionary findings. According to the SCC, Baker 
had not interfered with this principle. The case was merely authority for the power of 
reviewing courts to evaluate whether a decision-maker had ‘failed to consider and weigh’ 
important factors.
1862
 While decision-makers were obliged to attend to all relevant 
considerations and allocate some weight to each, determining the suitability of their 
allocations fell beyond the scope of judicial review.
1863
 This approach has been confirmed by 
the SCC in subsequent matters.
1864
 Still, despite judicial confirmation of the prohibition, the 
Baker Court’s declaration that administrative findings must be consistent with stipulated 
values and principles
1865
 endures.
1866
 
 
Since Dunsmuir, these principles have been affirmed by the courts. In both Montreal (City) v 
Montreal Port Authority
1867
 and Bell Canada v Bell Aliant Regional Communications,
1868
 for 
instance, the SCC held that to survive review, discretionary decisions needed to be aligned 
with the values underpinning the legislative grant of the discretionary power concerned. 
Consequently, decisions offensive to the objects of enabling legislation would generally be 
unreasonable.
1869
 Read with the Dunsmuir guidelines, the proviso to this must be that where 
legal questions relating to the Constitution Acts or questions of fundamental import to the 
legal community face review, the correctness standard should apply.
1870
 
 
                                                          
1861
 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3 (Can). 
1862
 Ibid paras 29 & 34; see also Pezim at 607. Whether the Court in Baker truly refrained from re-weighing 
relevant considerations nevertheless remains doubtful; recall too Khosa paras 4 & 65-67. 
1863
 Suresh paras 29 & 34. 
1864
 Khosa paras 4 & 66-67; Halifax para 79; Pezim at 607. In Montreal (City), the SCC confirmed the 
qualifications to this rule stipulated in Baker. As Heckman records, however, it failed to indicate the extent to 
which decision-makers may identify relevant values of their own accord; Heckman (2010) at 41-42. Consult 
further, in this regard, CUPE (2003) and Huscroft at 307-8.  
1865
 And specifically with the underlying purposes of the original grant of discretion. 
1866
 Consider Montreal (City) and Bell Canada v Bell Aliant Regional Communications [2009] 2 SCR 764 
(SCC).  
1867
 Montreal (City). 
1868
 Bell Canada. 
1869
 Ibid. 
1870
 Dunsmuir para 58. 
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Canadian courts’ emphasis on societal values and legislative purpose is consistent with the 
Labour Courts’ attitude since Carephone.1871 Applying a test akin to the Canadian one in 
South Africa therefore seems fitting. The benefits of doing so are palpable. Were courts to 
refrain from re-examining commissioners’ allocations of weight to relevant factors, undue 
judicial interference would be reduced. Likely too, the instance of review proceedings would 
decline. Given commissioners’ broad discretions to determine the fairness of dismissals, the 
appropriateness of sanctions and the form of arbitration proceedings,
1872
 the approach would 
further comply with legislative intent. Thus, delineating the boundaries of review as 
preclusive of judicial attributions of weight offers a feasible means of defining the limits of 
reviewing courts’ powers. If suitably qualified, applying it in practice need endanger neither 
legal certainty nor precedent.
1873
 
 
Nevertheless, two conditions ought to attach to this proposed restraint of judicial power. The 
first arises from the Canadian principle that Constitutional questions should be evaluated on 
the standard of correctness.
1874
 Given the import of the Constitution, the notion seems apt. 
Still, whether applying an analogous principle in South Africa would be fitting is 
questionable. The second contests the appropriateness of an outright ban on judicial 
assessments of weight. These concerns (and potential solutions thereto) are considered in turn 
below.  
 
The first stems from the inevitable presence of South Africa’s Constitutional right to fair 
labour practices in all CCMA arbitrations.
1875
 This is exacerbated by the right to 
administrative justice’s role in all review proceedings. Given the overlap between these rights 
and Constitutional and public values, were the Canadian approach applied to section 145 
proceedings,
1876
 the prohibition against judicial assessments of weight would be 
                                                          
1871
 In Carephone, the LAC referred to the need to conduct review with reference to the Bill of Rights, the 
objects of the LRA and sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution; Carephone paras 11-37; chapter 2. 
1872
 See section 138 of the LRA; Shoprite Checkers 3 para 32; Myburgh (2010) at 15-16 and the CCMA 
Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations in GenN 602 GG 34573 of 2 September 2011, read with chapter 1 of this 
thesis. 
1873
 Refer to JL Clark ‘A mixed question of fact and law’ (1908-1909) 18 Yale LJ 404 at 404. While Clark’s 
argument was made in the context of appeals rather than reviews, it is of analogous import to review in the 
traditional sense. 
1874
 Dunsmuir para 58. 
1875
 See section 23 of the Constitution, read with section 1(a) of the LRA. 
1876
 Sanctioning judicial re-assessments of weight in light of societal values, Charter principles and the like. 
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redundant.
1877
 Constitutional questions of a discretionary nature should accordingly not be 
tested against the standard of correctness
1878
 when reviewing CCMA awards.   
 
Turning to the second difficulty with the proposed ban,
1879
 whether a complete prohibition of 
judicial weight allocations is desirable, may be disputed. The majority’s purported refusal in 
Khosa to evaluate the Division’s assessment of weight at all, comparatively to Fish J’s 
stance,
1880
 illustrates the problem.
1881
 As Klinck observes:  
 
‘…such an absolute refusal to assess the weight assigned to discretionary factors 
undercuts the legal requirement to take certain factors into account. Indeed, it is easy 
for administrative decision-makers to simply canvass the necessary factors, while 
failing to give some of them any genuine consideration.’1882   
 
The legitimacy of her remarks is plain.  Of related value is Mullan’s suggestion that 
discretionary determinations should be reviewed with reference to the proportionality test – 
purportedly a broader measure of reasonableness.
1883
 As he argues, devising reasonableness 
in this way would lend greater structure to the concept.
1884
 The standard’s susceptibility to 
manipulation by officious courts would then be curbed.
1885
 Applying proportionality review 
to discretionary findings, submits Mullan, could entail asking whether the decision-maker’s 
allocation of weight to stipulated factors was ‘manifestly disproportionate’.1886 While 
                                                          
1877
 As all reviews would then allow for judicial re-allocations of weight or assessment on the basis of 
correctness (contrary to legislative intent); section 1(d) of the LRA. 
1878
 As Dunsmuir directed; Dunsmuir para 58. 
1879
 Which Jones submits the SCC in Baker was guilty of contravening; Jones (2003). For the prohibition 
generally, see Suresh para 37; Dr Q paras 16-17 and Khosa paras 66-67. 
1880
 Recall Fish J’s view that the Division had fixated on a single factor; Khosa para 156. 
1881
 Khosa para 62. Despite the prohibition, the SCC in Khosa commended the decision-maker for having 
attributed ‘significant weight’ to the relevant factors; Khosa paras 65-67. 
1882
 Klinck at 55. 
1883
 Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 233; Michael Taggart ‘Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury’ 2008 NZ L Rev 
423; For proportionality review in Canada generally, consult Mullan ‘Proportionality’; Multani; Cartier; Evan 
Fox-Decent ‘The Charter and administrative law: Cross-fertilization in public law’ in C Flood & L Sossin (eds) 
Administrative law in context (2008) 169 at 181-189; Gratton; J Ross ‘Applying the Charter to discretionary 
authority’ (1991) 29 Alta L Rev 382; S Choudry & K Roach ‘Racial and ethnic profiling: Statutory discretion, 
Constitutional remedies, and democratic accountability’ (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ 1; Lorne Sossin ‘Discretion 
unbound: Reconciling the Charter and soft law’ (2003) 45 Can Pub Admin 465; David Dyzenhaus ‘Baker: The 
unity of public law’ in David Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law (2004) 1; Mullan ‘Charter issues after 
Multani’ (2006-2007). 
1884
 Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 233. Prior to Dunsmuir, others had advocated for proportionality review too; Guy 
Regimbald ‘Correctness, reasonableness and proportionality: A new standard of judicial review’ (2005-2006) 31 
Manitoba Law Journal 239; Evan Fox-Decent ‘The internal morality of administration: The form and structure 
of reasonableness’ in David Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law (1999) 143; Sossin & Flood (2007). 
1885
 Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 256; CUPE (2003). 
1886
 Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 257-258; Khosa para 156. See also Johannes Chan ‘A sliding scale of 
reasonableness in judicial review’ 2006 Acta Juridica 233; R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
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precluding full scale judicial re-assessments of weight, that test would ensure that grossly 
unbalanced outcomes would be quashed. In chapter 4, it was submitted that 
proportionality
1887
 is of limited pertinence to section 145 proceedings.
1888
 However, should 
the proposed ban on judicial assessments of weight be incorporated into the test for review of 
CCMA awards, the import of Klinck’s and Mullan’s sentiments must be acknowledged.1889 
As such, some allowance for evaluating commissioners’ allocations of weight must be made. 
In line with Mullan’s proposal, that allowance could permit review of grossly or egregiously 
disproportionate weight allocations.
1890
 Yet, the pliability of labels such as ‘gross’ and 
‘egregious’ may expose the scope of this test to radical fluctuations between cases.  
Confining the enquiry to the question of whether commissioners had attributed at least some 
weight to each relevant consideration may therefore be preferable.
1891
  
 
6.6 True questions of ‘jurisdiction’ 
 
It has been proposed that the nature of the question in dispute be determinative of the 
standard of review. From the Canadian experience it is clear that one of the key difficulties 
with this model is defining the term ‘jurisdictional’.1892 When reformulating the test for 
review of CCMA awards, it is sensible to anticipate this problem.
1893
 The Canadian courts’ 
attitudes to jurisdictional decisions, and the SCC’s definition thereof in Dunsmuir, constitute 
useful points of departure in this regard.
1894
 Before examining the Dunsmuir definition, it is 
helpful to canvass the pitfalls associated with identifying jurisdictional issues in Canada 
generally.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Department [2001] 2 AC 532 at 547. The test for proportionality in Canadian law (which applies to allegedly 
unconstitutional irregularities) closely resembles section 36 of the Constitution.  
1887
 As defined by Hoexter; Hoexter (2007) at 309-310. 
1888
 For the complete argument, refer to chapter 4. 
1889
 Particularly given the ostensible (albeit debatable) poverty of many CCMA awards; Sasol Mining para 7. 
1890
 Comparably to the test articulated by Conradie JA in County Fair Foods para 43. 
1891
 See the discussion of Khosa above. 
1892
 In so far as the definition is vague, courts may inappropriately label questions as jurisdictional, thereby 
enabling correctness review; Heckman (2010); Heckman (2009); Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008)  at 126-127; 
Dustin Kenall ‘De-regulating the regulatory compact: The legacy of Dunsmuir and the “jurisdictional” question 
doctrine’ (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 115 at 117. For the principles of review governing jurisdictional 
questions in Canada, see Heckman (2009) at 770. Compare the Canadian experience to that of pre-democratic 
South Africa, with reference to De Ville (2005) at 150-152 and Hoexter (2007) at 252-258. For the position in 
the labour arena, consult Fergus (2012). 
1893
 There is evidence to suggest that the Labour Courts are already attributing the ‘jurisdictional’ label 
inappropriately; see Fergus (2012) and the cases cited therein. A preferable stance was taken in EOH Abantu 
(Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation & others (2010) 31 ILJ 937 (LC) para 28. 
1894
 Note, however, that in Alberta Teachers’ Association v Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) 2011 
SCC 61, the SCC expressed skepticism as to whether a separate category of ‘jurisdictional’ question existed at 
all; Alberta Teachers’ Association para 34; Quayat at 184.   
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Well before Dunsmuir, whether a question was jurisdictional was determined with reference 
to either the ‘preliminary question doctrine’ or by asking whether the decision-maker had 
asked the ‘wrong question.’1895 The former obliged courts to consider whether the issue in 
dispute was a condition precedent to the decision-maker’s exercise of jurisdiction or 
collateral to the merits, or whether it fell within the prescribed limits of the decision-maker’s 
jurisdiction.
1896
 Where the question was ‘preliminary’ to jurisdiction or ‘collateral’ to the 
merits, it was subject to correctness review.
1897
 In contrast, questions of law or fact beyond 
these parameters were immunised from review entirely, provided only that the enabling 
legislation contained a privative clause.
1898
 The primary difficulty with this doctrine
1899
 was 
the flexibility of the terms ‘preliminary’ and ‘collateral’.1900 This allowed interventionist 
courts to style legal questions as jurisdictional issues, enabling correctness review in the 
process.
1901
  
 
Equally problematic,
1902
 the wrong question doctrine held that a decision could be set aside if 
the decision-maker had: ‘…asked itself the ‘wrong question’, taken into consideration legally 
irrelevant factors, or ignored factors that it was legally required to consider.’1903 Again, the 
doctrine’s principal shortcoming was its failure to distinguish meaningfully between 
                                                          
1895
 The doctrine followed the House of Lord’s decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission 
[1969] 2 AC 147 but was not entirely accepted by Canadian Courts. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, the SCC 
nonetheless adopted the precise language used in Anisminic, obliging lower courts to apply it; van Harten, 
Heckman & Mullan at 803-804. 
1896
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 804-806. 
1897
 Ibid at 805. 
1898
 Ibid. 
1899
 For further criticism thereof, refer to van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 805; CUPE (1979) at 233, citing 
HWR Wade Administrative Law 4 ed (1977) at 245; David Mullan ‘Tribunals and courts — The contemporary 
terrain: Lessons from human rights regimes’ (1999) 24 Queen’s LJ 643 at 660; Council of Canadians with 
Disabilities at 88-89. For critique in the labour context, see Brian Langille ‘Judicial review, judicial revisionism 
and judicial responsibility’ (1986) 17 Rev Gen 169 at 184; Paul Weiler ‘The ‘slippery slope’ of judicial 
intervention: The Supreme Court and Canadian labour relations 1950-1970’ (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 33;  
G Adams ‘Bell Canada and the older worker: Who will review the judges?’ (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall LJ 389 and 
G Adams ‘Grievance arbitration and judicial review in North America’ (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall LJ 443. 
1900
 See, for example, Bora Laskin ‘Certiorari to labour boards: The apparent futility of privative clauses’ (1952) 
30 Can Bar Rev 986 at 989-991, 994 & 996. 
1901
 See, for example, Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver (City) [1994] 1 SCR 231 (BC); Mullan ‘The 
struggle for complexity’ (2004) at 79-80; Council of Canadians with Disabilities; there, the SCC warned that the 
preliminary question doctrine: ‘…has the capacity to unravel the essence of the decision and undermine the very 
characteristic of the Agency which entitles it to the highest level of deference from a court – its specialized 
expertise.’; Council of Canadians with Disabilities para 88. 
1902
 For critique of the doctrine, consult David Mullan ‘A blast from the past – A surreptitious resurgence of 
Metropolitan Life?’ (1992) 5(2d) Admin Law Reports 97; CUPE (1979) and Service Employees’ International 
Union, Local No 333 v Nipawin District Staff Nurses Association et al [1975] 1 SCR 382 at 389; van Harten, 
Heckman & Mullan at 804-806. 
1903
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 805; Anisminic. 
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questions of jurisdiction and questions of law. This jeopardised the principle that legal 
questions were exempt from correctness review.
1904
 
 
In response to these difficulties, the SCC in Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 
v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation (‘CUPE (1979)’)1905 stated that: ‘The courts…should 
not be alert to brand as jurisdictional, and therefore subject to broader curial review, that 
which may be doubtfully so.’1906 Jurisdiction was thus to be construed in the narrow sense, as 
concerning the decision-maker’s authority to entertain the enquiry at hand to the exclusion of 
other concerns.
1907
 Notwithstanding this directive, officious courts continued to escape 
reasonableness review via doubtful attributions of the ‘jurisdictional’ label.1908  
 
Seeking to remedy the problem in UES, Local 298 v Bibeault, the SCC introduced the 
pragmatic and functional analysis.
1909
 Later, in Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration),
1910
 it confined jurisdictional questions to those attracting 
correctness review under this analysis.
1911
 Consistently with the purpose of the analysis, 
                                                          
1904
 Van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 806.   
1905
 Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation [1979] 2 SCR 227 at 
233 (‘CUPE (1979)’). Note also, Paschienyk v Saskatchewan (Workers Compensation Board) [1997] 2 SCR 
890. The SCC in CUPE (1979) explained its departure from the preliminary question doctrine on the basis that 
the dispute had arisen in the labour relations context, holding that: ‘[p]rivative clauses of this type are typically 
found in labour relations legislation. The rationale for protection of a labour relations board’s decisions within 
jurisdiction is straightforward and compelling. The labour board is a specialized tribunal which administers a 
comprehensive statute regulating labour relations. In the administration of that regime, a board is called upon not 
only to find facts and decide questions of law, but also to exercise its understanding of the body of jurisprudence 
that has developed around the collective bargaining system, as understood in Canada, and its labour relations 
sense acquired from accumulated expertise in the field.’; CUPE (1979) at 421-424. For further commentary on 
CUPE (1979), refer to Langille (1986) at 191-194. 
1906
 CUPE (1979) at 233; consider too Nipawin at 389.  
1907
 Ibid. 
1908
 Bell v Ontario (Human Rights Commission) [1971] SCR 756 (SCC); Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 129-
130; Mullan ‘A blast from the past’; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co; Langille (1986) at 190; Paul C Weiler In 
the last resort: A critical study of the Supreme Court of Canada (1974) at 129-31; Weiler (1971) and PW Hogg 
‘The jurisdictional fact doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada: Bell v Ontario (Human Rights Commission)’ 
(1971) 19 Osgoode Hall LJ 203; David Mullan ‘The jurisdictional fact doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada 
– a mitigating plea’ (1972) 10 Osgoode Hall LJ 440. For a comparably aggressive approach, see Port Arthur 
Shipbuilding Co v Arthurs et al [1969] SCR 85, as cited by Langille (1986) at 189. 
1909
 Which seeks to ascertain legislative intent as to the body upon which the legislature intended to confer the 
decision-making power in question; Bibeault at 1083-1087; Heckman (2009) at 770 – 771; Dunsmuir paras 30-
31; Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 130. 
1910
 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982. 
1911
 Ibid para 28. 
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determining the nature of the question in dispute was associated with identifying legislative 
intent.
1912
  
 
While the Pushpanathan method alleviated the confusion, in Dunsmuir, the SCC returned to 
an equivocal definition of ‘jurisdictional’. It held: 
 
‘…true jurisdictional questions arise where the tribunal must explicitly determine 
whether its statutory grant of power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter. 
The tribunal must interpret the grant of authority correctly or its action will be found 
to be ultra vires or to constitute a wrongful decline of jurisdiction.’1913 
 
This vague depiction of ‘jurisdictional questions’ exposed the jurisdictional label to judicial 
manipulation once more.
1914
 Recognising this danger in Nolan v Kerry (Canada) Inc,
1915
 the 
Court reiterated that true questions of jurisdiction were limited and that: 
 
‘The inference to be drawn from paras 54 and 59 of Dunsmuir is that courts should 
usually defer when the tribunal is interpreting its own statute and will only 
exceptionally apply a correctness standard when an interpretation of that statute raises 
a broad question of the tribunal’s authority.’1916  
 
Still, the Court offered no indication of how jurisdictional issues were to be distinguished 
from other matters. Reviewing courts’ attitudes thereto have therefore been erratic since 
Nolan.
1917
 Of these, the Court’s description of ‘jurisdiction’ in Public Service Alliance of 
Canada v Canadian Federal Pilots Association et al,
1918
 is preferable. There, Evans JA 
                                                          
1912
 Ibid para 26; van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 798; Paschienyk para 18; Huscroft at 309. Note the similar 
approach adopted in Council of Canadians with Disabilities para 90, citing DP Jones & AS de Villars Principles 
of Administrative Law 4 ed (2004) at 140 and Canada (Attorney General) v PSAC [1991] 1 SCR 614 at 14. 
1913
 Dunsmuir para 59. 
1914
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 129; consider too Mullan’s criticism of Bell v Ontario and Bastarache’s 
response thereto; Bastarache at 233. For varying interpretations of Dunsmuir’s formulation of jurisdictional 
issues, see Gruber at 313; Heckman (2009) at 770-774; Canada (Attorney General) v Watkin (2008) 378 NR 268 
(FCA); Nolan at 32-35; Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canadian Federal Pilots Association 2009 FCA 
223 and van Harten, Heckman & Mullan at 798.  For the view that following Dunsmuir, courts have 
progressively moved away from inopportunely labeling questions as jurisdictional, consult Kenall. 
1915
 Nolan v Kerry (Canada) Inc [2009] 2 SCR. 678 (SCC). 
1916
 Ibid para 35. Thus, the interpretation of the tribunal’s home statute in Nolan did not comprise a jurisdictional 
question and instead attracted deference; Heckman (2009) at 772. 
1917
 Heckman (2009) at 772; Northrop Grumman Overseas Services Corp v Canada (Attorney General) [2009] 3 
SCR 309 (SCC). In Heckman’s view, the SCC’s conception of ‘jurisdictional’ in Northrop was unduly broad; 
Heckman (2010) at 33; for a comparable approach in the federal sphere, see Watkin; consult too Heckman 
(2009) at 772-774; Heckman (2010) at 34-35 and Assoc des courtiers et agents immobiliers du Quebec v Propio 
Direct Inc [2008] 2 SCR 195 (SCC) para 67, as cited therein. 
1918
 Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canadian Federal Pilots Association et al (2009) 392 NR 128 (FCA). 
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asserted that in disputes involving adjudicative or policy-making functions at least,
1919
 the 
presence of jurisdictional questions was best ascertained with reference to the standard of 
review analysis.
1920
 This did not imply that jurisdictional issues would never arise; it was 
merely necessary to limit their incidence appropriately. It consequently remained crucial that: 
‘the tribunal [had] the legal authority to interpret and apply the disputed provision of its 
enabling legislation.’1921 In other words, provided that the statute concerned authorises the 
decision-maker to engage with the issue in dispute, the question will not be jurisdictional.
1922
  
 
The merits of Canadian Federal Pilots resemble those of many CCMA arbitrations.
1923
 As 
such, the principles articulated therein are well suited to section 145 review proceedings. If 
unwarranted intrusion is to be avoided, adopting an equivalent attitude to jurisdictional issues 
during these proceedings may be necessary.
1924
 When determining the jurisdictional status of 
a question, the apposite enquiry might therefore be whether the legislature intended 
commissioners to be the final arbiters of the issue.
1925
 Where the answer to this enquiry is 
yes, the question should not be cast as jurisdictional.
1926
 
 
Of course, just as the term ‘jurisdictional’ is open to abuse, so too may formulations of the 
nature of the question in dispute be manipulated.
1927
 As Underhill remarks:  
 
                                                          
1919
 Note that when engaged in arbitration proceedings, CCMA commissioners are performing an adjudicative 
function. 
1920
 This is analogous to the Pushpanathan test; Canadian Federal Pilots paras 37-49; note also Council of 
Canadians with Disabilities para 88. For an example of a truly jurisdictional issue (according to the Court), see 
United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City) [2004] 1 SCR 485 and Canadian Federal 
Pilots para 5, read with Dunsmuir. 
1921
 Canadian Federal Pilots para 51. In the ordinary course, the authority of decision-makers to render 
determinations is either expressly or implicitly conferred by statute; Canadian Federal Pilots para 51; Nova 
Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin [2003] 2 SCR 504 paras 40-41; AUPE 2008 ABCA paras 15-
16. 
1922
 This approach was seemingly followed in R v Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) 2010 
ONSC 4006 and again in Toronto Hydro-Electric System Ltd v Ontario (Energy Board) 2010 ONCA 284 
(‘THESL’) paras 22, 33 & 34.  
1923
 For the facts of the case, refer to Canadian Federal Pilots paras 3, 20 & 53. On the strength of those facts, 
the Court concluded that the question in dispute was not jurisdictional and the reasonableness standard therefore 
applied. 
1924
 Heckman (2009) at 774-775. Consider too Pushpanathan. 
1925
 CUPE (2003) para 149; Huscroft at 310; Keyes at 120-121 & 149; Dunsmuir paras 30-31. 
1926
 When applying this test, reviewing courts should recall that commissioners are not tasked with resolving 
disputes correctly. Similarly, it should be remembered that jurisdictional issues cannot be determined with 
reference to the merits of disputes; Gcaba paras 74-75; Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security & others 
(2011) 32 ILJ 112 (LAC) para 37; Chirwa para 155 and Fergus (2012). 
1927
 For examples of abuse, consider Bell v Ontario and Bibeault; Mullan ‘The struggle for complexity’ (2008) at 
74. 
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‘…defining the nature of the question in such a way as to lead to a standard of 
correctness is not unknown for an interventionist court unhappy with the bottom line 
of a particular administrative decision.’1928  
 
To guard against this, reviewing courts must define the boundaries of questions before them 
carefully, with reference to the case at hand.
1929
 Should the nature of the question in dispute 
become the chief determinant of applicable standards of review, doing so will be 
imperative.
1930
 Without careful delineation of questions in dispute, consistency and coherency 
during review proceedings may not be achieved.
1931
  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Much of the uncertainty evident in section 145 proceedings may be resolved with reference to 
Canadian principles of judicial review. While comparative analysis should be treated with 
caution,
1932
 the numerous parallels between the countries’ administrative and labour law 
regimes suggest that Canadian law would be a viable starting point from which to clarify the 
South African position. Of particular utility are the SCC’s judgments in Dunsmuir and 
Khosa. While in Dunsmuir the ambit and application of the reasonableness standard were 
revised, in Khosa, the SCC explained the common law’s relationship with judicial review 
legislation. Together these decisions demonstrate that the Canadian conception of 
reasonableness (comparably to South Africa’s), is concerned with ensuring that 
administrative decision-makers remain within the confines of the law when resolving 
disputes.
1933
 In turn, the rule of law is upheld. Moreover, reasonableness dictates that respect 
be shown for the proper separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary. This implies that a measure of deference is due to administrative decisions facing 
review. When engaged in review proceedings therefore, courts must recall that 
                                                          
1928
 Underhill at 256; Underhill refers in this regard to Harrison v British Columbia (Information & Privacy 
Commissioner) 2008 BCSC 411. See also, Barrie Public Utilities v Canadian Cable Television Assn [2003] 1 
SCR 476 para 16 and Deputy Minister of National Revenue Canada v Mattel Canada Inc [2001] 2 SCR 100 
paras 33 & 86-87. 
1929
 Heckman (2009) at 760; Junger at 66; cases in which precedent was arguably relied upon inappropriately 
include Propio Direct Inc; Canadian National Railway v Canadian Transportation Agency (2008) 378 NCR 121 
(FCA) and Northrop; Heckman (2010) at 32-33; Heckman (2009) at 765-766. For the tension between the 
presumption of reasonableness where decision-makers interpret their home statues and Dunsmuir’s directive to 
apply precedent, consult Quayat at 191. 
1930
 As proposed above and addressed in more detail below and in the conclusion to this thesis. 
1931
 Defining the nature of the question in dispute correctly is particularly important in Canada, where precedent 
(rather than a full standard of review analysis) may dictate the applicable standard of review; Heckman (2009) at 
765-766, read with Dunsmuir. 
1932
 See, in this regard, Kahn-Freund; Arthurs (2007). 
1933
 Dunsmuir paras 27-28. 
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reasonableness does not equate to correctness. Instead, to be reasonable, a decision must 
simply fall within the range of acceptable outcomes identified by the reviewing court.
1934
 
When delineating the breadth of this range, contextual considerations come into play.
1935
 
Here, the intersection between the Canadian formulation of reasonableness and that of the 
Labour Courts
1936
 is overt. Some might argue that Canadian law resultantly has little to offer 
in the search for a reliable and concise test for review.
1937
 However, the opposite is true. The 
submissions of Canadian commentators and judges since Dunsmuir describe the limits of 
reasonableness in an accessible and instructive way.
1938
  
 
The first important principle, which may be drawn from Canadian law, is that reasonableness 
is not the only basis on which administrative determinations may be assessed. In certain 
circumstances, the correctness standard is more fitting.
1939
 In other words, different tests 
apply to different contexts. The primary criterion for determining the applicable standard is 
the nature of the defective conduct alleged. Were an equivalent construction of 
reasonableness adopted in South Africa, the controversy around the relationship between 
reasonableness and section 145 may be remedied.
1940
 Rather than wavering between discrete 
measures of scrutiny, this would enable reviewing courts to apply prescribed standards (of 
either reasonableness or correctness) to each of the statutory grounds. Consistently with 
Khosa, when doing so, some room for contextual variation should be retained.
1941
  
 
When determining applicable standards of review, Canadian courts are obliged by Dunsmuir 
to consider judicial precedent. Where precedent clearly indicates the relevant standard, that 
standard should be used. On the other hand, where no indication of the appropriate test is 
available, reviewing courts must engage in the standard of review analysis.
1942
 The primary 
object of this analysis is to identify legislative intent and specifically, the body upon whom 
the legislature purported to confer the power to decide the matter at stake.
1943
 Like the Bato 
Star factors, the standard of review analysis emphasises the context in which the decision was 
                                                          
1934
 Ibid para 47. 
1935
 Khosa paras 28 & 59. 
1936
 For details, refer to Sidumo, Fidelity and chapters 3 and 4. 
1937
 Ibid. 
1938
 In the specific context of section 145 proceedings. 
1939
 Dunsmuir para 66. 
1940
 With reference to Khosa’s stipulation that the Dunsmuir principles applied to statutory grounds of review 
too. 
1941
 Khosa paras 28 & 59. 
1942
 Unless precedent clearly indicates the applicable standard. 
1943
 Dunsmuir para 29; THESL para 22; Kenall at 122. 
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taken, with reference to specified criteria.
1944
 Of these criteria, the most pertinent to section 
145 proceedings is ‘the nature of the question in dispute’. It has accordingly been proposed 
that this factor be adopted as the principal determinant of reasonableness’s contextual 
flexibility in different cases. By confining contextual consideration to this factor, the 
difficulties associated with the Bato Star criteria may be assuaged.
1945
 
 
Of further value in Canadian law are the guidelines devised by the SCC in Dunsmuir, 
suggesting, but not prescribing, the standard of review applicable. These affirm the pivotal 
role of the nature of the question in dispute in defining the scope of review. The first of them 
is that questions of fact, discretion and policy generally attract reasonableness review. Legal 
questions arising from a decision-maker’s enabling statute1946 or which entail its specific 
expertise similarly demand deference.
1947
 Determinations of law of fundamental importance 
to the legal community as a whole, together with those falling outside the skills and expertise 
of the relevant decision-maker, are nonetheless to be evaluated for correctness. This ensures 
that legal certainty and the rule of law are adequately preserved.
1948
 Finally, both true 
questions of jurisdiction and all remaining irregularities (aside from those addressing 
procedural fairness), invite correctness review.
1949
  
 
The SCC’s assertion that distinctive tests for review may apply to discrete legal questions is 
significant. Given the broad legislative discretions CCMA commissioners enjoy,
1950
 the 
pressures under which they operate, and the intended informality of arbitration 
proceedings,
1951
 differentiating between distinct legal issues on review is apt. The SCC’s 
guidelines are helpful at a general level too. Adapting them to section 145 proceedings would 
lend greater structure to the Labour Courts’ unpredictable interpretations of reasonableness. 
Details of how this may be achieved are provided in the conclusion to this dissertation. 
 
                                                          
1944
 Ibid para 64. 
1945
 As discussed in chapter 4. The principal difficulty with the Bato Star (and related) factors is that there are too 
many of them to assess each and every one during review proceedings. The factors nonetheless set the contextual 
tone for review. 
1946
 Or statutes closely connected thereto. 
1947
 Dunsmuir paras 51-56. 
1948
 Ibid paras 29-31, 50 & 163. 
1949
 Ibid. 
1950
 Section 138 of the LRA. 
1951
 For details thereof, consult chapter 1. 
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Supplementing these guidelines, the Court in Dunsmuir described the core features of 
reasonableness. Paramount amongst these is that reasonableness looks both to reasoning 
process and findings. Secondly, the principal components of reasonable decisions are 
‘justifiab[ility], transparen[cy] and intelligibil[ity].’1952 To meet these standards, decisions are 
required to be defensible in terms of both the facts and the law.
1953
 These characteristics of 
reasonableness are familiar and arguably of minimal comparative worth therefore. Yet, when 
examined with reference to the remainder of the SCC’s judgment in Dunsmuir and Khosa, 
they clarify much of the uncertainty surrounding reasonableness review. Later judicial 
pronouncements, as well as the commentary on these decisions, are equally informative.  
 
From these, it is plain that reasonableness in outcome will absolve procedural defects in 
decision-makers’ reasoning in limited circumstances only. Specifically, excepting questions 
of procedural fairness or ‘true’ jurisdiction, substantive reasonableness may remedy 
procedural unreasonableness only where the relevant decision-maker’s reasons are 
adequate.
1954
 To this extent, in Canada, both procedural
1955
 and substantive reasonableness 
are required to countenance alleged irregularities. An apposite construction of when decisions 
may be overturned for want of procedural unreasonableness (despite adequacy in outcome) 
appears from the SCC’s formulations of adequate reasons, read with Mullan’s discussion of 
the issue. These indicate that while both procedural and substantive reasonableness are 
necessary to sustain decisions, when evaluating the latter, alternative reasons may be 
considered. Again, the Canadian approach is aligned with that of the Labour Courts in South 
Africa.
1956
  
 
What may be inferred from this model is that where a decision-maker’s reasons (or reasoning 
process) are unsatisfactory only in so far as the substance thereof does not justify the outcome 
reached, if alternative reasons supporting the decision exist, the decision-maker’s findings 
may stand.
1957
 On the other hand, where reasons fall short of the prescribed basic standards 
for satisfactory reasoning, the decision may be quashed regardless of its substantive 
                                                          
1952
 Dunsmuir para 47. 
1953
 Ibid. 
1954
 In that they meet the basic standards for satisfactory reasons delineated above; crucially too, administrative 
reasons must serve the purposes for which the reasons are given. 
1955
 Whether in the form of reasoning process or adequate reasons. Regardless of the term attributed thereto, 
reasoning process and adequate reasons are necessarily intertwined.  
1956
 See chapters 3 and 4 and Fidelity. 
1957
 Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 136; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 15. 
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reasonableness.
1958
 To ensure the effective implementation of this notion in practice, it is vital 
to delineate the procedural ingredients of adequate reasons properly.
1959
 These were 
addressed by the SCC in Khosa.
1960
 According to the Court, to escape review, reasons must 
be comprehensible and expressed with clarity. In addition, they should be consistent with the 
purpose of granting the legislative power in question.
1961
 Finally, reasons must be logically 
linked to the outcome and must disclose the reasoning path which the decision-maker 
followed.
1962
 To summarise: clarity, disclosure and rational connections constitute the 
primary components of adequate reasons. 
 
Differentiating between the procedural and substantive elements of reasonableness in this 
way accords with the functions of review
1963
 and concurrently leaves room for deference. If 
imported into section 145 proceedings, it would explain the relationship between the 
Carephone and Sidumo standards too.
1964
 It may further elucidate the circumstances in which 
substantive reasonableness may validly be applied as a resolutive test.
1965
 The confusion 
around these issues and the association between procedural and substantive reasonableness 
might then be resolved.
1966
  
 
                                                          
1958
 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 16; Edwards expresses a different view, arguing that the 
enquiry into the adequacy of decision-makers’ reasons has been entirely ‘subsumed’ into the reasonableness test 
since Dunsmuir; Dave Edwards ‘Judicial review of administrative action’ (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 151 
at 158. While, in light of Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union, Edward’s submission may be legitimate 
in Canada, the courts in South Africa continue to hold that reasonableness comprises two components – 
procedural and substantive. To understand these, it is necessary to differentiate the two enquiries to some degree. 
1959
 Whereas the SCC in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union noted that the adequacy of reasons could 
not be separately evaluated from the substance of the resultant decision, the candidate does not propose that 
drawing a clean division between reasons and outcome is necessarily possible or even desirable. Nonetheless, to 
understand both the distinction between Carephone and Sidumo and the dual aspects of reasonableness, a 
measure of distinction is necessary. Note, however, Edwards at 158. 
1960
 Khosa paras 66-67; the SCC’s comments in Khosa were later augmented in Lake para 46. 
1961
 Lake para 46; Khosa paras 66-67. 
1962
 Ibid. 
1963
 In facilitating improved future decision-making and maintaining the rule of law; sections 1(d), 33 & 195 of 
the Constitution; Jowell (2006) at 16-17; Hoexter in Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 27; Corder in 
Corder & van der Vijver (eds) (2002) at 1-2; Mureinik (2006). See too Anand, Edelstein & Wong-Chong’s 
interpretation of Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union, who cite the case as authority for the view that 
‘reasons for a decision remain important as they provide important safeguards and thus “serve several statutory 
purposes.”’; Anand, Edelstein & Wong-Chong at 159; consider also Anand, Edelstein & Wong-Chong at 178. 
1964
 Which still troubles the courts; compare Bestel para 18; Ellerine Holdings at 15; Shoprite Checkers 1 para 23 
and Super Group Autoparts t/a Autozone v Hlongwane NO & others [2010] 4 BLLR 458 (LC) para 7. 
1965
 See Clarence and Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO & others (2009) 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA), as discussed in chapters 3 
and 4.  
1966
 For the procedural and substantive features of reasonableness, consult Sasol Mining and the discussion 
thereof in chapter 3, together with Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 17 and SAMWU para 11. 
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Starting with the distinction between Carephone and Sidumo, it is now clear that while the 
Carephone test precluded assessments of alternative reasons to justify awards, the Sidumo 
standard does not.
1967
 Notwithstanding this, overlaps between the standards persist and courts 
continue to conflate their meanings. In turn, it is debatable whether the standards are 
distinguishable at all. Were the substantive and procedural features of reasonableness to be 
understood in South Africa as proposed above, much of this uncertainty would fade. In its 
stead, it would appear that the Carephone standard emphasises the substantive reasonableness 
(or rationality) of commissioners’ findings with reference to the adequacy of their reasons 
specifically. Comparatively, Sidumo looks to each aspect of reasonableness with a measure of 
independence. Thus, while adequate reasons (as defined) remain important for procedural 
reasonableness,
1968
 the substantive legitimacy of commissioners’ reasons has lost its 
significance. Commissioners remain obliged to provide satisfactory explanations for their 
awards, but the precise factors considered by them when reaching their findings no longer 
need be the only justifications therefore. Provided their reasons evince ‘clarity, disclosure and 
rational connections’,1969 alternative reasons may be appraised to endorse the awards. What is 
left of Carephone accordingly resides in the realm of suitable reasoning rather than in 
substantive outcomes.
1970
 Not only does this depiction of the two tests rectify the controversy, 
but it explains the dual features of reasonableness.
1971
 Simultaneously too, the circumstances 
in which substantive reasonableness may remedy so-called ‘procedural unreasonableness’ are 
identified.
1972
  
 
The substantive aspect of reasonableness is more difficult to define.
1973
 While the SCC in 
Dunsmuir described the characteristics of reasonable decisions as discussed above, applying 
these coherently in practice is challenging. The Court’s subsequent sentiments in Khosa shed 
some light on the problem.  There, the SCC observed that reasonableness consists of only one 
standard. Still, in different contexts or when faced with different questions, discrete 
                                                          
1967
 Fidelity paras 102-103; PAK Le Roux & K Young ‘The role of reasonableness in dismissal’ (2007) 17(3) 
Contemporary Labour Law 21 at 29; Bato Star para 186.  
1968
 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 16. 
1969
 Lake para 46; Khosa paras 66-67. 
1970
 And there is little doubt that this requirement remains valid; Strategic Liquor Services para 17, citing 
Mpahlehle para 12. 
1971
 Consider Fidelity and Sasol Mining.  
1972
 That is, when commissioners’ reasons are procedurally adequate but do not justify their findings of their own 
accord, alternative reasons may be consulted. See Edcon and the discussion thereof in chapter 3.  
1973
 Woolley at 269. 
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approaches to review (and to reasonableness) may be appropriate.
1974
 Furthermore, reviewing 
courts should recall that reasonableness does not arise from the right of decision-makers to 
err. Instead, it acknowledges that, in certain circumstances, administrative decision-makers 
are better placed to decide disputes than the courts.
1975
 In case of CCMA commissioners’ 
factual and discretionary findings, this principle is particularly apt. As such, when engaged in 
reasonableness review during section 145 proceedings, the Labour Courts would do well to 
recount it. When revising the current test for review too, these elements of reasonableness 
should be accounted for. 
 
The ambit of reasonableness is further illuminated by relevant provisions of the ATA and the 
FCA, read with Khosa’s discussion of the latter. The Dunsmuir guidelines prescribe an 
approach to reasonableness which distinguishes between standards of review attributable to 
distinct types of question. The ATA and FCA add to this by exposing the logic of assessing 
procedural conduct and substantive findings discretely. The value of this approach lies in its 
potential to reduce the overlaps between statutory procedural defects and reasonableness.
1976
 
In so doing, consistency and clarity may be enhanced. Separating strictly procedural errors 
from substantive ones when reformulating the test for review of CCMA awards may 
consequently prove helpful.
1977
 
  
Two additional points require attention. First is the Canadian approach to evaluating 
discretionary findings. Secondly, the meaning of ‘jurisdictional questions’ must be addressed. 
In relation to the former, the SCC in Baker held that discretionary determinations were 
susceptible to review for reasonableness in the same way that legal findings were. Reviewing 
courts were therefore precluded from re-evaluating the weight assigned to pertinent factors by 
decision-makers. Nevertheless, administrative decisions remained bound to comply with the 
rule of law (and associated principles of administrative law), the objects of the decision-
maker’s enabling legislation, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the Charter.1978  
 
As a result, judicial allocations of weight are largely prohibited in Canada during reviews of 
discretionary decisions. Evidently, this is a feasible and valid means of limiting courts’ 
                                                          
1974
 Khosa para 125. 
1975
 Ibid; Klinck at 48-49; Mullan ‘Let’s try again!’ (2008) at 137-140. 
1976
 Most importantly, the overlap(s) between gross irregularities and reasonableness may be reduced. For the 
difficulties with the overlap, refer to chapters 3 and 4. 
1977
 The proposal is explained in greater detail in the conclusion to this thesis.   
1978
 Baker para 53. 
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powers. Still, as both Mullan and Klinck warn, outright bans on judicial assessments of 
weight are dangerous.
1979
 Any such ban should accordingly be qualified by the requirement 
that, to survive review, administrative attributions of weight must not be ‘manifestly 
disproportionate’.1980 For the reasons asserted above, were these principles to be implemented 
in section 145 proceedings, the enquiry should be confined to asking whether the 
commissioner had addressed all relevant factors and allocated at least some weight to 
each.
1981
 Doing so would remedy much of the controversy around the powers of reviewing 
courts’ to re-assess commissioners’ weight allocations.1982  
 
Finally, the Canadian courts’ difficulties with identifying when a question is truly 
jurisdictional are revealing. In light of the proposal that the nature of the challenged conduct 
be determinative of the standard of review, addressing this issue is crucial.
1983
 Judicial 
constructions of ‘jurisdictional’ have been inconsistent over the years in Canada. Recently, in 
Canadian Federal Pilots, however, Evans JA affirmed the Pushpanathan approach to 
ascertaining jurisdictional questions and it is submitted that this approach is preferable. He 
held that when determining whether a question is jurisdictional, reviewing courts must 
identify the body to which the power to decide the matter has been granted.
1984
 Where 
administrative decision-makers have been entrusted with that power, reasonableness rather 
than correctness will apply. One important proviso supplements this rule – the enabling 
legislation must authorise the decision-maker to ‘interpret and apply the disputed provision’ 
concerned.
1985
 Were a comparable attitude assumed by the Labour Courts, the problems 
associated with reviewing purportedly jurisdictional questions, as well as those arising from 
the overlap between reasonableness and ‘excesses of power’, may be avoided.1986  
                                                          
1979
 Klinck at 55; Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 233. 
1980
 Mullan ‘Proportionality’ at 257-258. 
1981
 Consult the discussion in relation to Khosa paras 66-67 above and Heckman (2009) at 782. 
1982
 Compare Transnet Freight Rail with NUM obo 112 Employees, read with the critique thereof in chapter 3. 
1983
 Heckman (2009) at 760; Underhill at 256. The overlaps between the statutory grounds of review in the LRA 
render it particularly important to define the nature of the question in dispute clearly. For examples of these 
grounds, see Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others [1997] 12 
BLLR 1632 (LC) at 1634-1637; Moloi v Euijen & others [1997] 8 BLLR 1022 (LC);  Sampson Associates (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Interbrand Sampson v Cities Shepherd & others [2010] 7 BLLR 746 (LC); Jafta v Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & Others (2006) 27 ILJ 2368 (LC); Sasol Mining; United National 
Breweries (SA) Ltd v Khanyeza & others [2006] 4 BLLR 321 (LAC); Darcy Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: 
A Comprehensive Guide 4 ed (2003) at 152-155 and the cases cited in Myburgh (2009); Myburgh (2010) and 
Myburgh (2011). 
1984
 Canadian Federal Pilots para 14. 
1985
 Ibid para 51. 
1986
 For the difficulties with the Labour Courts’ current approach to jurisdictional questions, see Fergus (2012), 
read with SARPA, Banda, Chabeli and Asara Wine Estate, amongst others. For excesses of power generally, 
consult section 145(2)(a)(iii) of the LRA and Myburgh (2011) at 1518. Given the interplay between 
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Having consolidated these accounts of reasonableness, a clean revision of section 145(2) of 
the LRA is seemingly necessary. That task is undertaken in the conclusion to this thesis 
which follows. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
jurisdictional questions and excesses of power, the proposed approach ought to apply equally to allegations 
arising under section 145(2)(a)(iii) of the LRA. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
 
1. A SYNOPSIS OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to pinpoint the test for review of CCMA arbitration 
awards. As difficulties with doing so were anticipated, an incidental goal was devised – to 
develop a clear, practical and reliable test for review. The difficulties arise from the 
ostensible discord between the Constitutional rights to fair labour practices
1987
 and just 
administrative action.
1988
 Whereas efficiency, accessibility, flexibility and informality in 
dispute resolution are prized by the former,
1989
 the right to administrative justice holds 
accountability, transparency, legal certainty and reasonableness above these values.
1990
 
Aligning the constraints imposed by the latter, with the unique requisites of labour dispute 
resolution is tricky and reviewing courts have accordingly struggled to achieve an appropriate 
balance between them. If consistency in outcomes and legal certainty are to be preserved, 
however, formulating a pragmatic and clear test for review is crucial. 
 
Froneman DJP’s decision in Carephone marked a turning point in section 145 review 
proceedings. Particularly significant was the LAC’s emphasis on the implications of section 
33 of the Constitution on the courts’ powers of review under the LRA.1991 As a result, 
following Carephone awards were reviewable for rational justifiability. This standard 
permitted a measure of substantive review, but stopped short of granting full scale powers of 
appeal to the courts. The need to retain the distinction between appeal and review stemmed 
from the CCMA’s administrative status.1992 This necessitated that apposite deference be paid 
to commissioners’ awards. Reviewing courts interpreted Froneman’s judgment in Carephone 
in different ways and it was only in Rustenburg Platinum Mines that the confusion was 
                                                          
1987
 Section 23 of the the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’). 
1988
 Section 33 of the Constitution. This is important due to the CCMA’s status as an administrative institution; 
Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) paras 11-16; Sidumo & another v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) paras 88-89. 
1989
 Recall that the CCMA was established with these principles in mind, as an efficient, flexible and informal 
body. Furthermore, courts’ powers of review under the LRA are designed to prevent undue judicial interference 
and unnecessary delay; they are therefore narrow in scope. Section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
(‘the LRA’ or ‘the Act’); The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act 1995 16 ILJ 278 (‘The 
Explanatory Memorandum’) at 318-319; Food & Allied Workers Union on behalf of Mbatha & others v Pioneer 
Foods (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasko Milling & Baking & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2916 (SCA) (‘FAWU’) paras 21-22. 
1990
 Amongst other values such as procedural fairness and openness; see sections 33 and 195 of the Constitution 
in particular. 
1991
 Carephone para 37. 
1992
 Evident in its exercise of legislatively conferred public power; Carephone paras 11-19 & 32. 
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clarified.
1993
 According to the SCA therein, the focus of the ‘rational justifiability’ test fell on 
the rationality of the connections made by commissioners between evidence, outcomes and 
reasons, rather than on the rationality of their findings as such.
1994
  
 
The decision in Rustenburg Platinum Mines was taken on appeal to the Constitutional 
Court.
1995
 Agreeing with the LAC’s pronouncement that the Constitution had introduced a 
substantive element into section 145 proceedings, the CC nonetheless held that rational 
justifiability lacked currency. In its place, the reasonableness standard was to apply 
consistently with the final Constitution.
1996
 Like rational justifiability, reasonableness review 
permits scrutiny of outcomes and courts are consequently not confined to assessing 
procedural defects alone.
1997
 Still, the standard stops short of appeal. Subsequent courts have 
confirmed additional principles applicable to reasonableness. These may be broken down into 
four broad statements.  
 
The first is that reasonableness does not equate to correctness; to be unreasonable, however, 
gross unreasonableness is not required.
1998
 Secondly, the grounds for review of section 145 
remain valid and relevant.
1999
 Third, reasonableness is a substantive measure of review; as 
such, it allows courts to consider alternative reasons for commissioners’ awards when 
determining their susceptibility to review.
2000
 Yet, this does not imply that the distinction 
between appeals and reviews is obsolete; on the contrary, it remains key.
2001
 Thus, when 
evaluating commissioners’ awards, attention must be paid to the informal, efficient and 
accessible nature of CCMA arbitrations and the daily pressures commissioners face.
2002
 With 
these contextual factors in mind, suitable levels of deference should be afforded to 
commissioners’ decisions.2003 Finally, reasonableness comprises both substantive and 
                                                          
1993
 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others [2006] 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA). 
1994
 Ibid para 29. 
1995
 See Sidumo.  
1996
 Sidumo para 109. 
1997
 In terms of section 145 of the LRA. 
1998
 Fidelity Cash Management Service v CCMA & others [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC) para 99, read with Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) 
paras 44-45. 
1999
 Fidelity para 101; Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] 11 BLLR 1128 (LC) 
paras 14 & 17. 
2000
 Sidumo para 108.  
2001
 Consider Carephone para 32-37; Sidumo paras 105-110 and Fidelity paras 92-101. 
2002
 Sidumo para 118; Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] JOL 22087 (LAC) at 11. 
2003
 Sidumo para 109; Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v Cheetham & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 306 (LAC) para 6. 
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procedural components. While the attributes of these dual features of reasonableness are 
unclear, the courts have repeatedly affirmed their existence.
2004
 
 
Supplementing these principles, it has been argued that section 145’s suffusion with the 
standard of reasonableness has extended, rather than restricted, the permissible scope of 
review.
2005
 In other words, it has given broader powers to the courts to scrutinize awards.
2006
 
The raison d’etre of the test supports this contention.  By introducing reasonableness, the CC 
sought to protect the rights of all parties to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
administrative action. Courts are accordingly obliged to evaluate CCMA arbitrations (as a 
form of administrative action) against the requisites of this right.
2007
 In turn, accountability, 
transparency and openness are secured,
2008
 alongside the rule of law and legal certainty.
2009
 
Suggesting that the Constitutional Court constrained reviewing courts’ powers in order to 
promote these objectives runs counter to its rationale for implementing the standard – a 
plainly illogical proposal.
2010
 
 
Despite these established principles of reasonableness, the standard has been difficult to 
apply in practice. Instead, an array of judicial attitudes to it, together with further 
inconsistency and uncertainty, has arisen. The confusion centres around four particular issues. 
Chief amongst these are the relationship between reasonableness and section 145; the 
correlations between the Sidumo and Carephone standards (and the latter’s enduring 
                                                          
2004
 Southern Sun Hotel Interests para 14; Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Nggeleni & others [2011] 4 
BLLR 404 (LC); Pam Golding Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus & others [2010] JOL 24963 (LC) para 8. Consult 
too Anton Myburgh The LAC’s latest trilogy of review judgments: Is the Sidumo test in decline? Paper presented 
at the SASLAW Gauteng Chapter Seminar, Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc, Johannesburg (24 July 2012) at 9-10.   
2005
 See chapters 3 & 4 of this thesis and Carephone paras 37-38; Consider too Sidumo para 140 and Value 
Logistics Ltd v Basson & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2552 (LC). 
2006
 Ibid; or at least broader powers than those conferred by section 145 of the LRA alone. 
2007
 Carephone paras 11-16; Sidumo paras 88-89. 
2008
 Sections 33 and 195(1) of the Constitution. 
2009
 Carephone para 9; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] JOL 23356 (SCA) (‘Shoprite 
Checkers 3’) para 31; Cape Bar Council v Judicial Service Commission and another (Centre for Constitutional 
Rights and another as amici curiae) [2012] 2 All SA 143 (WCC) paras 25-26; Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and 
Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 58; 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 33. 
2010
 This is subject to the CC’s decision in Sidumo to abandon the ‘reasonable employer’ test, simultaneously to 
introducing the reasonableness standard of review. To this extent only, the effect of the CC’s decision was to 
limit courts’ authority to scrutinise awards (as the discretion of commissioners was expanded upon). The 
limitation, however, did not arise from the test for review itself. 
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relevance, if any); the circumstances in which reasonableness may appropriately be applied 
as a resolutive test and the designation and scope of the reasonableness standard.
2011
 
 
Seeking to answer these questions with reference to South African principles of labour and 
administrative law alone, has failed to achieve clarity. Whereas definitions of reasonableness 
developed in the general administrative law arena offer some guidance, the standard’s 
contextual nature demands a more nuanced approach.
2012
 Strict definitions of the standard are 
unhelpful and due recognition for contextual variation is needed.
2013
 However, the 
multiplicity of factors pertinent to reasonableness in labour dispute resolution renders 
determining reasonableness on a case by case basis unduly onerous.
2014
 Neither reviewing 
courts nor parties to proceedings can realistically be expected to engage with all these factors 
either prior to or during review proceedings. The uncomfortable coupling of section 145 of 
the LRA with section 33 of the Constitution must nonetheless be appeased in some way. In 
the absence of doing so, the unpredictability and inconsistency prevalent in labour court 
decisions will endure; ultimately, legal certainty and the rule of law may be undermined.
2015
 
 
At the outset of this thesis, the intentions of both the LRA’s and the Constitution’s drafters 
were sketched. It was mooted that had they consulted when drafting these Acts, much of the 
controversy arising from Sidumo could have been avoided. Yet, just how might they have 
reconciled the tension between section 145 and section 33? Conceivably, they would have 
turned to foreign jurisprudence for guidance.
2016
 When doing so, Canadian law might have 
caught their attention. 
 
Canadian principles of judicial review in the labour sphere offer possible solutions to many of 
the questions surrounding reasonableness. Furthermore, they assist with constructing the 
foundations for revising section 145, congruently with Sidumo. Seven specific ways in which 
Canadian law explicates the standard have been identified. First is Canada’s recognition that 
statutory grounds of review may attract different degrees of judicial scrutiny. Reasonableness 
                                                          
2011
 For an in-depth discussion of these issues, consult chapter 3. 
2012
 Bato Star paras 41 & 54; Sidumo para 118; Cora Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa (2007) at 321; 
JR De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa revised 1 ed (2005) at 211. 
2013
 Hoexter (2007) at 502; Cora Hoexter ‘Administrative action in the courts’ 2006 Acta Juridica 303 at 303-
304 & 318-319; De Ville (2005) at 213-214. 
2014
 Consult in this regard Bato Star and chapter 4 of this thesis.  
2015
 Shoprite Checkers 3 para 31; Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 1789 (LAC) para 54. 
2016
 Section 39(c) of the Constitution encourages courts to consider foreign law. 
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is therefore not the only available test on review. Whether reasonableness or correctness 
applies to any given ground depends on the context at hand.
2017
 In this way, where the 
reasonableness standard applies, adequate room for manoeuvre is retained, in accord with the 
standard’s inherent variability.2018 Secondly, the Canadian courts have developed a set of 
contextual criteria to be considered when determining the standard applicable.  Collectively, 
these criteria are known as the ‘standard of review analysis,’ an analysis primarily directed at 
identifying legislative intent.
2019
 Four considerations are prescribed in this regard. 
Comparatively to the Bato Star list, only one of these factors is likely to vary between CCMA 
disputes. That factor is the nature of the question in dispute.
2020
 Applying this criterion 
exclusively when determining reasonableness will allow for contextual variation while setting 
feasible limits. The Canadian standard of review analysis thus constitutes a more practical 
tool for the contextual delineation of reasonableness than Bato Star and related contextual 
considerations do.
2021
  
 
Third, the guidelines expounded in Dunsmuir are instructive in linking the statutory defects in 
section 145 with appropriate standards of review.
2022
 Again, the SCC’s focus in Dunsmuir 
fell on the nature of the question in dispute. Paramount in this regard was its emphasis on 
distinguishing between different types of legal question.
2023
 The Court’s declaration that 
reasonableness requires ‘justifiability, transparency and intelligibility’2024 is equally useful. 
Not only does this description correlate with Sidumo’s focus on ‘transparency, openness and 
accountability’ but Dunsmuir’s endorsement of intelligibility affirms the significance of 
adequate reasoning for administrative accountability. These three elements of reasonableness 
were elucidated in both Khosa and Lake.
2025
 Together, the judgments confirm that the 
requisites of adequate reasons include that reasons display clarity, disclosure and a rational 
connection between reasons and findings.
2026
  
 
                                                          
2017
 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 para 66. 
2018
 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa 2009 SCC 12 paras 28 & 59. 
2019
 Dunmsuir para 29. 
2020
 In other words, whether the issue contested on review is a question of law, fact, discretion, jurisdiction or 
procedure. 
2021
 See Bato Star para 45 and chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
2022
 Dunsmuir paras 51-56. 
2023
 Ibid paras 29-31, 50 & 163. 
2024
 Ibid para 47. 
2025
Khosa paras 66-67; Lake v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2008] 1 SCR 761 para 46. 
2026
 Ibid. 
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Fourth, according to Dunsmuir, reasonableness looks both to substance and procedure.
2027
 
While the relationship between the two was initially contentious, Mullan proposed a sensible 
conciliation thereof which essentially coheres with subsequent judicial pronouncements.
2028
  
He argued that where the reasons given for a decision are not substantively capable of 
justifying a decision on their own but alternative reasons are, reasonableness in outcome will 
be established.
2029
 Mullan’s approach is best understood in light of the principle that 
reasonableness relates not only to substance but also to procedure. In effect, while the 
substance of a decision-maker’s reasons need not be sufficient in themselves to justify the 
decision, the reasons must still comply with certain minimum standards.
2030
 Where they do 
not, the decision may be subject to review for so-called procedural unreasonableness,
2031
 
regardless of its substantive justifiability.
2032
  
 
Construing the dual features of reasonableness in this way resolves a number of the questions 
arising from Sidumo. Amongst these are the continued role of the Carephone standard and its 
association with reasonableness; the circumstances in which reasonableness may be 
resolutively applied and the interplay between the procedural and substantive facets of the 
standard.
2033
  
 
The fifth significant feature of Canadian law appears from legislation – specifically from the 
Federal Courts and Administrative Tribunals Acts.
2034
 Both of these statutes stipulate grounds 
                                                          
2027
 Dunsmuir para 47. 
2028
 David Mullan ‘Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, Standard of review and procedural fairness for public servants: 
Let’s try again!’ 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 117 at 136; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v 
Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board) 2011 SCC 62. 
2029
 Ibid. 
2030
 Being clarity, disclosure and rationality of connections between reasons and outcome; consult chapter 6 in 
this regard. 
2031
 In essence, inadequate reasons or reasoning. Procedural unreasonableness in this sense is distinct from the 
notion of process-related unreasonableness which Myburgh discussed in Anton Myburgh ‘Sidumo v Rustplats: 
How have the courts dealt with it?’ (2009) 30 ILJ 1 at 16-17. Rather than covering gross irregularities, failures to 
take relevant factors into account and the like, the concept as it is used here is confined to reasons which are 
unclear or which do not explain the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of the relevant commissioner’s finding. 
2032
 While the SCC in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union stated that the procedural and substantive 
components of reasonableness could not be separated, in order to explain the Labour Courts’ approach to review, 
it is helpful to distinguish between them to a certain degree; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 
14. Whether the SCC’s sentiments in this regard are correct is, in any event, debatable. 
2033
 Full discussions of the manner in which Canadian law clarifies these issues are provided in chapter 6; they 
are therefore not discussed here. 
2034
 Section 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act RSC 1985 cF-7 (‘FCA’); section 58 of the Administrative 
Tribunals Act SBC 2004 c45 (‘ATA’). 
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of review and, in varying degrees, the standards applicable to each ground.
2035
 Notably, 
allegations of procedural irregularities are subject to scrutiny based on the principles of 
natural justice and fairness. In contrast, substantive issues are reviewable for want of either 
reasonableness or correctness.
2036
 The logic of assessing procedural and substantive defects 
separately is evident.  Were a comparable approach to be adopted in South Africa, the 
confusion resulting from the overlap between gross irregularities and reasonableness may be 
remedied.
2037
 In turn, the danger of reviewing courts adopting discrete measures of review 
depending on the particular formulation of an applicant’s grounds may be reduced.2038  
 
Sixth, the SCC’s directive in Baker2039 and subsequent cases, that judicial reallocations of 
weight are impermissible, is important.
2040
 Given the courts’ obligation to refrain from 
usurping decision-makers’ powers, applying an equivalent prohibition when reviewing 
CCMA awards seems fitting. However, as Mullan points out, ‘manifestly disproportionate’ 
findings must be avoided
2041
 and any proscription against judicial re-allocations of weight 
should therefore be suitably qualified.
2042
  
 
Finally, the Canadian courts’ attitude to jurisdictional questions offers useful guidance.2043 In 
Canada, the principle that correctness rather than reasonableness applies to jurisdictional 
                                                          
2035
 The FCA has been held, however, to indicate the applicable standard of review only to a limited degree. 
Thus, the standard applicable may vary from one case to the next notwithstanding that the ground or defect 
alleged remains the same; Khosa paras 28 & 33. 
2036
 Khosa paras 42-48, read with section 18.1(4) of the FCA and section 58 of the ATA. 
2037
 By limiting the scope of the enquiry to actual procedures followed by commissioners during arbitration 
proceedings (to the exclusion of those involved when writing awards and reaching conclusions), gross 
irregularities may be clearly distinguished from reasonableness. Doing so would be consistent with the current 
test for gross irregularities, which focuses on whether the procedural irregularity deprived the parties of a fair 
hearing. Further details of the applicable enquiry are addressed below. Consider too, in this regard, the 
distinction drawn between patent and latent irregularities in Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & Others 
(2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC). 
2038
 For examples of relevant cases in this regard consult chapter 3.   
2039
 Subject to certain criteria being met, including (amongst others) that the decision be consistent with the 
values of Canadian society; Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 para 
53. 
2040
 Baker paras 54-56 & 74-77, read with Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 
SCR 3 (Can) paras 29 & 34; Khosa paras 4 and 66-67. Note that this relates specifically to discretionary 
determinations by administrative decision-makers. 
2041
 David Mullan ‘Proportionality – A proportionate response to an emerging crisis in Canadian judicial review 
law?’ [2010] NZ L Rev 233 at 233 & 257-258; Jennifer A Klinck ‘Reasonableness review: Conceptualising a 
single contextual standard from divergent approaches in Dunsmuir and Khosa’ (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 
41 at 55. 
2042
 This is addressed in more detail in later paragraphs. Ibid; chapter 6.  
2043
 For the difficulties with the current approach to allegations that a commissioner acted outside of their 
jurisdiction, or in excess of their powers, consult Emma Fergus ‘Circumventing review – When is a question 
jurisdictional?’ (2012) 129 SALJ 504. 
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issues is well established.
2044
 While the precise test for jurisdictional questions was not 
specified in Dunsmuir, both Pushpanathan and Canadian Federal Pilots offer apposite 
solutions.
2045
 In terms thereof, when reviewing purportedly jurisdictional findings, courts 
should first identify the institution to which the legislature intended to confer the power to 
decide the question in dispute.
2046
 Where the answer to this enquiry is the decision-maker,
2047
 
the question will not be jurisdictional and reasonableness will apply. Conversely, where the 
court resolves that the legislature intended the question to be judicially determined, the 
finding may be reviewed for correctness. The proviso to this rule, emphasized in Canadian 
Federal Pilots, is that the decision-maker must at least have had the power to interpret and 
apply the legislation (or law) concerned.
2048
 Considering the South African courts’ incoherent 
approaches to questions of jurisdiction, adopting an analogous test here would promote both 
predictability in outcomes and the rule of law.
2049
 
 
2. RECOMMENDATIONS: A NEW TEST FOR REVIEW 
 
By consolidating these principles and perspectives, section 145(2) may be reformulated to 
incorporate reasonableness. When amending the section, it is proposed that the following 
considerations be accounted for. 
 
First, questions of procedure should be distinguished from questions of substance. Procedural 
defects (whether termed ‘gross irregularities’ or otherwise) should be confined to strict issues 
of procedure. Only conduct arising during the arbitration itself ought accordingly to fall into 
this category.
2050
 The process followed by a commissioner in analysing the evidence and law 
and articulating his or her reasons for an award after the conclusion of the arbitration 
                                                          
2044
 The same is true in South Africa yet this principle is poorly applied here; Anton Myburgh ‘Reviewing the 
review test: Recent judgments and developments’ (2011) 32 ILJ 1497 at 1518; Fergus (2012) SALJ. Consider too 
SA Rugby Players’ Association (SARPA) & others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd & others; SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd v SARPU 
& another [2008] 9 BLLR 845 (LAC), where the LAC arguably assumed an inappropriate approach to 
determining whether the question in dispute was jurisdictional. 
2045
 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982 paras 26-28; Public 
Service Alliance of Canada v Canadian Federal Pilots Association et al (2009) 392 NR 128 (FCA). Consult too 
Toronto Hydro-Electric System Ltd v Ontario (Energy Board) 2010 ONCA 284 (‘THESL’) paras 22, 33 & 34 
and Kenall’s discussion thereof in Dustin Kenall ‘De-regulating the regulatory compact: The legacy of Dunsmuir 
and the “jurisdictional” question doctrine’ (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 115. 
2046
 Ibid. 
2047
 In other words, the administrative decision-maker. 
2048
 Canadian Federal Pilots para 51. 
2049
 Fergus (2012) SALJ. 
2050
 By differentiating between these defects and those concerning awards or findings, the overlap between gross 
irregularities and procedural unreasonableness may be dissolved, leaving a clearer measure of review. 
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proceedings, should be excluded.
2051
 Determining the legitimacy of procedural challenges to 
arbitrations should focus on the established test of whether parties had been ‘deprived of their 
rights to a fair hearing’2052 as a result of the commissioner’s failure to follow an appropriate 
procedure.
2053
 Provided the requisites of fairness and natural justice are met, defects should 
not be found.  
  
Substantive findings
2054
 ought to be reviewed on an altogether different basis. When 
investigating challenges of this nature, defects in reasons and defects in outcome should be 
distinguished.
2055
 The test for adequate reasons may be couched as follows:  
 
a) Are the commissioner’s reasons clear and comprehensible?; and 
b) Did the commissioner refer to these reasons when explaining the outcome of his or 
her award?  
 
The crux of this assessment is whether the court and the parties
2056
 are able to understand 
why and how the commissioner reached the conclusions he or she did.
2057
 If this is answered 
affirmatively, the commissioner’s reasons will be adequate, regardless of whether they justify 
the award on the merits.
2058
  
 
In contrast, when testing reasonableness in outcome the following questions may be applied: 
                                                          
2051
 Factors excluded may include, for example, assessing whether the commissioner took all relevant factors 
into account and whether the commissioner applied his or her mind to the dispute; These have been labelled as 
procedural instances of unreasonableness in numerous cases. Yet, they do not always fit comfortably within this 
category; Fidelity para 36. For a discussion of the courts’ characterisations of ‘process-related 
unreasonableness’, consult Myburgh (2012). 
2052
 Myburgh argues that, in Herholdt, the LAC found this test to set too high a threshold for review; Myburgh 
(2012) at 7; Herholdt para 39. Whether this interpretation of the case is valid is debatable. It is nonetheless 
beyond the scope of this paper to examine it further here. Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council 
& others [2011] 6 BLLR 594 (LC) para 17; Sidumo para 268; Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd & others (2012) 33 
ILJ 329 (LAC) para 44; Information Trust Corporation v Gous & others (2005) 26 ILJ 2351 (LAC) paras 9-10; 
Miladys v Naidoo & others (2002) 23 ILJ 1234 (LAC) para 30; Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & Others 
(2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC) para 41.  
2053
 Examples of defects in this category might include where a commissioner neglects to afford the parties the 
right to cross-examine the other’s witnesses, or where a commissioner refuses to admit relevant evidence. 
2054
 Including processes related thereto, such as the thought processes necessary to writing reasons for awards. 
2055
 That is not to suggest, however, that the two aspects are unrelated; on the contrary they are necessarily 
interlinked; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union para 14. Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
understanding the distinction between procedural and substantive reasonableness in the South African context, it 
is useful to differentiate them in this way.  
2056
 Remembering that often the parties to CCMA proceedings will be lay persons with minimal or no legal skills 
and expertise. 
2057
 Lake para 46, read with Khosa paras 66-67. 
2058
 In other words, regardless of whether they justify the award at a substantive level. 
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a) Did the commissioner discuss the applicable legal principles?;2059  
b) Did the commissioner identify the core facts?;2060  
c) Did the commissioner engage in a thorough balancing act when applying the law to 
the facts?;
2061
 and 
d) When doing so, did the commissioner consider all relevant factors and allocate at least 
some weight to each?
2062
 
 
Provided the answers to these questions are ‘yes’, awards should be exempt from review. 
Different standards of review ought nevertheless to apply to each separate enquiry. First, 
when evaluating commissioners’ references to applicable legal principles, the nature of the 
law concerned is relevant. Specifically, where common law principles or statutes unrelated to 
the LRA arise, commissioners’ legal declarations should be scrutinised for correctness.2063 
These questions will generally go beyond commissioners’ expert knowledge.2064 In addition, 
they may have implications for the labour fraternity as a whole.
2065
 It may therefore be 
                                                          
2059
 This element of the test addresses the established requirement that commissioners must identify the relevant 
law. Coupled with the remaining questions proposed above, the primary elements of reasonableness are met. For 
these elements, consult Coetzee v Lebea NO & Another (1999) 20 ILJ 129 (LC) para 10 and County Fair Foods 
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC) para 27. See also Calvin William Sharpe ‘Reviewing 
CCMA arbitration awards: Towards clarity in the Labour Courts’ (2000) 21 ILJ 2160 at 2173. 
2060
 In other words, the material evidence; consult The South African Municipal Workers Union v The South 
African Local Government Bargaining Council & others (LAC) unreported case no DA06/09 of 29 November 
2011 (‘SAMWU’) paras 10-11. 
2061
 To the extent to which the court considers the depth of the commissioner’s engagement, the established 
ground of ‘failure to apply the mind’ may be suitably accounted for at this stage; SAMWU paras 10-11. See also 
CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others [2009] 1 BLLR 1 (CC) para 76; Sidumo para 117. Consider too the 
comments expressed by Botma and van der Walt in Carli Botma & Adriaan van der Walt ‘The role of 
reasonableness in the review of labour arbitration awards (Part 2)’ 2009 Obiter 530 at 539. 
2062
 The test posed here distinguishes between questions of law, fact and discretion. Drawing these distinctions 
may be difficult but it nevertheless (arguably) remains possible. Mark G Underhill ‘Dunsmuir v New Brunswick: 
A rose by any other name?’ (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 247 at 256; Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer & 
Matthew Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3 ed (2004) at 184-187 ftnts 23-25. An instructive 
discussion of how to differentiate between these questions was provided in Media Workers Association of SA & 
Others v The Press Corporation of SA Ltd (1992) 13 ILJ 1391 (A) at 1396-1398. See also the references cited 
therein and specifically John Salmond (P Fitzgerald ed) Jurisprudence: or the Theory of the Law 12 ed (1966) at 
65-75. 
2063
 With due reference to the established principle that where errors of law are immaterial, they do not warrant 
review; Hira & another v Booysen & another 1992 (4) SA 69 (A); Timothy v Nampak Corrugated Containers 
(Pty) Ltd [2010] 8 BLLR 830 (LAC) at 833; Pam Golding paras 12-16 & paras 17-20; State Information 
Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2008) 29 ILJ 
2234 (LAC) (‘SITA’); consult too Nicci Whitear-Nel ‘Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others’ (1998) 19 
ILJ 1425 (LAC) (1999) 20 ILJ 1483 at 1488-1489. 
2064
 Consider CWIU & Others v Sopelog CC (1994) 15 ILJ 90 (LAC) at 97B-E. 
2065
 In Reunert Industries (Pty) Limited t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker & others 
[1997] 12 BLLR 1632 (LC) at 1636, Landman J submitted (without deciding the issue) that in light of the 
Constitution, errors of law may well be reviewable in and of themselves, in accordance with the rule of law and 
the need for lawfulness. See also Herholdt paras 55-56; Hoexter (2007) at 252; De Ville (2005) at 153. 
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presumed that the legislature intended the courts to be the final arbiters of this type of 
question.
2066
  
 
On the other hand, where identifying the applicable law entails interpreting and applying the 
LRA and related codes of good practice,
2067
 an assessment of legislative intent points to the 
contrary; that is to say, in crafting the LRA, the legislature ostensibly conferred powers of 
determination in respect of these issues on commissioners.
2068
 As a result, commissioners’ 
findings in this category should be examined on the basis of reasonableness alone, with the 
emphasis resting on whether there is sufficient justification given for a commissioner’s 
statement of the law. When applying reasonableness here, the dangers of judicial assumptions 
of superiority should be recalled.
2069
 So too ought the intended informality of CCMA 
proceedings and the pressures under which commissioners operate, be accounted for.
2070
   
 
Recently, in Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd,
2071
 the LAC called for the statutory preclusion of 
appeals against CCMA awards to be reconsidered, averring that: 
 
‘The inexorable truth is that wrong decisions are rarely reasonable. If that is true, the 
hypothetical reward from limiting intervention to a reasonableness or rationality 
review is dubious. On the contrary we risk reducing the final adjudication to an 
exercise in semantics or hair splitting in pursuit of a perceived socially expedient 
advantage that is at best illusory… I would tentatively venture that the time has come 
for the social partners and the legislature to think again. Justice for all concerned 
might better be served were the relief against awards to take the form of an appeal 
rather than a review. The protection granted by a narrower basis for intervention is, in 
all likelihood, fanciful – a chimera.’2072 
 
The emphasis on efficiency as the primary justification for limiting review of CCMA awards 
is indeed misplaced.
2073
 Yet, there are other meritorious reasons for restricting review. These 
were recognised long before the CCMA’s establishment in 1995. The LAC’s discussion of 
                                                          
2066
 Consider, in this regard, Alberta Teachers’ Association v Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) 
2011 SCC 61 para 34; David Quayat ‘The correctness battle rages: Alberta (Information & Privacy 
Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association’ (2012) 25 Can J Admin L & Prac 179. Note, however, 
Quayat’s argument at 188-189. 
2067
 Or at least those promulgated under the LRA; ibid. 
2068
 Consider the purpose of the Canadian standard of review analysis cited above; Fergus (2012); Canadian 
Federal Pilots paras 37-49 & 51. 
2069
 In particular, reviewing courts should not presume that their interpretation of a provision of the LRA is 
necessarily correct; Dunsmuir para 125. 
2070
 Sidumo para 118; Ellerine Holdings at 11. 
2071
 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2012) 33 ILJ 1789 (LAC). 
2072
 Ibid paras 55-56. 
2073
 See too O’Regan J’s decision in Sidumo. 
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the issue (albeit in the context of appeals against the Industrial Court’s findings) in Chemical 
Workers Industrial Union & Others Sopelog CC
2074
 is instructive. There, the Court 
acknowledged that questions of fairness concern neither strict law nor fact; it then dismissed 
the view that determining whether conduct amounted to an unfair labour practice was a 
question of statutory interpretation.
2075
 Instead, the Court held that matters of that nature were 
discretionary. In turn, a narrow scope of review was indicated.
2076
 In reaching this 
conclusion, the LAC recorded the need to respect the Industrial Court’s credibility findings in 
particular.
2077
 Thring J added: 
 
‘It seems to me that it can be expected that the members and additional members of 
the Industrial Court will have their fingers on the pulse of industrial relations, and will 
be sufficiently immersed in and conversant with the morals of the (labour) market 
place, and the business and labour ethics of that section of the community, to justify 
confidence that their discretionary decisions of what is fair and what is unfair in that 
field, … , will usually correctly reflect the general sense of fairness and justice of that 
community.’2078 
 
While declared in the context of an appeal against a decision of the Industrial Court, the 
Judge’s remarks apply equally to reviews of CCMA awards. Fairness cannot be determined 
on a strict interpretation of the law. As a result, it is inappropriate to assess commissioners’ 
findings on a standard comparable to that applied in ordinary appeals against inferior courts’ 
decisions. That reviewing courts do not have the benefit of hearing witness testimonies first 
hand or in many instances of accessing the complete records of proceedings, only confirms 
the inappropriateness of the appellate standard. Of course, uncertainty in substantive 
principles of labour law is concerning. Still, by allowing a measure of appeal as proposed 
(applicable to broader questions of law only), a suitable balance may be struck between these 
competing considerations.  
 
For one, differentiating between classes of legal error will ease the uncertainty in substantive 
law arising from inopportune displays of judicial deference.
2079
 Simultaneously, due respect 
                                                          
2074
 Sopelog at 94-98. 
2075
 Ibid at 94-96. 
2076
 Ibid. 
2077
 Ibid at 95. 
2078
 Ibid at 97-98. 
2079
 Compare, for example, Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) 
(‘Shoprite Checkers 1’), Shoprite Checkers v CCMA & others [2008] 9 BLLR 838 (LAC) (‘Shoprite Checkers 
2’), Shoprite Checkers 3 and Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO & others (2009) 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA). Thompson, in fact, 
predicted that inconsistency would result from the dispute resolution system provided for in the LRA, prior to 
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for Constitutional and legislative intent in the sphere of labour dispute resolution will be 
maintained. Naturally, determining whether a commissioner’s legal conclusions are 
warranted entails a value judgment. As such, deciding precisely to what extent and in what 
circumstances a court may interfere will remain a subjective and difficult task. Yet, as labour 
law is based not only on strict legal principles but also on fairness and equity, subjectivity can 
never be entirely extricated from the test on review.
2080
 A measure of uncertainty must 
inevitably be endured.
2081
 
 
Looking to the second enquiry governing commissioners’ factual determinations, the 
standard of review there should again be reasonableness. There are good reasons for this. 
Foremost is the superior position of CCMA commissioners comparative to that of reviewing 
courts, in evaluating evidence presented during arbitration proceedings.
2082
 Not only are 
commissioners better placed to assess the credibility of witnesses, but they hear and see all of 
the evidence presented. In contrast, reviewing courts often have access to only incomplete 
records of proceedings and do not benefit from first hand testimonies.
2083
 The FCA’s 
approach to factual findings is accordingly suitable here and errors of fact should be 
scrutinised in a manner akin to section 18.1(4)(d) of the FCA.
2084
 The test may be devised to 
determine whether the commissioner: 
 
‘…based [the award]… on an erroneous finding of fact that [was] made in a perverse 
or capricious manner or without regard for the material before… [the 
commissioner].’2085  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Act’s promulgation; Clive Thompson ‘The 1995 Labour Relations Bill’ (1995) IMSSA Bulletin at 23. 
Consider too Mondi Paper Co v Dlamini [1996] 9 BLLR 1109 (LAC); Astore Africa (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others 
[2008] 1 BLLR 14 (LC); Scrader Automotive (Pty) Ltd v Metal Industries Bargaining Council and Others (LC) 
unreported case no P488/05 of 26 September 2008 and Cheetham. See also, Transnet Freight Rail. De Ville 
supports this approach and proposes that different standards of review should apply to allegations of errors of 
law brought under section 6(2)(d) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’); De Ville 
(2005) at 154. 
2080
 Super Group Autoparts t/a Autozone v Hlongwane NO & others [2010] 4 BLLR 458 (LC) para 11; section 
151 of the LRA. Value judgments are arguably a necessary evil of reasonableness review; Carephone para 36; 
Sidumo paras 108-109 & 179. 
2081
 Cheetham para 13. 
2082
 Both generally and in terms of the credibility of witnesses who testify during proceedings; consult, in this 
regard, Aronson, Dyer & Groves at 180; Housen v Nikolaisen 2002 SCC 33 para 22; Alberta Union of Provincial 
Employees (‘AUPE’) v Alberta 2010 ABCA 216 para 47. 
2083
 Bestel v Astral Operations Ltd & others [2011] 2 BLLR 129 (LAC) para 24; Shoprite Checkers 1 at para 30; 
Aronson, Dyer & Groves at 180. 
2084
 Whilst the Court in Khosa indicated that the ground depicted therein did not prescribe a standard, the section 
evidently alludes to some measure of reasonableness review. 
2085
 Section 18.1(4)(d) of the FCA. It has now been suggested (and arguably established) in South African law 
that gross irregularities committed by commissioners may be assessed by asking whether the irregularity 
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While debatably equivalent to gross unreasonableness,
2086
 applying this approach would have 
nominal precedential implications (if any). Thus, it need not be detrimental to future 
decisions.
2087
 Further, parties’ rights to procedural fairness, reasonableness and lawfulness 
would not be unjustifiably limited by it.
2088
 If anything, allowing courts to interfere too 
readily with commissioners’ factual findings may actually jeopardise, rather than protect, 
their rights.
2089
 In addition, awards made in palpably erroneous ways would remain open to 
review. At the same time the intended nature of labour dispute resolution as informal and 
efficient may be protected and the final and binding nature of CCMA awards maintained.
2090
 
Applying greater deference to this category of defect is therefore apt.
2091
  
 
The third question listed above acknowledges the breadth of commissioners’ discretions to 
resolve disputes, while recognizing their obligation to apply the relevant law to the facts.
2092
 
This is the point where fairness comes into play and these decisions are discretionary in 
nature.
2093
 Consequently, when examining such findings, reviewing courts should be 
precluded from re-allocating weight to relevant factors. To pass muster, awards ought merely 
to reveal commissioners’ attention to all pertinent factors, and not that the weight attributed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘materially influenced the outcome’ or at least whether there was ‘potential prejudice’ to the parties as a result of 
the commissioner’s conduct; Sasol Mining para 11; Herholdt para 39; Myburgh (2012) at 7. 
2086
 Which was expressly rejected in both Bato Star and Fidelity. 
2087
 See Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748 for a discussion of the 
need for intrusive review in case of decisions having precedential implications only. 
2088
 Consider in this regard, Whitear-Nel at 1486; John Grogan ‘Death of the reasonable employer: the 
seismology of review’ (2000) 16(2) Employment Law 4; Kynoch Feeds (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [1998] 4 
BLLR 384 (LC) at 395-396 and C Garbers ‘Reviewing CCMA awards in the aftermath of Sidumo’ 2008 (17) 
Contemporary Labour Law 84 at 85. 
2089
 Given the superior position of commissioners in assessing evidence as presiding officers in a tribunal of first 
instance; Housen para 22; AUPE 2010 ABCA para 47. 
2090
 Section 143(1) of the LRA. For the intentionally narrow scope of review, consider section 145 of the LRA; 
The Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319 and FAWU paras 21-22. 
2091
 See Sharpe (2000) at 2164 ftnt 13; According to Sharpe, ‘…the American labour arbitration structure and 
experience testifies that a broad scope of judicial review of arbitration awards undermines these attributes of 
arbitration.’ Consider too Harry Arthurs ‘The Constitutionalisation of labour rights’ Institute for Development 
and Labour Law Occasional paper 1/2004 (reprinted March 2005) at 8-11. 
2092
 And to take all relevant considerations into account. Pam Golding paras 5-6. Inevitably, findings of mixed 
fact and law may overlap. Yet, as commissioners enjoy a broad discretion to resolve disputes generally, no 
significant difficulty with conflating these two should arise; sections 138 and 194 of the LRA, read with the 
Code of Good Practice: Dismissals; Schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
2093
 See Media Workers Association at 1400 (recently cited with approval in Kemp T/A Centralmed v Rawlins 
(2009) 30 ILJ 2677 (LAC)) and Sopelog at 95. Consult too National Union of Metalworkers of SA v G M Vincent 
Metal Sections (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2003 (SCA) para 18, where the Court held that fairness is not a strict 
question of law; it described the enquiry instead as ‘the passing of a moral judgment on a combination of 
findings of facts and opinions’. 
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to each was equivalent to that due in a court’s opinion.2094 To circumvent the problem of 
commissioners paying lip-service to each factor, courts may nonetheless be permitted to 
investigate whether weight was allocated in a ‘grossly unbalanced fashion’.2095 
 
To the extent to which jurisdictional challenges are raised, or excesses of power alleged, the 
true nature of the allegation must be established.
2096
 Consistently with the Canadian 
approach, this investigation should focus on determining the body upon whom the legislature 
purported to grant the authority to decide the issue.
2097
 Where commissioners hold this 
authority, the reasonableness of their findings should be assessed according to the three-tier 
test for substantive reasonableness cited above. Where the LRA points to the contrary,
2098
 
however, the standard of correctness should apply. The only qualification to this enquiry need 
be that the commissioner had the authority ‘to interpret and apply the legislative provision at 
hand’.2099  
 
Finally, where parties allege misconduct, or that an award was improperly obtained,
2100
 the 
correctness standard will be indicated. Determining the validity of these contentions is a 
factual enquiry, emphasizing the conduct of commissioners (and occasionally parties to 
disputes) preceding, during or after arbitration proceedings.
2101
 Generally speaking, 
evaluating the merits of the actual dispute is unnecessary in this context. When reviewing 
defects in these categories, the Labour Courts sit as courts of first instance, rather than as 
courts of review.
2102
 Still, a word of caution is due here. The boundary between misconduct 
                                                          
2094
 Media Workers Association at 1398; there, Grosskopf JA addressed the nature of discretionary decisions and 
the need for courts to abstain from inappropriately interfering therewith. Consult too the references cited by 
Grosskopf JA, including WA Wilson ‘A note on fact and law’ (1963) 26 MLR 609 at 617 and Salmond (1966) at 
65-75. 
2095
 Mullan (2010) at 233 & 257-258; Klinck at 55. 
2096
 Underhill at 256. 
2097
 Fergus (2012); Dunsmuir para 29; THESL paras 22, 33 & 34; Kenall. 
2098
 In other words, where the Act indicates that the relevant commissioner did not have the power to engage 
with the question at all or that the legislature granted the final decision-making power to the courts. 
2099
 Canadian Federal Pilots para 51. See also Fergus (2012). Consequently, determinations taken under the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (‘the EEA’), for example, should be subject to review on the basis of 
correctness; in most of these matters, commissioners do not have the principal authority to decide the issues in 
dispute (as they fall within the provisions of the EEA); sections 10(5) & 10(6) of the EEA. Similar principles 
ought to apply to disputes concerning the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 0f 1997 (‘BCEA’). 
Specifically, only to the extent to which commissioners are authorised to resolve such disputes (as provided for 
in section 74(2) of the BCEA), should their findings be evaluated against the standard of reasonableness.  
2100
 Sections 145(2)(a)(i) & (b) of the LRA. 
2101
 David Mullan ‘Establishing the standard of review: The struggle for complexity?’ (2004) 17 Can J Admin L 
& Prac 59 at 66. 
2102
 Ibid. 
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and procedural irregularities arising during the proceedings must be clearly defined.
2103
 In the 
absence of doing so, parties may disguise procedural defects as misconduct in order to secure 
correctness review.
2104
 It is proposed that this boundary be delineated by confining 
misconduct to cases involving personal turpitude on the part of presiding commissioners.
2105
 
Similarly, contentions that an award was ‘improperly obtained’ relate to allegedly partial 
conduct by commissioners.
2106
 As these defects emphasize the mindset or behaviour of 
commissioners, rather than the substance of parties’ disputes, the correctness standard is 
fitting.  
 
Interpreting reasonableness as Canadian courts do provides necessary direction for South 
African labour law. As this dissertation has shown, by construing the Sidumo test along 
comparable lines, many of the outstanding questions arising from the judgment may be 
answered. In turn, it has been possible to formulate a test for review specifically suited to the 
exigencies of section 145 proceedings.
2107
 The proposed test differentiates between standards 
of review applicable to discrete categories of defect. By doing so, the contextual variability of 
reasonableness is accounted for and due scope for flexibility retained. The configuration of 
the proposed test is markedly more structured than the divergent attitudes to review currently 
evident in judicial determinations. As such, it promotes legal certainty and consistency in 
outcomes on review, while concurrently assisting parties and courts at a practical level. Were 
this test to replace section 145 of the LRA, an appropriate balance between the requisites of 
the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action may conceivably be 
achieved.
2108
  
  
                                                          
2103
 Consider the overlap between gross irregularities and misconduct apparent from cases such as County Fair 
Foods and Sampson Associates (Pty) Ltd t/a Interbrand Sampson v Cities Shepherd & others [2010] 7 BLLR 
746 (LC) paras 31-38. The role of personal turpitude in establishing misconduct was discussed in Reunert 
Industries at 1634-1636. 
2104
 Arguably, this occurred in Sampson Associates. There, the applicant contended that ‘[t]he second respondent 
thus committed misconduct in his capacity as a commissioner by ignoring relevant evidence and taking 
irrelevant considerations into account failing to justify the award of [a] relatively high amount of 
compensation…’; Sampson Associates para 36. 
2105
 Consult Reunert Industries at 1634-1636. It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail the indicators of 
personal turpitude here. 
2106
 Albeit oft incentivized by one of the parties to the dispute. Accepting bribes is one example of this type of 
defect; Moloi v Euijen & others (1997) ILJ 1372 (LC) at 1397.  
2107
 Read with section 33 of the Constitution and Sidumo. 
2108
 Sections 23 and 33 of the LRA. 
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